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Résumé 
De manière générale, ma thèse examine les mécanismes des processus sociaux, 
économiques et politiques ayant contribué, souvent de manière contradictoire, à la 
(re)définition des critères d’adhésion au sein de la nation et de l’Etat. Elle le fait par le 
dialogue au sein de deux grands corps de littérature intimement liés, la citoyenneté et le 
transnationalisme, qui se sont penchés sur les questions d’appartenance, d’exclusion, de 
mobilité et d’accès aux droits chez les migrants transnationaux tout en  soulignant la capacité 
accrue de l’Etat à réguler à la fois les déplacements de personnes et l’accès des migrants aux 
droits. Cette thèse remet en question trois principes qui influencent la recherche et  les 
programmes d’action publique ayant trait au transnationalisme et à la citoyenneté des 
migrants, et remet en cause les approches analytiques hégémoniques et méthodologiques qui 
les sous-tendent. 
L’étude a été menée à deux niveaux distincts d’analyse empirique et analytique. D’une 
part,  nous examinons les « technologies de la citoyenneté » (Ong 2003, Fujiwara 2008) qui 
ont été développées par le gouvernement pour transformer l’Argentine en une nation latino-
américaine diverse et  inclusive pendant la dernière décennie, en nous intéressant 
particulièrement à la création, par le Kirchnerisme,  d’une « nouvelle légalité » pour les 
Paraguayens, les Boliviens et les Péruviens résidant dans le pays. D’autre part, nous analysons 
la « dimension horizontale des processus de citoyenneté » (Neveu 2005, Pickus and Skerry 
2007, Gagné and Neveu 2009) chez ces migrants dans des aires urbaines, périphériques et 
rurales du partido de La Plata. Plus spécifiquement, nous examinons dans quelle mesure les 
conditions socioéconomiques des migrants ont changé suite à leur nouveau statut légal (en tant 
que ressortissants du MERCOSUR en Argentine, dont les droits sont égaux à ceux des 
citoyens) et aux politiques de « citoyenneté inclusive » déployées par le gouvernement. 
Cette thèse se penche particulièrement sur les fondations et l’incarnation 
(« embodiment ») des droits en examinant comment le nouveau statut légal des migrants se 
manifeste au quotidien en fonction de a) où ils vivent et travaillent, et b) leur statut social 
perçu par les autres migrants et non-migrants. D’une part, nous examinons les aires urbaines, 
périphériques et rurales de La Plata en tant que « zones de souveraineté graduée » (Ong 1999), 
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où des régimes de gouvernementalité locaux spécifiques se sont développés en lien avec 
l’installation de groupes ethniques souvent distincts, et dont les droits et devoirs diffèrent de 
ceux d’autres zones. D’autre part, nous étudions la façon dont le statut social est produit à 
travers les interactions sociales quotidiennes en transposant des distinctions construites 
socialement telles que race, classe, genre et origine nationale, en systèmes d’exclusion formels 
(Gregory 2007). Notre analyse ethnographique de ce que nous appelons  les « expériences de 
légalité » des migrants démontre que leur égalité formelle vis-à-vis des Argentins, loin d’être 
simplement donnée comme un nouveau statut légal uniformément garanti pour tous, est à la 
fois inégalement vécue par les divers migrants, et différemment respectée dans les zones 
géographiques dirigées par  divers régimes de gouvernementalité (Foucault 1978). 
 
Mots-clés : anthropologie, anthropologie socio-culturelle, ethnographie, transnationalité, 
migration, intégration régionale, citoyenneté, État, MERCOSUR, Argentine 
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Abstract 
Broadly speaking, my thesis examines the workings of grounded social, economic and 
political processes that have contributed, often in a conflicting manner, to the (re)definition of 
membership criteria in both the nation and the state. It does so in dialogue with two broad, 
interrelated bodies of literature, citizenship and transnationalism, which have examined issues 
of belonging, exclusion, mobility and access to rights among transnational migrants, while 
highlighting the renewed capacity of the state to regulate both people’s movements and 
migrants’ actual access to public entitlements. My dissertation challenges three sets of claims 
shaping research and policy agendas on migrant transnationalism and citizenship, and 
questions the hegemonic analytical and methodological approaches underlying them. 
My research has been carried out at two distinctive analytical and empirical levels. On 
the one hand, I examine the “technologies of citizenship” (Ong 2003, Fujiwara 2008) 
deployed by the government to transform Argentina into a diverse, inclusive and Latin 
American nation over the past decade, paying particular attention to Kirchnerismo’s creation 
of a “new legality” for the Paraguayans, Bolivians and Peruvians in the country. On the other 
hand, I analyze the “horizontal dimensions of citizenship processes” (Neveu 2005, Pickus and 
Skerry 2007, Gagné and Neveu 2009) among these migrants in urban, peripheral and rural 
areas of the partido of La Plata. Namely, I study the extent to which migrants’ socio-economic 
circumstances have changed in tandem with their new legal status (as nationals of the 
MERCOSUR in Argentina with rights equal to those of its citizens) and the “inclusive 
citizenship” policies deployed by the government. 
My dissertation pays particular attention to the grounding and embodiment of rights by 
examining how migrants’ new legal status translates into everyday life depending on a) where 
they live and work, and b) their perceived social status by other migrants and non-migrants. 
On the one hand, I look at urban, peripheral and rural areas of La Plata as zones of graduated 
sovereignty (Ong 1999) where particular governmentality regimes have emerged in tandem 
with the settlement of often ethnically marked groupings, whose entitlements and obligations 
differ from those in other zones. On the other hand, I examine how social status is produced 
through everyday social interaction by transposing socially constructed distinctions, such as 
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race, class, gender and national origin, into formal systems of exclusion (Gregory 2007). My 
ethnographic analysis of what I shall call limítrofes’ experiences of legality demonstrates that 
their formal equality vis-à-vis Argentinians, far from being merely given as a new legal status 
evenly guaranteed to all, is both unequally experienced by diverse migrants and differently 
enforced in geographic areas governed by distinctive governmentality regimes (Foucault 
1978).  
 
Keywords : anthropology, socio-cultural anthropology, ethnography, transnationality, 
migration, regional integration, citizenship, state, MERCOSUR, Argentina.  
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CHAPTER I: Introduction 
 
My dissertation examines the experiences of migrants from neighbouring nations in Argentina, 
namely, Bolivians, Peruvians and Paraguayans commonly referred to as limítrofes, whose 
legal status dramatically changed in this country over the past decade1. Framed by regional 
and global processes, the particular political history of Argentina led to the adoption of a new 
migration law in December 2003 (Jelin 2006), which guarantees the economic, social, political 
and cultural rights of migrants while giving preferential treatment to nationals of the 
MERCOSUR—a regional integration initiative created in South America in 1991. The new 
entitlements granted to migrants in general, and the government-sponsored favourable views 
of the limítrofes in particular, are in sharp contrast with the national security perspective 
permeating legislation in Argentina since its last dictatorship (1976-1983) (Novick 2008) and 
the criminalization of these groups by the government in office during the 1990s (Recalde 
2006-a).  
 The presidencies of Kirchner (2003-2007) and Fernández (2007-2011, 2011-2015), or 
Kirchnerismo as I shall call the government in office during the 2000s, not only granted these 
migrants rights equal to those of Argentinians, but also sought to alter their negative portrayal 
in the nation’s social imaginary. These measures were integral to Kirchnerismo’s larger 
political project that involved transforming Argentina into a diverse, inclusive and Latin 
American nation anchored in its South American past and committed to regional integration. 
Kirchnerismo’s broad political agenda is representative of the shifting geopolitics in South 
America during the 2000s, which have been driven by a strong political turn towards a 
populist left. Questioning the subcontinent’s historical dependence on foreign powers and the 
previous two decades of ravaging neoliberalism, governments have engaged in the Latin-
Americanization of their respective nations and the strengthening of regional integration. 
These endeavours have been perceived as the only viable remedy for their common social, 
economic and political problems.  
 In dialogue with recent scholarship on migrant transnationalism and citizenship, my 
dissertation examines limítrofes’ experiences of their new formal equality vis-à-vis 
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Argentinians during the first decade of the 2000s. This analysis is particularly relevant since 
their criminalization during the 1990s and their denial of rights during former dictatorships 
were justified, or to better put it, constructed upon their lack of papers or irregular migratory 
situation. So, what has happened over the past decade since migrants were granted rights equal 
to those of Argentinians? Has their actual access to a wide range of public entitlements and 
state protections changed? If so, how? Previous fieldwork I conducted in the city of La Plata, 
Argentina in the late 1990s showed that migrants found it almost impossible to obtain their 
Argentinean document (DNI), an issue that became their main concern, as was the case in 
other parts of the country as well. Increasingly since 2005, however, Kirchnerismo has 
deployed a series of strategies to facilitate and speed up the documentation of MERCOSUR 
nationals in Argentina, the vast majority of whom are limítrofes. Now that access to the DNI 
seems to have become less problematic, has the value attributed to this document by migrants 
changed? If so, how?  
 My dissertation pays particular attention to the grounding and embodiment of rights by 
examining how migrants’ new legal status translates into everyday life depending on a) where 
they live and work, and b) their perceived social status by other migrants and non-migrants. 
On the one hand, I look at urban, peripheral and rural areas of La Plata district as zones of 
graduated sovereignty (Ong 1999) where particular governmentality regimes have emerged in 
tandem with the settlement of often ethnically marked groupings, whose entitlements and 
obligations differ from those in other zones. On the other hand, I examine how social status is 
produced through everyday social interaction by transposing socially constructed distinctions, 
such as race, class, gender and national origin, into formal systems of exclusion (Gregory 
2007). My ethnographic analysis of what I shall call limítrofes’ experiences of legality 
demonstrates that their formal equality vis-à-vis Argentinians, far from being merely given as 
a new legal status evenly guaranteed to all, is both unequally experienced by diverse migrants 
and differently enforced in geographic areas governed by distinctive governmentality regimes 
(Foucault 1978).  
 In the first part of this introduction, I present some background information that will be 
crucial to understanding the policies implemented by Kirchnerismo in the context of shifting 
South American geopolitics (chapter III) and how they have framed migrants’ experiences in 
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Argentina over the past decade (chapters IV, V, VI and VII). I start by presenting the initial 
evolution of MERCOSUR and the attendant emergence of intra-regional migrations as an 
issue to be regulated by the bloc. These processes contributed to the creation of a system of 
stratified rights (Morris 2002), closely associated with the monitoring and control of migrants, 
which became most apparent in Argentina in the late 1990s, when limítrofes were criminalized 
by the government. I then move to delineate the evolution of Peruvian, Bolivian and 
Paraguayan migrations to this country while tracing their historical belittlement by 
Argentinians, and the elaboration of a devalued status for these migrants in the nation’s social 
imaginary. In the second part of this introduction, I characterize my doctoral research’s 
fieldwork site, methodology and participants. I finish by presenting an overview of the 
chapters.  
CONTEXTUALIZING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM  
The Emergence of a System of Stratified Civic Rights in the MERCOSUR 
The Mercado Común del Sur (Common Market of the South) is an initiative of regional 
integration that began in 1991 with the goal of creating a free-trade area in the Cono Sur 
(Southern Cone). Its founding members or estados miembro are Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay 
and Paraguay and, soon after, Chile (1995) and Bolivia (1996) were incorporated as estados 
asociados (associated states)2. During its initial years, MERCOSUR broadened its scope to 
encompass the regulation of diverse social, economic and political issues, and the management 
of migrations soon acquired particular relevance, becoming the focus of agitated debates and 
disputes over power (Recalde 2005).  
In its beginnings, MERCOSUR proponents envisioned it as the panacea for the region. 
Wider economic liberalization would contribute to the strengthening of democracy, whereas 
regional development and the shrinking of the state would facilitate the protection of human 
rights (Min. del Interior et al 1999). A decade later, however, the MERCOSUR’s promised 
results were not that rosy. While the consolidation of the economic bloc helped to 
counterbalance the external vulnerability of its members and improved their participation in 
the international market, the expansion of intra-regional trade increased the dependence of the 
so-called “small” members (Uruguay and Paraguay) on the “big” ones (Argentina and Brazil). 
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Moreover, even if MERCOSUR promoted the strengthening of democratic and more 
egalitarian regimes, political, economic and social asymmetries continued to pervade the 
region (Recalde 2004). Thus, despite public enunciations promising economic development 
with social justice, the social aspects of the integration did not receive much attention, being 
merely dealt with precariously and in a reactive manner (Recalde 2005).  
The initial development of MERCOSUR also brought about the generation of opposing 
discourses on the role that political borders should play in the newly created region. 
Representing the interests of different influential social actors, these discourses materialized in 
conflicting strategies aiming to progressively eliminate and reinforce national borders. For the 
fervent promoters of intra-regional trade, national borders were bothersome internal frontiers 
that challenged the economic development of the bloc. These advocates considered that 
MERCOSUR had to create a fortress capable of protecting regional trade fostering the flow of 
goods and capital through the strengthening of its external frontiers. With this goal in mind, 
politicians and economic elites argued that a shared socio-cultural space or regional culture 
had developed in South America due to the “natural tendency” of MERCOSUR states to come 
together. In order to give a material counterpart to such discourse, monuments and bridges 
were built and financial support was given to projects, programs and partnerships that engaged 
bloc members (Recalde 2004). As if national differences and conflictive relationships had 
never existed between South American states, this claim of historical brotherhood was 
employed to justify the consolidation of a united region without internal divisions (see, for 
example, Recondo ed. 1998 and Clementi ed. 1996).  Moreover, in order to pursue this goal 
and with the determination to overcome all obstacles in the way, a set of institutional bodies 
was soon established to design and implement legislation loosening national restrictions. It 
was then that the movement of people in the bloc began to be perceived as an issue that had to 
be regulated. Responding to the needs of a growing market demanding mobile workers, 
negotiations started to delineate a regional migratory policy seeking to free labour from 
national constraints (Recalde 2005)—as has happened in other regional integration initiatives 
such as NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), ODECA (Organization of Central 
American States) and the Pacto Andino (Andean Pact) (see Sassen 1998).  
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In contrast to the solid development of institutions regulating the economic side of 
MERCOSUR, the management of the migratory phenomenon was done in a fragmented and 
ad hoc manner by a series of relatively isolated bodies. The migratory issue was passed around 
among several commissions and working groups that only dealt with it reactively, with no 
coordinating entity and no legislation that would enable bloc members to operate in a supra-
national manner (Recalde 2005). In this institutional and legislative context, a narrow and 
distorted understanding of the migratory phenomenon prevailed. Intra-regional migrations 
were associated with poverty, marginality and crime, and were portrayed as threats to both 
national order and identity by politicians, union leaders and economic elites—as has happened 
more recently in the United States and Europe (see Guild and van Selm eds. 2005, Glick 
Schiller and Faist eds. 2010). The media played a central role in the re-creation and 
dissemination of discourse linking intra-regional migrations to risk in South America, which 
powerfully shaped public opinion (Martini 1999). In turn, these misconceptions materialized 
in immigration policies that were focused on the surveillance and control of borders at the 
national level while developing surveillance technologies for frontier crossing points, 
exchanging migratory information and coordinating administrative procedures at the regional 
level (Recalde 2005).  
The contrasting conceptualizations of national borders and the strategies deployed to 
enforce them in the MERCOSUR generated a series of conflicting dynamics—such as the 
promotion of the frontier-free market vs. the bounded welfare state and the reinforcement of 
frontier controls vs. the need of intra-regional mobile workers—that negatively impacted 
migrants. In particular, the fragmented and often contradictory regulations that were supposed 
to manage intra-regional migrations in the bloc created a gamut of migratory statuses as a 
result of granting different rights depending on the type of entry into the state (Recalde 2006-
b). The degrees of membership so created correspond closely to the system of civic 
stratification studied by Morris (2002) in Europe, whereby differential rights and protection 
are granted by the state to diverse entry categories, producing a system of stratified rights, 
closely associated with monitoring and control. This phenomenon became most apparent in 
Argentina in the late 1990s, when some intra-regional migrants were blamed for the economic, 
political and social crisis that the country was going through.  
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The Criminalization of Limítrofes in Argentina in the late 1990s 
The decade of the 1990s was marked by a dramatic deterioration of the quality of life in 
Argentina. While unemployment rates and poverty levels escalated, the population lived in a 
state of constant anxiety that was only reinforced by the increasing insecurity and political 
instability that permeated the nation. The harsh neoliberal policies deployed during the two 
successive mandates of President Carlos Saúl Menem (1989-1999) were central to the 
development of this crisis. Claiming that the Argentinean economy was in a state of 
emergency and that the Welfare State had collapsed, the government implemented drastic 
administrative, institutional and economic reforms in order to eliminate inflation, stabilize the 
national currency (Argentinean peso) and pay the country’s foreign debt. Arguing that the 
market would spontaneously and naturally harmonize society (Novick 2000), the state initiated 
a vertiginous process of privatizations, whereby a wide range of public services and industries 
were sold, transferred to the private sector through concessions or literally given away—such 
was the case of communication, media and transportation services along with the production 
and distribution of energy. In addition, callous policies of employment re-structuring 
(flexibilización laboral) and budgetary adjustment (ajuste presupuestario) were enforced 
while the state strove to attract foreign capital and liberalize commercial and financial 
transactions. The implementation of this model brought about the so-called vaciamiento del 
estado 3 and a marked deterioration of the public school and health care systems4, which left 
pauperized Argentinians without access to any public safety nets (Minujin ed. 1996, Lo Vuolo 
and Barbeito 1998) 5. At the same time, workers in various fields were being constantly laid 
off without payment of mandatory compensation, thanks to labour legislation reforms 
allowing employers to fire employees with only one month’s notice 6. The dramatic effects of 
this decade’s policies contributed to the creation of a climate of despair and resentment that 
was exploited by supporters of Menem’s government to blame foreign forces and actors for 
the devastating consequences of the neoliberal model in place (Recalde 2006-a). 
The 1990s also witnessed the emergence of discourse that criminalized migrants from 
neighbouring nations in Argentina. Detailed descriptions of the criminal, promiscuous and 
contagious migrant who went to Argentina to steal jobs from local workers in need while 
illegally occupying houses and overloading the public health care and education systems were 
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promoted by some politicians and union leaders, who used the monopolized and privatized 
news market (supporting the government) to disseminate such discourse (Oteiza and Aruj 
2000, Courtis and Santillán 1999, Martini 1999, Aritz Recalde 2005). Embedded in arguments 
that blamed the victim—the Other, the foreign, the different, the poor migrant—for the 
problems that the country was going through, these xenophobic accusations fuelled 
denigrating attitudes towards Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans in the nation (Grimson 
1997, Szulik and Valiente 1998, Casaravilla 1999, Neufeld and Thisted eds.1999, Margulis 
and Urresti eds. 1999, Oteiza and Aruj 2000). Oteiza and Aruj (2000) note that the non-
immigrant population echoed official discourse promoting such discrimination, thus 
identifying the worker from a neighbouring nation as the cause of their very difficult situation. 
Likewise, Szulik and Valiente (1998) argue that the 1990s crisis generated an environment 
that was conducive to the consideration of South American immigration to Argentina as a 
conflict of interests. Regrettably, even if Argentinean scholars denounced the falsity of these 
accusations (Torrado 1994; Montoya and Perticará 1995; Maguid 1995, 1997, 2001; Oteiza 
and Aruj 2000) 7, the media prevailed, shaping public opinion and fuelling prejudiced views of 
migrants from neighbouring nations in Argentina.  
During the nineties, state-promoted discourse incited stigmatizing and often unjustified 
attitudes towards these migrants by both drawing on and reinforcing what I have described 
(Recalde 2006-a) as the undervalued place of the limítrofes in Argentina’s social imaginary. 
By this, I mean the construction of nationals from neighbouring countries as inferior due to 
their mestizo or aboriginal ancestry, which has been crucial to the invention and subsequent re-
creation of the Argentinean national identity as the “superior and white” country in South 
America. The promotion of racial supremacy has demanded the construction and constant 
reinforcement of racist hierarchies and labels. Over time, these were naturalized and came to 
permeate the historical constitution of class relations and the processes of social construction 
of meaning in the nation. Providing the rationale for the stigmatizing views of limítrofes and 
their mistreatment, this racist logic came to constitute the matrix for the production of 
subjectivity (Margulis and Urresti 1999) in Argentina—that is, a repertoire of elements with 
which to identify the boundaries of nationality, its style, and its distinctive markers and 
symbolic frontiers.  
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Menem’s government also implemented a series of episodic and contradictory 
migratory regulations throughout the 1990s that, in an effort to manage the “migratory 
problem”, transformed Peruvians, Paraguayans and Bolivians into ilegales or illegal aliens 
(Orlog and Vives 1999, Pacceca 1997). By presidential decrees, the state welcomed these 
migrants one day and expelled them the next, while increasing the authority of the executive in 
the design and implementation of migratory legislation, something that clearly overrode the 
powers of the legislature and the judiciary (Recalde 2006-a). This created great confusion 
among public officials who were in charge of implementing shifting norms; not having the 
knowledge or the training to do so, they typically used their personal interpretation when 
dealing with migrants (CELS 2002, 2003). Migrants, for their part, felt puzzled about the 
abrupt changes in Argentina’s migratory legislation, and expressed an increased feeling of 
vulnerability vis-à-vis a supposedly democratic system, whose public institutions and citizens 
treated them as ilegales (Casaravilla 1999, Margulis and Urresti eds. 1999, Neufeld and 
Thisted eds. 1999, Recalde 2006-a). 
Although these shifting regulations did not legally nor practically prevent Peruvians, 
Bolivians and Paraguayans from entering Argentina, they did make it nearly impossible for 
most to become legal residents. Indeed, the legislative and administrative mechanisms in place 
did not seek to interrupt the irregular movement of people across the border, but rather to 
regulate it while maintaining a clear distinction between sending and receiving nations—a 
phenomenon Kearney (2004) has also documented in the United States. Whereas in the past, 
South American citizens only needed their national identification to cross borders and reside 
temporarily in a neighbouring nation, during the 1990s, this situation drastically changed in 
Argentina. The state granted different types of tourist visas to nationals of neighbouring 
nations depending on how they entered the territory: they obtained 3 months if they did so by 
air (airport), but only 15 days if they did so by land (border) (CELS 2002, 2003; Recalde 
2006-a). This arbitrary practice—unjustly classifying people according to their economic 
means—created a gamut of migratory statuses and attendant degrees of membership in the 
body politic that correspond to Morris’s (2002) system of civic stratification. Once in 
Argentina, migrants were required to have a work contract right after their tourist visa expired, 
which was not feasible for most. In fact, following the required administrative procedures was 
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perceived by many as an obscure, complicated and very expensive process that included 
learning how to overcome both official and off the record regulations (Casaravilla 1999, 
Grimson 2002, Recalde 2006-a). In this way, the Argentinean state generated illegality 
through practices that granted itself discretionary control, and by so doing, reinforced the 
stigmatizing public image of the limítrofe ilegal. 
Labelling migrants illegal went far beyond confirming that they did not have the proper 
documentation. Making good use of the ingrained stereotypes belittling nationals from 
neighbouring countries in Argentina, these labelling processes created transgressors. Divesting 
migrants of their multifaceted identities and situating them in a delinquent world, 
Paraguayans, Bolivians and Peruvians were depicted as criminals prone to committing a series 
of legal offenses. The figure of the inmigrante ilegal dehumanized the individual and 
transformed him/her into a social problem that caused concern and demanded action. Juliano 
(1987) argues that there exists a close, although not apparent, correspondence between 
institutional pragmatism, social imagery and the implementation of restrictive measures, from 
which practices that enclose the Other within precise boundaries—the terrain of illegality and 
criminality in our case—are derived. In the Argentina of the 1990s, cultural and “racial” 
differences were frequently employed to legitimize these boundaries, as a means to justify the 
devaluation and mistreatment of migrants from neighbouring nations. 
Migrants in La Plata were affected by the government-sponsored criminalization in 
two important ways. First, their access to public services and resources was significantly 
constrained, unconstitutionally justified by migrants’ so-called illegal status. In this context, 
Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans became the target of prejudiced attitudes, abusive 
treatment and exploitation. While the police and other state bureaucrats abused their authority, 
taking bribes from and humiliating migrants, most employers (often compatriots) 
economically exploited their vulnerability, paying them meagre salaries and not providing 
them with safe working conditions. Moreover, informal, daily social interaction with ordinary 
citizens was often permeated by denigrating attitudes and mockery, which contributed to the 
further marginalization of these migrants. Even if they were not all affected to the same 
degree, many were submerged into increasingly pauperized living conditions, inhabiting the 
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city’s new peripheries, which lacked most public services, and working in the precarious 
sectors of the unregulated economy.  
Second, the social figure of the limítrofe ilegal powerfully articulated the creation of 
new cleavages within these three colectividades or migrant communities8. Many of the 
Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans in La Plata deployed discursive and residential 
strategies to differentiate themselves from those being criminalized in the media and, as a 
result, new distinctions were created among them, especially within each of the three 
nationally defined migrant communities. Lacking the DNI, having recently arrived in the city 
(in the late 90s as opposed to the 70s and 80s) or searching for work in the precarious sectors 
of the economy all became obvious signs of migrants’ “criminality” in the eyes of those 
Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans who echoed state-promoted discourse. Many of these 
migrants earnestly held onto the opposition between a legal “us” (documented, honest) versus 
an illegal (undocumented, criminal) “them”, as if by highlighting these issues, they could 
create a protective shield from the attitudes of Platenses (inhabitants of La Plata). Migrants 
themselves re-created interrelated oppositions such as metropolitan vs. rural, educated vs. 
uneducated, mestizo vs. indígena, and migration by choice vs. migration by need. Moreover, 
migrants and non-migrants alike often assumed a causal connection between recently arrived 
limítrofes’ poverty and low levels of education with their alleged tendency to resort to 
criminal activities, despite the fact that most were not involved in such crime9.  
Biased scholarship and the Immigration from Neighbouring Nations to Argentina  
Argentina has historically been marked by international migrations and, up to the early 20th 
century, those that originated both in European and neighbouring countries prevailed. 
Nevertheless, scholars have only recently properly documented the early presence and 
distinctive contributions made by migrants from neighbouring nations (Benencia 2004, 
Recalde 2006-a, Pacecca and Courtis 2008, Texidó 2008, Cerruti 2009). This migration has 
been contemporaneous with internal migration in Argentina, buffering its economic and 
demographic effects (Recalde 2006-a) while enriching the country's ethno-cultural landscape 
(Pacecca and Courtis 2008). Argentinean scholars’ reluctance to acknowledge these 
contributions is likely based on an ingrained misconception about the exclusive European 
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ancestry of Argentina, which has its roots in the 19th century’s nation-building project of the 
country’s elites. As I have demonstrated elsewhere (Recalde 2006-a), since its independence 
from Spain in 1810, successive ruling classes promoted European immigration, believing that 
it could be manipulated in order to develop the country. Seeking to justify their own 
superiority in the continent, Argentinean elites endorsed the idea that Argentina was the white 
and European nation in South America, the more and more over the second half of the 19th 
century. Throughout the first half of the 20th century, they used the disciplinary institutions of 
the state (compulsory vote, military conscription and public education) to integrate large 
numbers of (mostly) European immigrants and their Argentinean-born children into their 
version of Argentinean nationhood. Since then, Argentinians have been socialized into the 
myth of their own “white superiority”, which has relied on the belittling of people considered 
“dark” due to their (perceived) mestizo or aboriginal ancestry. As a result, not only nationals 
of neighbouring countries but also Argentinians who are not Porteños (from the city of Buenos 
Aires) have been mistreated and considered inferior. This has served to sustain the historical, 
even if disputed, supremacy of Porteño elites. This myth has powerfully shaped this nation’s 
social imaginary, informing Argentinians’ views of and attitudes towards those who are 
stereotyped as be negros or cabecitas negras (I shall return to this issue in chapters IV, V, VI 
and VII). The use of these tainted lenses by scholars has led many to deny the historical depth 
of immigration from neighbouring nations to Argentina, claiming that it  only began when the 
European one came to an end (Recalde 2006-a). 
The Increasing Primacy of Migrations from Neighbouring Countries to Argentina  
In fact, migration from neighbouring nations to Argentina preceded the creation of the state, 
since populations in the region historically circulated, crossing what would become national 
borders, in order to develop commercial activities (Texidó 2008). In contrast, European 
immigration only became perceptible in the country in the mid-19th century, when 
governmental efforts to attract these migrants were finally successful—after decades of failed 
attempts (Recalde 2006-a). Moreover, transoceanic and regional migrations have fluctuated in 
very different ways over time. While the absolute and relative numbers of Europeans moving 
to Argentina have changed drastically over the centuries, those of migrants from neighbouring 
nations have remained constant. According to Argentina’s National Censuses, European 
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immigrants represented 9% of the total population in 1869 (168,970 people), 22.3 % in 1895 
(890,946 people) and reached their peak in 1914 with 2,184,469 people (representing 27.3% 
of the country’s population), after which their absolute and relative numbers continuously 
declined (Pacecca and Courtis 2008)10. During the period of mass immigration (1881-1914), 
when Argentina received the largest numbers of immigrants (4.2 million) in its history, most 
of these were Europeans attracted by the country’s international role as an exporter of 
agricultural products and raw materials. As in previous decades, Italians (2,000,000) and 
Spaniards (1,400,000) overwhelmingly prevailed over other groups, being only timidly 
followed by French (170,000) and Russians (160,000) (Devoto 2004) 11. Thus, it is undeniable 
that transoceanic migrants, and in particular certain European groups, radically modified the 
economic, social, political and demographic characteristics of Argentina during that period 
(Pacecca and Courtis 2008). 
Migrants from neighbouring nations, for their part, have historically represented 
between 2% (in 1947) and 2.9% (in 1985) of Argentina’s total population, even recently, when 
they formed the country’s most active and constant (im)migration current (Benencia 2004, 
Pacecca and Courtis 2008, Texidó 2008, Cerruti 2009). This has been the result of two 
interconnected processes: a) the historical decrease in the relative proportion of migrants over 
Argentina’s total population, and b) the marked decline in European immigration coupled with 
the sustained dynamism of that from neighbouring nations. Argentina’s population has grown 
significantly in absolute numbers from 1869 (1,737,076 people) to 2001 (36,260,130 people) 
whereas the relative proportion of its migrant population has drastically decreased. Immigrants 
represented 12.1% of the total population in 1869, 25.4% in 1895, and reached their historical 
peak of 29.9% in 1914, after which their weight gradually declined to 4.2% in 2001 (Pacecca 
and Courtis 2008). The 2010 National Census signals a small reversal of this tendency, 
showing that 1,805,957 migrants represented 4.5% of Argentina’s total population 
(40,117,096 people) that year (INDEC 2012).  
In terms of the composition of the migrant population in Argentina, almost 68% was of 
Latin American origin in 2001 and, out of this total, 88% came from neighbouring nations 
(Pacecca and Courtis 2008, Texidó 2008), representing 2.5% of the country’s total population 
(Cerrutti 2009). Moreover, in contrast to the progressive aging and mortality of former 
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transatlantic immigrant cohorts, the stock of nationals from neighbouring nations has 
progressively increased, constituting 60.3% of Argentina’s migrant population in 2001 
(Cerruti 2009). The 2010 Census confirmed this trend, showing that Paraguayans represented 
30.5% of Argentina’s foreign-born population that year, Bolivians 19.1%, Chileans 10% and 
Peruvians 8.7%. These four groups constituted 68.9% of the total migrant population in 2010. 
From 2001 to 2010, Paraguayans increased their numbers by 69.4% (reaching 550,713 
people), Bolivians did so by 47.9% (becoming 345,272) and Peruvians by 78.5% (reaching 
157,514). Chileans, however, decreased their numbers by 10% to 191,147 people. The 
remainder of Argentina’s migrant population in 2010 included Europeans (16.6%), nationals 
from other countries in the Americas (12.6%), Asians (1.7%), as well as Africans, Australians 
and New Zealanders (0.2%) (INDEC 2012).  
 Like most migrants in Argentina, those from neighbouring nations have increasingly 
chosen Buenos Aires city and province as their favoured destinations. According to the 2001 
Census, 15% of Paraguayans lived in the country’s capital while 65% of them lived in Buenos 
Aires province. The figures for Bolivians (22% vs. 38%) and Peruvians (44% vs. 38%) show a 
similar geographical concentration (Cerrutti 2009). The 2010 Census confirmed this trend, 
indicating that 41.1% of migrants in the country lived in the Gran Buenos Aires (I shall clarify 
the meaning of this term shortly) and 21.1% of them in the federal capital. The distribution of 
migrants from neighbouring countries in these destinations was the following in 2010: 60.8% 
and 14.6% among Paraguayans, 33.1% and 22.2% among Bolivians, and 33.5% and 38.4% 
among Peruvians (INDEC 2012).   
As has happened in other Latin American countries, the migration of these three groups 
to Argentina has increasingly feminized over the past decades. In 2001, almost 60% of 
Peruvians and Paraguayans in the country were women (59.4% and 57.6% respectively). The 
numbers of Bolivian women have increased in a sustained manner as well, but still remained 
weaker than those of men that year, representing 49.7% of their national total (Cerrutti 2009). 
These groups have also continued to be concentrated in the 25 to 49 year old age bracket, 
which indicates their readiness to work and the centrality of economic motivations for their 
migration to Argentina (see Cerrutti 2009, Texidó 2008, Pacecca and Courtis 2008, and 
Recalde 2006-a for historical reviews of these migrations to Argentina). The Encuesta 
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Complementaria de Migraciones 2002-2003 confirmed this historical trend by showing that 
the search for better or alternative work prospects was the main motivation to migrate among 
Peruvian, Paraguayan and Bolivian men and women in Argentina (Cerrutti 2009). The 2010 
Census signals the persistence of both trends: a) the feminization of these migrations—55% of 
Peruvians, 55.6% of Paraguayans and 50.3% of Bolivians were women; and b) their 
productive age—86.6% of Peruvian men and 89% of women, almost 78% and 80% of 
Paraguayans respectively, and more than 80% of Bolivians were aged 15 to 65 (my 
calculations using data from INDEC 2012, Cuadro P6).   
  The economic participation of these migrants in Argentina has followed ethnic and 
gendered lines, and has evolved along with their increasingly urban destinations (see Recalde 
2006-a). According to the 2001 Census, Paraguayan and Bolivian men were concentrated in 
the construction, manufacturing, commerce and repairing services sectors (63% and 59% of 
them respectively), even if an additional 23% of Bolivian men worked in agriculture. Bolivian 
men have had the lowest levels of education and training of all the limítrofes. Peruvian men, in 
contrast, have had the highest levels of education (even higher than the Argentinian median), 
yet, paradoxically, they have showed the highest rates of unqualified employment (Cerrutti 
2009). Migrant women, on the other hand, have progressively increased their participation in 
the labour market, but have remained concentrated in a few “feminine” occupations. In 2001, 
most Peruvian (70%) and Paraguayan (60%) women worked in servicio doméstico (domestic 
work) in private houses. As was the case of their male counterparts, the unqualified jobs held 
by Peruvian women are at odds with their high levels of formal education. Bolivian women, 
for their part, have been incorporated into a wider range of economic niches: retail trade 
(23%), manufacturing, mostly clothes-making (14%), and farming, mainly fruit and 
horticultural production (13%). Despite the gendered occupational differences among these 
migrants, most of them, men and women alike, have worked under very precarious labour 
conditions. The circumstances of women have been even more disadvantageous than those of 
their male counterparts (Cerrutti 2009), and this continues to be the case in La Plata, as my 
2010 fieldwork shows.  
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Other Recent Migrant Groups and the Emigration of Argentinians 
Over the past five decades, Argentina has not only received a number of other national groups 
but, as I show further on, has also generated a significant and continuous emigration of its own 
citizens. In the 1960s, small groups of Asian immigrants, mostly South Koreans and Chinese 
(initially from Taiwan and later on from continental China) began to arrive and settle in 
Buenos Aires. According to the 2001 Census, these groups totalled almost 16,000 people12. 
Most Koreans arrived in Argentina during the 1980s as a result of an economic agreement 
between the two governments, and settled in Buenos Aires city. Over the years, many 
experienced upward social mobility thanks to the consolidation of family strategies allowing 
migrants to participate in independent occupational niches such as the garment industry, 
commerce and imports. Yet, by the late 2000s, many had returned to Korea, notably the youth. 
Systematic migration from China began in the 1980s as well, reaching its peak in the 1990s, 
although it did not benefit from government support. Most of these migrants have settled in 
the Gran Buenos Aires and have worked in commerce (as owners of small and medium-size 
supermarkets), gastronomy, imports and pharmaceutics (Pacecca and Courtis 2008). The 
Asian immigration to La Plata has become quite salient over the past decades and has affected 
limítrofes in two important ways. On the one hand, by contributing to changing the city’s 
ethnic hierarchies, it has repositioned Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans closer to 
Platenses from idiosyncratic, cultural and historical points of view. On the other hand, it has 
negatively affected Bolivian women in particular, who have been increasingly hired in 
Chinese-owned mini-markets under very exploitative and precarious labour conditions (I 
examine these issues in chapter IV).  
In the 1990s, migrants from Central and Eastern Europe also arrived in Argentina, 
attracted by a preferential regime granting them temporary residence through facilitated 
procedures13. The country has also received a small number of asylum seekers from Latin 
America (mostly from Peru, Cuba and Colombia) since the 1970s, and more recently, others 
from Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia. During the period 1973-1975, in the context of Latin 
American dictatorships, 11,300 people were recognized as refugees: 84% were Chileans, 11% 
Uruguayans, 2.2% Bolivians and 1.3% Brazilians. Since the creation of the CEPARE (Comité 
de Elegibilidad para los Refugiados) in 1985, 9,792 petitions were made, yet only one third of 
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them were accepted. According to official statistics, 3,000 refugees lived in Argentina, mostly 
in the GBA, by the early 2000s (Pacecca and Courtis 2008) 14. It remains to be seen the extent 
to which the increasing presence of African migrants in the GBA (Maffia and Zubrzycki in 
press) will modify the nation’s social imaginary in general, and the standing of limítrofes in it 
in particular. 
Argentina has more recently combined its capacity to attract continental and extra-
continental migrations with becoming a source country for emigrants. Since the mid-1960s, 
Argentinians with university degrees and/or holding qualified jobs in the public and private 
sectors have been leaving the country, fleeing political persecution. During the sanguinary 
military dictatorship of the 1970s, increasing numbers sought asylum elsewhere in the 
Americas (Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico and the USA) and Europe. After the return to 
democracy in 1983, the emigration of the urban middle classes continued, this time for 
economic and social reasons. During the 1990s, these groups left mainly to escape escalating 
social exclusion and inequality15. Since 2004 (after the country’s economic, social and 
political crisis), Argentinians have emigrated mostly to Spain, Italy, the United States, Canada 
and Australia, seeking upward social mobility (Texidó 2008, Pacecca and Courtis 2008). It is 
estimated that about 507,000 Argentinians live abroad (CEPAL 2007 cited in Pacecca and 
Courtis 2008, p.12). Kirchnerismo has been very active in developing strategies targeting 
citizens living abroad in an effort to a) repatriate scientists; b) seek collaboration between 
professionals in Argentina and other countries; and c) increase the participation of emigrants 
in the country’s democratic processes (see Appendix C for more on Argentinians living 
abroad).  
 
FIELD SITE, METHODOLOGY AND PARTICIPANTS 
Situating the Partido de La Plata 
My dissertation draws on the fieldwork research that I conducted in the partido de La Plata, 
Buenos Aires Province, from December 2009 to July 2010. According to the 2010 National 
Census, 38.95% of Argentina’s population—that is, 15,625,084 people—is concentrated in 
this province, which has a total land area of 304,907 km216. Administratively, the province is 
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divided between the Gran Buenos Aires or GBA and the interior. The GBA is composed of 24 
partidos, with a total land area of 3, 680 km2; they are collectively referred to as the 
conurbano bonaerense and have a population of 9,916,715 inhabitants that accounts for 
63.46% of the provincial total. The interior has 5,708,369 inhabitants distributed across 110 
partidos over 303,891 km2. The GBA surrounds the Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires or 
Buenos Aires city, the federal capital, which has the highest population density in the country: 
14450.8 people per km2—compared to 2694.8 and 18.8 people per km2 in the GBA and 
interior respectively. In other words, Buenos Aires’ 2,890,151 inhabitants live within 200 km2 
(INDEC 2012, Cuadro P3; see the Appendix for maps and tables). The GBA and Buenos 
Aires city have historically constituted the two most important urban destinations for migrants 
in Argentina (INDEC 2012). Many of the Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans who 
participated in my research had lived in the GBA and worked in Buenos Aires before moving 
to La Plata, while a few were still commuting daily to work in these destinations.  
The partido of La Plata is often considered part of the GBA due to geographical 
proximity and for demographic reasons, even if, from an administrative point of view, it 
belongs to the interior of Buenos Aires province. The partido has a land area of 942.23 km2 
and comprises its casco urbano or capital, La Plata city, and 17 centros communales or 
localities with urban, peripheral and rural characteristics (see Fig. 4). According to the 2010 
Census, the partido has 654,324 inhabitants (DPEPBA 2011) and one third of them live in its 
capital (Lódola and Brigo 2011). Situated 56 km south of Buenos Aires city, La Plata is also 
the capital of Buenos province. Since its foundation in 1882, the city has played a strategic 
role in national and provincial politics, becoming one of Argentina’s most important scientific, 
artistic and intellectual hubs. La Plata is home to the Universidad Nacional de La Plata 
(UNLP)—one of the most important national universities in the country and the third in terms 
of the number of students (90,000 in 2001)—,the Universidad Tecnológica Argentina (UTA) 
and Universidad Católica Argentina (UCALP). The vast and prestigious educational services 
of the city have turned La Plata into a vibrant academic centre that attracts large numbers of 
national and international students, who in 2002 constituted 20% of La Plata’s total 
population, a trend that has continued (Lódola and Brigo 2011). The city’s educational role 
has combined with its politico-administrative functions to shape the partido’s commercial 
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activities and its real estate market. Moreover, La Plata city has come to house most 
professional and financial services and public institutions (85%, 83% and 77% of them 
respectively are located in the city; p. 45). 
The partido’s productive sectors are important not only to the local economy but also 
to the provincial one. Along with the neighbouring partidos of Berazategui and Florencio 
Varela, La Plata is part of the GBA’s green belt (cinturón verde del GBA), one of the most 
important productive zones of fruit and vegetables in the country. La Plata has the largest 
number of horticultural sites in the province and is the principal producer, even at the national 
level, of several garden vegetables such as tomatoes, lettuce and peppers, which allows the 
partido to satisfy the demand generated by its population, specialized shops and active 
gastronomy industry (Lódola and Brigo 2011). Its production of flowers (such as carnations, 
chrysanthemums, freesia and roses) and interior plants (such as ferns, pothos and rubber 
plants) accounts for 63% and 10% of the provincial totals (p.26). The partido’s manufacturing 
industry is highly diversified—including the production of food and beverages, 
communication equipment, chemical and mineral products, print supplies and construction 
materials (p.4)—and the construction sector has continued to grow over the past decade (p.28). 
Bolivian, Paraguayan and Peruvian migrants have become integral to the labour force 
sustaining the main productive activities in the partido. Most of those who participated in my 
research were either working or had worked in flower and horticultural production and 
construction. Finally, the production of services represents more than three quarters of La 
Plata’s gross product; those of major relevance are communal and real estate as well as the 
commerce of goods (Lódola and Brigo 2011). Bolivians have come to prevail in the 
commercialization of fruit and vegetables in the partido, as I shall examine in chapter IV.  
Project’s Methodology 
Building on my previous fieldwork research on South American migrants in La Plata city17, in 
2010, I expanded the geographical area of my project to include other urban (City Bell, 
Gonnet, Tolosa, Villa Elisa), peripheral (Los Hornos, Villa Elvira, San Lorenzo) and rural 
(Angel Etcheverry, Lisandro Olmos) localities of the partido. In these different settings, I 
conducted 55 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with Peruvian, Bolivian and Paraguayan 
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migrants, the majority of whom had arrived in the partido between the late 1990s and early 
2000s18. Interviews were between 1.5 and 4 hours long and were done at migrants’ 
workplaces, houses and public settings such as parks, shopping areas and diverse 
commemorative events. Interviews permitted me to collect information on migrants’ socio-
economic backgrounds, the reasons leading them to migrate, the household strategies they 
deploy to access a wide range of migration-related resources through transnational networks of 
compatriots and relatives, and their labour and social trajectories in Argentina. Interviews 
focused on understanding two interrelated issues: a) if, and if so how, migrants’ lives had 
changed over the past two decades along with their new legal status in the country; and b) if, 
and if so how, the importance of having Argentinean papers during the 1990s had changed, 
since it had become possible to obtain them more easily over the second half of the 2000s. In 
other words, to what extent had legal (formal) equality affected migrants’ actual access to 
entitlements, their informal social interaction with (other) migrant and non-migrant residents 
and their appreciation of official papers? I contextualized my fieldwork in La Plata by carrying 
out another fifteen interviews with migrants who worked in Buenos Aires city and lived in 
either this city or in disadvantaged peripheries of the GBA.  
I use the term periphery to emphasize the disadvantageous circumstances and 
marginality of peripheral localities or zones, which are administratively attached to a larger 
urban center. As Wacqaunt (2008) shows, since the mid-1980s, throughout Europe but 
specially in France, this term has been increasingly used to denote lower-class districts of the 
urban periphery harbouring high densities of deteriorating public housing considered prime 
breeding grounds for the ‘urban ills’ of the age, which combines economic deprivation, 
ecological degradation, social dislocations, postcolonial immigration and youth delinquency 
(p.4). The specific ethnic, social, and economic characteristics of La Plata and GBA 
peripheries, which I examine in chapter V, only partially fit into Wacquant’s classificatory 
scheme, however. In his comparative sociology of advanced marginality, he distinguishes 
between the American hyperghetto (in singular) and the French banlieues (in plural). 
Wacquant describes the former as an ethnically and socially homogeneous universe 
characterized by low organizational density, weak penetration by the state and extreme levels 
of physical and social insecurity. In contrast, the French banlieues are typified as having 
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fundamentally heterogeneous populations according to ethnoracial provenance and only 
secondarily to class position, whose isolation is mitigated by the strong presence of public 
institutions catering to social needs (p.5). As we shall see, the Argentinean peripheries, where 
Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans live, combine elements of both analytical types.  
In interviews and informal conversations with migrants, I paid particular attention to 
the gendering of concerns, experiences and household roles, including the transnational care of 
diverse relatives (this gender lens permeates my analysis in all ethnographic chapters). I also 
conducted participant observation at migrants’ workplaces, public parks, shopping areas, 
money transfer agencies, public institutions (those granting official documentation and 
providing social, health care and educational services), and Buenos Aires international 
airport’s migration office, as well as at events and celebrations organized by or related to these 
migrants in the partido. In combination with the data collected through interviews and 
informal conversation, participant observation allowed me to more fully capture everyday 
social interaction among migrants and between migrants and non-migrants while gauging 
migrants’ actual access to entitlements. I looked closely at the relationship between migrants 
and state officials in order to understand the different governmentality regimes in place in 
urban, peripheral and rural areas of the partido (issues that I examine in chapters IV, V and VI 
respectively). 
Conversing with groups of migrants showed me the extent to which their narratives 
changed depending on the social status, gender, age and ethnicity of those present and the type 
of relationship existent among them (chapter IV). This is the case because in any particular 
situation, those who are present negotiate cultural practices and the meanings drawn from 
them. In other words, social configurations are dependent on who participates in such 
negotiations or is brought to significance by the people present (Turner 2000). It goes without 
saying that my own presence influenced what migrants said and how they did so at different 
moments. As Aaron Turner (2000) argues, the anthropologist cannot be present in a social 
field without participating and becoming a significant author of events, practices and political 
configurations, thereby affecting what happens and the significance it has for the constructions 
that emerge for participants (p.53).  
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My informal conversations with non-migrants—60 Platenses (inhabitants of La Plata) 
and 20 Porteños (inhabitants of Buenos Aires city)—sought to evaluate if, and if so, how, their 
perceptions of limítrofes and other migrant groups (Asians and Africans among them) had 
changed since the 1990s in tandem with: a) the solid economic presence of Chinese migrants 
in the city; and b) almost a decade of pro-MERCOSUR and inclusive citizenship policies 
deployed by Kirchnerismo. I examine these issues in chapters IV, V, VI and VII. In order to 
characterize the local implications of Argentina’s new migration law in La Plata, I interviewed 
the two municipal officers at the Dirección General de Colectividades y Migraciones, which is 
in charge of implementing documentation programs and information campaigns in the partido 
in accordance with the new legislation. I present the views of migrants held by these public 
officials in chapter VI.  
I complemented and contextualized the qualitative data collected through my 
ethnographic fieldwork with the analysis of a) statistical data, media and government 
discourse, b) Kirchnerismo’ public policy, and c) scientific literature on migrations to 
Argentina and regional integration in South America (chapter III). Fieldwork was conducted 
in Spanish, which was also the language of the different sources I consulted. All translations 
are mine. In the analysis of fieldwork data and preparation of the dissertation, I have used 
pseudonyms in order to protect the confidentiality of research participants. Before asking for 
consent, I explained to each participant the purpose and goals of my project, and informed 
them that they could withdraw without explanation at any time.  
Brief Characterization of Research Participants 
According to the 2010 Census, 43,397 migrants lived in the Partido of La Plata, and the vast 
majority of them were from Paraguay (14,268), Bolivia (10,212) and Peru (6,458). In line with 
national trends, Peruvian and Paraguayan migrations to the partido have increasingly 
feminized. In 2010, (3,517) Peruvian women represented 54.4% of their national group while 
their (7,658) Paraguayan counterparts accounted for 53.67% of theirs. Bolivian women 
(4,877), in contrast, did not surpass men (5,335) in numbers, accounting for 47.75% of their 
national group in the partido (INDEC 2012, Cuadro P6-D). As is the case on the national 
level, these three migrant groups are concentrated in the productive age bracket (15-65 years 
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old), their readiness to actively participate in the labour market, that is, the centrality of 
economic motivations for their migration (INDEC 2012, Cuadro P6-D).  
Most of the Peruvians, Paraguayans and Bolivians who participated in my research 
arrived in the partido de La Plata between the late 1990s and early 2000s. Even if some of 
them had previously lived in different localities of the GBA while working in Buenos Aires 
city, most had moved within the partido instead. Residential (geographical) mobility in La 
Plata was often coupled with occupational mobility and developed in three main directions: a) 
from rural to urban areas: mostly among Bolivians who left horticultural and/or floricultural 
production behind in order to work in the commerce of fruit and vegetables and/or 
construction in the city (chapter IV); b) from urban to peripheral areas: among the three 
migrant groups, it represented the opportunity to take possession of abandoned private 
property by either inhabiting some sort of housing or building their own (chapter V); and c) 
from urban and peripheral areas to rural settings (chapter VI). This last occurred less often 
than the other two types of mobility and it was mainly among Bolivians who sought to go 
back to quieter rural life. Some of the Bolivians I interviewed had spent their childhood and/or 
youth in Argentina’s Northern provinces while working in seasonal, intensive agriculture with 
their parents. A few of them had been born in these provinces and had both nationalities; yet, 
they considered themselves as strictly Bolivian. This was also the case among some 
Paraguayans, whose mother or father was Argentinean, and who had been born and raised in 
Argentina. Most of these people, who described themselves as Bolivians and Paraguayans of 
Argentinean origin, had moved to the GBA and La Plata district in their young adulthood. 
In the vast majority of cases, migrant participants came from very poor families who 
had long struggled to survive. Even among those whose circumstances had not been so dire in 
the home country, their economic situation deteriorated over time and was accompanied by 
increasing social exclusion. Migrant men and women from rural areas had practiced intensive, 
family agriculture often combined with some form of small scale farming, with their 
production destined for both subsistence and commercialization purposes. In Argentina, they 
had to learn anew the specific techniques required to practice horticulture since they notably 
differed from the ones they knew from home; the same applied to pesticides and crops. The 
occupations of those coming from urban areas were more diversified in the country of origin. 
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Some men practiced trades they had inherited from their fathers, such as construction, 
carpentry, shoe-making and upholstery while others worked as truck drivers or street service 
providers, ranging from repairing to selling objects. A few men had commercialized 
agricultural products such as rice, as part of a family business, or taught at rural primary 
schools. Women, for their part, depending on their age and civil status, had studied, taken care 
of their households (including domestic chores, children and husbands), sold goods on the 
streets (such as toys) and/or in private houses (such as watches, perfumes and lingerie) and 
produced some of their merchandise at home (such as stuffed toys, household decorative items 
and souvenirs). Some (Peruvian and Paraguayan) women had also held administrative 
positions, as secretaries of a family business, private company or public institution, while 
others had done data entry or cashier jobs. 
Most migrant participants were in their late 20s and 30s and had already formed a 
family before migrating. They usually had from two to five children, most of them born before 
migrating. Many migrants had children from previous relationships who almost always lived 
with their biological mother (in the home country or in Argentina), even if fathers tended to 
contribute to their support. As a result, composite families (with children from one or both 
members of the couple’s previous relationships) were very common among those I 
interviewed. Except for some Paraguayan women, who had Argentinean or Peruvian partners, 
usually after having children with a previous partner of the same nationality, migrants were 
quite endogamous. Yet, as I indicated previously, some of those who considered themselves 
and were identified by others as migrants were in fact Argentinean-born children of one or 
both migrant parent/s. The migratory or citizenship status of most families was also mixed 
(Dreby 2012, Kubal 2012), with some members who already had Argentinean citizenship, 
others with or waiting for their residency and others who had not even applied to get their 
papers.  
Most migrants had relatives or close friends in other countries, mostly in Spain, and to 
a lesser extent in Chile, Brazil and Venezuela. Indeed, Spain had become an attractive 
destination for many Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans in Argentina, who believed that 
after obtaining their Argentinean citizenship their entry into Europe would be eased. Migrants 
often cited the higher standard of living of Spain vis-à-vis that of Argentina as its main 
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advantage. Yet, they were also well aware of Spain’s heavy drawbacks, namely, its tough 
immigration regulations and the high price of airplane tickets, which together tended to deter 
migrants from going to Spain directly from their home country. I examine these issues in 
chapter V.  
Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans began to arrive in the partido de La Plata during 
the late 1960s and 1970s, yet the consolidation of their ethnicized labour niches developed 
during the 1980s and 1990s (Recalde 2006-a). As in the GBA and Buenos Aires, these 
migrants have predominantly worked in the precarious, unregulated sectors of the economy, a 
situation that began to change during the 2000s with Kirchnerismo’s immigration and labour 
policies (chapters IV, V and VI).  
 
OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
In the next chapter (II), I do a concise literature review of the scholarship on transnationalism 
and citizenship, which makes apparent its narrow geopolitical focus on liberal democracies 
and the hegemonic standing of a handful of disciplines when it comes to setting its “global” 
research agendas. In addition, after introducing the analytical tools used to examine my 
fieldwork, media and government discourse data, I present the main research contributions of 
my dissertation. Namely, it a) challenges three sets of claims that have shaped research and 
policy agendas on migrant transnationalism and citizenship, b) questions the hegemonic 
analytical and methodological approaches underlying them,  and c) contributes to the 
decentering of this scholarship’ hegemonic geopolitics by illustrating the increasing centrality 
of “South-South” migrations and the extent to which a “Southern country” such as Argentina 
can be at the same time an immigration and emigration state that plays diverse roles in the 
mobility trajectory of migrants.  
In chapter III, I examine how Kirchnerismo set out to transform Argentina into an 
inclusive, diverse and Latin American nation during the first decade of the 2000s, and how 
this has impacted migrants from neighbouring nations in the country. Its commitment to 
respecting human rights and deepening regional integration were both key in passing a new 
migration law granting MERCOSUR nationals rights equal to those of Argentinians. In 
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addition, the implementation of inclusive policies, seeking to universalize access to public 
services and goods, have been very advantageous to migrants, who are entitled to them despite 
their migratory status. At the same time, the state has granted migrants equal protection 
against discrimination, exploitation and unfair treatment. Moreover, Kirchnerismo’s strategies 
to reshape the nation’s social imagery, so as to make Argentina Latin American and diverse, 
has created an atmosphere conducive to perceiving these historically despised migrants in a 
more favorable light.  
In the following four chapters (IV to VII), I draw on my ethnographic fieldwork in 
order to examine the extent to which this new legal and social environment has affected the 
experiences and circumstances of Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans in different areas of 
the partido of La Plata. Chapters IV, V and VI are divided in two main sections each, where I 
introduce a case study, the socio-economic trajectory of a migrant household, as the departure 
point from which to elaborate several core issues characteristic of urban, peripheral and rural 
areas of the partido respectively. In the first part of chapter IV, I use the urban labour 
trajectory of a Bolivian couple to show: a) the degree to which migrants’ labour niches in La 
Plata city are both gendered and ethnicized, b) the uneven impact of Kirchnerismo’s 
regularization campaigns on diverse migrants, and c) how the solid presence of economically 
successful Chinese migrants has led to the overall, more favourable repositioning of 
Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans in the city’s ethnic hierarchy. In the chapter’s second 
part, I analyze how the narratives of migrant men differ from those of women. My analysis of 
the experiences of a Peruvian couple exemplifies the increasing feminization of South 
American migrations to the country (Cerrutti 2009, Pacecca and Courtis 2008, Texidó 2008) 
and their role in the transnationalization of social care (Parreñas 2001, 2008; Hondagneu-
Sotelo 1994, 2001; Maher 2004; Herrera Mosquera 2008; Ehrenreich and Hoschschild 2002). 
Peruvian and Paraguayan women in La Plata undergo a dramatic decrease in social status in 
tandem with the low-ranking, isolating jobs they perform in the city. Nevertheless, they 
interpret their initial solitude and sacrifices as leading to a process of personal growth and 
learning that results in increased personal autonomy and financial independence.  
In chapter V, I focus on the experiences of Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans who 
live in the peripheries of the partido of La Plata while working in a number of its urban 
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localities and those of the GBA. In the chapter’s first part, I examine the labour and residential 
trajectory of a Paraguayan family, which sheds light on how busy migrant parents incur high 
costs when leaving their children behind, paradoxically, in order to secure the financial well-
being of their families. Long periods of separation often result in children feeling emotional 
detachment towards parents or falling into severe depression. This case also shows the peculiar 
challenges faced by families living in areas governed by the state’s neglect and the actual high 
price they pay for the free accommodation these peripheral areas offer. Even if these localities 
are characterized by similarly poor and dangerous living conditions, each has its own particular 
social dynamics, which becomes most apparent in the relationships established among 
migrants, and between them and the most disadvantaged social categories in the GBA. In the 
second part of this chapter, I examine the case of a Peruvian family, who lived in a periphery 
of the GBA before moving to another one in the partido of La Plata. The positive changes 
associated with migration represent a costly trade-off for many women, who tend to fall 
physically and psychologically sick or have to neglect their own children after bringing them to 
Argentina. The labour trajectory of the husband shows how a male, unregulated labour niche, 
that of  trapito or cuida coche, has consolidated itself as “Peruvian territory” during the first 
decade of the 2000s. His numerous encounters with the police illustrate this institution’s racial 
profiling of the most disadvantaged social groups in the GBA, migrants and non-migrants 
alike.  
In chapter VI, I examine the circumstances of Bolivians, the majority of whom are 
from Tarija province, who have settled in Las Quintas, a rural area of the partido of La Plata 
made up of three adjacent localities: Lisandro Olmos, Angel Etcheverry and Abasto, where 
small-scale horticulture is widely practiced. Overall, this chapter documents the phenomenon 
dubbed the Boliviarization of Argentinean horticulture (Benencia 1997, 2003, 2006, 2008). In 
the chapter’s first section, I look at the geographical and labour mobility of “Bolivians of 
Argentinean origin”, as the children of Bolivian temporary farm workers in Argentina tend to 
refer to themselves. I examine the effects of horticulturists’ isolation on the commercialization 
of their products and the safety of their families, while making apparent the limitations 
imposed by horticulture’s high time demands on their capacity to complete diverse 
bureaucratic procedures and visit family. Horticulturalists’ critical views of the government 
and its policies along with their detailed knowledge of a range of bureaucratic procedures 
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contrasts with the denigrating views of these migrants held by some municipal officials. In the 
chapter’s second section, I analyze the experiences of another Tarijeño family who settles in 
Olmos. The husband’s initial labour trajectory shows that the hiring en negro of recently 
arrived, undocumented migrants is common in urban areas neighbouring Las Quintas, and 
seemingly easier to implement than in La Plata city. This case illustrates rural migrants’ 
commitment to the educational success of their children and the mixed status of their families 
(Dreby 2012), whose different members are situated along a continuum of citizenship statuses, 
ranging from not having even started procedures to obtain residency to already having 
Argentinean citizenship. My analysis of the unfair commercialization of Bolivian 
horticulturists’ products takes me to La Plata’s Central Fruit and Vegetable Market, where the 
monopolization of this industry is most manifest and reflects the partido’s ethnic hierarchies. 
This section also examines some of the policies of the Bolivian state reaching its citizens in 
Argentina and demonstrates that, in contrast with Peruvians and Paraguayans, Bolivians tend 
to keep in touch with the political reality of their country of origin. 
In chapter VII, I examine migrants’ views and uses of the hegemonic ethnic hierarchy 
in force in the partido of La Plata over the past decade. Even if migrants agree on the devalued 
status of Bolivians in Argentina, some criticize it, along with Argentinians’ denigrating 
attitudes and exploitative treatment of these migrants. The cases I examine make apparent 
migrants’ problematic operationalization of such a hierarchy in everyday social interaction, 
which tends to contrast with their theoretical mastery of its racial logic. Finally, in chapter 
VIII, I return to the thesis core questions and research contributions in order to advance some 
conclusions.  
  
 
CHAPTER II: Literature Review, Thesis Theoretical Framework 
and Research Contributions 
 
My thesis is in dialogue with two broad, interrelated bodies of literature, those on citizenship 
and transnationalism, which have examined issues of belonging, exclusion, mobility and 
access to rights among transnational migrants, while highlighting the renewed capacity of the 
state to regulate both people’s movements (across its borders and within its territory) and 
migrants’ actual access to public entitlements. My doctoral research draws from and seeks to 
contribute to the development of empirically grounded, theoretical debates that question three 
sets of claims that have shaped research and policy agendas over the past two decades: a) the 
alleged undeniable diminishing role of the state under current processes of intensified 
globalization and global interconnection; b) the exclusive juridico-legal meanings of 
contemporary citizenship in the context of the “globalization of the law” (Jacobson and Ruffer 
2004), and, in particular, the coercive power of international human rights law; and c) the 
overly economic rationality attributed to contemporary transnational migrations in the present 
era of increasing trans-border money transfers. The formulation of these claims has often been 
supported by the use of problematic analytical and methodological approaches. Some of this 
research has not relied on empirical evidence to formulate its propositions, which have been 
deducted from ideal types or mathematical models instead (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002, 
Ratha and Shaw 2007, Tsuda 2007, Glick Schiller 2010). In addition, gender-blind 
perspectives have tended to obscure not only the design and implementation of research and 
policy on a wide range of migration-related issues, but also the interpretation of their results 
(Sassen 1998, Morris 2002, Ehrenreich and Russell Hochschild 2002, Maher 2004). Moreover, 
homogenizing grids of Euro-American values and beliefs have often acted as the guiding 
(moral) principles or “universals” against which these research and policy results have been 
evaluated (Ong 1999, Amselle 2002, Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). Recent scholarship on 
citizenship and transnationalism has questioned these approaches and challenged the above-
mentioned claims. The contributions made by anthropologists have been particularly relevant 
for my dissertation.  
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In this chapter, I begin by delineating the core theoretical perspectives that have 
contributed to the consolidation of these three claims. This departure exercise will not only 
make apparent the extent to which disciplinary lenses have shaped successive “dominant 
paradigms” (Glick Schiller 2004) in this scholarship, but also serve as a genealogy of the core 
contributions made by anthropology, which I subsequently present. This being done, I will 
introduce the analytical tools used to examine my fieldwork, media and government discourse 
data along with the main research contributions of my dissertation.  
 
The Diminishing Role of the State under Current Processes of Intensified Globalization 
 
The work of globalization and postnational scholars has been fundamental to the development 
and consolidation of the first claim, even when the postnational approach sought to overcome 
the main drawbacks of the globalization thesis. Largely stemming from economic sociology 
and sociology of international relations and geography, advocates of the globalization thesis 
have claimed that the entire regulatory framework of the state with respect to business and 
labour has been shaken by globalization in tandem with the emergence of new global, 
decentralized centres of production, power and wealth (Sassen 1991, 1996, 1998, 2004-a, 
2004-b). According to this view, national migration policies have become obsolete since 
transnational corporations and communities (Massey 1987, Portes 1997) along with human 
rights regimes (if not individual migrants) are the prime agents of globalization (Sassen 1996, 
1998, 2004-a, 2004-b). This scholarship has evoked strong criticism across disciplinary 
boundaries, however. Some political scientists and sociologists have considered the 
globalization thesis’ factoring out of politics and the state from international relations as its 
main shortcoming (Hollifield 1998-1999, 2000; Baubock 2003; Brubaker 2005) while others 
have signalled that no convincing evidence exists for the decline of the state’s sovereignty in 
matters of immigration control, be this in its formal rule-making authority or its empirical 
capacity to implement rules (Joppke 2006). Employing a neo-institutional perspective, some 
have claimed that globalization theorists’ arguments heralding the decline of the nation-state 
have neglected either the actual administrative mechanisms and domestic political processes 
or the limitations of rights in determining migration outcomes. In the view of some political 
scientists, the liberal state has extended and reinvented its control while changing its 
 31 
gatekeepers, leading to the development of an increasing density of relationships that centre on 
the official apparatus of the state (Lahav 2006). 
Anthropologists, for their part, have also raised a number of concerns. Some have 
shown the extent to which globalization scholars’ technological determinism resulted from a 
combination of their excessive emphasis on the power of technology and the postmodern 
insistence that the past was stable and the present fluid (Ong 1999, Amselle 2002). Others 
have remarked on globalization theorists’ tendency to see transnational processes as a 
phenomenon linked to the current moment of capitalism, which neglects that the current 
period has been marked by both a paradigm change and a restructuring of processes of capital 
accumulation (Basch et al. 1994). Some have criticized globalists’ inclination to treat the 
developments associated with globalization (technological innovation, the internationalization 
of production and finance, migration, global media and so on) as a package of traits that are 
everywhere inciting a similar logic and processes of transformation, thus neglecting important 
differences in the ways in which global processes are brought to bear and materialized within 
specific historical and political contexts of nation-states (Gregory 2004). More specifically, it 
has been argued that the “anthropology of globalization” gives a false answer to a badly posed 
question that implicitly reproduces the failings of the acculturation or colonial situation 
concepts (Amselle 2002). 
The postnational approach to the study of transnational migrations was initially 
developed by a number of sociologists interested in the evolution of rights granted to 
immigrants and foreigners in Europe (Soyosal 1994, Jacobson 1996, Baubock 1994, 2003). 
Inspired by the developments in international human rights law and seeking to bring politics 
and law back into the analysis of international migrations, these scholars have claimed that we 
have entered a “post-national era” characterized by “universal personhood” (Soyosal 1994), 
the expansion of rights across borders (Jacobson 1996) and a certain “transnational 
citizenship” (Baubock 1994). Postnational scholars often argue that the globalization of the 
economy has created a new kind of postnational membership. According to Soyosal and 
Jacobson, the rise of a postnational regime for human rights, even if still grounded in the logic 
of the nation-state, has allowed migrants to attain a legal status that surpasses citizenship, 
whereas for Baubock, a new transnational/political citizenship is inevitable. Under these 
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circumstances, states only play a marginal role in the governance of contemporary 
international migrations, whose defining feature is (the individual’s) agency (Jacobson and 
Ruffler 2004). Some critics of the postnational approach have emphasized that this scholarship 
ignores the extent to which state policies shape the choices that migrants make (Hollifield 
2000, Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). Others have signalled that postnational theorists 
wrongly see the nation-state as essentially outmoded and incapable of keeping pace with 
changes in the world economy (Hollifield 1998-1999). Moreover, some have argued that the 
international human rights regime is not so strong as to make states fear and tremble, since it 
lacks implementation and enforcement powers (Joppke 2006). 
As their critics and advocates make apparent, and despite their differences, 
postnationalists rejoin globalists by equally dismissing the current legitimacy and capacity of 
the state to regulate transnational migrations and migrants’ actual access to rights. Moreover, 
both sets of scholars tend to agree on the primacy of international human rights law and the 
idiom of human rights, which they believe has become the common language of globalization 
(Jacobson 1998-1999, 2004; Sassen 1998, 2004). 
The Exclusive Juridico-Legal Meanings Attributed to Contemporary Citizenship 
As I have noted, the work of some globalist and postnational scholars has been particularly 
influential in spearheading research on transnational migrants’ rights in new directions while 
shaping attendant debates on citizenship, (trans-, post-) nationalism and the state. Yet, these 
analyses have focused almost exclusively on liberal democracies, that is, English-speaking 
settler societies and Western Europe or the so-called Euro-Atlantic arena. In this section, I 
introduce some further propositions advanced by two scholars, Sassen and Jacobson, whose 
work has been quite influential in consolidating the second claim.  
Sociologist David Jacobson (1996, 1998-1999; Jacobson and Ruffer 2004) claims that 
the nation-state is being disaggregated and that its political, communal and territorial 
components, once thought so intertwined, are being unbundled. Diasporas and transnational 
identities are increasingly common, whereas new regional, international and transnational 
political entities have had disparate effects on the state. The latter have enhanced its 
bureaucratic role while constraining more than ever before who can and can’t be admitted into 
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the state (Jacobson 1998-1999). The “globalization of the law”—a growing density of both 
domestic and international law—has become apparent in the increasing importance of the 
individual as the object of law and in the visible presence of tribunals, arbitration mechanisms 
and other legal entities that deliberate independently of the state, allowing non-state actors to 
arrive at agreements autonomously (Jacobson and Ruffler 2004). These developments are part 
of a social and political framework of immense coercive power that mediates between diverse 
spaces using the logic of contractual law, which is anchored in certain moral assumptions on 
the dignity and privileging of the individual and private property (Jacobson 1998-1999). 
Under these circumstances, international human rights law and the idiom of human rights are 
becoming the common language of globalization (understood as the web of global activities 
that parallel and transcend states) whereas the state has turned into a mediating mechanism 
(rather than a primordial source) of international norms (Jacobson 1998-1999, Jacobson and 
Ruffler 2004). 
 Similarly, Saskia Sassen (1996, 1998, 2004-b), also a sociologist, has argued for the 
constraining role of human rights law on the state’s policy making authority and for its 
undermining of key notions about immigration control. For Sassen (1998) a “de facto regime”, 
centred in international agreements and conventions as well as in various rights gained by 
immigrants, has conditioned the state’s role in controlling immigration. In addition, the 
extension of rights, which has taken place mostly through the judiciary, has confronted states 
with a number of internal constraints (namely, courts have emerged as central institutions for a 
whole series of changes) while the numbers and kinds of political actors involved in 
immigration policy debates and policy making are far greater than before. These developments 
have contributed not only to the reduction of the autonomy of the state in immigration policy 
making, but also to the displacement of its governance functions to non-state entities. For 
Sassen (1996, 1998, 2004-b), the international human rights regime has undermined the 
exclusive authority of the state over its nationals, contributing to the transformation of the 
interstate system and the international legal order. Human rights codes have strengthened 
concepts of personhood, pushing states to increasingly take account of persons qua persons 
(rather than qua citizens), which has transformed the individual into an object of law and a site 
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for rights. As a result, the state has become accountable to all its residents on the basis of 
international human rights law (Sassen 1998).  
 This burgeoning scholarship has challenged traditional notions of the nation-state and 
the global interstate system. Much of it has shown how globalization—understood as a 
package of transnational flows of people, production, investment, information, ideas and 
authority—has changed the nature of citizenship, by putting some of these flows out of the 
reach of the state while creating new levels of membership and rights claims (Ong 1999, 2004-
b; Sassen 2004-b). This literature has also critically examined the interaction of two traditions 
of rights: citizenship and human rights (Shafir 2004, Lipschutz 2004) while showing how 
globalization has created a “citizenship gap” (Brysk 2002) that puts non-citizens and “second 
class citizens” at risk (Brysk and Shafir 2004). Despite its invaluable contributions, however, 
this scholarship has also led to the reification of legalistic notions of citizenship. By focusing 
on the granting of (albeit important) new legal entitlements to a range of disadvantaged 
groups, much of this literature has neglected people’s actual access to and experiences of their 
new rights, that is, their exercise of citizenship. The experience of formal membership in the 
body politic varies substantially depending on the relative positioning of a group in the 
national moral order, which establishes the degrees of deserving and undeserving citizenship 
according to a wide range of non-legal factors, including racial classificatory systems (Ong 
2004-a, 2004-b). Moreover, groups’ actual access to legal entitlements is often permeated by 
conflictive negotiation and changes over time and across socio-economic and political 
contexts (Gagné et Neveu 2009).  
The Overly Economic Rationality Ascribed to Contemporary Transnational Migrations  
The past fifteen years have witnessed an increasing interest in the connections between 
migration and development among scholars, international financial institutions and policy 
makers. Following the unleashing of neo-liberal market forces and the dramatic growth in 
economic and social disparities in many places of the world, powerful financial and global 
governance institutions have highlighted the positive agency of migrants, portraying them as 
vital agents of international development (Glick Schiller and Faist 2010, de Haas 2010). While 
development scholars have interpreted transnational ties as “inevitably” producing win-win 
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situations—that is, migration benefiting both sending and receiving states (Delgado Wise and 
Marquez Covarrubias 2010)—migration scholarship in the United States and Europe has often 
depicted migrants as a potential destabilizing force as bearers of political, cultural or religious 
difference (Faist 2010, Guild and van Selm eds. 2005, Glick Schiller 2010). This paradoxical 
reading of international migration has been only reinforced by the resurgence of the politics of 
fear, which has increasingly equated human mobility and the flights from war, destruction, 
disaster or economic collapse with terrorism (Isolato 2010, Bigo 2005, Guild 2005). Critics of 
this paradigm have highlighted that this contradictory and simultaneous portrayal of migrants 
as heroic agents of development and threats to the peace and security of nation-states is 
inherent in the “migration-development mantra”, whose agenda is firmly set by the countries 
in the North or West and leaves the principles that underpin neo-liberal globalization intact 
(Glick Schiller and Faist 2010, Delgado Wise and Marquez Covarrubias 2010). 
 Much of this public, policy and academic debate has focused on the “unparalleled” 
financial centrality of transnational remittances in the current era (cf World Bank 2006, Hujo 
and Piper 2010, Ratha and Shaw 2007), which has neglected the fact that the increase in 
remittances to developing countries has been coupled with a sustained decline in official aid 
flows (de Haas 2010). Moreover, often using a neo-classical lens, these debates have portrayed 
migrants as rational decision-makers, who move across borders in order to maximize their 
personal utility via higher income (Glick Schiller and Faist 2010, de Haas 2010, Hujo and 
Piper 2010, Delgado Wise and Marquez Covarrubias 2010) even if differences in income 
between origin and destination countries do not capture how income may affect incentives for 
all migrants (Ratha and Shaw 2007). The economistic bias underpinning much of this current 
scholarship and public debate has not passed unquestioned, however. Scholars from social 
policy and geography have argued that the recent euphoria over the economic development 
impact of migrations in general and remittances in particular has neglected an array of social 
and political themes, such as the well-being, equality and security of migrants; these scholars 
claim, instead, that migration is more than a strategy to mobilize or diversify income (Hujo 
and Piper 2010, Hujo and Piper eds. 2010). Literature from economics, development studies 
and anthropology has argued that the assumptions and paradigms underlying the study of the 
asymmetrical but mutual transfers of resources that accompany migration are deeply flawed 
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and continue to reflect the interests of the Global North, the most powerful states and the 
globe-spanning institutions that serve their interests (Glick Schiller and Faist eds. 2010). Some 
of these scholars have proposed to employ a “global perspective on imperial power” or a 
“global power perspective on migration”, in order to pay attention to the contemporary neo-
liberal moment and the human costs of neo-liberal restructuring while tracing its various 
trajectories and the resistance it engenders (Glick Schiller 2010). 
 Anthropologists working on migration, remittances and household strategies have also 
challenged the overly economic rationality attributed to current transnational migrations and 
the restrictive pecuniary meaning given to remittances. Some have proposed to examine 
“remittance practices” as the outcomes of cultural traditions and social practices, which are 
rooted in the strengths and weaknesses that drive individual migrants and their sending 
households and communities (Cohen 2011). Remittance practices are considered as one of the 
many transnational flows that link movers and non-movers and sending and receiving 
communities through complex social and cultural ties (Brettell 2003, Paerregaard 2008, Trager 
2005). This scholarship has highlighted that mobility is not always a response to economic 
need or a quest for economic prosperity, but can also reflect other insecurities, such as ethnic 
conflicts, natural disasters and other events that put migrants’ personal safety in danger (Merla 
and Baldassar 2010, Cohen 2011). Moreover, remittances have to be understood for their 
benefits and costs, and as being not only important for the role they play in sending 
households, but also to the movers who send resources, whose social status is thereby 
enhanced (Cohen 2011). 
Anthropologists have also criticized the economistic bias of approaches reducing 
money to a neutral and impersonal means of economic exchange, supposedly adapted to the 
rationality of the contemporary market world, while questioning pessimistic predictions on the 
replacement of rich social exchanges by interested calculation (Zelizer 2006). Anthropologists 
have studied how remittance practices are experienced and perceived by the different social 
actors involved in the recreation of transnational social fields, showing that this phenomenon 
involves a double dynamic: the monetarization of social life, and the domestication or 
socialization of events that had been initially considered as strictly economic (Tran and 
Pantaleon 2010). Recently, sociologists and anthropologists have also examined the 
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relationship between economic and emotional considerations in the context of familial 
transnational relations, highlighting that migrants continue to be part of kinship obligation 
networks and that they spend a lot of time, energy and resources in order to compensate for 
their physical absence (Merla and Baldassar 2010, Baldassar 2010, Merla 2010).  
ANTHROPOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTIONS  
 
The study of migrations as transnational processes in which migrants construct and maintain 
social, political and economic relationships across borders was permeated in its beginnings by 
the use of the term “transnational community”, mostly in the work of sociologists (Portes 
1997; Portes, Guarnizo and Landlort 1999; Portes and DeWind 2007) and some 
anthropologists (Charles 1992, Georges 1990, Kearney and Nagengast 1989). Other 
anthropologists, however, opted for the term “transnational circuit” or “transnational social 
field” (Rouse 1991; Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc Szanton 1992), building on the critique of 
community studies and the concepts of social network and field developed by Manchester 
School scholars (Glick Schiller 2004). Anthropologists have criticized both the excessive use 
of the term transnational community—claiming that often very little empirical evidence of 
“community” is presented in the literature that uses the concept (Hage 2005)— and the almost 
exclusive reliance on the ethnic group as the unit of analysis when studying migrants’ 
incorporation and transnational connections, arguing instead for non-ethnic approaches to the 
analysis of migrant settlement (Glick Schiller 2008, Glick Schiller and Çaglar 2011).  
Anthropological contributions to the study of migrant transnationalism have been 
rooted in the critique of three interrelated problematic issues. First, they have rejected the 
organic, territorially embedded view of culture popularized by British functionalist and 
structural-functionalist anthropology, which portrayed cultures and societies as bounded and 
ahistorical entities divorced from larger social, political and economic processes (Ong 1999, 
Amselle 2002, Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002, Glick Schiller 2004). Second, 
anthropologists have criticized the intellectual orientation dubbed “methodological 
nationalism” (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; Glick Schiller 2004, 2010) or the “container 
theory of society” (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc 1992; Glick Schiller 2004, 2010, 
Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004), which, in its different forms, assumes that national borders 
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are the natural unit of study, while equating society with the nation-state and conflating 
national interests with the purpose of social science. Third, anthropologists have also noted the 
revival of assimilationist theory in the United States and the new integrationism in Europe at 
the beginning of the 21st century, which have permeated public debate, scholarly analysis and 
policy making on transnational migration, contributing to approaches that depict the nation 
and its migrants as fundamentally and essentially distinct both socially and culturally (Glick 
Schiller 2004, 2010).  
The second wave of scholarship on transnationalism has brought together the study of 
transnational migration and transnational cultural processes, and has been enriched by 
ethnographical contributions in three important ways (Glick Schiller 2004). First, the critique 
of the concept of transnational community and the growing interest in the study of 
transnational social fields has shown that social or cultural capital shared within kin or broader 
ethnic networks does not always constitute a community of interest able to generate access to 
economic capital. Likewise, ethnic or national identifiers are not descriptors of persons who 
necessarily share either a community of interest or connection. Moreover, familial networks 
that stretch across borders are marked by gendered differences in power and internal rankings 
of status and class, thus theorization of the transnational intersections between specific kin, 
local and national institutions is necessary (p. 462). Second, the increased effort to study forms 
of simultaneous incorporation of migrants and their descendants in diverse localities 
(countries) has challenged strongly held ideas about the incorporation of these groups while 
defying established notions of society (p. 463). Third, the study of transnational migrations has 
made apparent the continuing viability of states whose legal systems limit movements across 
borders and extend or restrict legal rights. Trans-border citizens are people who live their lives 
across the borders of two or more nation-states, participating in the daily life and political 
practices and debates of these various states, whereas social citizens are those who have legal 
residence but not citizenship, being granted access to a range of public services yet exercising 
a restricted political role. While the former contribute to the development of political 
processes and ideologies of different states, the latter face legal restrictions, lack legal 
protections and have limited access to protection when they seek to flee persecution or 
environmental degradation (p. 464). 
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Anthropological approaches and insights have substantially enriched current 
discussions on the changing experience of citizenship. For almost two decades now, scholars 
have been interested in the analysis of the paradoxical dynamics that connect citizenship (as a 
mechanism for allocating rights and claims through political membership in the nation-state) 
and globalization (as a package of transnational flows of people, production, investment, 
information, ideas and authority). These interconnected processes have diffused the traditional 
sense of citizenship, leading scholars to move beyond its study as a set of legal entitlements 
that a person either has or does not have to considerations of membership that encompass a 
range of subjects which includes non-citizens (Ong 2004a, 2006). Anthropological analyses 
have been central to broadening the scope of these debates through their study of the symbolic 
and social meanings of citizenship. The pioneering work of Renato Rosaldo (1994, 1997) paid 
attention to the ways in which every day behaviour and thinking define the norms of 
belonging that operate as informal modes of inclusion and exclusion. Rosaldo shows that 
formal legal citizenship does not erase the enduring exclusions of the colour lines that often 
deny full citizenship to Latinos and other “persons of colour”. He has used the term cultural 
citizenship to refer to the right to be different (in terms of race, ethnicity or native language) 
with respect to the norms of the dominant national community, without compromising one’s 
right to belong, in the sense of participating in the nation-state’s democratic processes (1994).   
Anthropological research has also shown that the spaces of citizenship formation have 
changed radically, from the national territory to transnational spaces and globalizing cities. 
Increased migrations across national borders have ruptured old categories that assumed a 
homology between nation-states, populations and cultures. The study of transnationalism has 
opened up the question of how citizenship may be constructed from abroad by expatriates 
seeking to remake their homeland (Basch, Glick Schiller and Blanc 1993). Some 
anthropologists have claimed that diasporic communities relocated in new differentiated and 
mobile spaces renegotiate their positions in the context of post-national orders (Appadurai 
1996) while others have noted the emergence of strategies combining the security of 
citizenship in a new country with business opportunities in the homeland (Ong 1999). 
Moreover, a convergence of anthropological and political perspectives has shaped current 
discussions on citizenship, highlighting the political significance of cultural difference in 
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liberal democracies (Ong 1996) and a rethinking of the spatialities that go into the making of 
citizenship (Ong 2004a). 
Some anthropological approaches have conceptualized citizenship as a series of 
everyday processes of being made and self-making in various domains of administration, 
welfare, church and working life, and examined it as a social process of mediated production 
of values concerning freedom, autonomy and security (Ong 1996, 2003). Looking at 
citizenship practices and representations, anthropological perspectives have highlighted their 
horizontal dimensions (Neveu 2005) and examined how citizenship processes are constituted 
within and, at the same time, are constitutive of relationships between individuals, between 
and within groups, during mobilization and participation, between representations and 
imaginaries as well as in their interaction with institutions (Gagné and Neveu 2009). 
Francophone anthropologists have highlighted the distinctive meanings denoted by the terms 
citizenship and citoyenneté along with the problem that this raises for comparative analysis 
(Neveu 2009, Gagné and Neveu 2009).  
Transnational Social Fields, Zones of Graduated Sovereignty and Latitudes of Citizenship  
The work of Glick Schiller and Ong has been of particular influence in shaping research 
agendas in the anthropological study of migrant transnationalism and citizenship on both sides 
of the (Northern) Atlantic. At a time when other scholars in the United States (anthropologists 
M. Kearney and R. Rouse, and the sociologist P. Levitt), Canada (the sociologist L. Goldring) 
and France (the sociologist M. Morokvaisic) were also conducting ethnographic studies of 
transnational migration, Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc (1992) coined the terms 
“transnationalism” and “transmigrants”. They used the former to refer to a new paradigm for 
migration studies that allows researchers to explore simultaneous embeddedness, and the latter 
to speak of the persons who live their lives across borders (Glick Schiller 2004, pp. 448-449). 
In order to advance research and theory on transnationalism, Glick Schiller has considered it 
crucial to differentiate between transnational processes of communication and transnational 
social fields. She has used the latter concept to examine observable social relationships and 
transactions composed of networks of interpersonal connections that stretch across borders. 
They are people-to-people relationships through which information, resources, goods, services 
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and ideas are exchanged, and where multiple actors, with very different kinds and locations of 
power, interact to create and sustain such relationships. These fields include individuals who 
have never themselves crossed borders but who are linked through social relations to people in 
distant and perhaps disparate locations (Glick Schiller 2004, 2010). The concept of 
transnational social fields highlights the ways in which transmigrants become part of the fabric 
of daily life in both their home and other states. By joining the workforce, contributing to 
neighbourhood organizations and entering into politics, they participate in diverse localities at 
the same time, a phenomenon that has been labelled simultaneity (Glick Schiller 2004; Levitt 
and Glick Schiller 2004).  
Glick Schiller (2004) has also distinguished between social practice and identity 
politics when developing transnational theory. She has employed the term transnational ways 
of being to include various quotidian acts through which people live their lives across borders, 
that is, in transnational social fields. These are transmigrants in terms of their life ways. In 
order to examine how these activities are represented, understood and translated into identity 
politics, Glick Schiller has used the term transnational ways of belonging. This is the realm of 
cultural representation, ideology and identity through which people reach out to distant lands 
or persons through memory, nostalgia and imagination whether or not they live in 
transnational social fields. While not rooted in social networks, transnational belonging 
denotes processes (rather than fixed categories) and is an emotional connection to persons who 
are elsewhere (a specific locality such as a village, a region, a specific religious formation, a 
social movement) or who are geographically dispersed but bound together within a notion of 
shared history and destiny (458-459). Glick Schiller’s continuous critique of methodological 
nationalism and her insistence on the non-ethnic study of migrants’ incorporation (see 
previously in this section) have also been substantial contributions to scholarship on 
transnationalism. Her more recent interest in examining the relationship between migrants and 
cities is part of a collective effort to move towards a comparative perspective that builds on 
two themes: a) multiple pathways of migrant incorporation and transnational connection, and 
the scalar positioning of cities, and b) migrants as scale makers (Glick Schiller and Çaglar 
2009, Glick Schiller and Çaglar eds. 2011, Glick Schiller 2011).  
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Aihwa Ong’s work (1996, 1999, 2004a, 2004b, 2006) has also been influential in 
shaping research agendas on the study of migrant transnationalism while advancing 
anthropological approaches and insights to the study of citizenship. Ong (1999) argues that the 
models that have analytically defined “the global” as political and economic and “the local” as 
cultural do not quite capture the horizontal and relational nature of the contemporary 
economic, social and cultural processes that stream across spaces, nor do they express their 
embeddedness in differently configured regimes of power. For this reason, Ong has introduced 
the notion of transnationality that, besides suggesting new relations between nation-states and 
capital, also alludes to the transversal, transactional, transnational and transgressive aspects of 
contemporary behaviour and imagination that are incited, enabled and regulated by the 
changing logics of states and capitalism (p.4). Ong differentiates between transnationality—or 
the condition of cultural interconnectedness and mobility across space that has been intensified 
under late capitalism—and transnationalism, which she uses to refer to the cultural 
specificities of global processes (p.4). Employing the latter term, Ong relates transnational 
strategies to systems of governmentality—in the broad sense of techniques and codes for 
directing human behaviour that both condition and manage the movements of population and 
capital—while tracing the multiplicity of the uses and conceptions of “culture”, understood as 
a contingent scheme of meaning tied to power dynamics (p.4). Culture-making involves not 
only a process of “othering” by dominant players but also processes of cultural self-theorizing 
and re-envisioning in relation to fluid power dynamics, whether at the level of interpersonal 
relations or at the level of national politics and geopolitical posturing (p.243). Claiming that 
transnational processes are situated cultural practices, Ong (1999) proposes to embed the 
theory of practice within (not outside or against) political-economic forces, relating political 
economy to human agency in order to study the reciprocal construction of practice, gender, 
ethnicity, race, class and nation in processes of capital accumulation (p.5, also Ong 2003). 
Since different regimes of power and truth (state, family, economic enterprises) shape and 
direct border crossing and transnational relations, Ong claims that shifting patterns of travel 
and realignments between state and capital need to be understood according to the logics of 
culture and regional hegemony (1999, p.6).  
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For Ong, globalization (understood in the narrow sense of corporate strategies) has 
induced the emergence of zones of graduated sovereignty (1999, 2006) whereas individuals 
and governments have developed a flexible citizenship (1999).  The former notion refers to 
zones that vary in terms of the mix of disciplinary and civilizing regimes and often contain 
ethnically marked groupings, which in practice are subjected to regimes of rights and 
obligations that are different from those in other zones. The presence of these zones makes 
apparent that, even if the state maintains control over its territory, it is also willing to let 
corporate entities set the terms for constituting and regulating some domains (1999, p.217). 
Flexible citizenship, on the other hand, denotes the assemblage of transnational practices for 
gaining access to different global sites (for business advantages, real estate deals, enrolment in 
top universities, or security for the family) as well as the versatile mobilization of business, 
legal and social assets that facilitates a high degree of mobility (Ong 2004b, p.47). For Ong, 
the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, travel and displacement have induced subjects to 
respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions, and in their 
quests to accumulate capital and social prestige in the global arena, they have both emphasized 
and been regulated by practices favouring flexibility, mobility and repositioning in relation to 
markets, governments and cultural regimes (1999, p.6). Under these circumstances, systems of 
variegated citizenship have emerged, in which populations subjected to different regimes of 
value enjoy different kinds of rights, discipline, caring and security (Ong 1999, 2006).  
Globalization has also intensified the connections between external and internal lines 
of differentiation, leading to a transvaluation or transborder restructuring of social capital and 
norms of labour that Ong (2004b, 2004b) has dubbed latitudes of citizenship. Transversal 
processes distribute disparate forms of citizenship in sites linked by the capital-accumulating 
logic that spans different spheres of worth across the world. In addition, since “latitude points” 
are transnational sites, they deviate from standard norms governing citizenship within nation-
spaces while having the scope and flexibility to combine disparate forms of rights, privileges 
and labour conditions. Such “ensembles of unequally lateralized citizenship status” are shaped 
by processes at once transborder and yet highly specific in constituting particular positions of 
subjectivation. At the same time, an ever-shifting landscape shaped by the flows of markets, 
technologies and populations has crystallized mutations in citizenship (Ong 2006), which go 
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beyond the idea of citizenship as either a protected status in a nation-state or a condition 
opposed to that of statelessness. On the one hand, the elements of citizenship are becoming not 
only disarticulated from each other but also re-articulated with universalizing criteria of 
neoliberalism and human rights. Such “global assemblages” define zones of political 
entitlements and claims. On the other hand, these spaces of assemblage become the site for 
political mobilization by diverse groups in motion, whose particular constellations shape 
specific problems and resolutions to questions of contemporary living, further disarticulating 
and deterritorializing aspects of citizenship.  
Transnationalism in Question 
 
Despite its multiple contributions, the transnational approach has not been without criticism. 
Sociologists Roger Waldinger and David Fitzgerald (2004) have claimed that what 
immigration scholars describe as transnationalism is usually its opposite: highly particularistic 
attachments antithetical to those by-products of globalization denoted by the concept of 
“transnational civil society” and its related manifestations (p. 1182). They argue that states and 
the politics conducted within their borders fundamentally shape the options for migrant and 
ethnic transnational social action. State controls operate at internal and external levels, seeking 
to regulate membership in the national collectivity and movement across territorial borders 
respectively. The variability in the degree to which these internal and external boundaries are 
institutionalized and the means and intensity by which states police them condition the ability 
of migrants living “here” to act in ways that yield leverage “there” (p.1178; see as well Torpey 
1998, Kearney 2004, Walters 2006). In addition, civil society actors in both host and 
destination countries raise questions regarding the allegiance and political bona fide of persons 
whose social identities are framed by the connections to two states, so the terms of national 
belonging are very often conflictive, and variations in political culture ensure that they differ 
from one nation-state to another (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004, p.1184; see as well Faist, 
Gerdes and Rieple 2007, Freeman 2007). Moreover, the use, form and mobilization of the 
connections linking here and there are contingent to multiple political constraints, since the 
relationship between states affects the scope for multiple versus exclusive national loyalties, 
and the security/solidarity nexus waxes and wanes with the degree of interstate tension 
(Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004, p. 1185). For Waldinger and Fitzgerald, transnationalism 
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should be examined as the collision of the social organizations of migration and its state-
spanning results, with reactive efforts by state and civil society actors to produce state-society 
alignment (p. 1186). 
Social and political theorist Rainer Baubock (2003) criticizes the “globalist and strong 
transnationalist perspective” which claims that globalization is undermining the salience of 
national sovereignty and citizenship while creating deterritorialized and postnational 
communities as an alternative to territorially bounded national polities (Glick Schiller et al 
1992, Basch et al 1994, Soyosal 1994). Baubock argues that transnational politics depend on 
national politics because political activities of migrants are strongly oriented towards both 
sending and receiving states, whereas states are actively involved in shaping the emergent 
transnational social fields through attempts to exercise political control or as providers of 
entitlements. For Baubock, transnational political activities transcend “politics as usual” 
(p.701) since political transnationalism does not circumscribe itself to politics across borders, 
but also includes changes in the institutions of the polity and its conceptions of membership in 
both origin and receiving countries. Moreover, transnational practices and structures need not 
involve the state as an agent, or the nation as an imagined political community, because 
political transnationalism affects the very definition of the entity whose borders are crossed. 
For Baubock, transnational politics proliferate across multiple levels and involve not only 
individuals and political organizations but also government agencies (p.708).  
Anthropologists have also contributed to the critique of some important assumptions 
held by transnationalism advocates, notably on the magnitude of international migrations and 
the significance of crossing international borders. Jonathan Friedman (2002) has pointed out 
that, due to its focus on movement, this approach seems to have overlooked that less than two 
percent of the world’s population is on the move internationally. In other words, the discourse 
on the “primacy of movement in the world” has assumed, without any research to support it, 
that the whole world is on the move (p.33).  Ghassan Hage (2005), for his part, has questioned 
the significance of movements across borders in shaping people’s lives, arguing that it is not 
some objective experience that defines international migration regardless of who is crossing 
borders and how. To sense that one’s movement is significant, it has to involve a sense of 
being uprooted from things that one is familiar with and a sense of being out place. Yet, one 
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should be careful not to assume that when crossing international borders, the change from one 
national culture to another is the most significant aspect of the move (p.470). In order to 
capture these “significant movements”, Hage uses the term “existential mobility”. For him, 
people engage in the type of physical mobility that defines them as migrants because they feel 
that another space is a better launching pad for their existential selves. In other words, people 
move physically to feel that they are existentially on the move again, or at least, moving better 
(p.470). 
GEOPOLITICS AND HEGEMONIC SCHOLARSHIP 
 
Even if brief and selective, as any such exercise may be, my literature review makes apparent 
two interrelated and problematic issues about the scholarship on migrant transnationalism and 
citizenship: its narrow geopolitical focus on liberal democracies, and the hegemonic standing 
of a handful of disciplines when it comes to setting “global” research agendas. The vast 
majority of the studies in this burgeoning scholarship have concentrated on the liberal 
democracies of the so-called Euro-Atlantic arena. Some anthropologists have challenged this 
geopolitics by conducting ethnographic research on transnational migration and citizenship 
outside these favoured destinations, such as Ong (1999, 2003) in China and the Southeast 
Asian tiger economies, Salazar Parreñas (2005, 2008) in the Philippines, Constable (2007) in 
Hong Kong, Gregory (2007) in the Dominican Republic, Goldade (2008) in Costa Rica and 
Gardner (2010) in Bahrain. Nevertheless, much more needs to be done in order to give proper 
room—actual acknowledgment and active incorporation (see Latour 1987)— to the work 
being done by scholars in other parts of the world. Being familiar with the scientific literature 
produced in South America, it is striking to me the extent to which the scholarship on migrant 
transnationalism and citizenship from the “Global North” neglects the prolific work of 
scholars from the “Global South”, even if the opposite is not the case (see for example Novick 
ed 2008 and 2010; Maffia 2010; Pizarro ed. 2011; Grimson and Jelin eds.2006). 
The second problematic issue refers to the hegemonic role played by a handful of 
disciplines such as political science, economics, geography, demography and sociology in 
setting “global” research and policy agendas on migrant transnationalism and citizenship. 
Disciplinary lenses have been particularly important in dictating methodological and analytical 
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approaches, which in many cases have led to the formulation of conclusions without empirical 
grounding (such as in the formulation of ideal types or mathematical models) or to the use of 
gender-blind perspectives. Even if shifting, the hegemonic standing of these disciplines is still 
present, a legacy of the crucial role they played in the consolidation of the nation-state (see on 
this issue Glick Schiller 2010 and Recalde 2008). The hegemonic standing of these policy-
oriented, sometimes even at-the-service-of-the-state, disciplines has combined with the 
privileged access of scholars and institutions from the Global North to a wide range of 
resources to create a double bias. This has resulted in the geographical, methodological, 
analytical and sometimes ideological narrow focus of the scholarship produced in the Global 
North, and its predominant neglect of the rich scientific developments occurring outside its 
geopolitics. Anthropology has made valuable contributions to the decentring of this 
scholarship, which still remains precarious. My thesis engages in this same effort through an 
empirically grounded analysis of the recent “experiences of citizenship” of South American 
migrants in Argentina, which draws on local and regional scholarship.  
DISSERTATION ANALYTICAL TOOLS  
 
Broadly speaking, my thesis examines the workings of grounded social, economic and 
political processes that have contributed, often in a conflictive manner, to the (re)definition of 
membership criteria in both the nation and the state. As I have outlined in the previous 
chapter, my analysis is done at two distinctive analytical and empirical levels. One the one 
hand, I examine the “technologies of citizenship” (Ong 2003, Fujiwara 2008) deployed by the 
state to transform Argentina into a diverse, inclusive and Latin American nation over the past 
decade, including the creation of a “new legality” for the Paraguayans, Bolivians and 
Peruvians in the country. On the other hand, I analyze the “horizontal dimensions of 
citizenship processes” (Neveu 2005, Pickus and Skerry 2007, Gagné and Neveu 2009) among 
Peruvians, Paraguayans and Bolivians in urban, peripheral and rural areas of the partido of La 
Plata. Namely, I look at how their social, economic and political circumstances have changed 
in tandem with their new legal status (as nationals of the MERCOSUR in Argentina with 
rights equal to those of its citizens) and the “inclusive citizenship” policies deployed by the 
government. In what follows, I elaborate on the key analytical tools that I have used to 
interpret data from my fieldwork and to analyze media and government discourse.  
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My examination of Kirchnerismo’s strategies to shape the Argentinean nation during 
the first decade of the 2000s has benefited from the work of political scientist Sheila Croucher 
(1998) on the construction of national boundaries in post-apartheid South Africa. Recognizing 
the fluidity of the national form—captured in the question when, why and how is a nation? 
instead of what is a nation?— Croucher highlights that discourse is constitutive of nations and 
national identities. Following Doty (1996), Croucher (1998) claims that the boundaries of the 
nation-state, which are constantly constructed and reconstructed, are not merely territorial, but 
are a function of the state’s discursive authority. In light of the internally unstable and 
contingent nature of identity, the boundaries and meaning of the nation and the national 
identity become fixed, if only temporarily, through discourse (p.642). In any given discourse, 
certain sites or focal points will play a particularly important, or privileged, role in fixing or 
assigning meaning, and in the case of national identity, immigration constitutes one such 
concrete site in, about and through which the form and content of national identity gets shaped 
(p.643).  Moreover, it is not just official immigration policy that constructs the contours of the 
nation, but the politics, rhetoric and discourse surrounding immigration that play an equally 
important role. Thus, even if statecraft is crucial in constructing national identity, a multitude 
of practices also contributes to it, including an array of cultural and symbolic resources and the 
ways in which they are drawn upon, used and interpreted by government officials, politicians, 
community leaders and media (Croucher 1997). In the next chapter, I show how Kirchnerismo 
deployed a series of complementary strategies to shape Argentina into a diverse, inclusive and 
Latin American nation. Even if the remaking of this country’s national identity was not strictly 
organized around the migratory issue, securing a wide range of rights to migrants in general 
(according to international conventions) and granting MERCOSUR nationals equal rights to 
Argentinians in particular (according to the country’s new migration law), were core to 
Kirchnerismo’s political project. By focusing on fortifying the “sameness” between “us” 
(Argentinians) and “them” (South American migrants), migration politics and policy became 
an important discursive site for defining the nation and delineating the boundaries of the 
national community during the first decade of the 2000s.  
While membership in a state is decided legislatively or constitutionally through 
citizenship policies, whose exclusionary aspect looms large (Shafir 2004, Howard 2006, 
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Morris 2002), membership in the nation is not necessarily coterminous with legal entitlements, 
and typically entails a much more complicated configuration of “us” and “them” (Gregory 
2004, 2007). Nationhood is an inherently exclusive concept, and national identity, like other 
forms of identity, is defined and maintained in opposition or contradiction to some other 
group, category of classification that, at best, becomes temporary outsider or, at worst, deeply 
despised enemy (Croucher 1998, Barth 1969). In the ethnographic chapters of my thesis, I 
examine the displacement of this “space of otherness” in the Argentinean social imaginary 
from the limítrofes during the 1990s to both the so-called chinos (Asian migrants) and pibes 
chorros (disadvantaged and marginalized Argentinean youth) during the first decade of the 
2000s. The extent to which the nation is a social and political construct that takes place on a 
variety of fronts, and that migration can provide the content of and vehicle for that 
construction (Croucher 1998) becomes evident in my analysis of the complementary domestic 
and foreign policies, attendant discourse and events deployed by Kirchnerismo to pursue its 
political project. These multiple strategies connected core political goals shared by 
governments in the region—the fight against poverty, inequality and environmental 
degradation through regional integration—with Kirchnerismo’s national agenda—developing 
an inclusive citizenship and defending human rights—which served to reinforce the remaking 
of the Argentinean nation as diverse, inclusive and Latin American.   
To examine Kirchnerismo’s invention of the Argentinean past, present and future as 
Latin American, the work of anthropologist James Clifford (2000) on identity politics has 
proved valuable. Clifford argues that modern national projects, where identity politics are 
prevalent, can never be finished or whole since, to differing degrees, they are unstable, 
complicated and undermined by other identifications. National and transnational orders are 
domains of continual struggle and negotiation, formation and breakup, where identity politics 
is at best grasped with ethnographic complexity as a series of contradictory and multivalent 
processes of historical transformation (p.96). Cultural politics is not secondary to more 
“material” political/economic agencies, since cultural discourse situates groups, providing 
them with roots, with narrative connections between past and present traditions, and with 
distinctive social habits and bodies. Moreover, the remembering and forgetting, gathering and 
excluding of cultural elements, crucial to the maintenance of an identity, is materially 
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constrained, politically limited and inventive (p.97). In other words, to imagine a coherent 
future, people selectively mobilize past resources, so the “articulations of tradition” are 
generative components of peoplehood, ways of belonging to some discrete social time and 
place in an interconnected world (p.97). The inventive, contradictory and multivalent character 
of the articulations of tradition is apparent in Kirchnerismo’s efforts to shape the Argentinean 
nation through the revision of its past (as Latin American), the renewal of its membership 
criteria (as inclusive and diverse) and the projection of a new future (as an autonomous nation 
engaged in regional integration and global geopolitics and commerce).  
Even if my intention is not to examine relations of domination and resistance, James 
Scott’s (1990) emphasis on uncovering the contradictions, tensions and immanent possibilities 
of power should be kept in mind when reading my thesis. Anthropologist and political 
scientist, Scott distinguishes between public and hidden transcripts when studying hegemonic 
relations between “dominant” or “powerful” and “powerless” or “subordinate” groups, and 
highlights the dialectic of disguise and surveillance that pervades such relations. The public 
transcript refers to the open interaction between subordinates and those who dominate, where 
“public” denotes the action that is openly avowed to the other party in the power relationship 
and “transcript” a complete record of that which is said, including nonspeech acts (p.2). The 
hidden transcript, on the other hand, refers to discourse that takes place “offstage”, beyond 
direct observation by certain others, so it is specific to a given social site and to a particular set 
of actors (p.14). The implementation of diverse strategies by Kirchnerismo in seeking to shape 
the Argentinean nation, which I examine in the next chapter, should be interpreted as 
performances integral to its public transcript. Its monumental deployment of resources during 
the celebrations of the Bicentenary of the Nation, what I also analyze in the next chapter, 
constituted a crucial occasion to celebrate and dramatize its rule by making a spectacle of 
itself in a manner largely of its own choosing (Scott 1990, p.58). 
In examining Kirchnerismo’s efforts to restore the primacy of the nation-state as an 
encompassing space of belonging and governance, which had been given away during the 
1990s in tandem with decentralization and privatization policies, Ferguson and Gupta’s (2002) 
notion of vertical encompassment is useful. This notion refers to the claims that naturalize the 
authority of the state over “the local” by merging three analytically distinct ideas—superior 
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spatial scope; supremacy in a hierarchy of power; and superior generality of interest, 
knowledge and moral purpose—into a single figure: the “up there” state that encompasses the 
local and exists on a “higher level”. As I will show in the next chapter, Kirchnerismo has used 
a range of everyday technologies to spatialize the federal state, seeking to make verticality and 
encompassment widely shared features of social life.  
My analysis of fieldwork data has significantly benefited from anthropological 
approaches to the study of citizenship. In his research on the contested politics of globalization 
in the Dominican Republic, Steven Gregory (2004, 2007) argues that global capital needs the 
political apparatus of the nation-state and its ideologies of belonging to reproduce itself. 
Gregory underscores the significance of the state as a complex “political field” (Poulantzas 
1978) upon which the conditions of possibility for globalization are secured through the 
structuring and disciplining of labour markets, and more broadly, through the constitution and 
governance of subjects. Drawing on Tilly’s (1995) notion of citizenship as a continuing series 
of transactions between persons and agents of a given state in which each has enforceable 
rights and obligations, Gregory argues that citizenship constitutes a critical and contested field 
of power relations and practices where struggles over access to employment, political 
participation and other rights and goods are conducted between state authorities and the 
heterogeneous populations under their control (2007, p.39). Through these contested practices 
of citizenship and their enabling discourses, regulations and documents, differences tied to 
race, class, gender and national origin are embodied and articulated into a complex system of 
exclusions that is the social foundation of the division of labour (2004, pp.290-291). 
Moreover, social status is a defining characteristic of citizenship that is produced through 
everyday interactions which transpose socially constructed distinctions into formal systems of 
exclusions (2007, p.40). The extent to which citizenship is far from a mere legal identity will 
become apparent in the ethnographic chapters of this thesis, where I examine migrants’ 
experiences of their new legal entitlements in the context of a shifting ethnic landscape 
affecting the rankings attributed to different migrant groups within the hegemonic hierarchy of 
value of the partido of La Plata. 
 In reading the prejudiced views of migrants held by the municipal officers of La Plata 
and their often unsuccessful attempts to “integrate” migrants into society, Ong’s (2003) work 
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on citizenship in the new America has proved valuable. Ong looks at citizenship as the 
cumulative effect of a multiplicity of bureaucratic figures who are concerned with the 
practicalities of democracy, daily figuring out ways to produce subjects who can be induced, 
nudged and empowered to become self-sufficient and goal-oriented citizens (p. 17). In the US, 
the “human techniques” that allocate, classify, formalize and normalize seek to govern through 
freedom; that is, to adjust citizen-subjects to key values of autonomy and self-definition. Social 
policies and practices beyond the state suggest, define and direct adherence to democratic, 
racial and market norms of belonging (p. 15; see also Lipschutz 2004). In chapters IV, V and 
VI, I examine how migrants in the partido of La Plata challenge the disciplining strategies 
(citizenship techniques) deployed by the municipality. The extent to which this was the case, 
especially among those living in rural areas, becomes most apparent in the derogatory remarks 
of municipal agents, which are permeated by frustration and disappointment.  
 
 My analysis of how migrants’ daily social interaction, in general, and their access to 
entitlements, in particular, differed among urban, peripheral and rural areas of the partido 
benefits from Ong’s (1999) notions of zones of graduated sovereignty and systems of 
variegated citizenship (see previously). Wacquant’s (2008) comparative study of advanced 
marginality was also useful for framing my analysis of the specific challenges faced by 
migrants living in the peripheries of the partido (and the Gran Buenos Aires). Wacquant 
defines advanced marginality as the novel regime of socio-spatial relegation and exclusionary 
closure that has crystallized in the post-Fordist city as a result of the uneven development of 
the capitalist economies and the recoiling of welfare states, according to how these two forces 
bear upon the segments of the working class and the ethnoracial categories dwelling in the 
nether regions of social and physical space (pp.2-3). Wacquant argues that state structures and 
policies play a decisive role in the differential stitching together of inequalities of class, place 
and origin (whether ethnoracial or ethnonational) on both sides of the Atlantic. Through its 
multifaceted action, the national state shapes not only the markets for housing, employment 
and educational credentials, but also the distribution of basic goods and services, and through 
this mediation governs the conversion of the social space into appropriated physical space 
(p.6). Wacquant considers it useful to distinguish between the social condition characteristic of 
a zone of relegation and the conditionings it entails, that is, between its position in a 
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hierarchized structure of places measured by their material and symbolic value and the function 
it performs for the metropolitan system (p.11; see also Çaglar and Glick Schiller 2011, Glick 
Schiller and Çaglar 2011). Wacquant also specifies the degree and form of state penetration in 
neighbourhoods of relegation as well as the changing and often contradictory relations that 
their inhabitants maintain with different public officials and agencies, schools and hospitals, 
housing and social welfare, firefighting and transportation, the courts and the police (p.11). In 
the peripheral areas of the partido of La Plata, the state’s governance by neglect and absence 
was crucial in shaping migrants’ precarious or nonexistent access to public entitlements and 
security. Moreover, the relationships established among migrant and non-migrant neighbours 
in these “forgotten areas” and between limítrofes and diverse state representatives varied 
greatly between areas of the partido, issues that I examine in the ethnographic chapters (from 
IV to VII).  
 
RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
 
My dissertation challenges three sets of claims that have shaped research and policy agendas 
on migrant transnationalism and citizenship, and questions the hegemonic analytical and 
methodological approaches underlying them. First, my dissertation shows that, even if in 
dialogue with regional bodies and international conventions, the state continues to play a 
hegemonic role when it comes to managing people’s movements across its borders and within 
its territory (Glick Schiller 2004, 2010; Ong 1999, 2003, 2004-a). This becomes most apparent 
in South America, where states have independently decided if and how to implement adopted 
international conventions on the protection of human rights as well as regional agreements 
seeking the free mobility and equal treatment of nationals of the newly created blocs (Recalde 
2006-b, 2008-a). Argentina has led these developments in South America, as I will show in the 
next chapter. Moreover, migration politics and policies have both been crucial to the current 
nationhood-(re)making projects of particular states in processes of regional integration, an 
issue that I illustrate with my analysis of Kirchnerismo’s strategies to anchor Argentina’s past, 
present and future in the economic, social and political developments that are particular to 
South America.  
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Second, my dissertation questions legalistic approaches to citizenship by showing that 
formal legal entitlements are translated into quite different “experiences of rights” depending 
on: a) the “value and deservedness” or social status attributed to diversely defined groups 
based on their standing in local shifting ethnic hierarchies of value (Ong 2004-a, 2004-b); b) 
the geopolitics of place and the attendant regimes of governmentality that have evolved in 
diverse settings along with the settlement of diverse ethnic and social class groups, which 
change over time and across space (Ong 1999, 2006; Wacquant 2008); and c) migrants’ 
embodied (gender, age, phenotype, etc.) and acquired (social class, ethnicity, etc.) 
characteristics (Gregory 2004, 2007; Morris 2002) and their access to networks of trust 
spanning across multiple countries, which are permeated by uneven distributions of power 
along lines of gender, age and status (Glick Schiller 2004, Cohen 2011).  
 
Third, my dissertation demonstrates that transnational migrations do not exclusively 
respond to economically calculated reasoning, but that are rather guided by complex decision-
making processes integral to household strategies (Merla and Baldassar 2010, Merla 2010, 
Baldassar 2010, Cohen 2011, Brettell 2003, Paerregaard 2008, Trager 2005). Decisions to 
migrate are always gendered and are related to the positioning of different individuals in their 
household’s reproductive cycle. Moreover, they often result from negotiations taking place 
within extended kinship networks that are framed in turn by local, sub-national and national 
shifting economic, political and social circumstances affecting the contrasting prospects 
available at home and “somewhere else”. Once more, “better prospects” are not merely 
defined in economic terms, but rather, in varying combinations of (social and environmental) 
safety, civil and political freedoms, gender role expectations, access to a variety of public 
entitlements (notably education and health care) and upper social mobility opportunities. 
Therefore, my thesis contributes an ethnographically grounded analysis of migrant 
transnationalism and citizenship that questions gender-blind assumptions and challenges the 
universalist generalizations that often lack empirical bases. 
  
 My dissertation also contributes to the decentering of the hegemonic geopolitics that 
have shaped research and policy agendas in the scholarship on migrant transnationalism and 
citizenship. This literature’s predominant focus on the Euro-Atlantic arena has brought about 
two particularly problematic issues, which are challenged by my doctoral research. First, this 
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scholarship has considered English-speaking settler societies and Western Europe as the 
destinations “par excellence” of transnational migrants, while assuming that an almost 
exclusive South-North dynamic propels these migrations. This assumption has not only 
permeated current literature on the “transnationalization or privatization of social 
reproduction” (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001, Parreñas 2001, Ehrenreich and Russell Hochschild 
2002, Russell Hochschild 2002, Maher 2004, Herrera Mosquera 2008, Arat-Koç and Giles 
1996) supporting the “social organization of care” (Glenn 2010), but has also guided research 
on the political economy of migrations from “poor” to “rich” countries more generally (Sassen 
1998). My study of South American migrations to Argentina problematizes this twofold claim 
by illustrating the increasing centrality of intra-regional or so-called “South-South” migrations 
in different parts of the world (see Ratha and Shaw 2007, Hujo and Piper eds. 2010, Goldade 
2008, Gardner 2010). My dissertation also shows the extent to which a “Southern country” 
such as Argentina can be at the same time an immigration and emigration state that plays 
diverse roles in the mobility trajectory of migrants, ranging from the desired “final” destination 
to a transitional one permitting migrants to get the papers or the necessary capital to move on 
to the next one.  
 
Second, dominant paradigms (Glick Schiller 2004) in the scholarship on migrant 
transnationalism and citizenship, produced in the “Global North”, have often neglected the 
prolific work of scholars from the “Global South”, which has led to the use of diverse 
combinations of Euro-American value systems as “universals” when designing research (and 
policy) despite the diversity of both the groups concerned and their geographical locations. My 
dissertation draws on local and regional scholarship and is based on extended fieldwork in 
Argentina, undertaken in a serious attempt to further question my own disciplinary and 
scholarly geopolitical assumptions. In this regard, the thinking about the conditions under 
which ethnographic knowledge is produced has considerably broadened in recent years (Fabian 
2001) and the “reflexive turn” in social sciences has led to the consideration of researchers as 
significant participants in the intersubjective constitution of the phenomena they study (Turner 
2000). Nevertheless, “ethnographic truths” remain inherently partial and made possible by 
powerful “lies” of exclusion and rhetoric since power and history work through them, in ways 
their authors cannot fully control (Clifford 1986). 
  
 
CHAPTER III: Creating Legality for the Limítrofes While 
Constructing a “New” Argentina 
 
The creation of “legality” for the Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans in Argentina during 
the first decade of the 2000s was not a goal in itself for the government in office—as had been 
their criminalization over the course of the 1990s— but rather fit into its broader political 
project. The presidencies of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández, or Kirchnerismo as I 
shall refer to them together 19, set out to re-create Argentina, which they considered a pressing 
task necessary for reversing the harmful effects of the previous decade’s neoliberal policies. In 
this chapter, I show how the fulfillment of this undertaking involved the profound 
reorganization of state institutions and their ways of working, along with the reinvention of 
Argentina as an inclusive, diverse and Latin American nation. Kirchnerismo envisioned two 
central audiences or spheres of action when pursuing its project: the nation and the region (and 
by extension the world at large). The national audience was engaged through public policy 
promoting the inclusiveness and diversity of its citizenry, whereas regional dialogue was 
fostered by the deployment of a foreign policy that strove to deepen Latin American 
integration. As I shall demonstrate throughout the present chapter, these spheres of action and 
the public strategies to effect them are only analytically distinct, since in practice they 
overlapped. Kirchnerismo faced three central challenges: a) it had to counter hegemonic 
discourses portraying the dynamics of Buenos Aires as the reality of the whole country; b) it 
had to confront deeply entrenched foundational myths about the exclusive European ancestry 
and character of the nation; and c) it had to fight against the “Americanization” of Argentinean 
culture as had been promoted by Menem’s government during the 1990s.  
 
The analysis of the dramatic social, economic and political changes introduced by 
Kirchnerismo during the 2000s is fundamental for understanding the circumstances and 
experiences of migrants from neighbouring nations in Argentina over the course of the decade. 
To start with, its commitment to respecting human rights and deepening regional integration 
were both key in passing a new migration law granting MERCOSUR nationals rights equal to 
those of Argentinians. In addition, the implementation of “inclusive” policies that sought to 
universalize access to public services and goods were very advantageous to migrants, who 
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were entitled to them despite their migration status. At the same time, the state granted 
migrants equal protection against discrimination, exploitation and unfair treatment. Moreover, 
Kirchnerismo’s strategies to reshape the nation’s social imagery, so as to make Argentina 
Latin American and diverse, created an atmosphere conducive to perceiving these historically 
despised migrants in a more favourable light.  
 
Even if presented as an urgent reaction to the previous decade’s callous neoliberalism, 
the reinvention of the Argentinean nation and the reconstruction of its social, economic and 
political fabric over the 2000s was an endeavour that touched upon thorny conflicts dating 
back to the country’s independence in the 19th century. In developing such a project, 
presidents Kirchner and Fernández drew upon the political achievements and historical claims 
of Peronismo in particular, and on earlier attempts to unify Latin America more generally. 
Before taking up the analysis of the re-creation of Argentina, let me first briefly outline the 
main traits of historical Peronismo and introduce the former political leaders who established 
the precedent for current regional integration initiatives in South America. This short detour 
will serve to delineate the political genealogy of Kirchnerismo’s project and to trace its core 
ideological foundations, both of which will be crucial in order to understand its public and 
foreign policies during the 2000s.   
 
KIRCHNERISMO’S POLITICAL-IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS  
 
The movimiento peronista or peronismo histórico was a social, economic and political 
movement organized around the figure of Juan Domingo Perón, an Argentinean general and 
politician who held two presidential mandates (1946-1955 and 1973-1974). A controversial 
political figure, Perón has been seen either as an extremely popular, democratic leader by 
those who think of Peronismo as an “identity” linked to his public policies and persona, or as 
an authoritarian figure by those who claim that his regime personified the “tyranny of the 
majority” (Moniz Bandeira 2004; see also Appendix C). Perón questioned the liberal policies 
of the década infame or the “infamous decade” (1930-1943) that had led to the country’s 
economic underdevelopment, social inequality and corruption, and sought to put an end to 
both the electoral fraud that had hitherto prevailed and the huge profits being extracted from 
the country by foreign capital (Aritz Recalde 2010-e). With this goal in mind, Perón 
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consolidated the alliance between the movimiento sindical (union movement) and the Army, 
two of the most powerful social actors in Argentina at that time, in order to establish a regime 
that would guarantee full employment while promoting the industrial development of the 
country (Moniz Bandeira 2004). Perón contributed to the development and consolidation of 
large, powerful sectorial industrial unions, which have come to characterize the country’s 
labour market and political landscape (Cruces and Gasparini 2010), and created the Secretaría 
de Trabajo y Previsión Social (Work and Social Security Secretariat) in order to protect 
workers and small producers’ interests (Aritz Recalde 2010-e).  
 
The popular and nationalist character of Perón’s regime (exalted by the extraordinary 
influence of his second wife Evita) shaped Argentina’s domestic and foreign policies in the 
context of the Cold War. Defying international pressure to participate in the bipolar 
confrontation between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union, Perón proposed a tercera 
posición or “third position” for Argentina. This doctrine, later on renamed Justicialismo, was 
opposed to both capitalism and communism, considering that the abuses of the former had led 
to the emergence of the latter, and translated into a diversified foreign policy by establishing 
relations with socialist countries while keeping ties with Europe and, albeit conflictive, also 
with the US (Moniz Bandeira 2004). As a result, Argentina was not aligned with either 
superpower and sought to consolidate an economic and political community in South 
America. With this goal in mind, Perón pursued the “ABC Treaty” (between Argentina, Brazil 
and Chile) that was to be an economic, political and military bloc that could counterbalance 
the “Pan-Americanism” and “good neighbour” policies of US President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. Perón also sought to advance Justicialismo in Latin America by a) placing union 
delegates in all Argentinean embassies (beginning in 1946), b) creating the Latin American 
Central Union (ATLAS: Agrupación de los Trabajadores Latinoamericanos Sindicalistas) and 
c) promoting his regime over the Servicio Internacional Radiofónico Argentino (Aritz Recalde 
2010-g; Moniz Bandeira 2004). These different measures set an important precedent for future 
developments in South America in general and for Argentina in particular. While the ABC 
Treaty and the ATLAS were both fundamental for later initiatives of regional integration such 
as MERCOSUR, UNASUR and TeleSur, Perón’s diversified and Latin Americanist foreign 
policy became a guiding principle for Kirchnerismo (as I shall show in a later section). 
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During Perón’s first term as president, public policy was formulated in Planes 
Quinquenales (five-year plans) that pursued three core goals: 1) gaining economic 
independence, largely through the industrialization and diversification of the country’s 
production; 2) achieving political sovereignty by implementing independent, Latin 
Americanist and tercerist policies;  and 3) consolidating social justice through both the social, 
educational and cultural emancipation of workers and national entrepreneurs, and the creation 
of decent living conditions (condiciones de vida digna) for all inhabitants of the country (see 
Appendix C for details). The implementation of Peron’s five-year plans led to the 
industrialization of Argentina and the elimination of unemployment while putting a halt to the 
frequent economic crises resulting from international fluctuations in the prices of the country’s 
agro-exports. Industrial economic growth and stability were accompanied by a redistribution 
of wealth “with a national perspective”, which showed a substantial tendency towards higher 
equality during the first two presidencies of Perón and remained relatively stable during the 
1960s (Gerchunoff and Llach 2003, Alvaredo 2008). This redistribution of the country’s 
resources permitted the financing of universal access to public health care (with the state as 
the producer of drugs) and educational services (from kindergarten to undergraduate 
university studies), the development of national science and workers’ “right to leisure” 
(derecho al esparcimiento), which led to a substantial improvement in the population’s 
standard of living (Aritz Recalde 2010-g; Moniz Bandeira 2004). As will become apparent 
throughout the chapter, the achievements of Peronismo histórico not only laid the political-
ideological foundations of Kirchnerismo but also provided the requisite institutional-legal 
basis from which to re-create the state and reinvent the nation.  
 
Kirchnerismo’s referencing of 19th century attempts at Latin American unification has 
also been central to the effective deployment of its project. Crucial to the reinvention of 
Argentina as a Latin American nation has been the re-writing of its history so as to root it in 
the political developments of the region. This strategy has faced fierce resistance because a) it 
challenges the hegemony of discourses claiming the “European ancestry” of the nation that 
successive ruling classes have crafted and imposed as being “inherent” to Argentina (see 
chapter I), and b) it is at odds with the 1990s government-endorsed promotion of the 
“Americanization” of the nation (which I shall examine in a later section). Kirchnerismo 
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countered this opposition by institutionalizing the political trajectories of several historical 
leaders whose role had been crucial in the liberation of the continent from European rule 
during the 19th century; namely, Francisco Morazán, José de San Martín and Simón Bolívar 
(which I show in a later section). These leaders were key to the independence of numerous 
countries on the continent and fought to create the Patria Grande or “enlarged homeland” in 
Latin America, that is, a regional political union offering a shared space of belonging for its 
peoples (see Appendix C for more details). The unification projects that these leaders 
envisioned and pursued during the 19th century have been seen as the precedent for the 21st 
century’ regional integration efforts (Aritz Recalde 2010-a,b,c,f; Novick 2010).  
 
Honduran General and politician Francisco Morazán (1792–1842) was central to the 
strategies aimed at consolidating “the union of nations” in Central America, which he labelled 
República Federal de Centro América. As its ruler, he enacted liberal reforms, including 
freedom of the press, speech and religion, and limited the power of the Church by making 
marriage secular and by abolishing government-assisted tithing. The Argentinean General and 
politician José de San Martín (1778-1850) is primarily known for the liberation of Argentina, 
Peru and Chile as well as for promoting a very strong sense of “continental belonging” in the 
region, given that he conceived the American continent as one nation (Aritz Recalde 2010-d). 
Venezuelan military and political leader Simón Bolívar (1783-1830) participated in the 
foundation of the first union of independent nations in Latin America called the Gran 
Colombia. Bolívar was the president of this union from 1819 to 1830, which included the 
territories of present-day Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama. During his lifetime, 
Bolívar led Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela to independence, and 
helped lay the foundations for democratic ideology in much of Hispanic America. Due to their 
liberation and integrationist projects, Morazán, San Martín and Bolívar are considered to be 
not only national heroes and the próceres or patriotas latinoamericanos (“fathers” of the 
continent’s independence), but also as visionaries who conceived a different type of 
nationhood and polity for Latin America. Today, their projects continue to powerfully resonate 
in the region, notably among those who see in the Patria Grande a historical, cultural, 
economic and social terrain that must be politically articulated (Jauretche 1958, Recalde 2010-
c)20. 
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These political leaders considered the continent’s independence from European rule as 
being inseparable from Latin American unification and, a century later, Perón was to agree 
with them—seeing the United States as the main threat to the continent’s sovereign 
development and the emancipation of its peoples, however. Indeed, Perón drew on San 
Martín’s legacy and emphasized four of his postulates: a) the liberation of America requires 
popular emancipation; b) national freedom (liberación nacional) implies the development of 
an interventionist and industrialist state; c) national liberation needs an educator state, that is, a 
state that promotes science and culture at public institutions; and d) imperialism, colonialism 
and neo-colonialism ought to be fought in all their forms (Aritz Recalde 2010-c)21. During the 
2000s, Kirchnerismo was to take up once again these so-called legados sanmartineanos, 
making them public policy. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I examine the strategies 
deployed by the government to re-invent Argentina. In the making of an inclusive nation, 
Kirchnerismo drew on the developments of Peronismo histórico while invoking the 
achievements of the continent’s heroes when seeking to Latin Americanize it. Integral to the 
fulfilment of these intertwined strategies was the creation of a “new legality” for the 
Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans in the country. These migrants’ new legal and social 
status not only improved their access to a number of services, goods and protections granted 
by the state, but also had an impact on social interaction between them and non-migrant 
residents of the partido of La Plata.  
 
GRASPING KIRCHNERISMO 
 
Kirchnerismo is the name given to a school of political thought (corriente política partidaria) 
with a Peronist background that first emerged in 2003 in Argentina, centred around the figures 
of presidents Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007-2011, 
2011-2015), who were a couple until the death of Kirchner in October 2010. As university 
students in the 1970s, they were militants in the Juventud Peronista (Peronist Youth, part of 
the Peronist Left) and later joined the Partido Justicialista (PJ), where they developed their 
political careers22. Interestingly, even if los Kirchners, as the couple is called, have been 
identified with the PJ Peronista, their supporters do not coincide with the traditional definition 
of Peronismo and many Peronists in fact oppose them23. Indeed, the heterogeneous 
composition of Kirchnerismo’s members and supporters and its frequently shifting alliances 
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have prompted observers to see this school of political thought as a “complex puzzle still 
searching for some of its pieces” (Schurman 2006) 24. In this context, the letter “K” has come 
to be identified with Kirchnerismo and the kirchneristas (for example, the radicals K), 
whereas those who oppose them, as much within as outside Peronismo, have come to call 
themselves anti-kirchneristas or members of anti-kirchnerismo.  
 
Kirchnerismo has been defined by a number of political-ideological postulates that 
became public policy (terrain of governmental action) during the presidencies of Kirchner and 
Fernandez. To start with, Kirchnerismo has been devoted to the defense of human rights; in 
particular, to the prosecution of those who committed human rights violations during the 
“Dirty War” or Proceso de Reorganización Nacional (1976-1983) and were later on granted 
immunity from prosecution by the governments of Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989) and Carlos S. 
Menem (1989-1999)25. Kirchnerismo has also strongly rejected neoliberalism and its 
associated policies, forcibly opposing the multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements 
pursued by the United States26. To this extent, the Ks have engaged in an economic policy of 
desarrollismo (industrialist development) that solidly supports the MERCOSUR. 
Kirchnerismo has sought to rebuild a national capitalism that, through the valorization of 
Argentinean production, could re-create the conditions necessary for upward social mobility. 
In this regard, a model based on a “virtuous cycle”—predicated on the notion that improving 
competitiveness and reducing costs would fuel economic growth—was implemented. This 
model was to produce higher levels of economic activity, higher governmental revenues and 
budget surpluses, thus permitting higher levels of public investment and better infrastructure, 
all in a context of equal access to education, health care and decent housing27. Moreover, 
Kirchnerismo has worked to strengthen Argentina’s relationships with the non-neoliberal 
countries of Latin America, notably Venezuela, Ecuador, Cuba and Bolivia, while striving to 
establish a “South American economic axis” with Brazil28.  
 
In 2010, polls indicated that N. Kirchner would win the presidential elections of 2011 
despite the 2008 crisis, the strike of the ruralistas (agro-producers), and the 2009 near-
electoral defeat (the government won by only 2 points, while losing popular support compared 
to 2007) (Aritz Recalde, January 2010, personal communication). Kirchner died of a heart 
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attack on October 27, 2010, leaving a nation in sorrow and uncertainty. During my fieldwork, 
I witnessed to what extent his death mobilized diverse social groups across the lines of 
political allegiance and socio-economic class, who spontaneously gathered in public places to 
express their condolences and sorrow. Formal tribute was paid by a number of foreign 
presidents, UNASUR and the United Nations. In December 2011, C. Fernández won the 
presidential election with more than 54% of the vote, which made her the first woman to be 
elected president in Argentina. Not only did she obtain the largest number of votes since the 
return to democracy in Argentina in 1983, but her victory over the candidate ranked second, 
Hermes Binner from the Frente Amplio Progresista, who obtained 16.8% of the vote, 
constitutes an unprecedented advantage in the country’s electoral history.  
 
In what follows, I present the core strategies deployed by the Kirchners to reinvent 
Argentina as a diverse and inclusive nation, and pay particular attention to the measures that 
most affected Bolivians, Peruvians and Paraguayans in the country during the first decade of 
the 2000s29. These migrants’ enhanced access to a number of social, economic and political 
rights resulted from public policies that sought to re-incorporate into the system, that is, into 
productive and meaningful social interaction, a wide range of social groups that had been 
expelled from it over the previous decade. To counteract the social, economic and political 
exclusion generated by the 1990s’ neoliberal model, the Kirchners fostered inclusion by 
providing universal access to public goods and services as well as by ensuring equal treatment 
by the state. Under these circumstances, migrants, along with a number of other disadvantaged 
groups, became entitled to a wide range of rights as a result of being inhabitants of the nation, 
whatever their residency status30.  
 
ARGENTINA BECOMES MORE INCLUSIVE AND DIVERSE 
 
An Inclusive Federalism Attentive to the Particular Needs of Provinces and Localities  
 
For the Kirchners, redressing the injuries inflicted on the nation demanded not only dramatic 
changes in public policy and state priorities but also a reinvention of the nation itself, which 
was to become inclusive, diverse and Latin American. Fighting against the centralism that had 
historically silenced the particularities of the country’s provinces, the government fostered a 
broader and more all-encompassing notion of “we and all” (nosotros y todos).  In this regard, a 
 64 
new National Ministry of Education was to engineer a national space able to integrate the 
developments of provinces and serve as a surface for inscribing an “Us”. The teacher was 
conceived as an agent of transmission and re-creation of culture, whereas the school was 
thought to be a crucial social institution in the binding of what was broken and fragmented, by 
building bridges between past and future and by incorporating the diverse provincial and local 
knowledge that had been accumulated throughout the country’s history31. In addition, in order 
to overcome the educational, social and economic differences between provinces, a multitude 
of ministries and secretariats were given the task of adapting national programs to regional and 
local realities32. By basing national planning on the distinctive needs of provinces, the 
government strove to redress the asymmetric distribution of the country’s poverty, which had 
become structural and increasingly heterogeneous over the previous three decades. The 
interplay of two sets of processes contributed to the consolidation of poverty.  Argentina’s 
historical centralism had continued to concentrate public resources and opportunities in the 
nation’s metropolises, mostly in the GBA33, whereas the 1990s’ decentralization policies 
(políticas de descentralización) had led to an almost complete retreat of the state from its 
former managerial and financial responsibilities at the municipal and provincial levels, thus, 
accentuating historical disparities in the allocation of national resources (Lo Vuolo 1998). 
 
Three national programs illustrate Kirchnerismo’s efforts to redress the historically 
unequal distribution of public resources in Argentina through the implementation of an 
inclusive federalism attentive to the particular needs of provinces and localities. The National 
Plan of Local Development and Social Economy Manos a la Obra (“Let’s get down to work”) 
was created to generate employment and social development among the sectores sociales con 
menos recursos (social groups with the least resources in society). Combining subsidies, 
credits and training, this plan sought to improve the competitiveness and commercialization of 
social undertakings at the local and regional levels. Considering employment as the best 
mechanism of social integration, the government endorsed “integral projects” that responded 
to the needs of particular communities. Many of the Bolivians who participated in my 
research, and who were living in the partido of La Plata’s rural area called Las Quintas, 
benefited from this program, mostly in the form of technical assistance from an agronomist. 
Another program that responded to the “particularities and customs” of the country’s regions 
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was the national food security plan known as El Hambre Más Urgente (“the most urgent 
hunger”), which sought to secure people’s access to a sufficient and adequate diet that was 
respectful of local traditions. A number of social actors—including municipal and provincial 
governments, schools, health community centres/centros de salud, NGOs and citizens—
worked together under the coordination of the national government to support public and 
community efforts. Many of the migrant families whose members I interviewed, who were 
living in urban areas of the partido of La Plata and struggling to make ends meet, benefited 
from a wide range of goods and services delivered by this plan. This was particularly the case 
for single parent families (mostly led by women), and for low-income families with young 
children and pregnant women. Finally, the national plan known as Familias (Families) set out 
to promote the integration and development of families in vulnerable situations, that is, living 
under precarious conditions, and whose heads lacked employment, by helping to strengthen 
family bonds and citizenship rights while creating an “identity sphere” at the community level. 
Its subsidies served to improve families’ living conditions and to develop their productive 
capacities34. Many of the migrant families living in urban areas of the partido who participated 
in my study benefited from this plan, receiving various subsidies, increased access to health 
care and support for sports activities geared toward children and youth. These three national 
plans were cornerstones of Kirchnerismo’s efforts to consolidate a diverse and inclusive 
Argentina, and, along with its Política de Recuperación de Derechos Sociales (Recovery of 
Social Rights Policy), notably improved migrants’ socio-economic circumstances over the 
2000s.  
 
Restoring the Levelling Role to Public Education and Health Care 
 
The Recovery of Social Rights Policy included a vast and varied range of initiatives in all 
areas of public reach and targeted not only those groups traditionally considered the most 
vulnerable, but also a new highly diversified range of people, whose circumstances had 
dramatically deteriorated during the 1990s. From the point of view of this policy, the 
vulnerable were: children (notably those not attending school, working and/or living under 
highly precarious conditions); women (especially those who were poor and pregnant and/or 
heads of single parent families); the elderly (who as a social group were increasingly 
impoverished and lacked access to public safety nets); the unemployed or precariously 
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employed and their families (who often lived under extremely marginal conditions and worked 
in the exploitative and unsafe informal sector); people with disabilities; homosexuals and 
aboriginal peoples35. As beneficiaries of this policy, these social groups were able to access a 
large number of tax-free subsidies, universal pensions and different forms of credit (see 
Appendix C for more information). Ultimately, these measures were predicated on two central 
goals: a) to restore the universal character of public education and health care, and b) to 
restore the dignifying and inclusive role of regulated employment. In what follows, I present 
the initiatives deployed under the Recovery of Social Rights Policy that most impacted 
Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans in Argentina during the first decade of the 2000s.  
The government’s commitment to guaranteeing the “integral protection” of children 
and adolescents (embodied in the new law 26.06136) was apparent in the strategies 
implemented by the new National Secretariat of Childhood, Adolescence and Family. Among 
the most significant was the Asignación Universal por Hijo para Protección Social (Decree 
1602), which consists of a monthly, non-taxable allowance paid to one of the parents, tutors or 
consanguineous relatives (to the third degree) for each minor in their care, who is under 18 
years of age, or regardless of age in the case of a person with disabilities  (discapacitado), as 
long as the person whom they are in charge of is not employed, emancipated or receiving 
other allowances stipulated by Law 24.714 (Ley de Asignaciones Familiares/Law of Family 
allowances/stipends). Also concerned with the healthy development of children were the 
National Program of Infantile Development known as Primeros Años, the School Health 
Program Sanidad Escolar and the national vaccination campaigns. In order to secure the full 
participation of vulnerable children and adolescents in the education system, the National 
Program of Inclusive Education was implemented37 and secondary school was improved and 
made compulsory. Along with these initiatives, substantial funds were allocated to financing 
educational infrastructure and equipment, teachers’ salaries and training, literacy campaigns, 
school materials and scholarships38. The varied measures deployed by the new Secretaría 
Nacional de Niñez, Adolescencia y Familia substantially improved the circumstances of 
children and youth who, along with their families, were living under very precarious 
conditions in the 2000s. These included impoverished migrant families; indeed, those who 
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participated in my research (predominantly living in urban and peripheral areas) benefited 
enormously from these complementary measures.  
The government worked to consolidate a Sistema Nacional de Salud (National System 
of Health Care) that would guarantee equal (universal) access for the whole population. 
Engaging provincial and municipal governments as well as private and community social 
actors, this health care network focused on prevention and primary health care (atención 
primaria). Central to this new system were public hospitals, counterbalancing the highly 
segmented access to sanitary conditions, and the Centros Integradores Comunitarios, serving 
as central service points for various public services in the areas of social policy, health care 
and economic development. In addition, a new National Policy of Prescribed Drugs (through 
the REMEDIAR Program) was established to give out free generic prescription drugs to those 
who could not afford them39. Together, these measures sought to restore the historic levelling 
role to public health care, which, along with public education, had previously balanced out 
inequalities between social classes in Argentina.  
As a result of the diverse initiatives implemented under the umbrella of the Recovery 
of Social Rights Policy, the circumstances of many deeply impoverished people, non-migrants 
and migrants alike, improved markedly40. For the Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans living 
in the partido of La Plata, these measures were particularly important for at least two reasons. 
First, many of them could not even afford the health care and education services that were 
considered public in their countries of origin. Migrants often mentioned that Argentina’s 
universal (free) access to public school and health care were the two most important things 
that the country had given their families, allowing them to fulfill their dreams of greater 
upward social mobility. In Peru, Bolivia and Paraguay, educational achievement is highly 
regarded and is often associated with greater upward social mobility. Yet, for most of those 
who decide to migrate to Argentina, its cost in their countries of origin is such that it remains 
out of reach. The same applies to health care for poor families, who cannot even afford a 
minor medical intervention without compromising their financial stability. Second, these 
initiatives countered the unconstitutional practices endorsed by the government during the 
1990s, which forced health care workers and education practitioners to denounce 
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undocumented migrants and prevent their gaining access to these universal public services 
(Recalde 2006-a).  
“El Trabajo Esclavo Mata”: Reducing Informal and Precarious Employment 
In the area of employment, the government deployed a very active campaign of regularization 
in order to improve work quality while reducing informal labour 41. Considering remunerated, 
regulated work to be a crucial mechanism of social inclusion that could facilitate wealth 
distribution and economic growth, the government introduced the Ley de Ordenamiento 
Laboral (Law 25.877) in 2004. This law not only made it compulsory for employers to 
register their workers but also expanded the state’s oversight mechanisms to ensure its full 
enactment42. Under this new law, the Plan de Regularización del Trabajo (Employment 
Regularization Plan) guided the inspection of companies, and particularly of those with 
between five and fifty employees, where the highest number of unregistered workers were to 
be found. In addition, the Reglamentación de Presunciones Laborales of 201043 equipped the 
AFIP (Federal Administration of Public Revenues) with the Método de Interpretación de la 
Realidad Económica, which allowed the government to estimate the contributions that 
employers should have paid in cases where workers were either not or under-registered. The 
new law also established clear procedures on how and when employers should fulfill their 
obligations (in terms of registering workers and making contributions) while putting in place 
rigorous sanctions for those who did not provide the necessary documentation or who 
hindered workers’ regularization44.  
This approach to managing informality represented a drastic shift from the 1990s, 
when the government had punished workers for the precarious situations in which they were 
being forced to work rather than focusing on abusive employers. When employees were 
“caught working under the table” (in the language of Menem’s government), they often 
became prey to a number of further injustices such as having to pay unaffordable fines and 
automatically losing their jobs. When those working precariously were undocumented 
migrants from neighbouring nations, they could also be incarcerated and even deported 
(Recalde 2006-a). Submerging migrants in precarious employment by making it almost 
impossible for them to obtain their papers had been crucial to Menem’s government in two 
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important ways. First, it provided a scapegoat (the “cheating”, “illegal” migrant) that could be 
blamed for the crisis resulting from the government’s neoliberal policies. Second, it permitted 
the government and its supporters to economically and politically exploit migrants’ 
vulnerability (Recalde 2006-a). In this regard, Kirchnerismo moved away from the previous 
decade’s “blame the victim” approach. Rather, it penalized those who in fact created and 
reproduced informality—the employers who avoided making mandatory contributions—and 
also enforced safety regulations.  
Interestingly enough, this set of regularization strategies was particularly effective in 
the construction and textile sectors45. These were labour niches in the Gran Buenos Aires 
(GBA) where informality had proliferated during the 1990s and that were almost exclusively 
peopled by migrants. While the construction sector had come to be identified during the 1990s 
with Paraguayans, Bolivians and Peruvians in the GBA, the textile industry had been 
considered Asian territory since the 1980s, only occasionally hiring migrants from 
neighbouring nations as cheap labour during the early 1990s. In 2010, construction work was 
still seen as “belonging” to Bolivians, Paraguayans and Peruvians while textile production had 
increasingly opened up to them as employees and self-employed workers, even if the industry 
was still predominantly controlled by Asian groups.   
The regularization campaign implemented by the government during the 2000s was in 
fact a response to a dramatic incident resulting from the pernicious combination of often 
undocumented migration and precarious employment. On March 30, 2006, six Bolivians, four 
of them children, were killed in Buenos Aires by the explosion of a kitchen gas cylinder that 
set fire to a textile shop where they worked and lived46. This terrible incident brought to light 
two sets of interrelated issues: a) the precarious living conditions and exploitative working 
circumstances of some undocumented migrants and their families (Acosta et al 2007, Pacecca 
and Courtis 2006)47, and b) a regrettable lack of regulations both at the border and in the 
national capital that made it possible to exploit undocumented migrants at clandestine textile 
shops and construction sites (Pacecca and Courtis 2006, Acosta et al 2007)48. The magnitude 
of the case triggered crossed accusations among national officials and those of Buenos Aires, 
the Bolivian Consulate, textile shop owners and the big clothing brands that buy the 
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production of these shops. The political juncture also contributed to the government’s prompt 
reaction to this tragedy, since Argentina wanted to keep Bolivia as its energy partner, and the 
former Buenos Aires mayor had had to resign the previous year due to the death of almost 200 
people resulting from a nightclub catching fire. Under these circumstances, the national 
government authorized Buenos Aires city to inspect private residences where many of the 
textile shops were located, control the hygiene and safety of workplaces, and launch an 
awareness campaign to encourage the submission of complaints under the slogan el trabajo 
esclavo mata (“slavery work kills”). As a result of 1,655 operations being conducted, 502 
shops were closed down, which provoked protests among Bolivians, who sought to defend 
their employment (Pacecca and Courtis 2006). In response to these issues, the federal 
government deployed an intensive regularization campaign and launched a documentation 
program for migrants. Kirchnerismo’s emphasis on enforcing regulated work and 
documenting migrants has been also interpreted as an efficient strategy for increasing public 
revenues by securing tax contributions from registered employees, who become new 
taxpayers, and from employers (I will return to this issue when I examine the new Migration 
Law in a later section).  
In the context of its regularization campaign, Kirchnerismo also put in place a régimen 
de empleo for domestic workers in 200549 that for the first time sought to regulate this 
occupation50. In Argentina, domestic labour or empleo doméstico has been mainly done by 
internal and international migrant women, who, working behind closed doors, have often been 
subjected to abusive and exploitative working conditions. In the GBA, Paraguayan and 
Peruvian women gradually replaced internal migrants in the course of the late 1980s and, by 
the 2010s, they were seen as monopolizing this labour niche51. The situation of domestic 
workers had worsened over the 1990s, when the government’s laissez-faire economic model 
along with the criminalization of migrants from neighbouring nations permitted a number of 
rights violations to be committed against these migrant women (Recalde 2006-a). To redress 
the situation, their new labour regime granted these workers a number of rights, including paid 
vacations, maternity and sickness leaves, severance pay, and an eight hour workday with extra 
pay when working overtime and holidays. This regime sought to make domestic workers’ 
legal status equivalent to that of other workers in the country, who were already protected by 
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labour legislation and collective agreements. According to the Ministry of Labour, almost 
1,000,000 people worked in the domestic sector in Argentina in 2010 and 90% of them were 
not properly registered. By August of that year, 400,000 of these workers had registered 
themselves in the AFIP 52. In line with Kirchnerismo’s commitment to youth protection, the 
new regime limits the number of hours that can be worked by adolescents (to a maximum of 6 
hours per day or 36 hours per week among those aged 16 to 18 years old), and increases the 
minimum age of employment from 14 to 16 years of age53. My fieldwork in La Plata and 
Buenos Aires showed that this new regime is perceived by employers and employees alike as 
an important first step toward redressing the historical abuses endured by women working in 
this sector. Many of the Peruvian and Paraguayan women I interviewed who were domestic 
workers in La Plata were already benefiting from the new regime’s labour rights, with, for 
instance, pension and health care contributions now being made by employers and employees. 
Finally, Kirchnerismo’s efforts to “rescatar el campo” also benefited migrants from 
neighbouring nations in the partido of La Plata. During the 1990s, agricultural production had 
been deregulated, “set free to play by the rules of the market”, as it was often put. While 
having devastating effects on small and medium-sized producers, this gave enormous benefits 
to a few big landowners, who were allowed to produce, commercialize and export at will and 
by their own rules. To reverse this situation, Kirchnerismo sought to revitalize and 
democratize agricultural production by supporting small and medium-sized producers. They 
were provided with financial assistance, including small subsidies to help with buying seeds or 
to improve infrastructure, and technical assistance from agronomists 54. Many horticulturalist 
Bolivian families in Las Quintas (a rural area of the partido of La Plata) were able to get 
technical assistance from an agronomist paid for by the government.  
Results of Kirchnerismo’s Policies and the Impact of the International Financial Crisis 
In this section, I have shown how Kirchnerismo endeavoured to shape Argentina into an 
inclusive and diverse nation during the 2000s by embracing the distinctiveness of provinces 
and their inhabitants, as well as by seeking to reduce the increasingly heterogeneous 
distribution of poverty in the country. Kirchnerismo sought, among other things, to counter 
hegemonic discourses that portrayed Buenos Aires as representing the reality of Argentina as a 
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whole and to reduce the conflicts that this distortion had created. To these ends, Kirchnerismo 
pursued three sets of interconnected strategies: (a) giving visibility and voice to social actors 
historically forgotten by the state and consequently erased from the nation’s memory; (b) 
restoring social, economic and political rights to those groups whose members’ lives had been 
made increasingly precarious over the previous decades; and (c) striving to re-incorporate into 
society, that is, into dignifying, productive and meaningful social interaction, a variety of 
social actors who had been excluded from the system over the course of the 1990s. These 
strategies significantly benefited Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans in the country.  
 
As a result of Kirchnerismo’s policies, Argentina experienced unusually high 
economic growth between 2003 and 2008 (its average annual rate during this period was 8%), 
a notable decrease in unemployment rates (from over 20% to 8%) and a steady drop in poverty 
and inequality indicators (in 2006, the Gini coefficient had dropped to 1999-2001 levels) 
(Cruces and Gasparini 2010)55.  According to official statistics, registered employment 
increased (by more than 15% among the inspected companies and by 10% among the workers 
overseen during inspections), whereas the country’s tendency towards increasing rates of 
unregistered unemployment was reversed (dropping from 49% in late 2003 to 36.3% in late 
2008)56. Under these circumstances, the implementation of new taxes and the cessation of 
Argentina’s international debt payments led to a fiscal surplus that helped to stabilize the 
economy. This period came to an end in 2007/2008, however, as a result of the international 
financial crisis of 2007/2008 (Cruces and Gasparini 2010). 
 
At the same time, the social tensions and political instability of 2001-2002 were 
brought to heel by two core measures: a) an innovative program of monetary transfers 
benefiting the poor, which translated into an expanded social protection network reaching 20% 
of the country’s households, and b) the strengthening of labour institutions thanks to 
Kirchnerismo’s support of enhanced negotiating powers for unions (Cruces and Gasparini 
2010). These measures, along with those included under the umbrella of the Recovery of 
Social Rights Policy, illustrate the extent to which Kirchnerismo drew on the developments of 
Peronismo histórico to formulate its public policy. Perón’s notion of justicia social (social 
justice)—central to his doctrine and from which its name, Justicialismo, is derived (see also 
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Appendix C)—is paralleled by Kirchnerismo’s view of cuidadanía inclusiva (inclusive 
citizenship). The latter is based on two main postulates:  a) a citizen is such only if he or she 
can effectively exercise his or her rights, and b) full citizenship (ciudadanía plena) does not 
exist without the essentials for a “reasonably healthy and active life”57. In both cases, the 
terms social justice and inclusive citizenship articulate core notions of social inclusion, 
equality and fairness, and imply a strong federal state that guarantees a) quality employment, 
which is conceived as a central mechanism of social inclusion that dignifies and empowers a 
person, and b) universal access to a wide range of public services, which are conceptualized as 
the right of all inhabitants in the country. The regimes built upon these notions and the utopian 
societies that their leaders envisioned are in sharp contrast with former exclusionist models, 
both the oligarchic (before Peronismo) and neoliberal (during the 1990s).  
 
In February 2009, however, the percentage of the population having a negative image 
of President Fernández increased from 39% to 41% (while the percentage of those with a 
positive image remained stable at 29%) in the context of the international economic recession, 
claims for transparency in the government’s criticized management of the INDEC (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos; Noriega 2010), increasing insecurity in the country’s 
metropolises, the questioning of some influential public officers, charges of 
embezzlement against the Kirchners and their involvement in the practice of open-cast mining 
(Svampa and Antonelli 2009). Political opponents to Kirchnerismo have also argued that 
despite Fernández’s electoral victory of 2011, including the regained control over both 
chambers of Congress, her second presidential mandate has proved harder than the first one.  
In what follows, I examine a core initiative implemented by Kirchnerismo that 
exemplifies a space of governmentality where the strategies to make Argentina inclusive and 
diverse also contribute to reinforcing its Latin American allegiances.  
BRIDGING DIVERSITIES: KIRCHNERISMO INVESTS THE MEDIA WITH A NEW 
MORALITY 
The promulgation of a new law regulating the media in 2009 was integral to Kirchnerismo’s 
goal of forging a diverse and inclusive Argentina oriented toward Latin American integration. 
Known as the Nueva Ley de Medios (New Law of Media), Law 26.52258 has been considered 
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crucial in the promotion of cultural and informational democracy (Aritz Recalde 2009-b). By 
regulating the media and developing mechanisms to decentralize and strengthen competition 
in this sector, the law has helped to universalize access and lower the price of new information 
technologies59. Core to these reforms has been the new character and role Kirchnerismo 
attributes to the media, which has become a social activity of public interest (de interés 
público). By investing the media services with a new morality, the government equipped itself 
with a powerful tool to aid in furthering the socio-cultural development of the Argentinean 
population60 while strengthening Latin American integration. Kirchnerismo drew on the 
developments of Peronismo histórico in order to design this new law; namely, on its 
sanctioning of the first Ley de Medios (Law 14.241/53) in 1953, and the creation of TELAM 
(the Argentinean National News Agency) in 1945 and Canal 7 (the public TV Channel) in 
1951 (Aritz Recalde, 2009-b).  
The regulation of the media services was aimed at redressing the negative 
consequences of the so-called “free press” encouraged during the 1990s. The privatization and 
deregulation policies implemented by Menem’s government had led to greater monopolization 
and commercialization of the country’s media services, which were at the time considered to 
be a lucrative activity belonging to the private sector. As a result, the media had become a 
highly profitable business for a select few, who reproduced the neoliberal market logic of 
segmented access according to income (Aritz Recalde 2011-a, Novick 2008)61. Under these 
circumstances, only some influential economic actors and the commercial press were given 
the freedom to express themselves. Kirchnerismo’s new media law seeks to remedy this 
situation in three important ways. First, it creates an autonomous and decentralized entity—
Autoridad Federal de Servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual—to implement, interpret and 
ensure compliance with the new law62. Second, it sets a maximum number of licenses per 
license holder and type of media, and regulates the duration of licenses in order to prevent the 
formation of monopolies and oligopolies63. Third, it is aimed at preventing the 
“foreignization” of the nation’s media in terms of ownership and content64.  
Kirchnerismo’s goal of forging a diverse and inclusive Argentina oriented toward 
Latin American integration becomes most apparent in this law’s regulation of the production 
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and dissemination of media content. The new law establishes that a minimum of 60% of 
television content has to be national, while cable services must include at least one channel 
from MERCOSUR and other Latin American countries. A minimum of 50% of broadcasts by 
private radio stations must be produced in-house (including local news) while 30% of the 
music played must be of national origin—an exception being so-called “thematic” or “foreign 
communities” programming, namely, that produced by migrants and their descendants, most 
of whom come from MERCOSUR countries. In addition, the new law reserves 33% of regular 
radio broadcasts for NGOs, authorizes aboriginal peoples to broadcast radio and TV programs, 
and guarantees equal opportunity access to people with sensorial disabilities (by making it 
compulsory to include closed captioning, sign language and audio-description on TV and 
cable broadcasts). More generally, the law grants universal access to sporting events and the 
premieres of national films on television65, and commits the government to a) supporting the 
production of quality children’s educational and cultural content for radio and television66, and 
b) disseminating scientific and artistic knowledge through these mediums67.   
Moving away from the neoliberal model of the 1990s, this law invests the media with a 
new morality by turning communication and information services into a powerful tool for the 
“common good” of the nation. In this regard, the law’s close regulation of  media ownership 
and content has been central to Kirchnerismo’s goal of universalizing access to recreational 
and quality programming through new technologies while preventing foreign domination (in 
terms of access and content). This law gives visibility and rights to a number of social actors 
whose voices had been historically silenced, including aboriginal peoples, migrant 
communities, the elderly, people with disabilities, and, more generally, Argentinians who are 
not from Buenos Aires. By granting these groups new entitlements, Kirchnerismo’s inclusive 
federalism, which permeates the programming of public television and radio68, reinforces the 
same diversity that was being created through the implementation of other public policies (see 
previous section).  
The new law has also allowed the government to powerfully connect the nation’s 
diversity to that of the wider Latin American region. The inclusion of Latin American 
broadcasts as part of regular television, cable and radio programming brings home the ethno-
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cultural, socio-economic and political diversity of the wider region while portraying it in a 
positive light—which is in contrast with the contemptuous attitude towards other Latin 
American countries endorsed under Menem’s Americanization model. In addition, by granting 
migrant communities, most of whom are from neighbouring nations, the right to produce 
media, Kirchnerismo has fulfilled two purposes. It has connected the multifaceted realities of 
migrants’ countries of origin to their contributions to Argentina while institutionalizing its 
commitment to regional integration and the respect for migrant rights.  
The recognition of intra-regional migrants’ present and past contributions to the 
development of Argentina has also been pursued by other means. While schools were to teach 
regional and global histories that focused on Latin America (instead of on Europe or the 
United States as had been the case before)69, Kirchnerismo has given these migrants renewed 
visibility in public discourse and events (I return to this issue in a later section of this chapter). 
The preferential treatment given to MERCOSUR nationals is most apparent in Argentina’s 
new migration law of December 2003, which grants them rights equal to those of 
Argentinians. In what follows, I examine the strategies deployed by Kirchnerismo to construct 
a positive visibility for the Peruvians, Paraguayans and Bolivians in the country; namely, its 
articulation of a new “legality” for them after a decade of criminalization. Central to this 
endeavour has been Kirchnerismo’s commitment to “Latin Americanize” Argentina and to 
further regional integration. Through a combination of foreign and domestic policies, the 
government has confronted ingrained national myths claiming the exclusive European 
ancestry and character of the Argentinian nation. To accomplish this, Kirchnerismo entered 
into dialogue with the region. 
DEEPENING REGIONAL INTEGRATION  
 
The reinvention of Argentina during the first decade of the 2000s was a political project that 
did not limit itself to making the nation inclusive and diverse, but that also involved reshaping 
the country’s presence and agency abroad. In this regard, the synergy created between the 
strategies deployed by Kirchnerismo in the domestic sphere and the alliances it developed 
regionally and internationally has been of fundamental importance. This required a reshaping 
of Argentina’s national identity and founding myths while consolidating a multifaceted, 
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dynamic and democratic state on the international scene. As Peronismo histórico had done 
before, Kirchnerismo developed a highly diversified foreign policy supported by intensive 
presidential diplomacy. Its multilateralism has sought to preserve Argentina’s autonomous 
decision-making capacity while deepening regional integration and strengthening relationships 
with other regions considered vital to the production of national goods and services. 
Kirchnerismo has also diversified its bilateral strategies, increasing Argentina’s presence in 
Asia, opening up new markets in Africa and consolidating traditional markets in Europe and 
North America. Argentinean embassies have played a crucial role in the development of a 
national and integrated policy by promoting the country’s foreign trade and tourism abroad (as 
had been done under Peronismo). Kirchnerismo’s efforts to strengthen Argentina’s image as a 
peace-keeper on the international scene have been apparent in the country’s active 
participation in the United Nations’ peace and relief missions70.  
 
Argentina’s new history would integrate each province’s particular development while 
exposing the prevailing unequal distribution of resources and opportunities. Reshaping the 
nation’s official past was fundamental in creating a new present as well as in formulating a 
different future. Kirchner and Fernández set out to transform a “European” nation into a 
“Latin American” one via three types of measures. First, they sought to strengthen 
MERCOSUR while working to consolidate other strategic alliances in the region such as 
UNASUR (Unión de Naciones Sudamericanas) and TeleSur. Second, the government 
capitalized on the celebrations surrounding Argentina’s bicentennial in 2010 by 
institutionalizing the nation’s renewed (Latin American) origins and by giving its diverse and 
inclusive character powerful performative impetus (issues that I examine in the next section). 
Third, Kirchnerismo passed a new migration law in December 2003 that grants nationals of 
the MERCOSUR rights equal to those enjoyed by Argentinians (which I examine in a later 
section of this chapter). In this section, I analyze the first of these strategies. 
 
During the first decade of the 2000s, the government presented Latin American 
integration as an integral part of Argentina’s foreign policy, with the MERCOSUR as a crucial 
vehicle for the former71. In this context, Argentina has actively participated in the elaboration 
of measures for managing intra-regional migration, which have led to the emergence of a new 
 78 
political agenda in the region (Domenech 2007). Brazilian presidents Lula Ignacio Da Silva 
and Dilma Rousseff have also played a crucial role in steering regional integration in a new 
direction, as I will show shortly. This has meant consolidating a more multifaceted 
MERCOSUR by furthering its political, social and institutional aspects while strengthening 
other strategic alliances in Latin America. 
 
By the early 2000s, MERCOSUR’s unfulfilled promises and the renewed asymmetries 
that its initial development brought about were evident (see chapter I) and became the 
rationale for a renewed integration within a context of shifting regional politics. 
MERCOSUR’s second phase has sought to invest integration with a human face while 
enhancing its economic aspects. The bloc has advanced human rights, strengthened 
democratic institutions and fought against poverty in the region72. Protecting the environment, 
promoting sustainable development and consolidating equitable socio-economic growth73 have 
been also viewed as integral to MERCOSUR’s goals. During this period, the bloc expanded its 
membership by incorporating Peru (2003), Colombia and Ecuador (2005) as associated states, 
while Venezuela has been in the process of becoming its fifth member state since 2006 (see 
Appendix C). Known as MERCOSUR ampliado, the enlarged bloc has tried to consolidate 
integration’s institutional and juridical aspects, which has led to talk of MERCOSUR’s new 
institutional stage74.  
 
This evolution did not take place in a vacuum but rather was representative of two 
sorts of shifts taking place in the region’s geopolitics. On the one hand, there has been a turn 
away from the 1990s’ neoliberalism and its disastrous consequences: namely, the economic, 
political and cultural dependency imposed by foreign aid through harsh privatization and 
structural budgetary adjustment policies that were widely implemented in Latin America 
(Black 2002). On the other hand, there has also been a shift toward alternative futures and 
different ways of conceiving nationhood and statehood. Strengthened democratic regimes 
have envisaged more equitable societies, with less poverty and crime and healthier living 
conditions, while protecting human rights and fostering sustainable development (Novick 
2010). Kirchnerismo’s project of “Latin Americanizing” Argentina has been part of this 
challenging yet creative juncture in Latin America. This period has been diversely interpreted 
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as a turn to the left in South American politics (Lazo-Civinades 2005), as a 
transnationalization of Latin America through regional integration (Armony 2011) or even as 
an instance of opening the door to a new phase of re-establishing national foundations in the 
region, leading toward democratic consolidation (Novick 2011)75. Thus, although not unique 
in its efforts to make Argentina diverse, inclusive and Latin American, Kirchnerismo’s 
contribution to the advancement of regional integration has nonetheless been crucial. This has 
become apparent in two particular ways.  
 
First, Kirchnerismo, along with its Brazilian counterpart the Partido dos 
Trabalhadores—under the presidencies of Luis Ignacio Lula Da Silva (2003-2010) and that of 
his successor Dilma Rousseff (since January 2011)—have played a decisive role in moving 
MERCOSUR away from its neoliberal, mercantile origins. Specifically, Kirchnerismo’s 
commitment to defending human rights, coupled with the Brazilian Workers’ Party’s concern 
with social justice and workers’ rights, have been vital to envisioning an alternative 
integration. These two political forces (leading two of the most powerful economies in the 
region) have been extremely influential in setting the terms of negotiations within the 
MERCOSUR as well as for implementing agreements signed by the bloc (Serna 2001, Moniz 
Bandeira 2004, Aritz Recalde 2004, 2006-b, 2010-a, MERCOSUR’s official website). The 
alliance between Argentina and Brazil in this period, which has managed to overcome the 
historical rivalry between these countries (Moniz Bandeira 2004), has led to developing strong 
interdependence based on joint actions and coordinated efforts to strengthen the MERCOSUR 
(Aritz Recalde 2010-a) 76. Without a doubt, regional integration’s second phase has been 
marked by the leadership of Kirchnerismo and its Brazilian counterpart.  
 
Second, Kirchnerismo has been a vital political force in advancing other strategic 
alliances in Latin America, namely, by helping reshape UNASUR’s role in the region and by 
strongly supporting TeleSur. UNASUR (Unión de Naciones Sudamericanas) was created in 
December 2004 under the name Comunidad Suramericana de Naciones (CSN), and in April 
2007 adopted its new name77. UNASUR includes twelve states: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Suriname and Venezuela. While 
the CSN was largely concerned with political, economic and technological integration78, 
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UNASUR’s priorities have centered on fostering the integral well-being of the region’s 
populations and protecting its democratic regimes. As stipulated by its Founding Treaty of 
May 2008, UNASUR’s core objective is to constitute a space for cultural, social, economic 
and political integration among peoples in the region by giving priority to political dialogue, 
social policy, education, energy, infrastructure, funding and the environment. UNASUR seeks 
to eliminate socio-economic inequality, achieve social inclusion, encourage greater levels of 
participation by citizens, strengthen democracy and reduce asymmetries among states in the 
region, while reinforcing the sovereignty and independence of its member states79.  
 
UNASUR has proven crucial in the defense of democratic regimes in the region—
indeed, it helped defeat the 2008 attempt to destabilize the government of Evo Morales in 
Bolivia as well as the 2010 coup d’état in Ecuador. In both cases, UNASUR’s actions showed 
that integration could create a privileged consensual space for protecting democratic 
governments in the region (Novick 2010; and Aritz Recalde 2010-a). The leading role played 
by Kirchnerismo in consolidating UNASUR was publicly recognized by its member states 
when Néstor Kirchner was unanimously elected General Secretary in May 2010. Kirchner 
himself was widely seen as a fervent believer in the unity of Latin American peoples and as 
someone who fought to bring about profound changes in both Argentina and the wider region. 
Indeed, UNASUR described his death in October 2010 as “depriving Latin America of a key 
leader in the construction of a region without exclusion”80. Throughout his time with 
UNASUR, Kirchner took an active part in many initiatives with important implications for 
Latin America, such as helping facilitate the rapprochement between Colombia and 
Venezuela, defending democracy—particularly in the face of the attempted coup d’état in 
Ecuador—and pushing for the implementation of the Cláusula Demócratica para América del 
Sur. Since his death, Kirchnerismo’s role in UNASUR has been assumed by his widow, 
current Argentinean president, Cristina Fernández.  
 
Kirchnerismo has also played an important role in supporting TeleSUR: La Nueva 
Televisora del Sur, whose slogan is Nuestro Norte es el Sur (“Our North is the South” 81). 
TeleSUR is a Latin American communications-multimedia organization that aims to foster 
union between the peoples of the South, and that considers itself to be a space and a voice for 
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the construction of a new communications order. Created in 2005 as a non-profit, public 
organization by the Venezuelan Broadcasting Corporation (Corporación Venezolana de 
Radiodifusión), TeleSUR has been sponsored by seven Latin American states (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Venezuela). The promotion of an 
integrationist vision of peoples (visión integradora de los pueblos) through a certain work 
ethos (commitment, excellence, group work, social vocation, social transformation, creativity 
and ethics) has permitted TeleSUR to counterbalance the big international news chains, 
including CNN, Univisión, BBC, TVE and Deutsche Welle. The “informative and formative” 
content in its programming, which is transmitted via open signal and satellite to Latin 
America, the Antilles, the United States, Europe, North Africa and Syria, has generated strong 
reactions among some US politicians82. Kirchnerismo’s support of TeleSUR has been apparent 
since its creation through Argentina’s financial sponsorship83 and contribution of content to its 
programming (through Visión 7 Internacional, a weekly show produced in Argentina by the 
public TV network). Argentina also dedicates a large section of its News Agency TELAM to 
the promotion of peer agencies in Brazil, Venezuela, Guatemala, Mexico, Ecuador, Paraguay, 
Bolivia and Cuba as well as of TeleSUR84. 
 
Kirchnerismo’s efforts to further regional integration have strategically underlined the 
Latin American roots of the nation and the reinforced allegiances of the state. Its active role in 
a) “humanizing” MERCOSUR, b) strengthening UNASUR’s capacity to protect democracies 
in the region, and c) supporting TeleSUR’s freedom of the press and pluralist agenda has 
demonstrated Argentina’s commitment to its “Latin American-ness”. In what follows, I 
examine two other powerful strategies that Kirchnerismo deployed in pursuing its broad 
political project: the 2010 celebrations of the bicentenary and the adoption of a new migration 
law in December 2003. The former sought to usher the nation’s Latin American past into the 
present, while the latter was aimed at maintaining the state’s commitment to defending human 
rights.  
 
FROM INDEPENDENCE TO REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE BICENTENARY 
CELEBRATIONS  
 
Known as the Celebraciones del Bicentenario de la Patria, a wide range of events took place 
over the course of the year 2010 to commemorate Argentina’s 200 years of independence. 
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Celebrations began early on in all provinces, and while they were also held abroad, the core 
events took place in Buenos Aires at the Paseo del Bicentenario from May 21 to May 25, 
201085. The Paseo was conceived as a federal open-air space to commemorate the 200 years 
of the Revolución de Mayo86 together with the provinces and invited countries. A significant 
part of the 9 de Julio Avenue was taken up with six Thematic Staging Posts (Science and 
Technology, Youth and Education, Environment, Culture, Human Rights, and Work and 
Production) organized by various ministries and NGOs. These posts hosted talks and debates 
that reflected Kirchnerismo’s policy priorities. The government’s inclusive federalism was 
showcased in twenty-two Provincial Stands (portraying the provinces’ “distinctive 
identities”)87 and in the Paseo de los Sabores (a culinary fair offering traditional regional 
dishes), which included migrant groups and organizations representing the most disadvantaged 
social groups in the country. Five Country Pavillions presented artistic shows put on by 
participating countries, most of which were Latin American88. Other displays, including six 
Thematic Doors and four large stages, featured elements of Argentinean history and culture89.  
 
The wide range of artistic, historical and educational activities held at the Paseo, which 
were supported by a monumental deployment of infrastructure, gave high visibility to the 
government’s message of inclusive federalism and imbued it with powerful performative 
force90. Musical and dance performances (ranging from rock and folklore to classical and 
avant garde)91, audiovisual shows that utilized new technologies in their analysis of so-called 
broad historical national themes92, the live broadcast of an extremely popular soccer game on 
huge outdoor screens93, and a sports car race down 9 de Julio Avenue94 all contributed to 
creating a powerful atmosphere, with emotional momentum that touched even those who 
watched the celebrations from home95. The commemorations gave recognition to the daily 
work done by the government, in particular when certain large-scale performances showed the 
concrete results of its programs, plans and projects. These achievements were also portrayed 
in stands and presented in speech as the collaborative efforts of a number of new public 
institutions created by Kirchnerismo. Overall, the events of the bicentenary sought to reflect a 
federal, pluralistic and participative nation with its gaze fixed on Latin America.  
 
The government granted preferential spaces at the Paseo to the provinces, aboriginal 
peoples, migrant communities and the most disadvantaged social categories (the beneficiaries 
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of the main national social programs I have described in a previous section), which confirmed 
its commitment to the inclusive and diverse character of Argentina. These groups were not 
only given stands to showcase their “specificities”, but also mentioned prominently during 
commemorations (by highlighting public efforts to foster their “integration”) and included in 
huge parades, where a multitude of artistic expressions were featured96. These official 
demonstrations of “plurality” and “participation” were given a federalist framing that linked 
together the diverse members of the nation from historical to recent times.  
 
The government also took advantage of the celebrations to emphasize its commitment 
to the “Latin Americanness” of Argentina. Appreciation was expressed for the contributions 
made by the so-called colectividades latinoamericanas (Latin American migrant groups) in 
the country by including them in the Desfile de la Integración and the Paseo Gastronómico, 
events that for the government signalled “the fraternal union between peoples and the 
integration of Argentina to Latin America and the world”97. Referring to her Latin American 
peers, President C. Fernández remarked: “We know that our camino [path] is the same path of 
San Martín, Bolívar, Artigas and Martí”98, a comment that clearly sought to align Argentina’s 
efforts with those of other heroes of Latin America. At a presidential speech broadcast on 
National TV and Radio (Cadena Nacional) on May 25, 2010 Fernández stated that she was 
glad to celebrate the Bicentenary of Argentinean Independence with other influential Latin 
American leaders, and signalled the importance of “Latin American unity”99. Eight Latin 
American presidents participated in the celebrations (Brazilian Lula Da Silva, Paraguayan 
Fernando Lugo, Venezuelan Hugo Chávez, Ecuadorian Rafael Correa, Uruguayan José 
Mujica, Bolivian Evo Morales, Chilean Sebastián Piñera and overthrown Honduran Manuel 
Zelaya) along with nineteen representatives of other countries100.  
 
In addition to offering performative public (national) space to the colectividades and 
reinforcing regional diplomatic bonds, Fernández’s government pursued a third strategy that 
was also core to its goal of “Latin Americanizing” Argentina. Namely, the President launched 
the Salón de los Patriotas Latinoamericanos (Gallery of Latin American Patriots) on May 25, 
2010 in the company of other political leaders from the region who were participating in the 
celebrations of the Bicentenary. The gallery is located on the first floor of the Casa Rosada101 
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and has thirty-eight portraits of major Latin American political and social figures on 
permanent display, which narrate the history of the continent102. The government described the 
opening of the gallery as “a gesture that ratifies Argentina’s commitment to the advancement 
of Latin American integration”103. Coupled with the negotiations that took place at related 
events104, the launching of this gallery helped institutionalize the re-writing of the nation’s 
official past while reinforcing the renewed alliances that the state had more recently built with 
other governments in the region.  
 
Fernández’s government has implemented a number of other strategies with the goal of 
making the Bicentenary of 2010 a core component of Argentina’s official history, in particular 
vis-à-vis the Centenary of 1910105. One was la Casa del Bicentenario (the House of the 
Bicentenary) created by the Secretaría de la Cultura de la Presidencia de la Nación in Buenos 
Aires. La Casa is devoted to reflecting upon the political, social and cultural transformations 
that took place in Argentina over the two hundred year period through exhibits, debates, 
seminars, cinema, music, dance and theatre. Its goal is to examine the themes that run through 
Argentinean history, the so-called “broad historical themes”, which are not different from the 
“new national space of belonging for all” that other ministries were seeking to build (see 
previous section on Kirchnerismo’s strategies to make the nation more inclusive and diverse). 
La Casa also highlights the diversity of the nation and encourages Argentinians to rethink their 
identity so as to discuss the “type of nation that they envision for the future”106. Another 
strategy was the Web Mural Bicentenario (Mural Web of the Bicentenary), an interactive 
pedagogical tool that makes it possible to navigate through the country’s history, which was 
created by Canal Encuentro (the first TV Channel of the Ministry of Education)107, Educ.ar 
(the educational portal of the Argentinean State) 108 and the Casa del Bicentenario. The 
Mural’s website has a video library on the period from 1810 to 2010, offers an iconographical 
coverage of historical events and provides a wide range of other resources for teachers. 
Moreover, two other interactive tools about the bicentenary109 along with various new Internet 
sites allowed people to follow the celebrations, vote for who they thought were the new 
Argentinean icons and relive the events110.  
 
This varied set of educational resources has been key to Kirchnerismo’s strategies 
aimed at Latin Americanizing the nation. By narrating the (updated) official history through 
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the use of new technologies, the government has a powerful tool able to reach a wide range of 
audiences—including younger generations of students, teachers, activists, practitioners and 
citizens in general—who use Internet-based social communication tools as part of their daily 
virtual interaction. Crucial to this have been new educational policies leading to the adoption 
of new technologies by schools, public libraries and other community organizations along 
with the new media law’s emphasis on democratizing content through the use of such 
technologies. These new resources for communicating official content have become a crucial 
pedagogical tool of Kirchnerismo, effectively complementing the more traditional strategies 
being deployed to accomplish its political project.  
 
The celebrations of the Bicentennial represented an important opportunity for 
Kirchnerismo because they permitted the government to stage its efforts to forge a pluralist, 
inclusive and federalist nation while publicly ratifying its strengthened alliances in the region. 
The year-long commemorations were also key to institutionalizing Argentina’s Latin 
Americanness both domestically and abroad. The planning of these celebrations gave the 
government the opportunity to deploy different strategies for reinforcing both the new official 
version of Argentina’s national identity and the state’s role in Latin America. The use of new 
technologies in the transfer of educational content, along with the variety of performative 
representations offered at the Paseo, were powerful tools for pursuing this goal. In the end, 
these different measures made it possible for the government to materialize its project of re-
writing Argentina’s history and re-shaping its present by anchoring both more firmly to the 
region. As we will see in the next section, the adoption of a new migration law worked 
towards achieving the same goal: strengthening Argentina’s sense of Latin American 
belonging while deepening regional integration.  
 
LA NUEVA LEY DE MIGRACIONES: MAKING REGIONAL INTEGRATION A 
NATIONAL PRIORITY  
 
As discussed earlier, Kirchnerismo has considered developing South American integration to 
be indispensable, largely because it has seen Argentina’s goals of reducing inequalities and 
fighting hunger and poverty as regional priorities shared by its partner countries. Kirchnerismo 
has argued that the twin goals of integration-development and democracy-human rights 
 86 
protect and reinforce one another, and make it easier to fight against a wide range of 
inequalities111. In line with this view, Kirchnerismo introduced a new migration law.  
 
Product of the long work of a wide range of social actors (Asa and Ceriani Cernadas 
2004)112, the Ley de Migraciones 25.871 was approved by the National Congress (with the 
consensus of all political parties) in December 2003 and was adopted in January 2004; 
however, it was only enacted in May 2010113. Unlike other issues, the defense of migrants’ 
rights in Argentina did not emerge solely in response to an international juncture, but is rooted 
in the country’s political experience (Jelin 2006)114. The adoption of this new law has been 
interpreted as an historic achievement for Argentina (Novik 2010, Ceriani Cernadas and Asa 
2005, Domenech 2007) since it puts an end to the abuses and unconstitutional practices carried 
out under the previous migration law of 1981. Reflecting the national security logic of the last 
Argentinean dictatorship (1976-1983), the Ley 22.439: Ley General de Migraciones y de 
Fomento de la Inmigración, known as Ley Videla, violated a wide range of human rights. 
Contrary to what is established in the National Constitution, it did not allow “irregular” 
migrants to access primary education and forced personnel of schools, hospitals and other 
public and private institutions to denounce them. In addition, arbitrary detentions and 
expulsions were regularly conducted by the Dirección Nacional de Migraciones (DNM) and 
the auxiliary migration police (Gendarmerie, Aeronautic Police and Naval Prefecture) without 
any intervention by the judiciary (Kweitel 2001, Ceriani Cernadas and Asa 2002, Cernadas 
2003).  The pernicious effects of this law became the most prominent during Menem’s 
government, notably from 1995-1999, when migration policy was the most restrictive since 
the return to democracy  (Marmora 2004, Novick 2008). In contrast, Law 25.871 seeks to 
formulate a new national demographic policy that strengthens the country’s socio-cultural 
fabric while promoting migrants’ socio-economic integration (Novik 2010, Nejamkis and 
Rivero Sierra 2010). 
 
Under the new law, migration is seen an essential human right and the state is obliged 
to guarantee it (art.4)115. The law grants a wide range of other rights to migrants regardless of 
their migration status (even in situations of “irregularity”), including education (art.7), health 
care (art. 8), equal rights for nationals and foreigners (art. 6), “due process” in the case of 
detention and expulsion (arts. 61 and 70), free legal assistance and the services of an 
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interpreter (art. 86), participation in decisions regarding public life and the administration of 
local communities (art. 11) and family reunification (art.10) (Giustiniani ed. 2004;  Asa and 
Ceriani Cernadas 2004, 2005; Ceriani Cernadas and Asa 2005; Acosta et all 2007; Novick 
2010). Moreover, Law 25.871 focuses on regularizing undocumented migrants (art. 17) (Asa 
and Ceriani Cernadas 2005)116, an about-face from the Ley Videla’s creation of “irregularity” 
by its emphasis on policing undocumented migrants and establishing burdensome bureaucratic 
procedures.  
 
This new norm also marks the first time in the history of Argentinean migration 
legislation that a regional (Latin American) integration process has been cited (art. 28) and 
offers special recognition to nationals of the MERCOSUR ampliado (art.23- l)117. Although 
the law continues to establish residency according to traditional criteria such as work, study 
and family ties, through its “nationality criteria” (art. 23-l), it authorizes citizens of the bloc to 
remain in Argentina for a period of up to two years, which can be extended with multiple 
entries and exits (Asa and Ceriani Cernadas 2004). The core principles of this migration law 
confirm Kirchnerismo’s commitment to defending human rights and deepening regional 
integration. Nevertheless, the very long delay in its enactment along with the problems 
inherent in its initial implementation have raised serious questions about the degree to which 
official discourse and legislation have been coherent with the public strategies deployed on the 
ground to carry out the new law118.  
 
Under the aegis of the new law, the Dirección Nacional de Migraciones (DNM) 
created the Programa Nacional de Normalización Documentaria Migratoria (Decree 
836/2004) in 2004. This program was oriented towards regularizing the status of foreigners 
while setting out new policies conducive to their integration. Even though preferential 
treatment was given to MERCOSUR migrants, an amnesty was also granted to non-
MERCOSUR nationals who were in Argentina on June 30, 2004. The Plan de Regularización 
Migratoria (Decree 1169/2004) not only gave these migrants six months to obtain a temporary 
residence permit, which was valid for up to two years and could later be made permanent, but 
also suspended their expulsion (Novick 2010, Ceriani Cernadas and Asa 2005)119. Then in 
June 2005, as a result of the tragic killing of six Bolivians at a textile shop in Buenos Aires 
(see previous section on this), the DNM passed another ruling regularizing the situation of 
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nationals of the MERCOSUR ampliado (by Decree 578/2005). Known as Patria Grande 
(PG), this program entitled intra-regional migrants to obtain their temporary residence (for up 
to two years) through accelerated procedures, after which they could become permanent 
residents if they had found “licit” means of making a living (Acosta et al 2007, Domenech 
2008 and Novik 2010)120. The program, which ran from April 2006 to April 2009, was 
initially launched in Buenos Aires city and province and was later extended to other provinces. 
From the beginning, PG was accompanied by a strong awareness campaign that highlighted 
the link between migration (residency) status and official labour regularization campaigns 
(Pacecca and Courtis 2006). This program has been favourably viewed as the most important 
measure deployed by the government to guarantee the “right to identity” of the migrant 
population (Acosta et al 2007), as a step forward despite the obstacles that it faced over its 
implementation (Novick 2010), and as the most important politico-administrative instrument 
regulating immigration from MERCOSUR countries to Argentina (Nejamkis and Rivero 
Sierra 2010).  
 
PG’s implementation was divided into two stages. The first consisted of initiating 
procedures to obtain Argentinean residency, through which migrants obtained a certificado de 
residencia precaria, often simply called “la precaria” by migrants. Core to the success of 
PG’s first stage was that migrants could present any available piece of identification at a 
number of designated places, including collaborating institutions and adherent municipalities, 
in order to get their precaria. With this certificate in hand, migrants were entitled to legally 
work right away in Argentina by initiating the procedures to obtain either the CUIL (Clave 
Única de Identificación Laboral) or the CUIT (Clave única de Identificación Tributaria), 
which indicate that a worker is registered to make the mandatory contributions to retirement 
and pension plans. In addition, the precaria was valid until migrants could fill in their 
application for residency. These facilitated bureaucratic procedures, and the extended time 
permitted to undertake them allowed migrants to reside and work legally in Argentina, 
something that had been impossible during the 1990s. The operational, infrastructural and 
logistical deficiencies that permeated this decentralization have been not minor, however. The 
personnel at the collaborating agencies, most of whom were volunteers, were not trained, did 
not have the resources to properly do their work (Pacecca and Courtis 2006), and tended to be 
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overworked (Nejamkis and Rivero Sierra 2010). The second stage of the program involved 
presenting the remaining documentation, including criminal records and certified birth 
certificates, and fulfilling several other requirements, which partially changed throughout the 
implementation of the program (Nejamkis and Rivero Sierra 2010).  
 
The implementation of PG and the nationality criteria of the new migration law led to 
the regularization of 680,834 migrants, who were nationals of the MERCOSUR ampliado, 
between 2006 and 2009. These migrants obtained their precaria, temporary or permanent 
residency in Argentina. Out of the 423,712 migrants who did so through PG, most were 
Paraguayans (248,086 people), being followed by Bolivians (105,017) and Peruvians (47,464). 
At the same time, 257,123 other migrants benefited from the implementation of the 
“nationality criteria”. In this case, Bolivians constituted the largest group (97,790), being 
closely followed by Paraguayans (55,519) and Peruvians (53,625) (Novick 2010)121. These 
figures and the political discourse that accompanied them, along with the strategies deployed 
by Kirchnerismo to document migrants, have come under scholarly scrutiny (as I show 
shortly). Paradoxically, however, researchers have rarely questioned the legalistic approach 
underlying these debates, which assumes that documentation guarantees “full integration”—a 
term that in and of itself is polysemic and problematic. Two exceptions to this are Nejamkis 
and Rivero Sierra (2010) and Domenech (2007)122.  
 
Acosta et al (2007) argue that, even if PG’s first stage was rolled out without major 
problems, the implementation of its second phase was quite problematic and permeated by 
uncertainty. Likewise, Nejamkis and Rivero Sierra (2010) note that there was often no 
information available on where and how complement the procedures, and claim that PG’s 
most significant problem was the lack of coordination between the DNM and the RENAPER 
(Registro Nacional de las Personas). Prior to obtaining their DNI, migrants had to get their 
residency at the DNM. It was only then that the RENAPER produced their DNIs. 
Nevertheless, even if according to PG the DNM did not require migrants to provide a birth 
certificate, the RENAPER did so before handing out a DNI. As a result, many migrants could 
obtain their residency but not their DNIs123. Others have argued that the mechanisms allowing 
migrants to be exempted from paying the mandatory processing fees, which continued to be 
onerous for most, were not known while the notion of “licit” means of making a living was not 
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defined, thus leaving ample room for discretionary interpretation by bureaucrats (Nejamkis 
and Rivero Sierra 2010; Asa and Ceriani Cernadas 2004, 2005; Ceriani Cernadas and Asa 
2005; Acosta et al 2007).  
 
PG’s precarious implementation (in its second stage) along with the delayed enactment 
of the new migration law (from 2004 to 2010) prevented intra-regional migrants from 
exercising most of the rights granted to them (Asa and Ceriani Cernadas 2004, 2005; Ceriani 
Cernadas and Asa 2005; Acosta et al 2007; Domenech 2008). In particular, their rights to 
health care, education, social security, rehabilitation and work were violated due to erroneous 
interpretations of the new law’s scope (Acosta et al 2007, Ceriani Cernadas and Asa 2005)124. 
These incidents were often legitimated by the persistence of discriminatory, xenophobic and 
racist discourse and the practices promoted by certain media and government officials (Acosta 
et al 2007); they were also reinforced by the bureaucratic obstacles that made it very difficult 
for migrants to obtain their DNI (Caggiano 2008). Under these circumstances, the absence of 
training programs and information campaigns only aggravated the vulnerability of migrants, 
since confused and misinformed public officers at the border and in national territory tended to 
continue applying the previous unconstitutional migration law (Acosta et al 2007, Pacecca and 
Courtis 2006). 
 
Some scholars have been more positive in their evaluation of PG125 by pointing out 
that, unlike the short-run life of previous amnesties granted by democratic governments in 
Argentina since 1949, this program permanently regularizes migrants and has to be understood 
as public policy (Novick 2010, Nejamkis and Rivero Sierra 2010). These scholars have also 
emphasized that it is the first time that the government, together with different entities 
(municipal, civil society and religious groups, migrant associations and unions), has 
collectively designed and implemented a strategy for these sorts of procedures126. Moreover, 
they have claimed that MERCOSUR has generated profound changes at various levels of the 
Argentinean state apparatus, which have increased the importance of regional integration in 
shaping new policies, whereas the “ideological climate” of the new migration law has brought 
to the fore the notion of a more egalitarian society in which the potential of youth and the 
contributions of migrants are valued (Novick 2010, Nejamkis and Rivero Sierra 2010)127. Thus, 
the positive views of PG have discerned Kirchnerismo’s progress in the area of migration by 
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noting: (a) the program’s permanent character vis-à-vis earlier, reactive amnesties; (b) the 
unprecedented collaboration underpinning its design and implementation; and (c) the 
transformative force of the current historical moment in Latin America as its backdrop. 
 
Scholars examining Kirchnerismo’s discourse on international migration have claimed 
that, compared to that of previous decades, the new direction that is in evidence in the 2000s is 
very significant. Domenech (2007), for example, argues that the greatest proof of a rupture 
with the past is the introduction of a human rights perspective (and the concomitant 
abandonment of the national security doctrine promoted under the previous migration law) 
along with the incorporation of the notion of communitarian (MERCOSUR) citizenship. 
Paradoxically, however, even though Kirchnerismo’s discourse and policy are both based on 
articulating human rights, communitarian citizenship and cultural pluralism, its practices are 
instead directed at regularizing migrants’ administrative situation (Domenech 2007). This has 
been interpreted as evidence of the “cost/benefit view” of migration inherent in the human 
rights perspective (van Selm 2005, Guild 2005), which underlies the contradictions arising 
from the attempt to reconcile international legislation with the interests of the state (Morris 
2002). Moreover, while the Argentinean state’s emphasis on labour regulation and migrants’ 
documentation are at least partly motivated by the potential tax revenues generated by 
registered migrants (Nejamkis and Rivero Sierra 2010, Domenech 2007), documentation 
campaigns also respond to security concerns arising from integration (Domenech 2007)128. In 
light of this, Domenech (2008-a, -b) argues that, beyond the official rhetoric of inclusion, 
which has not reformulated the relationship between migration and development, a new 
ideology of assimilation has been put in place by the state. In other words, although state 
policies and discourse on international migration and cultural diversity have been substantially 
reconfigured in Argentina (most notably vis-à-vis the 1990s), in practice, there has been little 
or no change in the socio-economic conditions of migrants and in the measures deployed to 
substantiate the pluralist discourse adopted by the state. However, the results of my fieldwork 
show that the circumstances of Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans in the partido of La Plata 
have improved, if unevenly, during the first decade of the 2000s.  
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BEYOND THE NEW MIGRATION LAW 
 
Throughout this chapter, I have examined the multiple and complementary strategies deployed 
by Kirchnerismo to transform Argentina into a diverse, inclusive Latin American nation129. 
The accomplishment of such a political project has involved creating new institutions for the 
state, changing their goals and practices, and investing their strategies with a very strong, 
inclusive federalism. The renewed presence of the federal government at the provincial and 
local levels, along with its adjustment-to-local-needs approach to public policy design, have 
been crucial for Kirchnerismo. Allowing the state to recapture the terrain that it had abandoned 
during the 1990s (due to decentralization, privatization and other neoliberal policies), this 
strengthened federalism has also been fundamental to the deployment of measures aimed at 
creating a more encompassing national space. The inclusive approach of Kirchnerismo has 
sought to embrace the historically neglected diversity of provinces and their peoples, while 
integrating into the system other socially marginal categories whose voices had been equally 
silenced. Addressing the realities of these populations has been part of the government’s effort 
to counter the unequal distribution of public resources and services. At the same time, entitling 
marginal categories to specific rights on the basis of their particularities has helped reinforce 
the inclusive national diversity being promoted by the government. Under these circumstances, 
most of the strategies deployed by Kirchnerismo were seen as an urgent response to the 
devastating effects of the neoliberalism of the 1990s. Redressing the “injuries committed to the 
nation” was considered by the government to be a pressing task that was made all the more 
apparent by the country’s increasingly heterogeneous poverty.  
 
As we have seen, however, Kirchnerismo’s political project has deeper roots, and is 
representative of a particular historical moment in the region. At this particular geo-political 
juncture, Kirchnerismo capitalized on the 2010 celebrations of the Bicentenary of Argentina’s 
Independence to strengthen regional alliances and to institutionalize the nation’s renewed 
official past. Kirchnerismo’s active participation in the furthering of regional integration 
together with its adoption of a new migration law formalized its allegiances to the region while 
demonstrating Argentina’s Latin Americanness. Integrationist policy and discourse were 
anchored in the nation’s renewed vision of its ancestry and, in particular, in the restored place 
of the founding fathers of the Patria Grande in its history.  
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Although it is still early to properly evaluate these developments and their 
consequences for the region, some important changes are already apparent in Argentina. 
Among the most prominent is the country’s new migration law, which considers this 
phenomenon to be a human right with the state as its guarantor, and which privileges 
MERCOSUR ampliado nationals. Despite the well-founded criticism of Patria Grande’s 
implementation and the law’s long-delayed enactment, intra-regional migrants have been 
granted substantial social, political, economic and cultural rights in Argentina, which had too 
often been violated in the recent past.  Accessing these rights is, of course, a different story, 
and requires a number of other changes going beyond new legal entitlements. In this regard, 
the inclusive public policies implemented by Kirchnerismo and the official discourse 
surrounding them have been important. Respecting what is established in the National 
Constitution, they have promoted universal access to a range of social, economic and political 
rights, without discriminating on the basis of legal status. As a result, migrants (even those 
whose migration status is “irregular”) have been able to access a multitude of public services, 
goods and non-taxable subsidies and allowances as have other disadvantaged, non-migrant 
groups in Argentina.  
 
In light of the dramatic change in the legal status of intra-regional migrants introduced 
by the new migration law along with the universal accessibility to a wide range of basic rights 
fostered by Kirchnerismo’s inclusive public policies, the following four chapters examine the 
experiences of Bolivians, Paraguayans and Peruvians in the partido of La Plata during the first 
decade of the 2000s. As will become apparent, these migrants’ experiences differ not so much 
because of their particular (legal) status, but rather due to where they reside and work in the 
partido and their gender.  
  
 
CHAPTER IV: Experiencing Legality in Urban Settings  
 
In this Chapter, I examine a wide range of urban issues that framed the experiences of 
Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans living and/or working in La Plata city during the 2000s. 
The cases I present show the extent to which personal and family decisions regarding 
migration are at the same time representative and trangressive of well-established ethnic 
patterns that have shaped migrants’ residence and work choices in the partido. In the first part 
of the chapter, I analyze the case of a Bolivian couple who initially moved to a rural area, but 
soon after decided to settle in the city. Their urban labour trajectories illustrate three important 
issues: a) the degree to which migrants’ labour niches in La Plata are both gendered and 
ethnicized, b) the uneven impact of Kirchnerismo’s regularization campaigns on diverse 
migrants, and c) how the solid presence of economically successful Chinese migrants has led to 
the overall more favourable repositioning of Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans in the city’s 
ethnic hierarchy of value.  
 
In the second part of the chapter, I analyze how the narratives of migrant men differ 
from those of women. While mens’ accounts focus on personal work performance, those of 
women bring to the forefront familial and other social ties by highlighting the costly 
implications of migration for all parties involved. My analysis of the experiences of a Peruvian 
couple, who has lived and worked in La Plata city since they moved to Argentina, examines 
this issue as well the increasing feminization of South American migrations to the country 
(Cerrutti 2009, Pacecca and Courtis 2008, Texidó 2008) and their role in the 
transnationalization of social care (Parreñas 2001, 2008; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994, 2001; Maher 
2004; Herrera Mosquera 2008; Ehrenreich and Hoschschild 2002). Peruvian and Paraguayan 
women in La Plata have undergone a dramatic decrease in social status in tandem with the low-
ranking, isolating jobs they perform in the city. Nevertheless, they interpret their initial solitude 
and sacrifices as leading to a process of personal growth and learning that results in increased 
personal autonomy and financial independence.  
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TARIJEÑOS IN THE CITY 
 
Encountering ‘Different’ Bolivians in La Plata  
 
Sandro and Edelina are from Tarija, a Bolivian city only 3 hours from the Argentinian border, 
and they lived together for several months before migrating to Argentina. Both come from poor 
families that struggled to make ends meet in a country ravaged by the utmost unjust 
distribution of wealth. Since early childhood, Sandro and Edelina played crucial roles in the 
social and economic reproduction of their respective households: Sandro worked his family’s 
fields (they mostly cultivated fruit trees while keeping a few farm animals) and Edelina 
performed a wide range of domestic chores. In terms of their elementary schooling, Sandro 
proudly recalls only missing classes during intensive labour periods, whereas Edelina dropped 
out of school because she was never very interested in it. By the early 1990s, Edelina managed 
to establish her own clothing store in Tarija and regularly travelled to the country’s largest 
cities such as Cochabamba, Santa Cruz and La Paz, where she bought garments produced in 
local factories. Edelina’s revenues were essential for the subsistence of her family. Sandro, for 
his part, continued to participate in his family’s agricultural activities and, along with some of 
his brothers, managed the property’s production. Since meeting Edelina, Sandro had begun to 
accompany her on her business trips.  
 
Despite being used to very hard work, Sandro and Edelina witnessed further 
deterioration of their living conditions during the 1990s. Sandro’s family was unable to buy 
new seeds, food, and other basic necessities, while Edelina’s sales stagnated because cheap 
“American” clothes (that is, garments being cheaply produced in a number of Asian 
destinations and exported to Bolivia by US companies) had become a common import in 
Bolivia. Under these circumstances, Sandro learned from a distant relative in La Plata that, in 
four days of work in Argentina, one could make the equivalent of a month’s salary in Bolivia. 
Not only was the pay in unregulated sectors of the economy good, such as in construction 
where a worker could made between 20$ to 25$ pesos a day, but the exchange rate in place 
(1peso=1US$) was particularly favourable for Bolivians, whose economy was pegged to the 
American dollar. Sandro left for La Plata in 1999.  
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Sandro’s migration was made possible by the financial support of his father and 
Edelina’s brother, who lent him the money to pay for the services of a company that regularly 
takes Bolivians to Argentina. This “bus” company’s job was to assure that Bolivians made it 
across the border by arranging for their papers (often producing tourist visas and sometimes 
faked documents) and dealing (mostly through bribes) with customs agents and other officials 
at the border. According to Sandro, these travel services were the only affordable means 
available to poor Bolivians such as himself seeking to go to Argentina during the late 1990s:   
“Either you had a lot of money or knew many [important] people…Because Argentina was 
doing very well then [referring to the parity between the Argentinean and American 
currencies], so the government was making it very difficult for foreigners to enter [the 
country].”  
 
“Helping” undocumented migrants to make it across tight borders became a highly 
profitable business during the 1990s (Recalde 2006-a) that laid the foundations for the 
emergence of a complex industry that capitalized on the circulation of information, goods and 
money in South America during the 2000s. As has been well documented in North America 
(Crépeau and Nakache 2006, Massey 2007, Kearney 2004) and Europe (Morris 2002), the 
tougher migration controls become (at the border and in the nation’s territory), the more 
profitable this licit and illicit industry, and the higher the financial, safety and emotional costs 
for migrants. By the late 2000s, the most lucrative services in this industry were those related 
to sending and receiving money (remittances), communication (internet, phone calls and 
attendant technologies) and transportation (of people and a wide range of goods). 
 
Upon his arrival in La Plata, Sandro promptly began to work in construction for a 
compatriot, even if he did not yet have the papers to do so (he only had a three-month tourist 
visa), nor any experience in the field. Shortly after, he was hired by an Argentinean architect 
with a large number of projects, who took Sandro to various construction sites in distant 
localities of Buenos Aires province. While working for the architect, Sandro travelled 
extensively, was treated very well and offered much better pay than he received from his 
former employer. Yet, Sandro was still hired en negro or “under the table”,  so he did not have 
access to mandatory benefits, safe work conditions and other kinds of state and union 
protection guaranteed to those with regulated employment. These disadvantages led Sandro to 
opt for another construction job several years later, this time in the formal economy:   
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“I really liked the architect, but I left the job because I began to work in a 
[construction]agency thanks to one of Edelina’s cousins, who already worked there…They 
paid me much better and since I already had my papers [DNI], I had many more benefits.” 
 
Sandro’s initial labour trajectory in La Plata illustrates that of other Bolivian, 
Paraguayan and Peruvian men in the city (and the GBA) who could promptly start to work 
upon their arrival in the country without having papers, yet only in the informal sectors of the 
economy, mostly in construction. During the 1990s, migrants worked under very precarious 
and exploitative conditions, but their circumstances noticeably improved in the following 
decade as a result of Kirchnerismo’s active regularization campaigns (I come back to this issue 
later on in the chapter).  
 
A year passed before Edelina joined Sandro in La Plata. In the meantime, she had to 
close down her store and could not find a job; at the same time, life was getting increasingly 
expensive in Bolivia, as she explained:  
“One was not making even enough [money] to eat…And his [Sandro’s] father was insisting 
that I should come because he was by himself…I was spending a lot of money on phone 
calls…And we were leaving Bolivia in order to save money…So I came to see Argentina.”  
 
Expressions such as “going to see” Argentina, to “check it out” and to “give it a try” 
were very common among the migrants I interviewed, which emphasizes their initial idea of 
returning home soon after a short-term stay in Argentina that would permit them to save 
enough money to start a family-run business or build their own house back home.  
 
Soon after Edelina arrived, following the advice of paisanos or compatriots, the couple 
moved to Los Porteños, a rural area in the partido that was well known for the cultivation of 
flowers by Portuguese and Japanese migrants since the late 1970s. By the time Sandro and 
Edelina started working there, the owners of this business had diversified while its labour force 
had increasingly homogenized. Chinese and Italians had joined the Portuguese as employers 
(the Japanese apparently having faded away) whereas Bolivians had come to replace the family 
members as the main labour force130. In the early 2000s, workers were offered precarious 
accommodation (often sheds situated beside the fields, lacking washrooms or toilets) and 
miserable pay, but were expected to work from dawn to nightfall (in winter using lanterns in 
order to extend work hours). Sandro and Edelina lived and worked under these circumstances 
for about six months until Edelina began to get very sick due to the high humidity levels in the 
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area, which they describe as a mud patch. Additionally, Edelina was not learning the trade, 
which they considered very problematic. Like most of those I interviewed, Sandro and Edelina 
explain that as migrants they were supposed to learn their new trades on the job. This time 
following the advice of friends, who assured they would see a marked improvement in their 
work prospects, Sandro and Edelina decided to go back to La Plata city. The urban milieu 
promised much higher financial compensation and “cleaner” work conditions131.  
 
Nevertheless, La Plata proved very challenging for them in a number of ways. To begin 
with, finding employment took them much longer than they had expected and their lack of a 
well-developed social network in the city only complicated the matter. As they explained:  
“There are many Bolivians in La Plata and it seems like the Argentinean people think that 
we all know each other well, but no…We don’t know where they come from…The paisanos 
from our place are in Las Quintas [a rural area of the partido dedicated to horticultural 
production], but here, in the city, people mostly come from Cochabamba and La Paz…And a 
Tarijeño is very different from a Cochabambino.”  
 
Making use of work ethic, public self (re)presentation and household care criteria, 
Sandro and Edelina discursively signalled the ethnic boundaries (Barth 1969, 1998)132 that, 
associating locality (geographical origin) to group values and attitudes, regulate migrants’ 
belonging and access to “Bolivian”133 social networks in the partido. In different 
circumstances, Sandro and Edelina highlighted that while Tarijeños are hard-working people, 
Cochabambinos exclusively think of work in order to buy themselves expensive 4x4 pick-ups 
and build big houses that are “empty”, “untidy” and “dirty” despite their impressive 
appearance. These material acquisitions are used by Cochabambinos to “show off”, as Sandro 
said: “If you go to the Central Fruit and Vegetable Market of La Plata, you’ll see that people 
[Bolivians] buying there are different…When we go to Las Quintas, we know the people.” To 
this, Edelina added:  
“People from the north do not care about how they live, they do not care about anything but 
work, they love working!...They always have good pick-up trucks, good houses, because they 
work day and night…They do not care about being dirty, about the clothes they wear…We, yes, 
we work but we like to dress well, we’re cleaner, much cleaner.” 
 
Though the core ethnic distinctions advanced by Sandro and Edelina are pre-migration, 
their re-elaboration in La Plata signals, among other things, the economic success of 
Cochabambinos in the partido over the 1990s. They not only managed to replace Argentinians 
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in the production and commercialization of fruits and vegetables (Benencia 1997-a, 2003, 
2006, 2008), but also started to invest in real estate in the late 2000s. Their conspicuous 
accumulation of wealth, however, was not accompanied by a concomitant rise up the city’s 
social ladder, which can be explained by Platenses’ perceived mismatch between migrants’ 
economic capital and its embodiment, that is, the low social status attributed to 
Cochabambinos’ racial identity (see chapter VI). As Ong (1999) has shown, the reproduction 
of social power for newcomers is never guaranteed or certain, especially when they embody 
signs such as skin colour, foreign accent and cultural taste that may count as symbolic deficits 
in the host society (p.91). As I will examine in further examples (in particular in chapter VII), 
the perception of Bolivians as being at the bottom of the partido’s ethnic hierarchy was shared 
by migrants and Platenses alike.  
 
Structuring social interaction between allegedly conspicuously different Bolivians, the 
ethnic distinctions just described (made through self-ascription and ascription by others) did 
not favour Sandro and Edelina’s search for employment in the city. Informal social interaction 
with compatriots served rather to reinforce the socio-economic and cultural cleavages existent 
among them.  
 
The Ethnicization of Bolivian Women’s Exploitation in La Plata: Ferias and Chinos 
 
Despite the difficulties encountered, Sandro eventually managed to get back his construction 
job with the Argentinean architect while Edelina found herself part-time work cleaning the 
house of a Platense Señora (female employer). Even if Edelina enjoyed this job and 
appreciated her employer’s “nice treatment”, as she put it, she had to quit soon after being 
hired to pursue full-time employment. As was also the case of Sandro, most of the migrants I 
interviewed mentioned liking jobs because their employers were “nice” or “good” to them, 
which seems to indicate that, despite their new legal entitlements, being treated fairly 
according to Argentinean legal and social standards was still rare in the labour niches migrants 
occupied. 
 
With the help of a Bolivian woman, Edelina began to work in a feria (a fruit and vegetable 
street market) run by a Cochabambina. With regret, Edelina talked about how this female 
employer exploited and humiliated her:  
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“It was horrible to work in the feria…She made me lift large, heavy boxes that hurt my 
hands and I had to do it even in the rain while she watched, seated in the [delivery] truck, 
keeping herself dry…She treated me very badly simply because I was the most recently arrived 
and the youngest [Edelina was in her early 20s]…She was so arrogant that she would not even 
let me laugh…I cried a lot those days, it was really nasty to work there, I suffered a lot.”  
 
Edelina worked from 04:00 to 15:00 for about 50-75$ pesos per day, a salary that was 
miserable by Argentinean standards but that represented a substantial amount of money in 
Bolivia, which she envisaged sending in the form of remittances. Edelina was forced to work in 
the sun and with almost no rest. Once, a large piece of iron fell on her head and she had to keep 
working without even seeing a doctor. As a result of the heavy work she performed during 
those years, Edelina developed tendonitis in both hands, which limits the movements that she 
can perform and the weight she can lift.  
 
The exploitative, abusive, and unsafe working conditions to which Edelina was 
subjected in the feria were not different from those of other recently arrived Bolivian girls in 
La Plata over the 2000s. Edelina witnessed how her own status in the feria improved over the 
years as a result of two interconnected processes. On the one hand, she acquired seniority not 
only by mastering the tasks required of her but also through successful self-discipline (Foucault 
1978, Ong 2003) in line with the unspoken norms of the workplace, namely, not talking, 
laughing or asking for or about anything, doing the job well without being told to do so, and 
knowing if and when to take breaks. On the other hand, the progressive arrival of new girls re-
positioned higher in the feria’s social hierarchy those with seniority, whereas the novices, 
starting at its bottom, became the target of exploitative and abusive treatment by the older, 
well-established (often Cochabambina) women who ran the ferias. Under these circumstances, 
being new to the feria implied three things for these Bolivian girls: a) being young and new on 
the job: having to learn the job and its work ethics through a silent pedagogy involving 
learning by imitation and leading to the disciplining of bodies that “remember” and 
“understand” (Samudra 2008). Being young was crucial in this process since it powerfully 
subordinated girls to the abusive authority of an older female employer, b) being new to the 
city and its norms: having recently arrived in La Plata and not knowing its social conventions 
and legal regulations, and c) being new to Argentina but in old ways (like in the 1990s): 
lacking their residence papers and not knowing that they could easily initiate the bureaucratic 
 101 
procedures to get them according to the new migration law (I come back to this issue later on). 
This ignorance was often manipulated by unscrupulous employers, who threatened girls with 
deportation if they voiced even minor complaints or thought of quitting the job— an abusive 
strategy that echoes those implemented during the 1990s.  
 
The interplay of these three issues was crucial in reshaping the ferias over the 2000s 
into increasingly feminized, ethnicized and precarious workplaces at a moment when the 
government was deploying an aggressive regularization campaign (see previous chapter). In La 
Plata, these fruit and vegetable street markets are mostly run by Cochabambinas, who 
exclusively hire new Bolivian girls. My participant observation and interviews with migrants 
and Platenses showed that no men worked in the ferias. When I asked Edelina if Argentinean 
or other migrant women were also hired, she laughed as if I had asked the most ridiculous 
question, after which she remarked: “No, only our people [are hired]…How on earth would 
Argentinians be hired!...She [Edelina’s former employer] did not hire Argentinians...Not at 
all!”. Edelina’s astonishment and laughter illustrates an ingrained notion shared by migrants 
and Platenses alike: only new Bolivian girls are docile enough to put up with the silent 
pedagogy imposed by Cochabambinas in the ferias. Formerly, these markets were managed 
and owned by Argentinians, men and women, who, in the 1990s, were unable to compete with 
the low prices of large, foreign supermarket chains such as Wal-Mart and Carrefour, and, as a 
result, were gradually forced out of the market. By the late 2000s, Cochabambinas turned the 
ferias Bolivianas, as these street markets came to be called in La Plata, into one of the few 
urban labour niches that were still able to evade official regulations and systematic inspections 
through the recruitment, discipline and hiding of new Bolivian girls.  
 
Edelina’s next job at a grocery store owned by a Chinese migrant exemplifies another 
labour niche that has been hiring more and more young Bolivian women. Moreover, the 
consolidation of this labour niche has crystallized a number of important changes in the social 
and economic fabric of the city. As was the case of the ferias, the almacenes de barrio 
(neighbourhood grocery stores owned by Argentinians, mostly men) succumbed to the 
unbeatable prices of giant supermarket chains in the 1990s. This time, however, the economic 
space left by the almacenero was occupied by Chinese migrants, who launched grocery stores 
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or mini-markets in La Plata city. Chinese migrants had been settling in La Plata since the 
1980s, yet, it was during the 2000s that their regional and federal governments in China began 
to partially cover the cost of their migration to and initial settlement in the city, which included 
the prompt production of travel documents134. At the same time, these migrants’ alleged 
“culture of hard work” (their stores are open year-round) along with the active role played by 
their own local Chamber of Commerce135 permitted small, family-run stores to expand into 
profitable enterprises, often chains of mini-markets. By the late 2000s, the Chinos, as both 
these businesses and their owners are called, reached the partido’s peripheries, altering the 
symbolic and material exchanges taking place in La Plata’s neighbourhood grocery stores. The 
alamacenes had functioned through relations of confianza (trust) based on affective closeness 
and geographical proximity that had developed over long periods of time. The almacenero’s 
clients were neighbours, whom he knew very well and with whom he interacted on a daily 
basis, so practices such as fiar (informal credit) were common. The consolidation of Chinese 
stores, however, introduced a process of distancing between clients and owners that was 
twofold. While owners (and their several employees) established a more impersonal treatment 
of clients, Platenses perceived a “cultural distance” between themselves and Chinese migrants.  
 
Edelina began to work in one of these mini-markets thanks to the help and 
encouragement of Cecilia, a friend who was already employed at a Chinese mini-market. 
Initially, Edelina was reluctant to join her friend because she did not have her residency papers, 
which were mandatory for applying for jobs in the formal economy. Moreover, her seniority in 
the feria had been rewarded with salary increases, “good” treatment and trust. By then, Edelina 
was no longer under surveillance and was in charge of training new girls, who continuously 
arrived in tandem with the departure of those with seniority. Nevertheless, she eventually got 
the courage to visit her friend’s workplace saying that Cecilia needed to be replaced in order to 
go to the hospital (this was a common strategy among female migrants seeking to introduce 
compatriots to a new employer). Though annoyed and a bit suspicious, the Chino let Edelina 
do the job, and to her surprise, offered her employment without having papers, after seeing 
how skillful she was at organizing fruits and vegetables. While in the feria it was very difficult 
to arrange products because they had to look pretty, Edelina explains, in Chinese mini-markets, 
it was easy.  
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During the eight years that Edelina worked for this employer, at seven of his stores, she 
witnessed how he hid unregistered or under-registered (as if they were part-time instead of full-
time) employees, mostly young Bolivian women with or without papers, when official 
inspections were conducted. Managing to promptly get out of the store without being seen 
tended to be a complicated and risky matter, involving going through back patios or jumping 
over high walls in order to reach the street. In addition, Edelina came to see how profitable she 
was for her employer, whose good treatment and flexibility (Edelina’s annual trips to Bolivia 
lasted more than a month) was not disinterested:  
“I got there and I knew everything, I was the most experienced among the girls…The Chino 
liked me a lot because I could make lettuce last for a week while the other girls did not care, 
they did not clean…They were Argentinean…He even brought vegetables that he could not sell 
at other stores, and I cleaned and sold them.”  
 
Thanks to eye-opening comments from friends, Edelina also realized that the Chino 
was in fact exploiting her, even if this job constituted a substantial improvement vis-à-vis that 
of the feria. Edelina worked at the Chinese mini-markets of this employer from Monday to 
Friday, 08:00-14:00 and 16:30-20:00, for 400$ pesos per month, whereas by the time she left 
the feria she was earning 250$ pesos a month. This employer’s exploitation also became 
apparent in his reluctance to hire Edelina en blanco, so as to avoid making mandatory 
contributions to pension, retirement and health care plans, even after she obtained her DNI 
through facilitated procedures upon the birth of her Argentinean daughter.  
 
Edelina and Sandro’s sacrifices permitted them to open their small verdulería (fruit and 
vegetable store) in a quiet neighbourhood of La Plata city in December 2008. Edelina ran the 
store while Sandro was in charge of supplying it with fresh products, which he bought at the 
Mercado Central (Central Fruit and Vegetable Market of La Plata), from 4:00 to 9:00, three 
times a week (I come back to this issue in chapter VI). Sandro also ran the deliveries of the 
store, on foot or by bicycle, while holding a number of part-time jobs in construction and 
painting. Costly and complicated rental regulations forced Sandro and Edelina to use the small 
business’ premises as their home. Over the 2000s, it became extremely difficult to rent an 
apartment either for residential or commercial purposes in the GBA because the tenant, 
regardless of his/her salary, had to find a guarantor who owned some sort of property, which 
became the guarantee that the tenant would pay the rent. In addition, rent prices were very high 
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in the city, even more so in central neighbourhoods, such as the one where Edelina and Sandro 
lived. Under these circumstances, the couple divided their small apartment in two, using a 
piece of thick cardboard, a few suitcases and some of the wooden boxes employed to carry and 
display merchandise. One part is used as the store’s premises and the other as their home. The 
section destined to be their house has a small bed (where the three family members sleep), a 
stove, a fridge and two stools, which does not leave much room to move around. The table is 
improvised using a wooden box that also served other purposes. In this same “room”, washed 
clothes are hung to dry, the cooking is done, and food is eaten. Toys pile up everywhere, taking 
up most of the very little space available. Outside their precarious home, on the sidewalk where 
some of the store’s products are displayed, I met Edelina, Sandro and their four-year old 
daughter for the first time in early March 2010. 
 
Some Core Issues that Sandro and Edelina’s Case Illuminates  
 
Sandro and Edelina’s migrant trajectories in La Plata illustrate the residential and occupational 
patterns historically developed by ethnically different Bolivians in the partido. Tarijeños 
(southern Bolivians) have predominantly settled in rural areas, where they have practiced 
family horticulture, and more recently, flower production as hired labour. Northern Bolivians 
(Cochabambinos), in contrast, have mostly commercialized fresh fruits and vegetables, which 
continues to be a predominantly urban activity (see chapter VI). Vis-à-vis this ethnicized and 
territorialized division of Bolivian labour, Sandro and Edelina’s launching of a verdulería in 
La Plata city constitutes a clear transgression. Cochabambinos’ disapproval of these Tarijeños 
was overtly manifested in a series of public settings (grocery stores, parks, money transfer 
bureaus, travel agencies and state institutions), where the couple was reminded that they had 
crossed the line, both territorially and symbolically. Yet, it is mostly in two other social 
settings where the socio-economic and ethnic cleavages separating these “different” Bolivians 
becomes most apparent; i.e., at the Central Fruit and Vegetable Market of La Plata, where 
verduleros, Chinos and other grocery store owners buy their fresh produce, and at the meetings 
of a cooperative building a “Bolivian neighbourhood” in the rural locality of Lisandro Olmos, a 
project that was funded by Bolivian President Evo Morales (see chapter VI).  
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Edelina’s urban work trajectory, in particular, shows the strong ethnicization and 
feminization of verdulerías and ferias in La Plata, which in 2010 were almost exclusively run 
by Cochabambina women. Whereas the latter seem to be strictly feminine economic spaces, 
men can be found in the former. In most cases, they are the spouse of the woman running the 
store, who occasionally replaces his partner; yet, in a few verdulerías I visited, both members 
of the couple were routinely serving clients136. Edelina’s urban labour trajectory also highlights 
the relocation of Bolivian women’s exploitation in La Plata, which, by the late 2000s, was 
predominantly in the hands of Cochabambina women (heads of the ferias) and Chinese men 
(owners of neighbourhood mini-markets). New Bolivian women in the city often transit 
through these exploitative sites, in the same order, as if moving along and in turn away from 
them was part of a necessary urban rite of passage—something that migrants are seldom aware 
of before arriving (an issue that I examine in the next chapter).   
 
Edelina and Sandro’s work trajectories also illustrate the extent to which 
Kirchnerismo’s regularization campaigns have unevenly affected migrant women and men in 
La Plata. While benefiting a large proportion of migrant men, public efforts to fight precarious 
employment have been particularly disadvantageous for most Bolivian women. As in other 
parts of the GBA, Peruvian, Bolivian and Paraguayan men in La Plata have predominantly 
worked in the construction sector and, by the late 2000s, they constituted its main labour force 
(see chapter I). My 2010 fieldwork among migrant workers and Argentinean employers in a 
number of sites in the GBA showed that official inspections and attendant sanctions 
importantly decreased the occurrence of former practices, which reproduced the precarious 
working conditions and exploitative hiring so widespread in this sector during the 1990s. Most 
often, employers considered it too risky and eventually too costly to hire workers en negro and 
without providing safe working conditions, which prompted them to respect new mandatory 
regulations.   
 
Migrant women working in urban areas of the partido did not experience such a 
generalized improvement in their labour conditions and rights. This resulted, at least in part, 
from the interplay between a) their somewhat more diversified participation in the local labour 
market and b) regularization campaigns’ focus on a handful of economic sectors. Most 
Peruvian and Paraguayan women have continued to work in a range of “care” and “domestic” 
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urban jobs (from cleaning and housekeeping to raising children and taking care of the elderly 
in a variety of family, corporate and governmental settings) whereas Bolivian women are 
concentrated in what has become “their” economic niche: the commercialization of fruits and 
vegetables. Kirchnerismo’s fight against informal employment has had disparate effects on the 
labour rights of these different migrant women. The initial regulation of the domestic sector 
(see previous chapter) contributed to the increasing hiring en blanco of most of the Peruvian 
and Paraguayan women I interviewed doing such jobs (see the following section and chapter 
V) whereas the labour conditions of Bolivian ones were hampered in two important ways. 
First, systematic municipal inspections fostered new evasion strategies among the Chinos, who 
found skilful ways to hide their non- or under-registered employees (generally documented and 
undocumented young Bolivian women) both physically (during the inspections) and “in the 
books” (when filing their business tax reports)137. Second, the ferias Bolivianas, which fell 
outside Kirchnerismo’s regulation targets, could safely exploit the “newness” of their female, 
often young, employees without much trouble.  
 
The government’s fight against informal and precarious employment yielded 
unexpected results among migrant women in La Plata, which highlights the dissonance 
between official strategies and migrants’ labour circumstances. The campaign’s focus on two 
economic sectors (construction and textile), albeit its incipient interest in domestic work, led to 
the deployment of blanket strategies that did not correspond to the gendering and ethnicization 
of some labour niches occupied by migrants in La Plata. Bolivian women were particularly 
disadvantaged.   
 
Insecurity’s Disciplinary Effects: The Pibes Chorros and the Crime Industry  
 
The first decade of the 2000s witnessed the emergence and consolidation of discourse on the 
so-called “2000s insecurity” in Argentina, which powerfully impacted the perceptions and 
behaviour of migrants and non-migrants in the GBA and Buenos Aires province in particular. 
In urban settings of La Plata, the alleged escalating rates of urban youth crime led many 
Bolivian men to replace full-time jobs with a number of part-time occupations in order to 
accompany their wives at their verdulerías. Sandro’s explanation of his and Edelina’s situation 
illustrates the constraining and shifting circumstances of urban Bolivians with verdulerías:  
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“After working for some time at the construction agency, I went back to work with the 
architect, and continued to do so until we opened this store…Well, nowadays it’s not possible, 
I want to work somewhere else but with the insecurity, it is impossible…You make the effort to 
work very hard until 01:00, but there is so much robbery and since they are minors, they get 
out of jail right away…We work the whole day and another one comes and robs you of the 
little profit you’ve made, so, for this reason, the two of us are here.”  
 
Even if Sandro and Edelina have been spared for the time being—maybe due to the 
precautions they took138—, they were well aware of the robberies taking place in other fruit 
and vegetable stores in La Plata. Paradigmatic of this oleada de delincuencia (wave of crime) 
was for them the case of a verdulera friend, who had been robbed by an armed youth from her 
own neighbourhood. Pointing a gun at the woman, the boy insisted that he wanted the money, 
not to hurt her, and the woman ended up giving him 100 pesos, after which he fired two shots 
in the air and ran off.   
 
The fear of being robbed by the so-called pibes chorros—young, poor Argentinean men 
(mostly minors) allegedly under the influence of drugs—was not exclusive to Bolivian 
verduleros in La Plata. Instead, it became the “reality” of migrant and non-migrant residents of 
urban Argentina over the 2000s, notably in the GBA and Buenos Aires province. As a result of 
the 1990s’ neoliberal policies, pauperization rates dramatically increased in the country 
(Capdevielle 2009) and, by the early 2000s, they increasingly affected poor urban youth, who 
continued to be marginalized (Devincenzi 2006)139. In this context, many of them resorted to 
criminal activities in order to survive at the margins of society or in response to the social 
violence exercised upon them. Nevertheless, the extent to which the social figure of the pibe 
chorro became emblematic of the prevailing feeling of insecurity during the 2000s is indicative 
of a number of other processes at work. Namely, the alarming situation of these youth was 
capitalized on by the sensationalist media (often against Kirchnerismo) to create a pervasive 
climate of insecurity, which in turn became the alleged “frightening reality” of urban dwellers 
as well as the raison d’être of a profitable industria de la delincuencia y de la inseguridad 
(crime and insecurity industry). Examining this sort of issue, anthropological research on 
contemporary youth has revealed the construction of their criminality in many parts of the 
world (Schneider and Schneider 2008).  
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Criminal acts were not only distorted, turning minor offences or common crime into 
violent spectacle, but were also multiplied by some media and political discourse that 
constantly referred to the same case even long after it had occurred. According to Capdevielle 
(2009), the roots of this “culture of insecurity” can be traced back to the 1990s, when the type 
of crime that increased (still at rates lower than those of the 1980s) was committed against 
property, not against people. Moreover, the proliferation of discourse highlighting the cruelty 
of crime and the need to abolish it nourished the perception of insecurity. This situation 
contributed to the growth of companies providing alarm systems as well as insurance and 
surveillance services, which in turn had to keep insecurity high in order to assure their profits 
(Devincenzi 2012). Under these circumstances, Buenos Aires province became a fertile terrain 
for the multi-million dollar (in)security business, where the marriage of poverty and crime was 
not an arbitrary journalistic act (Centro Cultural de la Cooperación Floreal Gorini 2012).    
 
The insecurity, as it was called, of the 2000s was clearly situated both geographically 
(mostly in the GBA and Buenos Aires province) and socially (the increasingly marginalized 
urban poor youth). The powerful social figure of the pibe chorro personified two facets of the 
same social drama. On the one hand, he was considered the exemplary member of the most 
disadvantaged social groups, formerly called negros, cabecitas negras, villeros or cabezas (I 
come back to this labelling and its underlying racial classificatory logic in chapter VII). As in 
the past, a negative morality and attendant behaviours were attributed to these groups (Frigerio 
2006) while the social violence exercised to produce their exclusion was made invisible 
(Capdeville 2009). On the other hand, the pibe chorro also embodied the fear of being 
assaulted at any time while capturing the feeling of insecurity that closely associated 
uncertainty, criminality and a well-delimited (racialized) social group140.  
 
The pibe chorro also came to replace the limítrofe ilegal as the prevalent stigmatized 
social figure catalyzing the social, economic and political tensions of the decade at least in the 
GBA and Buenos Aires province. This shift was widely embraced by the Peruvians, Bolivians 
and Paraguayans I interviewed in La Plata in 2010, who echoed the prejudiced views being 
endorsed by sensationalist media and political discourse (see chapter VII)—as they had done 
during the 1990s when the government criminalized the most recently arrived limítrofes 
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(Recalde 2006-a). This appropriation brought about an important shift in urban migrants’ social 
representations. The pibe chorro, with all the connotations that the term embodied, came to 
replace the police as figure of danger, as was also the case in the partido’s peripheries (see next 
chapter), but not in its rural areas, where this state institution continued to represent an abusive, 
fearful force for migrants (see chapter VI). During the 1990s, police agents personified 
migrants’ frightening reality in La Plata (and the GBA), and were associated with the same 
omnipresent danger and insecurity inherent in the social figure of the pibe chorro (Recalde 
2006-a).  
 
The insecurity and fear that this social figure embodied had powerful disciplinary 
effects on people’s use of public and private space. Indeed, as Etcheverría (2008) argues, 
subjects’ social representations of their insecurity, even if lacking an “objective” counterpart in 
reality, are core (meaningful) to their way of perceiving the world. Moreover, my fieldwork 
showed that collectively “imagined” (as in media and political discourse, and in different 
groups’ social representations) and individually experienced (embodied) insecurity informed 
each other in La Plata. The fear of being attacked generated a range of quotidian practices 
among migrant and non-migrant urban dwellers, who considered that the more precautions 
they took, the better protected against violent crimes they would be. Migrants with businesses 
in La Plata (such as Bolivian verduleros, Chinese owners of mini-markets or a Peruvian with a 
shoe repair shop) deployed a number of preventative strategies to avoid expected robberies. 
Keeping an eye on “suspicious-looking” individuals approaching their shops, working in 
couples, keeping shops’ entrance doors locked at all times, installing mirrors for owners to see 
who was approaching their stores before opening the door, and carefully checking the streets 
before leaving their shops were some important strategies routinely performed by the migrants 
I interviewed (as well as by Platenses who owned shops). Migrants and non-migrants in La 
Plata also deployed similar strategies to remain alert when using public transportation, walking 
to places, completing official procedures (at government institutions) or financial transactions 
(at banks, money sending or real estate agencies), doing their shopping and even when relaxing 
in public parks. By 2010, these preventative measures had been naturalized by La Plata’s 
residents, who did not view their actions as responding to any specific danger. This contrasted 
with the generalized unease and high tension felt in the city in the late 1990s141.  
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What could be interpreted as similar responses in public places by La Plata’s residents 
to a collective experience of insecurity translated into highly segmented (unequal) access to the 
goods and services provided by the security industry in private spaces. Sophisticated alarm 
systems in personal vehicles and houses, the continuous presence of private security personnel 
and video surveillance in residential and corporate buildings, access to private educational, 
health care, financial and recreational institutions equipped with security services as well as 
living and working in areas considered safe were unevenly distributed in La Plata as these 
goods and services remained very expensive. Indeed, the security industry strictly served 
people according to their income142. As a result, the vast majority of migrants I interviewed in 
La Plata along with other disadvantaged and pauperized social groups—the pibes chorros 
among them—lived “insecure” lives by virtue of inhabiting places, holding occupations and 
accessing goods and services that were not situated under the protective aura of the security 
industry.  
 
The Repositioning of Bolivians, Peruvians and Paraguayans in La Plata’s Ethnic Hierarchy  
 
During the first decade of the 2000s, important shifts developed in La Plata’s hegemonic ethnic 
hierarchy, which led to the more favourable positioning of Peruvians, Bolivians and 
Paraguayans. While it is to be seen to what extent Kirchnerismo’s pro-MERCOSUR and 
integrationist efforts have played a role in such improvement, it is clear that the solid economic 
presence of Chinese migrants in urban and peripheral areas of the partido has been crucial to 
the positive re-evaluation of limítrofes’ social status. In this regard, Edelina’s interpretation of 
her former employer (the Chino)’s exploitative practices not only represents that of other 
Bolivians, Peruvians and Paraguayans in urban milieus, but also echoes the widespread 
discomfort felt by Platenses vis-à-vis Chinese migrants.  
 
Even if some of the Peruvians, Paraguayans and Bolivians I interviewed considered 
Chinese migrants to be hard-working people, most resented their evasion strategies and 
exploitative working conditions, considering that both hampered the economic well-being of 
employees—very often their own relatives, friends or compatriots. While limítrofes tended to 
discreetly raise their dislike of Chinese employers in particular, Platenses openly expressed 
their generalized contempt for all Chinese regardless of their regional/ethnic origin and 
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occupation in La Plata. Platenses explained their feelings about these migrants as resulting 
from a series of (observed) behaviours and (assumed) values, which, even if initially attributed 
to mini-market owners and their Chinese employees, were later on extended to the Chinese in 
general as if they constituted a homogeneous group.  
 
Platenses’ most common remarks about these migrants can be organized into four 
categories: a) the Chinos turn off their refrigerators at night in order to save on electricity 
costs, thus damaging the quality of the products being sold in their mini-markets. Platenses 
view this as a clear sign of these migrants’ avarice, which they consider integral to a certain 
“Chinese business ethic” that is indifferent to clients’ health or neighbours’ well-being; b) the 
products sold at the Chinos have often expired and their owners refuse to exchange them, 
pretending not to understand clients’ complaints due to a language barrier. Platenses often 
emphasize the “low” morality of this “unscrupulous” practice by highlighting that the Chinos 
even sold a variety of baby products whose expiration date was long past; c) the mini-market 
owners and their Chinese employees always speak in their language so as to trick or defraud 
clients. Platenses perceive this practice not only as rude and dishonest behaviour, but also as an 
indication that these migrants are unwilling to “integrate” into the hispanophone host society; 
and d) the Chinos “enslave” their employees by imposing highly exploitative labour conditions 
(in terms of time and remuneration) and abusive treatment on them. Platenses disapprove of 
this labour regime, often claiming that the business owners were attempting to sneak the “mass 
exploitation” regularly imposed upon workers in China into La Plata. By assigning a negative 
morality to these behaviours, Platenses created a certain “Chineseness”, which they perceived 
as clashing with Argentina’s democratic and liberal standards. The comment of a Platense 
woman in her early 30s accurately captures the contempt felt for Chinese migrants in La Plata: 
 “These Chinos [referring to the owners of a mini-market two blocks from her home] are 
very rude, dirty and they only think of money, and if they can, they charge you more [than what 
they should]...They do not respect the native [Argentinians] and seek to rip you off.” 
 
By attributing negative connotations to the behaviours and values considered 
“Chinese”, Platenses introduced a distancing and devaluating process that not only affected 
their own rapport with these migrants, but also altered the city’s ethnic value hierarchy, against 
which migrant groups in general are measured (Recalde 2006-a). This reformulation has led to 
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a substantial improvement in the overall social standing of Bolivians, Peruvians and 
Paraguayans in La Plata. Limítrofes have been repositioned higher in the city’s ethnic value 
hierarchy due to their relative (more positive) status vis-à-vis that of the at-the-moment-most-
despised Chinese, who, by virtue of their standing at the bottom of the scale, have pushed 
limítrofes up. The more positive assessment of Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans by 
Platenses became most apparent when the latter came together with Chinese migrants in their 
discourse or physical surroundings. While comparisons favourable to limítrofes are often made 
by Platenses (using the negative remarks about the Chinos that I have mentioned), embodied 
(bodily) reactions are also very frequent, sometimes replacing discourse. Tension, frustration, 
disapproval, disgust, and scorn are among the emotions most commonly communicated by 
Platenses by means of body language, facial expressions and changes in intonation when 
referring to Chinese migrants.  
 
As I will show later on, even if relations with Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans 
were not idyllic, when viewed in the context of (and in relation to) their discontent with the 
Chinese in the city, Platenses’ opinions and feelings about limítrofes were generally rather 
positive. Moreover, several decades of Peruvian, Paraguayan and Bolivian immigration to the 
city led many Platenses to naturalize these migrants’ presence—considering it “normal” that 
verduleras were Bolivian, that the empleadas domésticas were Peruvian or Paraguayan and 
that migrant men from these three countries were the partido’s construction workers. Some 
even argued that these migrants were crucial to a well-functioning society; nevertheless, many 
disagreed, especially when migrants stepped out—and moved up—from what Platenses 
considered migrants’ well-delimited labour niches  (Recalde 2006-a) to perform higher status 
jobs.  
 
Limítrofes were also repositioned closer to Platenses in the course of the 2000s because 
they were Latin American and not Asian.  Informed by the changes taking place in the city’s 
ethnic hierarchy (related to the solid presence of Chinese migrants), this shift resulted from 
Platenses’ revision of their own ethnic kinship; that is, of their own ethnic loyalties and 
ancestry, which were increasingly anchored in South America (as a result, at least in part, of 
Kirchnerismo’s policies fostering the diversity, inclusiveness and Latin-Americanness of the 
nation for nearly a decade)143. This rapprochement between Platenses and limítrofes was 
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expressed in two important ways. First, in politicians’ and militants’ discourse but also (albeit 
less so) in ordinary conversations among Platenses, who stated that, as South Americans, 
limítrofes and Argentinians shared not only a common history but also a present commitment 
to deepen regional integration. This was the official discourse of the Dirección de 
Colectividades y Migraciones of La Plata’s Municipality, which was in charge of 
implementing the new migration law in the partido, and of Kirchneristas at the national, 
provincial and local levels. Militants advocating a wide range of causes also advanced this 
argument, believing that the social, economic and political problems of South American 
peoples could only be solved through regional efforts. Second, in everyday social interaction, 
when confronted in discourse or physical proximity with migrants, Platenses often expressed 
the idea that neither limítrofes nor Argentinians were Asian or Chinese. This negative 
statement indirectly signalled that Platenses spared limítrofes the “foreignization” process, 
involving distancing and devaluation,that was being exercised upon Chinese migrants.  
 
The overall repositioning of Bolivians, Peruvians and Paraguayans in La Plata’s ethnic 
value hierarchy occurred on two levels. On the one hand, their “moving up” improved their 
social standing within the larger group of migrants. In this regard, it remains to be seen to what 
extent the increasing, more recent arrival of African migrants to La Plata (Maffia and 
Zubrzycki in press) will affect the city’s ethnic hierarchies144. On the other hand, Bolivians, 
Peruvians and Paraguayans “moving closer” to Platenses implied a horizontal movement 
taking place in a different social space and informed by another classificatory logic: the 
political arena of citizenship145. In this respect, Platenses’ reinvention of their ethnic kinship as 
latinoamericanos (or even as Mercosureños) might be viewed as the initial step in the future 
reconfiguration of (albeit still unequal) exchanges with limítrofes. It also remains to be seen to 
what extent the progressive consolidation and implementation of the MERCOSUR citizenship, 
as stipulated by the bloc in its December 2010 plan of action146, will impact the status of 
MERCOSUR nationals in Argentina and their actual access to a wide range of rights. 
 
THE GENDERING OF ACCOUNTS, CONCERNS AND HOUSEHOLD ROLES  
 
The taller de calzado (shoe repair shop) run by César—“a Peruvian from the north” as he likes 
to describe himself—is an interesting social space, regularly assembling compatriots from 
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diverse walks of life. Despite his busy work schedule, César always welcomes visitors with a 
warm smile, and, upon offering them a chair, he engages in joyful conversation while returning 
to work. Over the years, the shop’s animated and easygoing atmosphere—a combination of 
César’s jokes, the loud noise of his sewing machine at work, and the salsa music he 
continuously plays—have turned this workplace into a haven for recently arrived Peruvians in 
La Plata as well as for those going through rough times. Indeed, the shop has come to 
constitute a crossroads where Peruvians “could feel at home even if being abroad”147, as both 
its regular and less frequent visitors comment. For those hanging out at the taller, the feeling of 
being at home while at César’s results from sharing moments with compatriots—as in Fabian’s 
(2001) notion of “time passed together”—, which, going beyond chatting, involves the bodily 
presence (Jackson 1996, Turner 2000) of others whom one knows and can trust148. Migrants 
often referred to the comforting feeling they experienced at the taller by using the notion of 
confianza, or the type of trust that develops from knowing someone quite well. 
 
Through extensive “hanging out” (Ngo 2010) at César’s shop, I had the opportunity to 
meet many Peruvian men and women who shared their migration experiences with me both 
individually and in groups. This form of participant observation allowed me to gauge the extent 
to which the presence or absence of others (relatives, acquaintances, friends or complete 
strangers) of varying gender, age, and socio-economic status affected what migrants chose to 
tell me at any given time. In particular, both differences in age and socio-economic status and 
the type of relationship between those present at the shop significantly affected what migrants 
told me and how. When a certain rivalry prevailed between men, they tended to magnify the 
successful aspects (economic or professional) of their stories. In contrast, when friendship, 
companionship or even empathy were more important, men often joked about each other’s 
difficult times in La Plata. Women’s presence in the shop did not seem to alter men’s 
narratives, mostly because the former sat at some comfortable distance from men and spoke 
with some privacy among themselves. Yet, the presence of other female compatriots did 
influence what women told me. This was the case for Yolanda, César’s wife, for example. In a 
one-on-one interview, she had only briefly mentioned working as an assistant at an aquatic 
centre for children, where her job consisted of cleaning the building and helping children get 
dressed. It fact, it was only when a good friend of hers was telling me about the 
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marginalization she had endured at her jobs cleaing and caring for the elderly that Yolanda 
spoke about Platenses’ racism, which she had experienced in the form of her female 
employers’ differential treatment and lack of consideration when working at the aquatic centre. 
In order to illustrate the gendering of migration-related concerns and the extent to which the 
narratives of men and women tend to differ, I start by presenting the initial accounts provided 
by César and Yolanda about their family’s migration to La Plata.  
 
César’s Version of his Family’s Migration to La Plata 
 
The first time I met César, he playfully told me that he had ended up in La Plata in December 
1997 after accepting a friend’s invitation to “go and see” the city. César clearly remembered 
his arrival in Buenos Aires airport and that he had liked La Plata’s atmosphere right away. As 
was the case of most migrants, César made it to Argentina thanks to his family’s financial 
support, who lent him the so-called bolsa de viaje—a large amount of money (between 
US$500 to US$1,000) then requested by the Argentinean government to grant nationals of 
neighbouring countries a discretionary 30-day tourist visa. This arbitrarily high fee 
automatically transformed migrants into debtors, an issue that César noted. He also 
remembered how difficult it was to obtain the residence papers due to complex and lengthy 
procedures and exorbitant processing fees at that time, and how much migrants feared the 
police. Police officers regularly conducted raids to catch undocumented migrants from 
neighbouring nations who, after paying for bribes and being mistreated, tended to be quickly 
deported. As most migrants I interviewed, César had deployed “invisibilizing” strategies in 
order to stay in La Plata, such as avoiding downtown as much as possible, refraining from 
using public services and not filing complaints when exploited or abused. Those who could 
afford it also paid for fake marriages with villeros (poor and stigmatized Argentinians)149 in 
order to get their papers. This costly transaction (around 2,000$ Argentinean pesos) did not 
always work out, however, since marriage certificates were mailed to the Argentinean 
“spouse”, who often disappeared after completing this commercial transaction. As a result, 
migrants ended up without their papers, further indebted and in serious trouble in their 
relationships. Under these risky and costly circumstances, César decided to apply for his papers 
in 1999.  
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Finding work in his trade was very challenging for César because his occupation did 
not fit into the well-delimited ethnic labour niches of La Plata. César was initially trained as a 
tapicero (upholsterer) and later on as a zapatero (cobbler). By the 1990s, he had his own 
cobbler business in Chiclayo and also did a number of upholstery jobs for a local hospital. 
Upon his arrival in La Plata, however, César’s attempts to work in his field were unsuccessful, 
since he continuously encountered Platenses’ reluctance to hire him or even tell him where to 
start. As a result, he ended up working in the construction and painting sectors of the informal 
economy, as did most migrant men. Like others before and after him, César learned to do this 
work on the job; over the years, he managed to become independent, choosing his own projects 
and dealing directly with clients.  
 
Initially, compatriots also offered César work as a trapito, which he rejected. The job of 
a trapito consisted of watching over cars parked on the street, occasionally washing them and 
securing parking spots during peak hours in the busiest parts of the city. The commercial 
transaction regulating this occupation was “informal” in two ways: it was based on an oral, 
often spontaneous agreement between the client and the trapito, and it was paid in cash 
(untaxed). This labour niche emerged in the late 1990s in tandem with the growing number of 
media reports of the increasing insecurity, and was progressively consolidated during the 2000s 
as a result of La Plata’s growing parking problem (which resulted from an increased number of 
vehicles and the lack of adequate responses to it by the local government). Initially, 
Argentinean men were likely to do this job, yet by the late 2000s, this labour niche became 
Peruvian territory (I present the experience of a Peruvian man working as trapito in the next 
chapter).  
 
Eventually, it was a trapito who informed César of an advertisement seeking help in a 
shoe repair shop in La Plata, a job that César was able to obtain. Working for this “Paraguayan 
or Uruguayan”, as César vaguely described his employer, was crucial for him and signalled a 
turning point in his “migrant career” in the city. With his employer’s support, César gradually 
learned how the upholstery and shoe-making industries worked in the GBA. Further, upon the 
death of this elderly employer years later, César managed to buy his shop’s machinery, thanks 
to the widow’s offer to him to pay for it with work. Having both the necessary knowledge and 
the tools in hand, César opened his own shoe repair shop in his home in the early 2000s.  
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At the time we met, César lived with his wife Yolanda and their two young sons in a 
small and precarious apartment in a quiet neighbourhood of La Plata. César’s family had taken 
possession of the (private) premises without paying for them (I examine the issue of occupying 
“abandoned” private property in the next chapter). The apartment was one of many connected 
through a long corridor leading to a common front door which opened onto the sidewalk150. 
The shop was doing well and, little by little, César’s clientele expanded; nonetheless he 
considered that the apartment’s “hidden” location was not propitious for the business to 
prosper: the taller needed increased visibility. As a result, César began to search for new 
commercial premises, and it took him years of unsuccessful tries and vanishing hopes before 
he managed to overcome the prohibitive rental rules in place (see previous section). 
Fortunately, by the time César found his shop’s new premises, not far from his home, an 
elderly client graciously offered to act as his rental guarantor. The lease was signed and the 
taller was finally launched “in the light” in late 2009.  
 
What I have just presented are excerpts of César’s initial account of his experiences in 
La Plata, which he told me in a one-on-one interview. This brief selection illustrates his focus 
on personal, career-related achievements, which barely includes any family or social 
relationship information. César rarely talked about the emotional and financial difficulties 
integral to the migration experience, such as those associated with leaving family members 
behind or struggling to make ends meet while having to repay debts and send money to 
relatives back home. Only in passing did César mention the costly trade-off involved in 
establishing his own shop: “Look, I have what I have, but it has been costly [pero me 
costó]...All the years I have been here…And I gave up so many things”. César did not 
elaborate and it was Yolanda, while giving him a hand at the shop on another day, who 
explained to me what he meant.  
 
As was the case for most Peruvians and Paraguayans I interviewed, men’s narratives 
focused on their personal work performance, either avoiding or minimizing emotional 
considerations and financial hardships. Those of women, in contrast, brought to the forefront 
familial and other social ties by highlighting migration’s costly implications for themselves and 
those left behind. In what follows, I present some excerpts of an interview with Yolanda in 
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order to show the extent to which her account of the family’s migration to La Plata differs from 
that of César, who, being in the same room, did not object to what Yolanda was saying. 
Yolanda’s version was also confirmed by César during group conversations with compatriots 
at the taller and in one-on-one chats with me.  
 
Migrant Women’s Suffering and Transnational Family Care   
 
Like César, Yolanda is from Chiclayo and lived in her parents’ house until her early twenties 
when she found a data entry job in Lima, Peru’s capital. Later on, she became the secretary of 
her brother’s business and greatly enjoyed her work. Yet, after a car accident, Yolanda returned 
to Chiclayo to rest and her mother, worrying that she might get hurt again, asked Yolanda to 
stay in town. She did as she was told. Soon after, Yolanda began to date César, who lived only 
a couple of blocks from her parents’ home, and they were married in due time. By the mid-
1990s, the couple’s economic situation worsened substantially because Yolanda could not find 
work in Chiclayo (where they asked for experience that she did not have) and César’s clientele 
continued to shrink due to increasing competition (the region was full of upholsterers and 
cobblers). It was under these circumstances that Yolanda learned that a cousin, whom she had 
never met was about to leave for Argentina. Accompanied by her mother, Yolanda visited her 
distant relative and the arrangements were made for their subsequent departure. Yolanda knew 
that the opportunity was worth a try, especially then, because of the uno a uno (parity between 
the Argentinean peso and the American dollar), which allowed migrants to save enough money 
to “buy things” in Peru, as they put it. As other migrants from neighbouring nations were 
doing, Yolanda left to “see” La Plata in early 1997, a probar (to test) if she could stay there, 
planning on getting settled and having César and their four year-old son join her. 
 
Right from the start of the interview, Yolanda emphasized how much she suffered upon 
her arrival in La Plata because she did not know anyone and her cousin had gone to work cama 
adentro (as a live-in caregiver) for an elderly couple. Yolanda did not have any way to contact 
her, nor did she have the means to buy herself a bus ticket to go anywhere. As planned, 
Yolanda went to live with four other young Peruvian women in an apartment rented by an aunt 
of Yolanda’s cousin. These compatriots were to find her a job as well. The same day Yolanda 
arrived, she went to a money-transfer agency where she sent home the 500US$ lent by her 
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family for her bolsa de viaje. It was borrowed money, she insisted, so it could not be touched. 
Unfortunately, Yolanda’s concern with fulfilling her family’s expectations (returning the 
money as promised confirmed the trust invested upon Yolanda by her family) made her 
overlook her compatriots’ “basic value orientations” (Barth 1969), that is, the standards of 
morality and excellence by which performance is judged (p.14). Yolanda’s wrong assumption 
held costly implications for her.  
 
To Yolanda’s disappointment, her roommates treated her as “someone they did not 
know”. Even though they were aware that Yolanda did not have any money left and that she 
would only receive her pay at the end of the month, they still asked her to pay the rent 
promptly. Likewise, despite knowing that Yolanda was going to bed on an empty stomach, 
they never shared any food with her. Further, when she asked them for some money to pay for 
the bus tickets to go to work, even offering her gold wedding ring as proof of her sincerity, her 
roommates rejected her request. Reflecting upon these initial hardships, Yolanda tended to 
emphasize her personal strength in the face of emotional and financial adversity while being 
far from home, and contextualized these memories within a religious interpretation of the 
events: 
“I suffered but there must be a reason for it…And I excelled so they [César and their child] 
could come and be with me because by myself, oh no!…Every day, when I was on the street, I 
looked at children with their father, mother, it was very painful.”  
 
Like other migrant women who lead their family’s move to Argentina, Yolanda 
deployed a number of caring strategies that were oriented towards preventing her own 
suffering from affecting those who remained at home. For example, when César wanted to join 
Yolanda sooner than planned, she emphasized the lack of space in the apartment, without 
mentioning that she did not have money to buy food or pay for the bus. Yolanda did not share 
with César that some of them slept on the floor, either. Instead, she tended to stress that she 
needed some time to “get settled” and that they had to be patient. In reality, Yolanda knew that 
her family would not have a place to live in La Plata at that time. Explaining why she had 
spared César her daily struggles was a way for Yolanda to demonstrate her autonomy and 
leadership when it came to making important decisions for her family: “If I had told César 
[about her initial suffering], he would have come right away and I was only getting started, I 
needed more time…Anyway, he could have not solved anything then.” On the phone with 
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César, Yolanda always reassured him that she was doing fine and promptly shifted the 
conversation towards their four-year-old, since she was anxious to hear how he was doing. 
When talking to her child, Yolanda sought to comfort him by mentioning the things that she 
would buy for him thanks to her work in La Plata, a strategy that often worked.   
 
Yolanda left their son, who had previously spent most of his time with her, under the 
tutelage of her own mother, who also looked after other grandchildren. Yolanda believed that it 
had been the right decision because César was working at the time and could barely take care 
of the child. In addition, by playing with his cousins, he would be somewhat distracted and 
would think less of her. Yolanda’s reasoning is representative of that of most Peruvian and 
Paraguayan women I interviewed in La Plata, who also left their children in the hands of a 
female relative in order to lead their family’s migration to Argentina. Coming from patriarchal 
societies where a “traditional” division of labour prevailed, many of these women had stayed 
home after marriage in order to take care of their homes, children and husbands, even if they 
had previously held commercial occupations, such as street vendors or store owners, or 
administrative positions. Under these circumstances, their migration to La Plata, where they 
mostly found work as empleadas domésticas, caregivers of the elderly and cleaners at public 
institutions and private enterprises, brought about important challenges for them. They found 
the dramatic decrease in their social status, given their low-ranking, isolating jobs, particularly 
difficult. This was exacerbated by the painful absence of their young children and other female 
relatives with whom they spent a large part of their days back home.  
 
Women’s Personal Strength, Determination and Increased Autonomy in La Plata  
 
Talking about her jobs in La Plata, Yolanda remarked that, in sharp contrast with the 
difficulties she had experienced with her roommates, she had never suffered with the abuelas 
(grandmothers), as she warmly called the elderly women she had worked for. Yolanda’s first 
job was with a seventy-year-old woman who was buenísima to her. This employer not only 
treated Yolanda fairly and always paid her on time (including bonuses that Yolanda did not 
expect), but also gave her food to take home (aware that her roommates did not share any with 
her). When César arrived months later, this Señora also hired him to do maintenance jobs at 
her home, paying him well even when César had not set a price. During Yolanda’s first two 
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years with this abuela, she worked from 08:00 to 14:00, cleaning her home and running some 
errands, and, when her health deteriorated, Yolanda began to keep her company at night.  
 
Reflecting upon her initial months in La Plata, Yolanda remarked that her prayers had 
not been in vain. The situation in her apartment did not change and Yolanda was feeling “too 
uncomfortable”, so, in despair, she asked God for help: “When I came to La Plata, I only had 
one job, so I said ‘ai Diosito’ [please God] help me get another job to be able to leave this 
apartment…I was feeling really bad then.” And in less than two months, she was working three 
shifts, or as she put it, full-time. Yolanda’s second job in La Plata consisted of cleaning the 
house and looking after the four children of her employer’s son. Yolanda found this job soon 
after her first and was able to arrange to work afternoons at the son’s house and mornings at his 
mother’s (both jobs would come to an end years later, when the abuela, who paid for 
Yolanda’s services, died). Yolanda’s third job, which she found a month after her second, 
involved looking after another abuela at night. This employer’s daughter hired Yolanda to 
make sure that her mother was all right and to notify her otherwise (the daughter lived a couple 
of blocks away from her mother and could be easily reached if needed). Luckily for Yolanda, 
this night job permitted her to leave the apartment for good, since she began to sleep at this 
abuela’s house while spending her days at the other two jobs. Moreover, when this employer 
learned that Yolanda was being charged by her former roommates for leaving her suitcase at 
the apartment (as if she lived there), the abuela allowed Yolanda to leave it at her place 
instead. The abuelas, Yolanda remarked, had always been kind to her, yet their daughters had 
changed over the years,  becoming less interested in their mothers’ well-being: “They are not 
as they were before”, Yolanda said when talking about daughters not spending enough time 
with their mothers and being less attentive to their needs.  
 
Yolanda’s initial months of sacrifice and solitude in La Plata not only permitted her to 
send for her family afterwards, but also changed how she viewed the traditional division of 
gender roles in the household. Being alone in a city where she did not know anyone and 
struggling to make ends meet while fulfilling the emotional and financial needs of relatives 
back home proved very challenging for her. Yet, by overcoming these hardships, she came to 
realize her personal strength and determination when it came to securing her family’s well-
being transnationally. As other Peruvian and Paraguayan women I interviewed also mentioned, 
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the initial adversity they faced taught them important lessons about autonomous decision-
making and economic independence, issues that were foreign to women back home where 
wives were often fully dependent on their husbands. Yolanda proudly told me that during her 
initial months in La Plata, she managed to save enough money to rent her family a room in a 
pensión close to where she worked. Pensiones were very convenient for recently arrived 
migrants living in urban areas of the GBA since they were the cheapest form of 
accommodation available in the city, and did not enforce the restrictive rental rules in place. In 
pensiones, tenants rented a room while sharing the rest of the facilities, and were not asked for 
either a deposit or a rental guarantor. The drawbacks were also significant, however, since 
pensiones tended to be located in disadvantaged areas, their infrastructure was often in a 
precarious state and landlords tended to turn a deaf ear to tenants’ complaints. Talking about 
how she managed to rent the room for her family and equip it with the basic things that they 
would need while covering most of the cost of their plane tickets, Yolanda says with 
satisfaction: 
“César had to sell all the cobbler machinery because he could not bring anything here…So, 
I told him ‘I’ll let you a month before I finish repaying what I owe, so you can sell your things 
and see how much you get, and if it’s not enough for the tickets, I will help you’.”  
 
In the meantime, Yolanda also prepared the official letter authorizing their child to 
travel with César (and without her) to Argentina and warned her husband that life in Argentina 
was not like in Peru. As their arrival date approached, the more Yolanda emphasized in their 
phone conversations:  
“I’m not going to come home from work to cook for you, take care of you and run to the 
next job…You’ll have to learn how to cook for yourself and for our son because I eat at work 
and will only have three hours in the afternoon to spend with you both.”  
 
In Peru, Yolanda stressed, women were expected to take care of all domestic work, 
including child-raising and caring for their husbands and elders, while men did not know how 
to do any of that.  
 
Eight months after Yolanda had left Chiclayo, her family arrived in La Plata and it was 
only then that César learned about the emotional and financial hardships that Yolanda had gone 
through. As was the case of most migrant women leading their family’s move, Yolanda 
gradually changed her work schedule in order to respond to her family’s needs. Making up for 
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lost time was crucial for Yolanda and caring for their child was her priority. Yolanda’s work 
change did not take place right away, however, because César was jobless for some time. In 
fact, Yolanda continued working three shifts for several months in order to make enough 
money to buy things, an issue that Yolanda convincingly presented to César as follows: “The 
kid needs a TV and if I quit two jobs, keeping only one, we won’t be able…César, I have to do 
it for a while.” Eventually, César was hired on a few construction and painting jobs, which 
allowed Yolanda to stop working nights by sending a replacement, a good friend of hers whom 
she could really trust (de mucha confianza). This also allowed the family to live under the same 
roof in the pensión. By then, Yolanda had found several cleaning day jobs through the abuelas 
she had previously worked for. Most often, after the death of an elderly employer, the 
deceased’s girlfriends or daughters asked Yolanda to work for them or for their relatives. 
César’s contribution to the raising of their children at that time made Yolanda’s life easier, 
even if she still did the cooking and cleaning of their apartment. In fact, until he managed to 
earn a somewhat higher and stable income, César was home looking after their son and second 
baby while Yolanda was busy at work.  
 
Things changed once more for Yolanda when César launched his shop in its new 
commercial premises. She became once again fully in charge of their household’s social 
reproduction and, as a result, substantially reduced her workload. Furthermore, César insisted 
that Yolanda should “help” him at the taller during peak work periods151 while remaining at 
home the rest of the time instead of finding remunerated employment outside their household. 
This sort of demand was common among the Peruvian and Paraguayan men I interviewed who, 
after becoming established economically, want their wives to fully devote themselves to their 
families. Men often justify this demand by stating that that their spouses already made a lot of 
sacrifices for them (and for other relatives back home) by leading their family’s migration to 
Argentina, and thus they deserve to rest. Even if this claim is often sincere, men’s demands in 
this respect work to restore the traditional division of household labour and the attendant 
relations of emotional and financial dependency that it entailed back home. Men’s remarks on 
this subject also signal the extent to which only remunerated labour is considered real “work” 
and of high value. In contrast, the jobs performed without financial retribution tend to be 
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interpreted as “help”, and are often naturalized as inherent to women and of lesser value, along 
with other domestic chores supporting the social and material reproduction of the household.  
 
The Transnationalization of Social Reproduction: Its Consequences for Migrant Women and 
Their Families  
 
Yolanda’s account in itself and vis-à-vis that of César is instructive in a number of important 
ways. To start with, it illustrates the increasing feminization of Peruvian and Paraguayan 
migrations to Argentina (Cerruti 2009, Pacceca and Courtis 2008, Texidó 2008) and the 
attendant transnationalization of social reproduction (Herrera Mosquera 2008, Arat-Koç and 
Giles 1996, Maher 2004). This twofold phenomenon constitutes an important shift from 
Peruvians and Paraguayans’ former mobility patterns, which has brought about important 
implications for migrant women and their families. As the heads of their family’s subsequent 
migration to Argentina, Peruvian and Paraguayan women in La Plata continue to play (albeit 
transnationally) key caregiving roles back home while incorporating new responsibilities, such 
as securing the financial well-being of those left behind. Without exception, the women I 
interviewed spent large amounts of energy and time comforting spouses and children over the 
phone and by Internet, and giving instructions to various (mostly female) relatives who are left 
in charge of their domestic responsibilities. As has been raised by the literature, the trade-off 
between emotional and economic considerations is inherent to transnational family relations 
(Russell Hochschild 2002, Merla and Baldassar 2010). Migrant women fulfill new pressing 
financial obligations such as paying back the loans that made their trip possible and sending 
money back home for various purposes (including buying food, clothes and toys for children 
and spouses, paying for medicines and bills, and supporting elderly or unemployed relatives).  
 
The transnationalization of migrant women’s domestic roles along with their 
incorporation of new financial responsibilities has led to the renegotiation of familial 
obligations and the renewal of households’ reproduction strategies. Leaving their children or 
elders in the hands of a female relative is very costly for migrant women, from both emotional 
and financial points of view. Depending on who the assigned caregiver is (most often their own 
mother or mother-in-law, but sometimes a sister, sister-in-law or aunt), migrant women fear the 
possibility of differential treatment, neglect or mistreatment of their dependents, despite their 
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own fulfillment of financial obligations towards the assigned caregivers. Women’s departure 
results in the transfer of their domestic (including care) duties to other women back home, 
whereas men, who most often do not partake in these responsibilities, become another 
dependent to be taken care of. By depicting motherhood as “natural”, a patriarchal ideology of 
mothering locks women into biological reproduction, and denies them identities and selfhood 
outside mothering (Glenn 1994), even when they have acquired new financial obligations 
towards their families. In this way, mothering as women’s responsibility is left unchanged and 
men continue to avoid the “second shift” (Ehrenreich and Russell Hochschild 2002).  
 
Yolanda’s account also shows the extent to which the initial emotional and financial 
hardships endured by Peruvian and Paraguayan women in La Plata contribute to changing their 
views of the traditional division of gendered household roles. Most migrant women mention 
facing discrimination and marginalization (especially at work and, to a lesser extent, in public 
institutions) in solitude upon their arrival in the city. While they explain the former by 
Platenses’ prejudiced views, lack of empathy and unsympathetic attitudes, women see their 
initial solitude as arising from their lack of access to social networks of trust (confianza). As 
they often put it, their initial suffering is caused by not knowing anyone in the city, even if 
retrospectively, they also provide a religious interpretation of the painful events, mostly by 
saying that “there was a reason for it”. By overcoming their initial struggles, however, women 
experience an important personal transformation, which they describe as a process of learning 
and growth.  
 
Women often mention being grateful to Argentina because the country gave them the 
opportunity to stand up for themselves while showing them that gender roles can differ from 
those they considered “normal” until their arrival. Fighting for their rights in La Plata in order 
to secure the well-being of those left behind shows women their own strength, determination 
and autonomy. In addition, women in La Plata make financial and other critical decisions for 
their families that override their husbands’ or parents’ preferences, which would be impossible 
in their countries of origin, where these relatives are invested with the authority to make 
important decisions for married or single women respectively. When talking about this issue, 
some women express frustration while others view their former emotional and financial 
dependency on husbands and parents as being a question of love and respect. Moreover, by 
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living and working in La Plata, Peruvian and Paraguayan women learn that their Argentinean 
counterparts are engaged in remunerated employment outside their homes as much as men are, 
which often results in both sexes sharing domestic chores. Migrant woman use this knowledge 
to question their traditional views of gendered household roles, something they rarely did 
before. Interviewees consider making money extremely rewarding and particularly 
empowering when it comes to supporting their families. Nevertheless, women’s new ambition 
for making money can become very costly, in particular, when enduring abusive and 
exploitative circumstances threatens their physical and psychological health, or when working 
day and night leads women to neglect their own young children, who end up “raising 
themselves” in La Plata (issues that I examine in the next chapter).  
 
Yolanda’s account also demonstrates that domestic work, crucial to the social and 
material reproduction of households, continues to be almost exclusively done and regulated by 
women. All the Peruvian and Paraguayan women I interviewed delegated their own domestic 
responsibilities (requiring their physical presence) to female relatives back home in order to 
take up some of those of their Argentinean counterparts. By cleaning the houses of Platenses 
and caring for their children and elders, migrant women “free” their Argentinean counterparts 
from domestic obligations, which allows the latter to engage in remunerated and highly 
regarded employment outside their homes. Yet, this transfer of devalued and poorly paid 
domestic obligations often deprives migrant women of their own right to family life (an issue 
that I examine in the next chapter).  
 
On the other side of the work relationship, these migrants’ employers are almost 
exclusively women. Daughters of elderly parents, sisters of mothers going through difficult 
times and supportive grandmothers or aunts of busy young people are the ones managing the 
domestic work of migrant women either in their own homes or in those of relatives. Platense 
women are the ones who hire, recommend to others, pay and fire Peruvian and Paraguayan 
women all while overseeing their performance and imposing “labour and family regimes” 
(Ong 1999) on them, that is, systems of power/knowledge that define and regulate subjects and 
normalize their attitudes and behaviour 152. As Glenn’s (2010) work demonstrates, the 
exploitation of women’s care labour and the denial of equitable benefits and entitlements takes 
place through multifarious forms of coercion, ranging from personal moral persuasion to the 
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force of impersonal legal doctrines, from internalized feelings of obligation to external 
constraints of the labour market. Moreover, since status categories such as race and gender 
continue to shape both market and kin relations, women are charged with a “triple status duty 
to care” on the basis of kinship, gender and race/class (p.7).  
 
Both in Argentina and in migrants’ home countries, female networks support the 
transfer of domestic work from more privileged to less privileged women, a relocation process 
that in itself contributes to the increasing devaluation of these chores and the reduced status of 
those who perform them. This happens in both migrants’ countries of origin and in Argentina. 
In the home country, the female relatives charged with caring for the dependents left behind by 
migrants increasingly consider their domestic roles to be less rewarding (or as having lesser 
value) than those of the women who left to perform paid work. Making money abroad 
translates into prestige at home, since the often unknown sacrifices made by migrants 
contribute towards sustaining or improving the material and social circumstances of those left 
behind. In Argentina, domestic labour has long been considered an occupation of lower value 
and this conception has tainted the social status of those who have performed it. Historically, 
the housework done by internal migrant women and men (and by aboriginal and black people 
before them) supported the standard of living of the country’s upper classes (Recalde 2006-a, 
Frigerio 2006). During Peronismo, the state’s promotion of women’s active economic 
participation was supported by a public network of daycare facilities and schools, which, 
combined with the private hiring of domestic employees, permitted middle class women, in 
particular, to work in more “desirable” (professional) occupations.  
 
Over the decades, this transfer of domestic obligations increased along with the 
accentuation of the lower status attributed to this kind of work in the context of a deteriorating 
national economy and the replacement of internal workers by international migrant women. 
The intersection between these processes and the historical contempt felt for neighbouring 
nations in Argentina has resulted in an even lower status being associated with the work of 
social reproduction that is performed by Peruvian and Paraguayan women in the country. 
Moreover, the value of the labour of raising a child, in particular, always low relative to the 
value attributed to other kinds of labour, has sunk even lower under the impact of 
globalization. When formerly unpaid work became the paid work of child-care workers, its low 
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market value revealed the low value of care work generally and further lowered it (Hochschild 
2002). 
 
Gendered Views of Kirchnerismo’s Policies 
 
In addition to the general issues regarding gender roles that emerge from Yolanda’s and 
César’s accounts, which represent the views of other Paraguayans and Peruvians in the 
partido’s urban areas, others come to light when migrants talk about the government’s public 
policies. Migrant men tend to emphasize the negative consequences of the inclusive citizenship 
policies implemented by Kirchnerismo, despite the fact that some of them were receiving 
technical training subsidized by these same policies. Several of the Peruvian men I interviewed 
had completed or were enrolled in evening or night classes at almost no cost while keeping 
their day jobs in construction. Most often, their training was in repairing high tech equipment, 
including high definition TVs, video game consoles and computers. Since this work was in 
great demand, migrants envisioned opening their own repair shops, which would eventually 
allow them to quit the construction jobs they had never liked. Others, such as some Paraguayan 
men living in Buenos Aires city, had completed or were planning to enrol in subsidized 
refrigeration courses to fix a wide range of equipment, a skill that also seemed to be in high 
demand. Another example is Lucas, a Peruvian man in his fifties, who was hired to care for a 
Platense architect in his late eighties after finishing his nurse assistantship training at one of La 
Plata’s public institutions. All the migrant families living in urban areas of the partido (and the 
GBA) who participated in my research received low-income-household subsidies financed 
through Kirchnerismo’s inclusive public policies. 
 
Migrant men often claim that the wide range of measures implemented by the 
government was creating a cultura de vagos or “culture of idlers” that fosters crime, mostly 
among the villeros and pibes chorros. César’s comments on this issue are representative of 
those of others:  
“I’ve been looking for an assistant or an apprentice [for his shop], but I do not find 
anyone…What happens is this plan being given by the President: the benefits for kids 
[Asignación Universal por Hijo] and all that…There are people who have 5, 7 children for this 
[reason], they receive 150$ pesos, plus 30$ as savings, for each child, and they don’t work; 
besides, they receive the canasta [amount of money covering the basic consumption of a 
household], they are given everything!, so, why would they work if the state supports them?”  
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Talking about Kirchnerismo’s inclusive policies, Peruvian and Paraguayan men, as well 
as some Bolivian ones, often remark that these measures constitute a regrettable waste of 
public resources, especially when combined with politicians’ corruption and bribery. Rodrigo, 
a Peruvian man in his late thirties told me, for example:  
“Sometimes, government leaders come to where I live to tell me: ‘So, are you registered in 
the plan to earn some money?’, and when I said no, they insisted that I should do it, by adding: 
‘You can pretend to be seeking employment and just go back home…But, we get 50$ [pesos] 
and you keep the remaining 100$.”  
 
Other migrant men also mention being invited by political leaders to participate in 
public partisan events. As Felipe, a Paraguayan man, puts it: “I have friends who tell me: 
‘Come, we’re paying 80$ pesos for people to accompany us to the capital [Buenos 
Aires]’…They are looking for support for I don’t know what political event”. Urban Bolivian 
men, in particular, tend to express their desire for “laws to be implemented” in a less overt 
manner, and often demand sanctions against criminal youth in particular. As Sandro once said:  
“From my point of view and reasoning, I say that [Argentina] lacks laws as well as the 
implementation of such laws, I have a lot of friends who are verduleros and they are constantly 
robbed…And there should be a sentence for minors, you see.” 
 
In the eyes of migrant men in La Plata, Kirchnerismo’s inclusive policies, coupled with 
politicians’ corruption, has fostered a holgazanería (shiftlessness) among the poorest, 
marginalized Argentinians: the villeros. Several migrant men remarked with indignation: 
 “They have been so accustomed to live at the expense of the state that they even ask for a 
raise, they go on strike!...They don’t do anything, those people wait for ‘things to fall from the 
sky’ for them, they do not need to work…This is the only country where this happens!”  
 
Migrants often claim that this bad habit, induced by politicians’ desire to get votes and 
steal money, is the cause of Argentina’s delinquency since (poor) parents use the money given 
by the government to send their children to school for cigarettes and alcohol instead. As a 
result, the villeros’ children have no education or ambition and resort to criminal activities, 
becoming the pibes chorros well known to migrants and non-migrants alike. Migrant men 
often propose mano dura (tough actions) as the solution to this “pernicious” situation, 
believing that by reintroducing compulsory military service, giving more freedom to the police 
and adopting harsher sanctions against criminal youth “things would improve”. These are the 
punitive, even draconian political measures well known by migrants in their home countries, 
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which have normally been used by influential people inside and outside the state to silence any 
opposition to the status quo153. When thinking within these parameters, migrant men contrast 
their own “culture of hard work” to that of the villeros’ holgazanería by signalling that they 
have always worked and never lived at the expense of the state.  
 
Peruvian and Paraguayan women living or working in the partido’s urban areas, on the 
other hand, rarely speak about Kirchnerismo’s policies in the way that men do. Women often 
highlight the “great things” that their families have received from Argentina, envisioning them 
as new opportunities. Access to free public education for their children and health care for the 
whole family are considered invaluable resources by women, which, along with a range of 
non-taxable public subsidies, have continued to secure their children’s educational and 
economic prospects. Women also appreciate the “great care at no cost” that they have received 
when delivering their babies in public institutions. Most of those who bore children in the 
home country speak about the restrictive fees imposed by health care institutions, public and 
private alike, which are often not even well equipped to deal with difficult pregnancies or 
premature babies. Under these circumstances, most poor women have their babies at home 
with the help of a female relative, whereas those who manage to do so at a medical institution 
end up badly indebted, sometimes even losing their homes154.  
 
Some of the women I interviewed also spoke about their relatives’ recovery from 
serious illnesses thanks to public medical institutions in Argentina. Andrea’s husband, a 
Peruvian man in his late thirties, underwent surgery for a stomach tumour that was badly 
affecting his health. All the exams, diagnosis, surgery, recovery treatment and the subsequent 
medical and nursing follow-up were done free of charge at public hospitals. One of Ana’s 
sisters, an undocumented Paraguayan woman in her early thirties, was also treated at public 
medical institutions for a serious liver problem, which eventually would require a transplant. 
Likewise, Richard’s sister, a Paraguayan woman in her early thirties, was treated for uterine 
cancer with all expenses, from diagnosis to post-surgery treatment and follow-up, paid for by 
the state. Even if some men occasionally mention these sorts of health-related concerns, 
women are the ones who speak about them at length and mention how grateful they are that 
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their relatives were in Argentina. If they had been home, women say, these relatives would 
have quite probably died. 
 
Women often acknowledge how much things have changed in Argentina since the 
1990s, when the government made it very difficult for migrants from neighbouring nations to 
access public services and obtain their documentation. Despite arriving in the 1990s or 2000s, 
the vast majority of the migrant women I interviewed in the city promptly obtained their DNIs 
(Document Nacional de Identidad) by having an Argentinean-born child, thanks to 
Kirchnerismo’s campaign of fast documentation. The Centros de Documentación Rápida (Fast 
Documentation Centres) were key to this measure155. Moreover, women mention learning to 
see what they have in a different light, meaning that their experiences in Argentina taught them 
to be thankful for things that they took for granted back home, such as friendship and family.  
 
Even if migrant men also consider Argentina a “generous country”, their accounts focus 
on how their own careers and financial circumstances improved. Women’s accounts, in 
contrast, draw attention to the more comprehensive improvement of their families’ well-being. 
Indeed, women tend to situate their personal growth and learning in La Plata within the larger 
social networks to which they belong, and vis-à-vis the contributions they make towards the 
nurturing of such extended kinship networks, whose members are spread over a number of 
countries. Thus, while men see their work stability and related financial progress as the key to 
improving their family’s material well-being back home and in Argentina, women perceive the 
more comprehensive well-being of their kinship networks as guaranteeing their family’s social, 
emotional and material reproduction as well as their own personal growth.  
  
 
CHAPTER V: Experiencing Legality in the Peripheries 
 
In this chapter, I shall focus on the experiences of Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans who 
lived in the peripheries of the partido of La Plata over the past decade while working in a 
number of its urban localities and those of the GBA. In the chapter’s first part, I examine the 
work and residential trajectory of a Paraguayan family. Busy migrant parents incur high costs 
when leaving their children behind, paradoxically, in order to secure the financial well-being of 
their families. Long periods of separation often result in children feeling emotional detachment 
from parents or falling into severe depression. This family’s frequent trips between Argentina 
and Paraguay illustrate the “circularity” of current migrations worldwide (Levit and Glick 
Schiller 2007, Portes and DeWind 2007, Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2008), a consequence of 
the changing economic, social and political circumstances in the region, in combination with 
decisions regarding work and family (Merla and Baldassar 2010). This case also shows the 
peculiar challenges faced by families living in areas neglected by the state and the high price 
they pay for the free accommodation these peripheries offer. By drawing on examples of 
migrants who have lived in peripheral areas of the partido and the GBA, I show that even if 
these localities are characterized by similarly precarious and dangerous living conditions, each 
has its own particular social dynamics. This becomes most apparent in the relationships 
established among migrants from different nationally defined groups, and between them and 
the most disadvantaged social groups in the GBA (an issue also examined by Wacquant 2008). 
 
In the second part of this chapter, I introduce the case of a Peruvian family who lived in 
a periphery of the GBA before moving to another one within the partido of La Plata. This 
example shows the extent to which the envisioning of the migration project and its 
implementation are both gendered processes, issues that I began to analyze in the previous 
chapter. The personal growth, increased autonomy and economic independence experienced by 
migrant women represent a costly trade-off, however, since many of them fall physically and 
psychologically ill or have to neglect their own children after bringing them to Argentina. The 
labour trajectory of the husband shows how a male, informal labour niche, that of trapito or 
cuida coche, gradually emerged in La Plata during the 1990s and consolidated itself as 
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“Peruvian territory” in the following decade. The numerous experiences of this Peruvian man 
with the police show this institution’s racial profiling of the most disadvantaged social groups 
in the GBA, migrants and non-migrants alike.  
 
THE ACTUAL COST OF FREE ACCOMMODATION  
 
Working Without Papers in the Early 2000s 
 
I met Aníbal and Nancy at their home in Villa Elvira, a disadvantaged area in the peripheries of 
the partido de La Plata, where they kindly offered to be interviewed on a Tuesday night (both 
worked long hours almost every day). Finding their home proved quite challenging and 
somewhat scary since their neighbourhood has no street signs, lights or even actual streets, 
paved or otherwise delimited. At 20:00 and after a rainy day, the area was a muddy, pitted and 
completely dark place, in which it was almost impossible to drive or see anything. If I made it 
to their neighbourhood, it was thanks to the guidance and support of my uncle, who 
accompanied me and insisted that we should keep trying, despite getting lost and receiving no 
answer to my phone calls. As we were about to give up, Aníbal appeared, seemingly out of 
nowhere, smiling in the dark with a flashlight in hand. He had not received my calls because 
cell phone reception is poor in the neighbourhood and, realizing I might have been trying to 
call him, he decided to come out and see if we had made it. Once again, without Aníbal’s 
guidance, we would have never found their home: not only was the area truly a boca de lobos 
(pitch black), but their house does not have a number nor is there any identifiable landmark 
close by that could have helped us to locate it.  
 
Aníbal is from the south of Paraguay (Humaitá) and Nancy from the north (San Pedro 
de Ycuamanditú), but they met halfway in Asunción, the country’s capital156. The opportunity 
for them to migrate to Argentina arose in 2001 when one of Aníbal’s sisters, who lived in 
Buenos Aires, found a job for Nancy. Unlike most of the Paraguayans (and Peruvians) I 
interviewed, the couple left together with their young son for Villa Elva, a disadvantaged 
locality in the peripheries of the partido of La Plata. Upon their arrival, they stayed at Nancy’s 
aunt’s house, where arrangements were made to share the premises between both families. As 
planned, Nancy began to work cama adentro en negro right away for a family in Buenos Aires 
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and commuted long hours every Sunday in order to briefly see her husband and child. Aníbal, 
unable to find work, stayed at home looking after their son.  
 
Before migrating, Nancy lived in the campo (rural area), where she attended school in 
the morning and worked with her mother on their chacra (small farm) in the afternoon. Nancy 
had never done housework before, this being reserved for her mother. As was often the case 
among migrant women in their first job in Argentina, Nancy went to allegedly replace her 
sister-in-law and then kept the job. This strategy worked well for both the newcomer in urgent 
need of work and her relative wanting to quit that job. It was only when Nancy began to work 
for the family in Buenos Aires that she learned of the exploitative schedule awaiting her (from 
06:00 to 03:00), an issue that she did not object to then, as she explains: “I had left my mom’s 
home and I had never worked like that before, so I believed that ‘work’ was that…Later, I 
came here and everything changed”. To my surprise, Nancy was not angry at her sister-in-law 
for not warning her about the type of work that awaited her with the judíos (Jews), as she calls 
her employers, which signals that they were Jewish. She simply believed that things were done 
differently in Argentina or, as Aníbal put it: “Things differ from rural areas to the city”. This 
lack of sharing exploitative work experiences, never mind how to overcome them, was quite 
common among the migrant women I interviewed, many of whom, like Nancy, were not 
warned about what awaited them. This no dicho (that which remains unspoken) among 
recently arrived young women along with their lack of urban domestic experience contributes 
to the reproduction of a certain “newness” among them, which is seen as their “docile” 
character by abusive employers seeking “exploitable” domestic workers. 
 
After several months on the job, Nancy travelled with her employers to Punta del Este, 
a popular seaside destination in neighbouring Uruguay, where the work became even more 
demanding, as she explains: 
“There, we never stopped working! We scrubbed the floors like slaves with polishing 
sponges, on our hands and knees, and they were always checking on us…I was pregnant with 
my second child, but the Señora didn’t know…Because she would have fired me and how 
would I have fed my first child?”  
 
The knowledge that Aníbal was still unemployed also contributed to Nancy’s 
willingness to put up with her employer’s exploitative treatment and abusive demands, even 
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dressing up “like a clown” as Nancy describes the dress code imposed by her employer—in a 
long, loose dress along with pants and shoes that she considered horrible. Nancy’s ability to 
aguantar (endure) came to an end, however, when she had to be hospitalized on their return 
from Uruguay: 
“At that time, it was very difficult for foreigners to work in Argentina because we didn’t 
have the DNI…And we had to aguantar…Yet, I could not do it anymore because my feet were 
too swollen, my belly was about to explode…I was then in my 7th month of pregnancy.”  
 
Once in Buenos Aires and feeling very sick, Nancy had to make up excuses in order to 
leave her employers’ house because she had “no actual reason” to go home (supposedly having 
hidden her pregnancy under her large dress). It was also difficult for Nancy to get her last pay 
since the Señora had refused to pay her since their departure for Punta del Este (which I 
believe was part of her strategy to retain Nancy’s services until the last minute without 
acknowledging her right to a maternity leave or her pressing need to rest)157. As other migrant 
women also remarked, exploitative employers often consider their empleadas domésticas’ sick 
or maternity leaves as unacceptable expressions of their lack of productivity, and thus, good 
reason to fire them. Under these circumstances, one of the job’s most advantageous aspects, 
i.e., that it is “under the table” and no attention given the worker’s irregular status, ends up 
working against migrant women, who find themselves with no legal protection against 
employers’ exploitation and arbitrary decisions.   
 
Luckily for the family, by the time Nancy gave birth at the public hospital where she 
was hospitalized, Aníbal had found work in the construction sector through one of his in-laws. 
Even if meagre, Aníbal’s salary, along with Nancy’s last payment, permitted the new mother to 
stay home with their two children. At the time, Aníbal did not have his residency papers and 
used his brother-in-law’s DNI to work:  
“If someone from the ministry [of work] came, I had to hide...I could only stay if I knew the 
document number by heart, so I had it written everywhere on the walls, just in case I forgot 
it!” 
 
Most compatriots in the obra (construction site), however, were not as lucky as Aníbal 
and had to resort to riskier evasion strategies. Some climbed into highly placed cement water 
tanks, where they hid during inspections, as Aníbal explains:  
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“The tanks are huge! So they [undocumented compatriots] got inside and we covered them, 
we put the lid on…And they had to be inside until the inspection finished as to avoid being 
caught and fired.”  
 
This type of dangerous hiding strategy was quite common among the Peruvians, 
Paraguayans and Bolivians I interviewed working without papers in the construction sector 
during the 1990s and in the early 2000s. Yet, over the course of the last decade, it has become 
almost impossible to find employment without papers in this industry because employers 
consider it too risky to hire workers en negro, as the result of Kirchnerismo’s regularization 
campaigns. Since the early 2000s migrants have needed at least a precaria (see chapter III). 
 
Another option available to undocumented migrants in the early 2000s was buying 
documentos truchos (fake DNIs), which, even if risky, often allowed migrants to work locally. 
Aníbal’s view of this alternative echoes that of other migrant men I interviewed in different 
parts of the GBA:  
“When we got here, they offered me one [fake DNI] for 200$ pesos, but it was only useful to 
work here in La Plata, and you could not use it to buy anything or to travel, you would end up 
in jail! [if you did so]. Some [people]even say that they’ll come up with it [the fake DNI] but 
they take all your money and disappear!”   
 
Under these circumstances, recently arrived migrant men have tended to find their first 
job with compatriots who are contratistas (small contractors) since they are the only ones who 
would turn a blind eye to their lack of papers. These jobs are poorly paid and lack union 
protection, however, so men seek to move on to regulated employment as soon as they can, 
especially from the mid-2000s on. This shift towards “legality” among migrants has been 
facilitated by the prompt production of their precarias by the government, an issue that was 
mentioned by many of those I interviewed. This certificate, easy to obtain, has permitted 
migrants to work legally (almost) immediately upon their arrival. Getting residence papers, 
which many see as truly making their lives easier, remains long and problematic, however. 
 
Shortly after Aníbal found work, Nancy’s aunt, who had been sharing her house with 
them in Villa Alba, asked him if he could help to finish a house she was building in Paraguay. 
Unable to refuse her request and seeing it as an opportunity to visit family back home, Nancy, 
Aníbal and their two children left for Asunción in 2002, only to find that no one was there158. 
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Having spent all their money on bus tickets, the family was obliged to move in with Nancy’s 
mother. Under these circumstances, Aníbal began to work in soy production for a Brazilian 
company and Nancy went back to doing farm work with her mother. Two years passed before 
an opportunity arose for Aníbal to return to work in Argentina: this time, a brother-in-law 
found him a job. Aníbal left in early 2004 for Villa Alba, and, in less than two weeks, he was 
employed at a construction site. In the beginning, he was only assigned small jobs, which did 
not pay enough to rent a room at a pensión, so he had to live at his brother-in-law’s house, 
where cohabitation was difficult. Later on, Aníbal was hired to build a house in Gonnet (an 
urban locality of the partido less than ten minutes from La Plata city) and he eventually moved 
into improvised housing provided by the contractor on the work site. This is a common 
practice among construction workers that permits them to save time and money by avoiding 
the long commute between home and work during the last phases of projects. Aníbal worked at 
this site for a year, which allowed him to learn the trade while earning his employers’ 
confianza.  He recounts with pride that by the time this project was finished, he had found 
several other part-time jobs and started to work independently. Indeed, when I met him, Aníbal 
already had his “chain of recommendations”, as he referred to his multiple clients. Depending 
on the size of the project, he has worked either by himself (since he can do most construction-
related jobs) or with the help of a small Paraguayan crew. Aníbal even found a job for Nancy at 
the house he had built in Gonnet.  
 
Emotional Costs of Family Separation 
 
This time, in order to join Aníbal, Nancy had to leave their three children behind (a third one 
was born while they were back in Paraguay). As the couple emphasized, since they had nothing 
left, they had no option but to work, work, and work. Nancy’s mother offered to help by 
looking after her grandchildren so as to enable Nancy to join her husband in Argentina (or, as 
Nancy put it, so as to “give her the courage” to do so). Nancy left for Villa Alba in 2005 and, 
this time, found a job she genuinely liked. She describes her new patrona (female employer) as 
a “really good person”, who is almost never at home, which permits Nancy to clean without 
being bothered. When talking about this Señora, Aníbal and Nancy emphasize that she has 
given them a lot of presents: “What we have here comes from my job…She sends clothes, 
shoes for the children…We do not need to buy those things” Nancy says, while Aníbal 
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remarks: “Thank God, the people we know are buenísimos, we can’t complain…And all the 
things that she gave us [as presents]…We haven’t bought almost anything!”   
 
This second time in Argentina, Nancy was lucky not only with this new employer but 
also with others, thanks to positive referrals. By the time I met Nancy in 2010, she had six 
different part-time jobs in various localities of the partido. Because she works by the hour, and 
given the poor public transportation to and from Villa Elvira, Nancy arrives home quite late, 
between 20:30 and 21:00. Since Aníbal also works long hours, the couple had decided to 
“invite” one of Nancy’s sisters to live with them, mainly to take care of the children, whom 
they had brought to Argentina in 2007. Paying for the ticket and subsistence for a younger 
female relative in exchange for looking after the household’s children is a common strategy 
among busy migrants, one that eventually permits the newcomer to find remunerated 
employment elsewhere. Aníbal and Nancy’s workload has not decreased over the years and 
they barely see each other, as Aníbal remarks: 
“Sometimes I even arrive later [after 21:00], in order to speed things up at work, and she 
[Nancy] also gets back at night…I even work weekends but she does not, for the kids, because 
we want them to play soccer and all that.”  
 
Even if the couple is quite satisfied with their move to Argentina, a country where they 
have enjoyed a number of rights they could not even dream of in Paraguay, both are aware of 
the costly implications of having been apart from their children.  
 
Aníbal and Nancy spoke at length about how poor people die at home because they 
cannot even afford public health care services while others mentioned spending their life 
savings (put aside in the hopes to buying a home) in order to pay for minor surgery at a public 
hospital. In fact, Nancy almost joined the unfortunate destiny of the majority in Paraguay 
when, on the verge of giving birth prematurely to their first baby in Asunción, the couple spent 
four hours in a taxi looking for a hospital with an incubator. By the time they found a private 
clinic that would receive them, Nancy was already unconscious, and the clinic charged them 
for medicine and post-partum supplies that they never used159. In Argentina, in contrast, 
Nancy’s second baby was born in a public hospital where mother and newborn were very well 
cared for at no charge.  
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Like most of those I interviewed, Aníbal and Nancy also value the public subsidies that 
they have received for their Argentinean daughter as well as the opportunity to study for free 
that has been made available to their three children. None of those things exist back home. 
Getting their documents (DNIs) through accelerated procedures after the birth of their 
Argentinean child has made their lives easier, since it has permitted them to access a wide 
range of public entitlements while working en blanco160. Moreover, Nancy and Aníbal have 
rarely lacked jobs in Argentina, whereas employment continues to be very scarce, poorly paid 
and almost exclusively for men in Paraguay, which barely permits poor families to survive. In 
this regard, not only are women happy about the autonomy they gain through work in 
Argentina, but men are also satisfied and consider their spouses’ financial contribution very 
helpful. Nevertheless, the downside of migrant families’ better financial situation is the 
emotional detachment often felt by children towards their parents after long periods of 
separation. 
 
In this regard, Nancy has been paying the higher price and she speaks with resignation 
about the extent to which their two younger children do not consider her their mother. When 
Nancy left Paraguay to join Aníbal in 2005, their eldest son was over 4 years of age, their 
daughter was 3 and the youngest not even two years old. It was in 2007 that Nancy and Aníbal 
brought them to Villa Elvira. Speaking about their daughter, Nancy says:  
“She’s not used to me, she’s really into my mom, when I go out, she never asks: ‘Where is 
mommy going?’, she only says: ‘Bye’…She got used to it…She’s tough. Even when I was 
packing my bag [to leave for Argentina], I was crying, but she was not, she was happy, but I 
was not…I’ve had to aguantar.” 
 
Another time, their children were cold at night and cried a lot because they were not 
used to the Argentinean winter. At that point, their daughter scolded Nancy: “Take me back 
home, why did you bring me here? Why did you take me away from my mom? You’re not my 
mother!”. Nancy finds her daughter’s complaints, directed exclusively towards her, extremely 
painful, yet, she adds with resignation: “It hurts me a lot [what she tells me] but I have to 
accept it, I have to listen to what she tells me”. 
 
Their youngest son’s adjustment problems manifested somewhat differently. Instead of 
reacting with anger and frustration at his parents’ decision to take him to Argentina, he fell into 
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a severe depression, which Nancy referred to as “grandmother’s sentimental problems” and 
Aníbal, as “nostalgia problems”.  As they explain, the child shut himself up in his room and did 
not want to play with anyone. He did not complain about his situation, nor did he want to talk 
to his grandmother over the phone; he remained silent and cried often. Things only became 
worse during a trip to Paraguay in 2008; the child did not want to return to Argentina and 
demanded that his parents send him his clothes instead. Upon the family’s return to Villa 
Elvira, Nancy and Aníbal decided to send their then five-year-old son to see a psychologist 
while paying for private transportation to take him to school, expenditures that were very 
costly in relation to their meagre incomes. After a year of treatment, the child greatly 
improved, but the parents still considered it wise to skip their annual trip back home in 2009. 
Luckily, their daughter was gradually coming to terms with the idea of living in Argentina, 
whereas their eldest son had not gone through such a rough time, as Aníbal remarks: “He wants 
to come back [to Argentina] each time and says ‘I have a future there’”. 
 
State Governance by Absence and Neglect: Neighbours’ Responses in Villa Elvira 
 
Like many other migrants I interviewed who have family in countries other than Argentina, 
Nancy and Aníbal emphasize that there are not many places where people can settle 
themselves on someone else’s private property without paying for it. The explanation provided 
by Ricardo, a Peruvian man who lives with his family in the Altos de San Lorenzo (a 
peripheral locality of the partido, situated half way between La Plata city and Villa Elvira), 
illustrates the views of others on this issue:  
“What happens is that there [in Santiago de Chile, where one of his brothers lives] if you 
rent a room, it has to be for 3 or 4 people because it’s extremely expensive. There is not like 
here where you can go and ‘invade’ a lot or get into an abandoned house and occupy it.” 
 
Even if this squatter practice was not new in the GBA, during the 2000s it became 
widespread in the peripheral and semi-rural areas of the partido of La Plata. To a much lesser 
extent, it also happened in its urban areas, as exemplified by César’s case (see previous 
chapter). Taking possession of abandoned property is actually endorsed by Argentinean civil 
law through the institution of usucapión or posesión veinteañal, which promotes and protects 
the productive use of property, and establishes that a person who productively takes possession 
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of some abandoned land or buildings can claim ownership after twenty years. It is with this 
hope that most people take possession of abandoned property.  
 
When I did my fieldwork in 2010, members of the most disadvantaged social groups, 
such as the so-called villeros, commonly moved into abandoned lots in semi-rural areas of the 
partido, where they installed a casilla (a poor, improvised structure) as their new place of 
residence. Likewise, an increasing number of individuals in the upper middle (professional) 
social classes actively took possession of unproductive and often spacious lots in the same 
areas. In that case, fencing the parcels of land tended to precede the construction of some sort 
of housing or the transformation of the wasteland into nicely landscaped backyards. These 
developments were often closely guarded against possible intruders by a hired watchman, who 
either moved into the lot/s or visited it/them frequently until their eventual occupation took 
place. The distinctive strategies deployed by these social groups reflect their respective access 
to symbolic and financial resources. While the villeros have focused on entering the abandoned 
property and sustaining their occupation (so as to resist being forced out), the upper middle 
classes have secured their possession by surrounding it (so as to prevent intruders from 
accessing it)161. Under these circumstances, when disputes over occupied property arise (even 
between successive occupiers), they are commonly solved through informal transactions 
involving financial compensation given to the owner or the occupier/s. This strategy seeks to 
avoid going through legal processes, which remain too lengthy and expensive162. 
 
In the peripheries of the partido such as in Villa Elvira, Villa Elva or Altos de San 
Lorenzo, however, life turns out to be much more complicated for those who inhabit 
abandoned properties. This is the case mainly because these areas have been forsaken by the 
state, which has removed itself almost completely from its service-providing obligations and as 
guarantor of public security. Villa Elvira, for example, where Aníbal, Nancy and their three 
children live, is an area that does not have running water, a sewage system, electricity or even 
paved streets or sidewalks. The barrio (neighbourhood), as its inhabitants warmly refer to the 
area, is composed of a large number of lots of diverse sizes, which are not demarcated, thus 
giving the impression of a continuous space where a series of precarious houses are scattered. 
As in other peripheries, residents tend to improvise their homes using the materials they can 
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come up with, while others organize into cooperative endeavours in order to build themselves 
houses made of cement, as many migrants proudly remarked163. Occasionally, houses are 
found in their initial stages of construction, which people tend to adapt to their family needs, as 
Aníbal did:  
“I expanded this part [the living room where we were] and the back part for the children 
and my mother, but since I was not making much money, I did it little by little...In a demolition 
job I had, they gave me everything, so I could bring it here and it’s a large house...I also did 
the septic tank…I have a patio in the back and I want to build more in the rear part of the lot, 
yet I do not want to spend a lot of money if we do not know what’s going to happen in the 
future.” 
 
Aníbal’s final remark reflects the uncertainty felt by several migrants I interviewed who 
live in the peripheries of the partido about the actual possession of the lots they occupy, which 
contrasts with the more assertive opinions of those who occupy abandoned property in either 
new or in-the-making urban areas. This situation was the result of social groups’ differential 
access to crucial resources along with their particular experiences with state officials. Access to 
vital information such as the list of abandoned lots and the rules of usucapión, political and 
administrative connections to influence and/or speed up the treatment of cases, and financial 
resources to pay lawyers, bribes or economic compensations were unevenly distributed among 
those occupying abandoned property in the partido. Like other migrants, Aníbal speaks with 
resignation about the almost complete retraction of the state from Villa Elvira along with 
public servants’ neglect to inform neighbours about their usucapión rights:  
“We were checking with a state accountant who came to speak about those issues but he 
disappeared!...It seems that this lot [facing his own] has a tax debt of many years…A [state] 
agrimensor [surveyor] has to come to give the person [occupier] the lot; the same happens 
with that lot [one placed a bit further from his], we’re inquiring about it and it seems that it 
has a huge debt that the municipality doesn’t want to take charge of, but all that came to 
nothing.” 
 
In response to the reluctance of service providers, including public agencies and 
concessions given to private companies, to furnish Villa Elvira with running water and 
electricity, neighbours have resorted to precarious solutions that not only threaten families’ 
safety but also generate conflict within the barrio. Neighbours find themselves waiting for 
unfulfilled promises and confused by contradictory responses given by diverse service 
providers’ agents, as Aníbal explains:  
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“We’re all in the same situation, the ‘electricity person’ came, so we bought the required 
pillar and I built it, but the person disappeared. Tractors were to come because the water pipes 
were really badly done, but in the end, we know nothing about it.” 
 
In the end, neighbours wound up being all enganchados or colgados (precariously 
connected to the electric grid without paying for it) in order to have electricity because the 
privatized serviced provider (EDELAP) told them to do so, which Aníbal regrets:  
“We went to EDELAP and requested the service in order to pay taxes because it’s for our 
future, we don’t want to be enganchados. Yet, they gave us the order to do so…Someone does it, 
another follows and it all becomes a nido de cables [tangle of wire]…It’s dangerous but people 
do not care about cables hanging close to the floor as long as they have electricity.” 
 
Residents have resorted to a similarly poor solution in order to have running water, so 
this vital resource is often unavailable to some as its consumption augments among others. 
Aníbal and Nancy have opted to remain silent in order to avoid conflict with neighbours, while 
buying bottled water for their youngest child, as Aníbal explains: “If you complain, you get 
into fights with everyone, so what can we do?” Equally problematic was a former attempt to 
pave one of the barrio’s main streets. Most neighbours opposed the project by claiming that 
they would not have water until the work was finished, thus nothing was done. The muddy and 
pitted streets of Villa Elvira also made apparent a contentious situation arising from an 
Argentinean family’s privileged access to resources and political connections. For example, the 
woman’s job at the municipality has permitted her family to buy a vehicle while her 
connections “facilitated” (gave for free) the labour and materials to improve the entry of their 
house. When talking about this issue, Aníbal notes:  
“She doesn’t care about the rest [of the neighbours], she has never shared anything with 
us…We paid out of our pockets to buy the escombros [debris] and we spread it on the 
street…They come and go by car and throw water on the street, which makes a big pozo 
[pothole], and she only adds dirt to fix her entry…We do not have a car, yet we paid out of our 
pockets.” 
 
With frustration, Nancy explains that the mess created by this family was affecting their 
children, who have to cover their shoes with plastic garbage bags when it rains in order to 
avoid getting dirty and muddy. Aníbal’s family walks almost twenty minutes every day in 
order to reach the only bus stop serving Villa Elvira, where two bus lines pass irregularly, often 
arriving at the stop already full, Anibal notes: “They never come on time, and if you’re a bit 
late, for example at 07:30, you’ll never get on them!”. 
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The few examples I have presented here illustrate how the scarcity of resources in Villa 
Elvira combined with the neglect of service providers has resulted in many neighbours’ 
attitudes of sálvese quien pueda (every man for himself) in a context where poor and 
contentious solutions to the most basic necessities prevail. Under similar circumstances, 
however, alternative, cooperative solutions have been found to comparable problems by 
neighbours (an issue that I examine in a later section).  
 
Migrants’ experiences of this sort of state governmentality by absence and neglect in 
Villa Elvira during the 2000s have been informed by previous, mostly urban, personal 
encounters with public servants as well as by their groups’ collective memories. In various 
circumstances, the Argentinean state has made itself present to migrants as an authoritative 
entity that imposes often arbitrary regulations and inefficient bureaucratic procedures, such as 
when they a) complete diverse administrative and legal procedures at municipal, provincial and 
federal public institutions; b) come in and out the country (at the border or in the airport); c) 
hide from state inspectors enforcing regularization campaigns (in construction sites and 
Chinese mini-markets for example); and d) meet the police on the street, albeit to a lesser 
extent since the mid-2000s—except for the partido’s rural areas, where this institution has 
continued to represent a frightening force for migrants (see next chapter). Without a doubt, 
migrants’ encounters with different state officers in their home countries constituted the 
foundations of their more general representation of the state as an authoritative force, upon 
which their views of the Argentinean state have been built. Migrants also draw on the 
collective memories of their ethnic groups in La Plata, which consist for the most part of 
stories of urban suffering, exploitation, police abuse and arbitrary deportation during the 1990s 
that are only ephemerally lightened up by recollections of the profitable uno a uno exchange 
rate implemented over the majority of that decade. Migrants access these memories and weave 
their own experiences into them through their daily social interaction with relatives, friends, 
acquaintances and other compatriots.  
 
By combining past and present personal experiences with those of others, migrants 
articulate their (changing) views of the Argentinean state, which shape the strategies that they 
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develop to interact with its different public servants. In peripheral areas of the partido such as 
Villa Elvira, these views have combined with migrants’ limited access to crucial material and 
symbolic resources to secure their usucapión rights during the 2000s, which has in turn 
translated into migrants’ attitude of waiting and remaining silent along with their generalized 
feeling of uncertainty and puzzlement about the state as guarantor of entitlements and public 
security. This situation is of course neither fixed nor identical to those of other areas of the 
partido, since governmentality regimes change over time and across space along with the 
social actors (re)producing them.  
 
Living Side by Side with Sex and Drug Trades  
 
In their vast majority, the residents of Villa Elvira are Paraguayans, although a handful of 
Argentinians and some people presumed to be Peruvians164 also live there. Although many 
migrants envisage future ownership of the lots they occupy, the main drive behind their 
decision to move into the barrio has been less ambitious, at least initially. For most, the free 
accommodation available in Villa Elvira has constituted their only option, as it permits families 
with meagre salaries to make ends meet while supporting relatives back home and repaying 
their migration-related debts. Combined with hard work and sacrifices, some migrants have 
managed to build their own, albeit basic homes in Villa Elvira. Many have also invited 
relatives to join them. In neighbouring peripheral localities of the partido, other migrants have 
launched businesses in their countries of origin (such as in rice commercialization) in 
partnership with relatives who stayed back home. Some of those with prospects of returning 
(whether concrete or imagined) have built homes in their native localities whereas others have 
bought apartments in larger cities, where they plan to launch stores catering to the needs of 
busy urban dwellers. These achievements have been earned through much effort, often 
demanding costly compromises from migrants.  
 
Nevertheless, there are residents of Villa Elvira who live differently and whose nightly, 
clandestine activities perturb the social reproduction of households whose members work and 
study during the day in important ways. It was when Nancy and Aníbal spoke about the loud 
music being regularly played at night in the neighbourhood that the reality of living side by 
side with people engaged in drug and sex trades came out. During the interview, I joked about 
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the high volume of the music that we could hear from their house, even after closing the doors 
and windows. It was a Tuesday at 21:30 when Nancy explained with indignation:   
“It’s like that all day and night, they do not work…And I would like to know how they 
actually make a living! We work all day long and sometimes we can’t buy anything, but they 
buy tons of things!” 
 
Aníbal added in astonishment that they were young people, probably in their mid-
twenties and early thirties, who have computers and a huge stereo system. This handful of 
young adults begins to play music early in the afternoon, increasing its volume as the day 
progresses. By the time night falls, the noise of pickup trucks, motorbikes and other vehicles’ 
engines adds to this disturbing atmosphere, which only subsides just before sunrise, when 
families in Villa Elvira are about to wake up to get ready for work and school. In addition, 
fights are not infrequent and often result in shouting and injuries. In order to protect their 
children from this perturbing environment, Aníbal built their room in the rear part of their lot, 
as Nancy explains:  
“Before, they [children] cried a lot and complained...Sometimes, he [their youngest child] 
grabbed his pillow, covered his head, and said: ‘For god’s sake!, aren’t they going to ever 
stop?!’”  
 
The clandestine activities performed in the barrio not only shared their timing and 
clientele, but also enhanced each other’s profits, as the growing material acquisitions of these 
young people in Villa Elvira made apparent. Ironically, while residents do not benefit from 
these financial gains, they are still forced to share their most pernicious side effects, such as 
witnessing or even experiencing the violence that accompanies drug and sex transactions, 
being unable to sleep at night due to the noisy and abusive climate that is generated, and 
finding their surroundings polluted by a range of party leftovers when they leave their houses 
early in the morning. Nancy and Aníbal spoke in a somewhat indirect manner about these 
issues, revealing that they were quite aware of what was going on even if they referred to these 
illicit transactions and their consequences in a discreet, almost polite manner165.  
 
As in other peripheries of the GBA, the fearful atmosphere created by a minority of 
residents was progressively naturalized by the majority in Villa Elvira, who, despite 
considering their dangerous milieu familiar, still deployed a range of preventative and 
preservation strategies around their home. Aníbal and Nancy, for example, almost exclusively 
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see people either inside their home or outside Villa Elvira, minimizing as much as possible 
their family’s use of nearby open spaces. Others spoke at length about the importance of 
avoiding certain parts of Villa Elvira at specific times of day, highlighting their knowledge of 
the barrio’s geographies of delinquency, that is, where and when diverse illicit activities are 
being performed and by whom. Central for all residents is to avoid being lured in by these 
illicit trades and their perpetrators. In this regard, special attention is paid to protecting children 
by instructing them about the dangers involved in the drug and sex trades and how to stay away 
from them166. Adults are equally concerned, since they struggle to avoid responding to violent 
reactions and other incitements to fight, accepting invitations to party or even getting involved 
in the businesses.   
 
To lighten up the conversation, Aníbal noted how things had improved in Villa Elvira 
during the course of the past year. Those involved in the drug and sex trade have become a bit 
calmer (less noisy), especially vis-à-vis the events that they previously organized around a pool 
table, whose notoriety used to attract large numbers of people: 
“Before it was a real disaster!, people came from so many different places, and one has to 
be careful because we do not know all those people, we know each other [neighbours]…They 
stopped that because they had lots of trouble with another neighbour, they bothered him so 
much that [in the end] they all went outside and fought.”  
 
Aníbal and Nancy were also relieved that their former belligerent neighbours, a 
Paraguayan couple who had serious domestic violence problems, had moved out. This couple’s 
nights started with drinking and playing very loud music (they placed their stereo system in a 
window, which was only a couple of metres from Nancy and Aníbal’s home), which would 
only stop at 05:00. Eventually, this noisy atmosphere evolved into the man coming out and 
crying for help while his spouse attempted to kill him. These fights had left profound marks on 
this young man’s body, whose face was disfigured. Talking about this couple, Aníbal says:   
“They started hitting each other and I had to come out at dawn to talk to them…The woman 
broke bottles on him, stabbed him…And he came to us begging for help…I went out for the 
kids because they cried and screamed.” 
 
Luckily, a quiet Paraguayan family had replaced this troublesome couple.  
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Sharing the Neighbourhood with Villeros and Pibes Chorros   
 
Los pibes del barrio, as Nancy refers to the criminal youth in the neighbourhood, have also 
calmed down, even if she is still concerned that they do too many drugs. Aníbal, for his part, 
signals that they have become harmless in Villa Elvira: “Criminal youth were dando vueltas 
[‘walking around’] before but they have calmed down, and they don’t do anything in the 
barrio”. This is a common remark among Peruvians, Paraguayans and Bolivians living in 
disadvantaged peripheries of the GBA, side by side with villeros, who indicate that the pibes 
chorros tend to leave their neighbours alone once they get to know them, which often implies 
neighbours showing some sort of “respect” or recognition to them. This coincides with the 
accounts of anthropologists working in “crime-ridden” neighbourhoods in other parts of the 
world (Schneider and Schneider 2008). 
 
Like the vast majority of migrant men I interviewed, Aníbal explains that these 
Argentinean youth are lost because they have given into the vice of drugs and alcohol, often as 
a result of “bad” (meaning too soft) parenting: “There are parents who empower their children 
too much and don’t stop them when they are little, so by the time they get older, who is going 
to do so?” For him, the only possible solution to this problem is mano dura:  the government 
should re-introduce the compulsory military service.  
 
In contrast with what tends to be assumed by most migrants, however, in many 
disadvantaged areas of the GBA, the pibes chorros are also migrants. Soledad, a Paraguayan 
woman in her late thirties who lives with her family in Dock Sud, Avellaneda (a disadvantaged 
locality of the GBA), explains:   
“In our street for example, there are Peruvians and Bolivians who sell drugs, they get 
together and sometimes they shoot or stab each other, but they’re well known now, they do not 
bother you...When we just moved in, yes, they asked for cigarettes and money, and if you didn’t 
give them, they ‘marked’ you…They are pibes and adult men…But after they get to know you, 
they leave you alone…Yet, if they don’t know you, fuiste! [you’re history!], they rob you of 
everything!” 
 
Laughing, Soledad adds that her husband once left their car parked at a garage located 
ten blocks from their house for about six months, at which point the pibes del barrio set it on 
fire. In a more serious tone, she also speaks about their plan to move to a new barrio, where 
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the government is building houses for unemployed or underemployed people with children 
who do not have health care. According to this plan de vivienda, those who meet the criteria 
are to be given their homes at no cost, according to their place on long waiting lists167. 
Soledad’s family has visited the area where the new barrio is being built (located about ten 
blocks from where they live) several times in order to assure their eventual safe arrival. While 
following the evolution of the project, Soledad’s family has sought to get to know those who 
already live there, a combination of Peruvians, Bolivians, Paraguayans and Argentinians. 
Soledad’s husband hopes to get a house as far as possible from a nearby villa (shantytown), for 
their children’s safety, while Soledad cautiously remarks that her family will eventually have 
to get to know their future neighbours really well. Even if she knows that their move is still 
uncertain, and projected to happen in the long term whenever their turn comes to obtain a 
home, Soledad is well aware that the sort of preventative strategies they have been deploying 
are necessary. Having lived in disadvantaged areas of the GBA’s peripheries since 2003 has 
taught her the lesson quite well.  
 
In other cases, however, the villeros del barrio do not treat neighbours well, often 
breaking into their houses when families are not there. As a result, neighbours tend to develop 
“solidarity networks” in order to watch over one another’s property and call the police if 
necessary. This has happened in a periphery of the partido of La Plata called Los Hornos, 
where Julián lives with his family in a neighbourhood mostly populated by Paraguayans, 
Bolivians, and provincial Argentinians. Julián is a Bolivian in his forties from Tarija, who 
initially moved to Argentina as a young boy to practice seasonal agricultural work along his 
parents. Many years later, he moved to the GBA (see next chapter, where I elaborate on his 
labour trajectory). His Argentinean-born wife is the daughter of southern Bolivians like him, 
who have lived in a villa of Quilmes (a locality of the GBA) until its increasing insecurity 
levels led them to move to Los Hornos. By the time I met Julián, he was managing 
construction projects, after years of experience in the industry. While the Argentinean 
engineers, architects and lawyers, with whom he has worked, always treated Julián with 
respect, the villeros del barrio have often mistreated him. Julián contrasts the attitudes of 
“people with education”, as he calls the former, with those of the villeros, whom he considers 
as la peor porquería (the worst scum):  
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“Yes, those are the ones who discriminate [us] the most, they tell us ‘bolita’ [derogatory 
term to refer to Bolivians]...Those from the villa, from the barrio; I have never had problems 
[with them] because I always listen, I do not respond, I do not pay attention to what they say; I 
do my thing, despite what they have to say.”  
 
Like other migrants who can afford it, Julián sends his children to private school in 
order to spare them the unpleasant discriminatory attitudes of the villeritos del barrio. Under 
these circumstances, the private-public divide is perceived by migrants and non-migrants alike 
as a protective barrier able to keep out the most pernicious social actors, as Julián explains:   
“My daughters told me that in public institutions there is discrimination…They tell them 
‘bolita’ and I don’t know what else…Because there are more villeritos, los del barrio [in public 
institutions] who believe that they’re ‘big’, ‘the’ Argentinians, and it’s quite the opposite.” 
 
 
Julián’s house was broken into on two occasions when no one was there; luckily, the 
couple was at work and their three children at school. In both instances, the burglars did not 
steal much; only small things were taken, not even a TV. As a precaution, Julián’s family does 
not keep money at home. Julián is sure that criminal youth from the neighbourhood were 
involved in these robberies because they know when no one is home, which worries him. He 
finds some relief in the solidarity among neighbours, who take care of one another.  
 
Like other migrant women (mostly Bolivian), Julián’s wife sews clothing for a popular 
clothing store targeting teenagers in La Plata, as her mother did before her. Like other 
reputable businesses in the garment industry in the GBA, this company hides the exploitative 
contractual relations imposed upon their employees, who are precariously hired and poorly 
paid. Workers most often work either at their own homes or in clandestine textile workshops, 
where conditions are inappropriate or insalubrious and unsafe respectively (Pacecca and 
Courtis 2006; CELS 2007). Julián’s wife initially worked at her mother’s, but when the latter 
retired, she bought her machinery, and started to work from home. Julián was relieved by his 
wife’s change of workplace, believing that it would prevent future robberies.  
 
Migrants Living in Pensiones in Disadvantaged Peripheries 
  
The vulnerability of migrants living in dangerous peripheries increases when they inhabit 
pensiones—unlike the positive urban experiences of others, such as Peruvian César, who lived 
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in this type of basic housing with his young son upon their arrival in La Plata city168. The 
experiences of Richard illustrate the former. He is a quite feminine169 Paraguayan man in his 
mid-twenties, who in 2006 moved to Berisso city, located in the Gran La Plata Aglomerado 
Urbano. Back home in San Lorenzo, Richard worked in “local politics” for an engineer at the 
municipality and for the owner of a renowned river resort. His work consisted of gathering 
people for political meetings and events in exchange for an eventual job with the municipality, 
a promise that was never fulfilled. Most of the time, Richard was out of work and so had to 
find a number of odd jobs in order to survive, such as cleaning houses and tending gardens. 
Disappointed by his work situation, Richard considered going to Spain when a former 
schoolmate living there “invited” him (that is, offered to pay for his ticket). However, not 
having the financial means to get the visa, put his papers in order or deal with any eventuality 
that might arise, Richard refused the offer: “I was afraid because people told me that if you go 
[to Spain] and do not have a contract, they send you back and you lose all your money”. He 
knew many paisanos (compatriots) who went to Spain, after selling all their possessions, and 
came back broke, even losing their homes, which they had used as the repayment guarantee of 
the loans they obtained to finance their trips from banks and other moneylenders. Under these 
circumstances, Richard decided to play it safe by accepting his sister’s invitation, who by then 
had spent five years with her Argentinean husband in a “neighbourhood of migrants” in 
Berisso, as Richard says: “They’re all foreigners [who live in that neighbourhood], Peruvians, 
bolitas, Paraguayans, but no Argentinians”. Richard’s sister gradually managed to bring her 
four Paraguayan children (from another man) to Berisso, and they have adapted well and were 
attending primary and secondary school.  
 
Upon his arrival, Richard worked for his brother-in-law, who has a small crew doing 
construction-related jobs. Yet, he soon realized the extent to which he was being exploited:   
“He [brother-in-law] told the Señora [the client] that he was paying us each [his crew] 70$ 
pesos per day, but he only gave me 50$ and since I lived at their home, he took 15$ for the 
food…So I earned 35$…I could never become independent because I could not even buy 
myself a pair of running shoes that cost $100.” 
 
In addition, Richard could not accept how violent and abusive his brother-in-law was 
towards his sister, and so as to avoid interfering in the couple’s problems, he moved out of 
their home. Finding employment elsewhere without papers (he did not have a precaria) proved 
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to be very challenging for Richard, who, in the end, could only find a job with the retired 
Señora he had met when working for his brother-in-law in City Bell. Through this employer, 
he got some referrals to do domestic and maintenance jobs at the houses of her close relatives, 
yet these were random, permitting him to earn very little and only occasionally. Richard’s 
meagre financial means only allowed him to rent a room in a pensión in the outskirts of the 
partido of La Plata, where other tenants did not like him, as he explains:  
“There were a lot of Paraguayans, bolitas and Peruvians as well, and they could not stand 
me…One day, I went to work and they broke the glass in the door trying to get into my room, 
so I had to find myself another place.” 
 
Following his employer’s advice, Richard then moved to another pensión in a 
supposedly quieter neighbourhood in Berisso. Even if he feels better there, Richard still regrets 
that the area is inhabited by migrants, mostly Peruvians, as he remarks: “What can I do? I do 
not have the means to pay for ‘algo que valga la pena’ [something that is worth it]”. As a 
result of working en negro and this, sporadically, Richard cannot afford to rent an apartment, 
where they also ask for a deposit and a guarantor, or even a pensión room in a “better” area, 
which for him means without migrants. One of Richard’s brothers had problems with 
Peruvians in the past. He had lived in Berisso for several years, but decided to sell his house 
and return home after some Peruvian neighbours threatened to set his home on fire and kill his 
daughter. According to Richard, Peruvians were like that, “terrible”; they never warn you if 
they do not like you. This frightening description of Peruvians living in disadvantaged 
peripheries resembles that of Soledad, from Paraguay, in the GBA. (See previous section).  
 
Richard also notes that there is a lot of discrimination against migrants in Argentina and 
that rivalry exists between Paraguayans and Argentinians:   
“There are people that bother you a lot, you simply walk by and they annoy you too much, 
they’re Argentinians…There are even some that fear you because you’re Paraguayan or who 
exclude you when they learn that you are Paraguayan.” 
 
Based on his own experiences and those of his relatives with Argentinians and migrants 
alike, Richard decided to avoid dealing with anyone (no tengo trato con ninguno), except for 
the few Argentinean Señoras he has worked for. He does not talk to anyone, even at the 
pensión, and only goes to work and occasionally to his sister’s.  
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Richard has returned home every year since his first trip to Argentina in 2006 and when 
he can afford it, he travels every eight months, staying in Paraguay for several months each 
time. His visits home are done in the cheapest way possible by taking a bus that takes 24 hours 
and costs 300$ pesos each way. Crossing the border has not been problematic for him 
regardless of his irregular stays in Argentina. Like other undocumented migrants, every time he 
returns home, Richard pays a penalty of about 50-100$ pesos for having overstayed the three-
month tourist visa granted to him170. Living on a miserable salary, Richard cannot afford to pay 
for the procedures involved in getting his Argentinean papers, yet he hopes to one day be able 
to get his DNI in order to study journalism at the Universidad Nacional de La Plata.  
 
Despite his social isolation, his sprecarious subsistence and the insecurity of the area 
where he lives, Richard is grateful to Argentina because he has managed to work. In contrast, 
he has no job or benefits in Paraguay, where people “are not used to paying” and work is 
scarce: “There is not much life at home…Here instead I’ve had work and the money I earn is at 
least useful there, even if it isn’t the case here.” Richard’s remarks illustrate those of other poor 
migrants from neighbouring nations in Argentina, whose meagre salaries, precarious jobs and 
poor living conditions in La Plata represent an improvement vis-à-vis their circumstances back 
home. This is mainly the case because, through much material and economic sacrifice, 
migrants are able to remit some money to support relatives in their countries of origin. More 
generally, Richard’s precarious circumstances and his frequent mobility between Argentina 
and Paraguay also illustrate South-South migration dynamics in other parts of the world. It is 
estimated that almost eighty percent of the migration in the “Global South” takes place 
between countries with contiguous borders, and most appears to occur between those with 
relatively small differences in income (Ratha and Shaw 2007). In South America, Argentina is 
considered as a middle-income country, along with Chile and Venezuela, which continue to 
attract substantial numbers of migrants from nearby low-income countries (p.17). Whereas 
large income differences encourage migration over greater distances, proximity even if 
associated with small increases in income can have substantial welfare implications for the 
poor (p.2).  
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PURSUING THE MIGRANT DREAM: BETWEEN SUPERACIÓN AND NECESIDAD 
 
Ana and Leo, like Yolanda and César, are Peruvians from Chiclayo, in the country’s north-
west. Like other costeños (people from the coastal region) who moved to the partido of La 
Plata in the late 1990s/early 2000s, these couples cherished the same dream or ilusión, as they 
put it: to improve their increasingly deteriorating socio-economic circumstances by working in 
Argentina temporarily171. All four had relatives, close friends or acquaintances who, before 
them, fulfilled their dreams in this “generous” country, which offered them plenty of 
employment and a profitable monetary exchange rate. Indeed, the success stories of close and 
distant compatriots were crucial in these couples’ imagining —in Anderson’s (1991) creative 
sense—of their own migration projects to La Plata. The envisioning of their (intended) 
temporary labour migration to Argentina along with their initial experiences in this country 
intersect in a number of important ways as well. Nevertheless, Ana and Leo’s decision to 
reside in peripheries—as compared with César and Yolanda’s to settle in urban areas—brought 
about important ramifications for them and their families. Namely, the weight of the 
governmentalities (Foucault 1975, 1978) ruling GBA’s peripheries in combination with Ana 
and Leo’s socio-economic background and personal choices contributed to bringing this 
couple’s migration experiences much closer to those of fellow neighbours in peripheral areas, 
such as Paraguayan Nancy and Aníbal, than to compatriots from the same community of origin 
residing in the city. In this section, I utilize a number of one-on-one and group interviews 
conducted with Ana, Leo and other migrants who know them, along with informal 
conversations held with all of them, in order to describe this couple’s migration trajectory in 
the GBA and to discuss its implications for their children. 
 
When I met Ana and Leo in La Plata, they were 34 and 38 years old respectively and 
had already spent twenty-one years together, during which they became not only compañeros 
(companions/partners) but also confidants and best friends. Ana had moved in with Leo’s 
family when she was fourteen years old and was grateful to her mother-in-law, who finished 
raising her. In her mid-teens, Ana began to study costurería (sewing), but quit in order to fulfill 
her obligations as a housewife, especially upon the birth of their daughter in 1991 (when Ana 
was 16 years old). Leo, for his part, worked in construction like his father, who had made his 
career in the industry, becoming a maestro mayor de obra172. Only in 1996, after the death of 
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their second child at the age of three due to a heart problem, did Ana begin to “work”. 
Following the advice of Leo, who believed that engaging in remunerated employment outside 
their home would help Ana overcome such a great loss, she became a street vendor, as she 
explains: “He told me to work, so I did, and because I had not finished my studies, I had to 
work as a vendedora ambulante for other people, but I was feeling better then.” In time, Ana 
managed to work independently by making at home the things that she was selling on the 
streets. Later on, thanks to the guidance of one of Leo’s sisters, who had several puestos (street 
stalls) where she sold clothes, Ana and Leo began to sell expensive toys and the business did 
well. 
 
 Like others, however, Ana and Leo wanted to improve their circumstances and saw 
migration to Argentina as a great opportunity to do so, as Leo says:   
“At that time, we heard [back home] that the economic situation was good here [in 
Argentina], so even if I was working as an albañil [construction worker], travelling to build 
schools in different parts of the country, and we were doing well, we wanted to ‘get better’ 
[superarse]…Even if we always worked, like my brothers and sisters.” 
 
Ana’s explanation of their decision to migrate to Argentina was less complaisant, 
however. She raises the issue of the actual hardships faced by her family and the regnant social 
inequality pushing them to migrate:   
“One has the dream ‘I arrive, work and make money for the progress of my family’…It’s 
the same necesidad [need that pushes you to migrate] because when you see that your child is 
being marginalized because of his clothes or when you see that everyone eats fruits while you 
can only give your child a cheap biscuit, no, no.” 
 
Under these circumstances, knowing that a cuñada (sister-in-law) had quickly found 
employment as an empleada doméstica and was earning 1900$ pesos a month, Ana left for 
Buenos Aires in 2001. As was often the case among migrant women, Ana brought with her the 
daughters of her former sister-in-law, who was the one “inviting” her (paying for her ticket). 
Since this relative had remarried and had a baby with a man who was not part of Leo’s family, 
Ana could not stay in their house. Upon her arrival, Ana’s breasts got badly swollen while her 
lips and nipples got infected because she had suddenly stopped breast-feeding her six-month-
old baby. Not knowing that in Argentina public health care services were free and being used 
to Peru, where they were unaffordable to her, she did not go to see a doctor. Instead, even 
though ill with a fever, she had to find a way to survive. With no money left (only her plane 
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ticket was paid for), Ana moved in to the house of a female compatriot with four children, 
where she cleaned and cooked in exchange for her accommodation and some food. This so-
called alquiler de cama or “right to bed” is still practiced among compatriots, although it was 
much more common in the past.  
 
Upon her arrival in Buenos Aires, Ana assumed that her search for employment would 
go as smoothly as that of her sister-in-law and that it would result in the same profitable salary. 
Things did not turn out as well for Ana, however, and only after two months did she find a job 
working cama adentro for a family in Martínez, a city of the partido of San Isidro, GBA. This 
abusive employer exploited Ana’s “newness”:  
“The first thing that they [employers] ask you is: ‘How long have you been in Argentina 
for?’ and I said ‘Two months’ and [this Señora responded] ‘Only [two]! so you know nothing! 
I’m going to pay you 300$ pesos [per month].” 
 
In this job, Ana worked six days a week, alternating between Saturday and Sunday as 
her day off, and had almost no time to rest or food to eat, as she explains:  
“When they ate, I had to leave the room, and ‘God does not let me lie’; I quickly made 
myself a soup out of boiled water and four or five spaghetti, while the kids ate…Imagine, 
eating like a burglar! [fast and hiding]…And when they finished, the Señora told me ‘Here you 
have what is left’ and sometimes she told me ‘Oh no Ana, there is nothing left’.” 
 
A week after Ana started the job, Leo unexpectedly appeared at her door (Ana still 
rented a bed at the house of the female compatriot for her day off). It was Mother’s Day, a 
Sunday. Leo had arrived to work in construction and, after learning about the exploitation and 
abusive treatment Ana was being subjected to, asked her to quit. Yet, she rejected the idea, 
even Leo’s offer to give her the same amount of money she was making at the job, because she 
was excited about her financial independence: “In my country I never had money in my hands 
because I always depended on my husband, since I was fourteen years old…I never had 300 
pesos that went directly to me.”  
 
Le Vieron la Cara!: Living with Racial Profiling in a Periphery of the GBA 
 
Leo worked in La Plata, but in order to be close to Ana, he found a room in a pensión in San 
Fernando city (capital of the partido of the same name, which neighbours that of San Isidro, 
GBA), where Ana could visit him on her weekly day off. Leo’s daily commute was quite long 
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as a result. The pensión was situated in a disadvantaged periphery, where the dangers of being 
caught by the police or assaulted by the pibes chorros were equally pervasive. At that time, 
Migraciones (the National Direction of Migrations) chased after undocumented migrants and 
police officers regularly stopped buses, making migrants get off and show their papers. Only 
those with a DNI could get back on the bus again. Under these circumstances, undocumented 
migrant women used a strategy that often worked, as Ana explains:  
“You had to say ‘I have children at home and I do not bring my papers because they see my 
cara de extranjera [foreigner’s face] and they assault me’…’You’ll have to take care of my kids 
[if you take me away] and now I want to make a phone call because I need someone to help 
me’.” 
 
Officers had always let Ana get back on the bus (when commuting between San 
Fernando and Martínez), asking that next time she bring her Argentinean papers with her 
(which she did not have at the time173). This trick only worked for women, however, and the 
undocumented men who were caught were unfailingly taken away, often to be deported. 
 
The fear of being deported was still quite present among undocumented migrants in the 
early 2000s; this was inherited from the previous decade and incorporated into the collective 
memory of migrant groups in La Plata). Under the circumstances, migrants deployed a number 
of preventative strategies seeking to save what they had obtained through much hard work. At 
the pensión in San Fernando, for example, close friends had copies of each other’s room’s 
keys, so they could eventually get the possessions of compatriots being deported in order to 
sell them, sending the money back home. In addition, migrants never had money in their 
rooms. Like other migrants with a commercial inclination, Ana and Leo initially collected 
items that they planned to sell back home, mostly goods with well-known brands such as 
perfumes, which were at least four times more expensive in Peru. Bringing money home had 
stopped being a profitable business when the parity between American and Argentinean 
currencies came to an end in the late 1990s.  
 
Migrants also feared the pibes chorros in San Fernando, who easily recognized them, 
calling them Peruchos, a demeaning term used to refer to Peruvians, as Ana explains:   
“Even my husband, who is very brave, always called someone to accompany him when he 
was about to return home…Other times he told me ‘Get out some coins’ since they asked him 
[for some change] and he gave it to them. Why? Because they saw his face! [le vieron la 
cara!]” 
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Commenting on this sort of incident, Ana remarks that she is also able to distinguish 
between migrants from neighbouring nations and Argentinians based on the former’s 
“mestizo’s face” (cara de mestizo): 
“La cara del mestizo is very similar among peoples, we look alike...It’s like the chino, who 
has his face, his physiognomy, you notice it…In contrast, you recognize the Argentinian 
because he is whiter…I distinguish them, even those from Catamarca [a province in 
Argentina’s north-west] because their eyebrows are bigger or their face is thinner, you see”. (I 
return to this racial classification later on).  
 
The pervasive fear of deportation, combined with the distress generated by the pibes 
chorros’ frequent assaults, led Leo’s sister to return home with her husband. At that moment, 
Leo suggested leaving to Ana, which she rejected by arguing that they had just arrived. In fact, 
Ana’s mother was then insisting that if she had decided to leave, she had to make it worth it. 
Meeting her mother’s expectations to succeed (by fulfilling her kinship obligations) ended up 
being very costly for Ana, however. Even if she managed to stay healthy, the “tension at 
work”, as she put it, affected her greatly and she began to get sick, which Leo noticed, but Ana 
dismissed. Ana’s desire for autonomy and financial independence was stronger than her own 
health concerns and she continued to deny Leo’s requests that she quit for several months. As a 
result, her initial mild malaise evolved into severe illness, including menstruating continuously 
for three months. Concerned and not knowing what was happening to her, Ana mentioned her 
symptoms to her employer, who responded: “Oh no Ana, but if you’re going to get sick, no! 
You are not useful to me!”. This callous remark combined with Ana’s poor health finally led 
her to give in to Leo’s requests, and they moved to a pensión room in Los Hornos, a peripheral 
locality in the partido of La Plata.  
 
Vicissitudes of the Life of a Cuida Coches   
 
By that time, Leo was already working as a trapito or cuida coches in downtown La Plata (see 
previous chapter), where he was well-liked. Clients wanted to help him find work in his trade 
(he was a maestro mayor de obra), but they could not because he did not have his Argentinean 
papers. Not only were the procedures to obtain the DNI complicated and expensive then, but 
migrants were also supposed to register in the AFIP (Administración Federal de Ingresos 
Públicos) in order to pay the monotributo (autonomous worker’s unique contribution)174, 
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which was unaffordable for most. By paying this tax, migrants had proof of legal residence in 
Argentina despite their irregular migration situation (from having overstayed their tourist visa). 
In this regard, several migrants mentioned being taken to the police station during the late 
1990s-early 2000s, but being soon released after showing proof that they had paid this tax. Yet, 
others considered it a waste of money that did not solve their documentation problem. Such 
was the case of Lucas, a Peruvian man from Chiclayo in his late forties, who works as a nurse 
assistant for the elderly in La Plata. He had paid the monotributo intermittently over the course 
of six years, but it was only through a lawyer that Lucas managed to obtain his DNI, and in 
only six months. The services of lawyers were expensive, however, and thus unaffordable for 
most migrants175.  
 
Ana considers the environment of the cuida coches a bad influence for Leo because it 
promotes the constant consumption of alcohol: “Everyone drinks on your street, beer when it is 
hot, wine if it’s cold”. Although he agrees with her on this issue, Leo still believes that it is a 
decent job, one that permitted them to survive without having to steal. Leo also obtained social 
recognition and gratification from working on the streets and notes that Platenses from all 
walks of life offered him friendship, even if he was an “illegal” migrant then:  
“When I worked as cuida coches, the Señora from across the street called me, a really tall 
blond woman, imagine!, to clean her window and she tipped me, she trusted me, she was not 
afraid of me. Another man asked me to go buy things for him with a 100$ pesos bill, so I came 
back with his change and he tipped me. When I saw la Doctora [respectful title indicating 
someone’s high status often associated with a prestigious profession] cleaning her house’s 
entry, she gave me 10$ pesos. The woman from the kiosco [corner store] always gave me 
something to eat, a soda, friendship…And I lived like that.”  
 
Ana’s memories of that time are much gloomier, however, especially when she speaks 
about the hardships they went through, such as not being able to even pay for a bus ticket, 
which forced her to walk very long distances, daily, from the pensión in Los Hornos to 
downtown La Plata. At that time, Ana brought food to Leo and they returned home on foot 
when his work day finished, at around 18:00, with 1.50$ pesos, which they saved for the 
following day. Reflecting upon those days, Ana adds:  
 “Let’s put it this way, there were good times and bad times [fechas lindas y fechas feas], 
but you can’t tell your family what you’re going through because you must send them money 
for food since you know that they’re looking after your children.”  
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As was the case of other migrant women I interviewed, Ana sought to protect her 
relatives who stayed back home from knowing of her suffering while fulfilling her financial 
obligations. Particularly pressing is the need to send remittances for those who leave their 
children behind.  
 
From his time as a cuida coches Leo remembers many encounters with the police, who 
were always after him simply because of his colour. On one occasion, he stopped in front of a 
shop window to look at some glasses in downtown La Plata while doing his job of cuida 
coches. As he was stepping away from the shop, four police cars appeared behind him por el 
color nomás, he says with a laugh: “And they told me ‘Let’s go, the comisario [superintendent] 
wants to meet you’, and, I said ‘But you already took me to meet him last week!’.” 
 
Leo explains that the police also rode on bicycles then in order to go everywhere when 
chasing undocumented migrants. They stopped people based on their looks (te miran) and 
asked for papers; if migrants did not have them, they ended up spending up to five hours in a 
comisaría (police station)’s cell, which Leo considers a waste of time. Another time, he went 
to make a phone call at 06:00 at a locutorio (store offering telephone, fax, and internet 
services) because it was the cheapest time to phone Peru. The China (Asian woman) who 
owned the place looked at Leo with mistrust, but gave him a phone booth. By the time he left 
the store, a police car was waiting for him. He was searched and interrogated as usual. 
According to Leo, the police sought to catch migrants right after they committed a crime, so as 
to have evidence to put them in jail. Talking about the incident at the locutorio, Leo explains in 
a jovial tone:  
“She [the Asian owner] might have been afraid of me, imagine, un negro [a male black 
person] at 06:00, wearing Bermuda shorts, running shoes and a cap! hahaha, [she thought] 
‘He’s going to rob me!’”  
 
Leo’s accounts of his encounters with the police and the fear that he inspires in people 
due to his mestizo appearance are representative of those of others, who also become the target 
of racial profiling by the police and are the object of racist assumptions and attitudes by non-
migrants and migrants alike. Other migrant men did not laugh about these incidents, however.    
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Leo’s jocular reaction to the attitude of the police eventually led him to understand their 
reasoning, and he even wound up working for some of them. Because he was taken to jail 
innumerable times, Leo was able to earn the trust of some officers, he believes. Once when he 
was summoned in the middle of his workday, he told the policeman: “Look chief, these are all 
the car keys of people who trust me, let me go, I have to return them; if not, they will denounce 
me.” Leo was then freed without having to spend the usual five hours in jail. Another time, 
policemen sought to prevent him and other cuida coches from working in an area of a street 
close to a bank, which Leo refused by asserting that he had a family to support. Eventually, his 
countless encounters with the police led him to internalize, to a certain degree, he asserts, their 
racial profiling and to be trusted by some of its members:  
“Yes, they chased migrants, but it is because the same job that you do [cuida coche]can be 
done by a chorro [burglar], they’re partly right...And in the end, I got to know some of them. I 
even washed the car of a policeman who worked at the bank, he left me his keys.”  
 
 
Leo’s particular experience with the police shows that state institutions are not 
homogeneous entities whose bureaucrats implement received rules in a consistent and 
unquestioned manner (Trouillot 2001, Ong 2003, Wacquant 2008). Some policemen trusted 
Leo, treated him with respect and gave him work, which is not usual behaviour among 
members of this force towards migrants from neighbouring nations.  Likewise, migrants are not 
pawns governed by strictly defined ethnic rules. Despite well-established legal and social 
conventions, individuals’ agency works to transgress them through personal negotiation and 
collective organization, most often in complex and contradictory forms (Constable 2007).  
 
Migrants’ Marginality and their Racial Visibility 
 
Soon enough, Ana’s health improved and she began to seek employment, but not finding any 
in La Plata, she went to Buenos Aires city, where she made stuffed toys with her former sister-
in-law. Shortly after, Ana got a night job at a private clinic providing in-house care for the sick, 
which nicely complemented her day-time occupation while providing free accommodation 
relatively close by. At that time, she could only afford one trip per week to La Plata. Ana soon 
realized that patients treated her differently because she was not Argentinian, which she regrets 
and considers “unnecessary”:   
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“A friend of mine, who is an Argentinean nurse, was the one who recommended me for the 
job and she was really nice to me…But if I said to a patient ‘I need x to work’, the person told 
me to manage with whatever I had; yet, when my friend asked for things, she always got 
them.” 176  
 
Lucas, the Peruvian man in his late forties mentioned earlier, recalls similar experiences 
when doing internships to complete his nurse training:   
“I was vaccinating people, working in a public institution and when they found out that I 
was Peruvian, they got very uncomfortable, they blushed…Another time, I was doing an 
internship at a public hospital and a Colombian woman, who had a Master’s in vaccination, 
was also there, she was excellent; yet since she was morochita [a bit dark], they did not 
respect her, even if she was a professional!...The people she was serving were blond, blue eyes, 
you see.” (In the next chapter, I examine migrants’ frequent remarks on the “whiteness” of 
Argentinians and their own “darkness”.) 
 
Migrants often speak about the “inferior” treatment they receive from Argentinians and 
women working in urban settings do so in particular, referring to it as marginalidad 
(marginality)177. In everyday social interaction, this phenomenon is illustrated by the 
denigration permeating the attitudes of some Argentinians towards migrants; its economic 
ramifications become apparent in the exploitative labour regimes imposed on them by certain 
employers. Ana’s labour trajectory in La Plata contains many examples of marginalidad. 
When cleaning for a family-run, well-known casa de comidas (a take-away store offering 
homemade dishes), Ana’s employer reproached her: “What kind of heart do you have that you 
could leave your kids and husband behind?! Why did you come?!”178. Abusive (female) 
employers do not engage in dialogue with their empleadas domésticas (even when asking 
questions), which serves to reinforce the distancing process integral to their contractual 
relationship, setting apart employers from employees in terms of class and racial/ethnic 
hierarchy.  
 
Suffering (sufrir, padecer) is integral to migrant women’s experiences of marginality, 
which eventually, as they see it, leads to their personal growth, increased autonomy and 
superación (surpassing oneself). Ana’s experience of marginality in Argentina has taught her 
an important lesson about how crucial it is to share exploitation experiences among 
compatriots. She knows that migrant men and women alike usually do not tell the truth because 
of orgullo (pride), which brings about negative repercussions for newcomers. Ana believes that 
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so much suffering could be prevented if compatriots shared their hardships in the first place 
instead of letting their pride overcome them179. Even for Ana, it took a long time to have the 
nerve to talk with her sisters-in-law about the exploitation that she had endured and, only then, 
did she learn to fight back, mostly by lying to new employers about how long she has been in 
Argentina. Talking about her suffering has also helped Ana become more assertive about who 
she is and what her rights are as an empleada doméstica:  
“You see how they treat you, te marginan, if anything gets lost, you’re always the one 
blamed, but, I’ve learned. When I go to a new house I say that my only ‘reference letter’ is 
myself, my work…When they ask me ‘Where have you worked?’, I tell them ‘I’ll do my job and 
if you don’t like how I do it, I leave’.” 
 
The extent to which migrants’ marginality is related to their visibility is explained by 
Peruvian Lucas, who emphasizes that even migrants with papers are in danger of being 
mistreated and exploited because they are identifiable by phenotype, accent and other 
characteristics: 
“They look at you mostly [because of] your face, [also] for your way of speaking and 
expressing yourself…And te dejan de lado [‘they push you aside’]…[yet] since the work is a bit 
hard, rough, they hire you, but if it were otherwise, they would not do it…They go as far as not 
paying you!”  
 
Migrants’ racial visibility, their mestizo appearance, also turns them into easy prey for 
pibes chorros and the police, as Ana and Leo’s examples have shown. Migrants remain forever 
identifiable in their papers as well because of a coding used in their Argentinean documents, as 
Lucas mentions:   
“Sometimes they tell you ‘you’re an immigrant, you have [Argentinean] documents, but it 
does not give you the right to claim anything’…Because your Argentinean document has a 
code that indicates that you’re an immigrant, so when you go [to work], they know it and they 
‘push you aside’, they marginalize you because they know it.” 
 
According to Ana, the only place where she has found equality in Argentina has been in 
church, mostly in the prison congregation, where she went for years along with Leo and the 
personnel of the penitentiary (I will come to this issue shortly, in the next section). Ana 
believes that the equal treatment that she experienced there results from a combination of 
religious and educational factors:   
“Because the Gospel calls you and teaches you that we’re all equal in front of God, so we 
got together policemen, lawyers, [medical] doctors and me, Ana, and in that way I’ve met 
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people with whom I could talk ‘at the same level’…At the same time, [it’s also because of] 
their knowledge, because they are professionals, so the treatment was better, I’m telling you 
the truth.”  
 
For Leo, being in prison at a Christian pavillion allowed him to become a better person 
not only through his relationship with God, but also by getting to know professional people:  
“I learned from them, I see it clearly now; they speak to you with education, they talk to you 
in a way that you’re not used to, they make you see things that are true, like the psychologist, 
so you start to treat people differently as a result…With lawyers, with prison chiefs, with police 
directors and sub-directors, you speak correctly, like them.” 
 
A lawyer who has called Leo “friend”—instead of a preso (prisoner) like any other—
went to their home to offer work to Ana and their daughter while he was in jail. This was for 
him a clear example of the equal treatment he received from the penitentiary’s professionals.  
 
The Kids Raised Themselves 
 
The life of Ana and Leo took a dramatic turn in October 2003, when they were getting ready to 
go back home the following December. After two years and three months in Argentina, Ana 
and Leo’s sacrifices allowed them to repay the money they had borrowed for their plane tickets 
while accumulating a great deal of merchandise that they planned to sell in Peru. However, as 
Leo explains:   
“I argued with a pibe [young man] and I went to jail, I ruined my life...He lost the fight and 
died…I had never fought with anyone before, I never had a problem before, no criminal 
record…But that happened to me, imagine! I was ready to go return home with my family and I 
practically ruined my wife’s life and that of my children, who were in Peru.” 
 
For Ana, Leo ended up in jail due to an alcohol problem:  
 “He missed our daughter a lot and every time that we called Peru, she told him ‘Papá, 
come back!’, so what he did? Drink, drink and drink because he could not bear it anymore.” 
 
Leo considered himself fortunate to have spent his seven years in jail at a Christian 
Pavillion of the Unidad 25 Prison of Olmos (a rural locality of the partido of La Plata), which 
was ruled by the Gospel: “The evangelists tienen conducta (behave properly, in good faith) 
while in Peru, jail is really tough, much worse than here”. According to Leo, the Peruvian 
Consulate, together with God, intervened to grant him such an opportunity. His time in jail not 
only led to his conversion from Catholicism to Evangelism but also deepened his religiosity, 
which he had lost when he turned to drinking in La Plata. Even if Leo considered that because 
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of his time in jail he became a better person, he deeply regretted being locked up for such a 
long time without being able to support and protect his family. The thought of having killed a 
person still haunted him.  
 
For Ana, who is a very religious woman and considers her husband un amor de persona 
(a truly loving person), it was emotionally draining to see Leo in jail. She never doubted her 
decision to remain by his side. Family at home were supportive after recovering from the 
shocking news; nevertheless, Ana remained by herself in a foreign country where she had to 
deal with the solitude of losing her partner’s companionship. In addition, she had to assume the 
couple’s kinship obligations when it came to supporting relatives back home financially and 
emotionally. She had to console their children and Leo’s mother as they coped with the bad 
news: Leo would be in jail for a very long time and, as a result, they would not be able to 
return home as planned. Moreover, Ana had to send money to relatives at home in order to 
assure their surbsistence, while paying particular attention to those who were in charge of their 
two children. Under these circumstances, Ana sought a number of other part time jobs in order 
to increase her income. Soon she was cleaning houses and business’ premises during the day 
while caring for the sick and the elderly at night. Since her jobs were spread over different 
localities of the GBA, she spent her days running between jobs and a weekly visit to jail.  
 
By mid-2004, Ana managed to bring their twelve-year-old daughter Emily from Peru 
and stopped working nights. The two of them moved to a pensión in the peripheries of the 
partido of La Plata, where Emily started to attend school, despite not having papers. In 2005, 
Ana’s sister came to help, bringing with her Marco, Ana and Leo’s four-year-old son, who was 
six months old when Ana left Chiclayo. However, what was intended as a relief to Ana’s 
stressful life added to her multiple concerns instead, since Ana’s sister suffered a kidney failure 
and had to be promptly hospitalized in La Plata two months after her arrival. Things became 
even more complicated soon after since Ana’s sister, who was being treated in a public hospital 
even though lacking papers, needed treatment that exceeded the medical expenses amount 
granted by the state to foreigners. As a result, Ana often went to the Peruvian Consulate in 
order to intervene on her sister’s behalf. When talking about those times and the recovery of 
her sister-in-law, Leo says:  
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“She spent four months at the Hospital Rossi, imagine! The jail and the hospital are the 
only things that my son knows! [he laughs]It’s terrible what happened to me!...She did not die 
because God didn’t want it and she has to thank Him because if she had been sick in Peru, she 
would have died! Here all her treatments were free.” 
 
Ana’s sister eventually recovered and moved back to Peru.  
 
With Leo being still in jail and her sister gone, Ana had to continue working several 
part-time jobs while leaving their young son in the care of their older daughter. Ana was then 
working with her former sister-in-law making stuffed toys in Buenos Aires and cleaning the 
house of a really nice Señora from 08:00 to 12:00, in Constitución, a disadvantaged 
neighbourhood of Buenos Aires city, where the train station of the same name is located. Even 
if Ana initially accepted this job out of necessity (she could not find any other in La Plata), she 
came to truly appreciate this employer, who has supported and treated her like anyone else.  At 
that time, Ana’s meagre income was not enough to afford a daily, two-hour-long trip between 
La Plata and Buenos Aires180, and for this reason, she could only see their children on the 
weekend:   
“I lived there [in Buenos Aires] from Monday to Friday in order to work, Saturdays I went 
to see Leo and Sundays, here, with my children…It was a bit complicated…For this reason, my 
boy se auto crió [raised himself].” 
 
Ana’s remark expresses a mixture of pride and regret. She emphasizes the extent to 
which Marco is self-sufficient and autonomous since he can prepare himself tea if he wants or 
even cook some pasta when he is hungry. His older sister Emily walked him to school until 
Ana found him another one, which is only a block away from the pensión. Since then, Marco 
has walked to school unaccompanied. From jail, Leo’s parenting role towards Marco consisted 
of his phone calls:  
“I called him at 08:00 [to say] ‘Wake up, wash yourself, go to study’; at 10:00, 11:00, I 
called again to ask him what he was doing ‘Are you studying?, watching TV?’ and I ‘saw’ 
[supervised] him until noon, when I called to tell him ‘Go to school’.” 
 
Leo’s calls also sought to give emotional support and moral (religious) guidance to 
Emily and Ana which was supplemented during weekly family visits at the jail. Based on this, 
Ana affirms:   
“The seven years that he spent in jail, el siguió mandando en mi casa [he continued to be in 
charge of my house], ‘Dad said this, dad said that’, I never went to a party or anything like 
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that, I always told him ‘You continue to be el jefe de la familia [the family’s chief] and he 
always gave us that example.” 
 
While Emily’s experiences at school were smooth, Marco had a much more difficult 
time. According to Ana, these differences resulted in part from their different personalities and 
their ages at arrival: “My son has a docile character while my daughter came here when she 
was older and she is tough, she defends herself, she’s rebellious, she contradicts everything”. 
From the start, Marco was bullied and discriminated against at school, which prompted Ana to 
forgo his enrolment in 2010:  “Mama, my friends call me peruano puto [insult used for a male 
Peruvian], they beat me”, he complained, imploring Ana to stop sending him to school. In 
2009, Ana removed him from school after a number of regrettable incidents. He was being 
insulted and bullied, and once, he was even forced to bring a pornographic magazine to school, 
an incident for which Ana was called down to the school. Ana explained to the school 
personnel that Leo was in jail (an issue that Marco never mentioned to avoid getting into more 
trouble) and that she was doing what she could despite her busy work schedule. Another time, 
the school psychologist told Ana that she should not force Marco to live in Argentina since he 
did not want to be there. Under these circumstances, Ana and Leo decided to send Marco back 
home.  
 
Leo suggested sending Marco to live with his mother, the child’s grandmother:  “Look, 
let’s do it and if he’s not doing well when you go visit, if he wants to come back with you, you 
bring him, but if he doesn’t want to, you leave him there”. Marco and Emily had lived with 
Leo’s parents when Ana and Leo left for Argentina even though paternal aunts and uncles were 
the ones in charge of the children. While Leo is thankful to his family for having looked after 
their children, Ana regrets it since she knows that they were treated “differently” by aunts and 
uncles, and marginalized by cousins. Ana explains that treatment changes when they’re not 
your own children:  
“When you raise your children you spoil them even when they make mistakes, but when 
someone else knows that the kids ‘have a mother’, they tell them instead ‘Muchacho de 
mierda! [bloody kid!] behave! You’ll see when your father comes!’.”  
 
After the difficult decision was made, sending Marco back home continued to be 
complicated since his passport had been stolen on the bus while returning from a jail visit. 
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Thieves had also stolen Emily’s passport and cell phone on that occasion, without her even 
noticing it. (Since prison visits could not be made without a valid ID, this incident had 
complicated things for Ana181). Family members at home were to send the money for Marco’s 
ticket and someone was assigned to accompany the child, but Ana did not have the 20$ dollars 
to process his new passport182. Luckily, after learning about Ana’s difficult situation, the 
Peruvian Consul prepared a legal document allowing the child to return home without a 
passport. Reflecting on their decision, Ana sadly indicates: “My son really felt the blow (la 
pegada), this is what hurts us; we can’t enrol Marco in school because I have to look after what 
is best for him”. 
 
Over the years, and with the support of the Peruvian Consulate, Ana managed to obtain 
her Argentinean papers and marry Leo in order to prevent his deportation183. Leo’s situation is 
particularly challenging because he was an undocumented migrant without a fixed residence in 
Argentina when he was sentenced for homicide. Leo believes that God’s intervention was 
crucial in shortening his sentence:   
“I saw how those who could pay for it, got out of jail before completing their time, so I 
began to pray and asked God, and soon my lawyer told me that a highly-ranked judge had 
reduced my sentence by three years…The judge who did not want to shorten my sentence, in 
the end, had to play by God’s rules, subduing to His mandate.”  184 
 
Leo got out of jail in April of 2010, almost two months before I met them. Since that 
time, the family has been living in a pensión room in Los Hornos, along with Emily’s Peruvian 
boyfriend and their one-year-old baby. Emily was eighteen years old at the time.  
Personal Projects and Legal Constraints  
 
Since Leo was out of jail, Emily had started her own family and Marco was about to be sent 
back home, Ana could start thinking about her own plans. She wants to pursue her profession 
in order to buy a house in Argentina:   
“My trade is la costura [sewing] and I began to study before I had my kids…Now, again, I 
registered myself [in a sewing course] in Buenos Aires and God wants it, they will call me… I 
have the practice, what I need now is to learn the theory.” 
 
Ana enrolled herself in a six-month sewing course offered for free by the City of 
Buenos Aires’ government and she envisions travelling to Peru often in order to see Marco. 
She is not yet sure, however, if she will stay in Argentina for good. Leo, for his part, wants to 
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learn a trade that permits him to be off the streets, where the vicio (vice) and the problems 
associated with it rule. His main goal is to find a job that will allow Ana to stop working:  “She 
keeps working now, but I tell her ‘It’ll change’ ”. Since his release from jail, some people 
(lawyers, psychologists), whom he met while completing his sentence, have offered him small 
jobs. Leo wishes to return home in the way that they left, that is, by airplane and not empty-
handed, and for this reason, he needs to save money. Moreover, he has promised himself not to 
leave his son alone again. Before being able to fulfill his dream, however, Leo has to finish 
carrying out his sentence, which includes going to Alcoholics Anonymous, keeping out of 
trouble and regularly meeting with counsellors, while solving his documentation problem, as 
he explains: “I have been in this country for ten years, but I’m not sure if they’ll give me the 
[Argentinean] document because of my criminal record and because I entered illegally”.  
 
Leo’s problems with the Argentinean justice system have also hampered the plans the 
couple once had to go to Spain, where Ana’s sister and her husband have lived for several 
years. From these relatives and other friends, Ana and Leo know that even if rules are  more 
strict in Spain, there are also more opportunities there, as Ana says:  “We see it when we they 
send us photos…We’ve learned to believe through photos, and yes, it’s the case, we see that 
the standard of living is better”. Migrants are well aware that in Spain it is almost impossible to 
live without having papers, and that entry regulations are getting increasingly restrictive as the 
process of obtaining a visa has become more complicated and expensive (see Richard’s case in 
the previous section; see also Hartman 2008). Some, like Ana, appreciate the Spanish state’s 
severe enforcement of the public order, considering that it makes both migrants and non-
migrants better people. This is often contrasted with the more flexible, in their view, legal 
system of the Argentinean state, especially when it comes to sanctioning criminals.  
 
Most of those I interviewed mentioned having family and friends in Spain185. Indeed, 
this country has become for many either a plausible alternative to Argentina as a final 
destination or a subsequent stop in their rather cyclical migration route (see Hinojosa 
Gordovana 2008). Many also see their DNI as opening the doors to a number of European 
destinations. With their Argentinean nationality in hand, migrants believe, their entry to Spain 
and stay in Europe will be much easier.  
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Transit migration, as this phenomenon tends to be called, has become increasingly 
important in many parts of the world. Middle-income “developing” countries serve as a 
springboard for professionals from lower-income states bound for destinations in the North, as 
exemplified by Ghanaian nurses who work in South Africa for one or two years before 
migrating to Canada, the United Kingdom or the United States (Ratha and Shaw 2007). 
“Developing” countries also receive migrants in transit to industrial countries. Some Central 
American migrants settle in Mexico while others temporarily stop there on their way to the 
United States, just as migrants wishing to enter Germany first go to the Czech Republic and 
Poland. Likewise, West Africans travel to Cape Verde, The Gambia and Guinea to obtain false 
documents en route to Europe, whereas Turkey and North Africa serve as transit countries to 
Southern Europe (p.20). Whereas Canada is renowned as an “easy giver of citizenship” among 
migrants wanting to reach the United States, Argentina seems to be emerging as such among 
some South Americans.  
 
In this chapter I have examined the effects of state governance by absence and neglect 
on the experiences of migrants living in the peripheries of La Plata and the GBA. This 
governmentality is most extreme in the partido’s rural areas, where the state has removed itself 
completely from its service-providing obligations and role as guarantor of public security. In 
the next chapter, I examine the impact of this state governance on Bolivian horticulturists 
living in Las Quintas.  
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CHAPTER VI: Experiencing Legality in Rural Areas of La Plata: 
Bolivians in Las Quintas  
 
In this chapter, I examine the circumstances of Bolivians, the majority of whom are from 
Tarija province, who have settled in Las Quintas, a rural area of the partido of La Plata made 
up of three adjacent localities: (Lisandro) Olmos, (Angel) Etcheverry and Abasto, where 
small-scale horticulture is widely practiced186. The term quinta designates a small parcel of 
cultivated land whereas its derivate, quinteros, is widely used to refer to the horticulturist 
Bolivian families in this rural area. Overall, this chapter documents the phenomenon that the 
Argentinean rural sociologist Roberto Benencia has dubbed the Bolivianization of Argentinean 
horticulture (1997, 2003, 2006, 2008).  
In the chapter’s first section, I look at the geographical and labour mobility of 
“Bolivians of Argentinean origin”, as the children of Bolivian temporary farm workers in 
Argentina tend to refer to themselves. Often born in this country’s Northern provinces, these 
self-identified Bolivians have dual citizenship, which permits them to move between the two 
countries easily. The case of one such family that settled in Etcheverry shows that migrants 
commonly resort to transnational kinship networks that reach back to the country of origin 
when they are in need of material, financial, emotional or social support. I examine the effects 
of quinteros’ isolation on the commercialization of their products and the safety of their 
families, while making apparent the limitations imposed by horticulture’s high time demands 
on their capacity to complete diverse bureaucratic procedures and visit family. The 
constraining circumstances of horticulturists in Etcheverry illustrate those of others in 
different localities of Las Quintas. Quinteros’ critical views of the government and its policies 
along with their detailed knowledge of a range of bureaucratic procedures contrasts with the 
denigrating views of these migrants held by some municipal officials (an issue to which I 
return in the next section). I finish by reflecting on the strong desire of many rural Bolivians to 
return to rural life, often after long periods of peripheral residence and urban work.  
 In the chapter’s second section, I analyze the experiences of another Tarijeño family 
who settles in Olmos. The husband’s initial labour trajectory shows that the hiring en negro of 
recently arrived, undocumented migrants is common in urban areas neighbouring Las Quintas, 
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and seemingly easier to implement than in La Plata city. Unequal power relationships are 
inherent in horticultural production in the partido, which leaves poor quinteros with no 
leveraging power to negotiate the price of their production. The case of this family illustrates 
rural migrants’ commitment to the educational success of their children and the mixed status 
of their families (Dreby 2012), whose different members are situated along a continuum of 
legal/migration statuses, ranging from not having even started procedures to obtain residency 
to already having Argentinean citizenship. My analysis of the unfair commercialization of 
quinteros’ products takes me to La Plata’s Central Fruit and Vegetable Market, where the 
monopolization of this industry is most manifest and reflects the partido’s ethnic hierarchies. 
Looking at this industry as a process that includes production, commercialization and 
consumption shows that a series of intermediaries with means of transportation are those 
benefiting the most, while quinteros and verduleros de barrio are among the most 
disadvantaged. This section also examines some of the policies of the Bolivian state that affect 
its citizens in Argentina and demonstrates that, in contrast with Peruvians and Paraguayans, 
Bolivians tend to keep in touch with the political reality of their country of origin. 
QUINTEROS IN ETCHEVERRY 
Caring For the Kids: Geographical and Labour Mobility Among Argentinean-born Bolivians 
Rufino was born in the north of Argentina, as he puts it, of Bolivian parents from Tarija who 
were golondrinas or seasonal agricultural workers187:  
“They come and go, they work by temporada [agricultural season]…They go to Salta and 
when the work is done there, they go to Mendoza and, after that, they go to Bolivia, where they 
have their home and their land.” 
Rufino spent his childhood watching his parents work in the fields and eventually 
joined them along with the rest of his siblings. When he turned fourteen, he left his parents’ 
home and moved to the northern Argentinean province of Tucumán, where he worked as a 
medianero, sowing the unused land of his socio (partner). The medianería is a common 
practice in small-scale agriculture in Argentina, which consists of a verbal agreement between 
two people who seek to maximize the exploitation of available resources. In its most common 
form, the patrón (boss) offers the land, while the peón or medianero provides the labour. The 
leverage (negotiation power) of associates is often very unequal and depends on what is 
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supplied by each of them, such as land, seeds, machinery, infrastructure, labour, knowledge of 
new technologies and pesticides. In fact, even if the medianero shares the production risks 
with the patrón, he only receives between forty and twenty-five percent of the products’ 
selling price, depending on whether he contributed some horticultural input or only his labour 
(Benencia 1997, 2006). The latter was the case for Rufino, whose work as a medianero came 
to an end when he turned eighteen and had to complete his one-year military service, which 
was then compulsory for all Argentinean male citizens188. After completing his national duty, 
he moved to Salta province (situated north of Tucumán), where he worked for twelve years in 
a ceramics factory. While in Salta, Rufino met his first wife, with whom he had two boys. 
Years later, they would separate and Rufino would have the custody of their children.  
Rufino’s job situation deteriorated and in 2005, he decided to leave for La Plata with 
his young boys, who were then ten and five years old. Upon his arrival in the city, he worked 
as a construction assistant with his brother Julián, who, having followed a similar trajectory, 
had moved to La Plata in 1998 (see chapter V). Soon after, however, Rufino decided to go 
back to the campo (rural areas) in order to be able to spend more time with his children:  
“Here [in Etcheverry], I can work and have the kids by my side, I’m close to them, whereas 
when I worked in the city as albañil [construction worker], I left home early in the morning, it 
was dark and they were sleeping, and by the time I came back late at night, they were sleeping 
again.” 
Rufino settled with his two boys in Etcheverry and soon realized how challenging it 
was to look after them while taking care of the house and working the land all by himself. 
Resorting to his family networks, he found himself an empleada (housekeeper) in Tarija, who 
some time later moved to Etcheverry with them. This Tarijeña was to become Rufino’s second 
wife, with whom he has two daughters, who were four years old and several days old, 
respectively, when I met them in early 2010.  
Rufino’s family live in an area inhabited by southern Bolivians who, like them, rent 
lots of different land sizes in order to produce fresh vegetables that are commercialized 
locally. Talking about the extent to which the area is ethnically demarcated along with the 
sacrifices made by Bolivian horticulturists, which Argentinians could not parallel (an issue 
also raised by Benencia 1997)189, Rufino explains: 
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“The people who live in Las Quintas are in their vast majority Bolivians or descendants of 
Bolivians, almost all of them have ‘Bolivian blood’…Criollos 190 [Argentinians] with quintas 
who do what a Bolivian does are indeed very few. We start to work when we wake up, even if 
it’s 05:00 since we can work with a candle and continue working until night; you can do it 
until 10:00 using a candle.” 
Despite the sacrifices inherent in horticultural work in Las Quintas, Rufino considers 
his present labour situation to be much better than former ones:  
 “Before, since I was a peón, I had to do what the patrón told me, even if it was wrong, just 
to please him…Today, I see things differently, I try to simplify things, to make work more 
efficient, I rent some land and I decide what’s best and I do not depend on anyone else’s 
whims.” 
Like other migrant men who managed to become their own bosses, such as those 
working in construction in the partido’s urban areas, Rufino sees his labour autonomy as very 
important since it has permitted him to leave behind exploitative and sometimes abusive 
patrones. As the examples that I have presented so far show, migrants’ exploitation is not only 
carried out by Argentinians but also by compatriots and other migrants. In rural areas, the 
exploitation of Bolivians by Bolivians intensified in tandem with the so-called Bolivianization 
of Argentinean horticulture (Benencia 2003, 2006), which has restructured the country’s 
horticultural production. Since the mid-1970s, Bolivian families from Tarija, Cochabamba and 
Potosí provinces have been crucial in the creation and reshaping of “green belts” (cinturones 
verdes) in different regions of Argentina. Working as peones and patrones, they have 
specialized in horticultural production for fresh consumption. By the early 2000s, Bolivian 
medianeros constituted the largest group of hired workers in most horticultural areas of the 
country (Benencia 2006). Moreover, many of them have experienced a process of upward 
social mobility dubbed escalera boliviana or “Bolivian ladder” (Benencia 1997), through 
which they become either independent workers arrendatarios (renting the land) or, less often, 
land owners (Benencia 2003). In the Horticultural Area of Buenos Aires Province, which is 
the most important in the country 191, census information indicates that in 2001 almost 40% of 
quinteros were Bolivians (88% of them were arrendatarios whereas 12% were proprietors) 
and that their labour force was exclusively Bolivian. The 2005 Horticulture Census of Buenos 
Aires Province confirms this trend, showing that out of the 2,934 horticultural sites in the 
province, 893 were run by Bolivians192. 
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Rufino sometimes hires a changrín or temporary agricultural worker because his wife 
can barely help him, being already busy with the house and the baby girl, and he does not want 
his children to neglect their studies. Hiring temporary labour was a common practice in Las 
Quintas when I did my fieldwork, which depends on a series of factors, including the 
household’s size and its reproductive cycle; the size of the land parcel; the product; access to 
technical advice, new technologies and agrochemicals; connections with relatives back home 
who can help find workers; and the ability to remunerate labourers with very low pay or by 
providing accommodation, food and the opportunity to learn the job (see Benencia 1997, 
2006). 
Rufino is glad that his children do not neglect their school obligations, which he 
considers vital, and he speaks proudly about how happy they are to attend a nearby public 
institution, along with the children of other quinteros: 
“One of them plays volleyball and the other one the guitar, and they only help me when 
they do not have homework or school-related activities, but only a little bit…They really like 
going to school, where teachers are very nice to them.”  
Rufino knows that some quinteros prefer not to send their children to school so they 
can be free to help in the fields, but he thinks otherwise: “I prefer that they go to school, even 
if they don’t [actually] study, but merely ‘sit, warming the chair’ [calientan la silla]…They 
have to fulfill their obligation.”. Most of the quinteros I interviewed highly regard education 
and would not waste the opportunity to study for free given to their children in Argentina. 
Parents often go beyond their poor financial means to support their children’s success at 
school, an attitude that has also been documented by Benencia (2006) in other horticultural 
areas of Buenos Aires and Mendoza provinces. 
When Isolation Becomes Safety 
Rufino’s dispersed neighbourhood193 is comprised of several Tarijeño families, who know 
each other well and whose lots are adjacent. In all cases, households practice small, family 
horticulture while renting their parcels from Argentinean land owners who do not live in the 
area. Families have built their own precarious homes, which are situated beside their workable 
land (parcels) and separated from each other by dirt paths leading to some spacious areas 
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where people socialize and children play. Public services are practically absent in the 
neighbourhood, which is situated far away not only from urban centres (about forty-five 
minutes by bus), but also from the closest paved street (twenty-minutes on foot). Families’ 
lack of access to basic public services, such as running water, electricity, sewers, septic tanks 
and paved streets and sidewalks, compromise sanitary conditions, while mobility is hampered 
by a highly inadequate bus system, whose stops are situated far away from the neighbourhood 
and whose service is unreliable. In addition, horticulturalists lack private means of 
transportation, except for a few households that have bicycles. Under the circumstances, the 
neighbourhood’s relative isolation from the “outside” urban life of neighbouring Olmos, 
Etcheverry and Abasto have important repercussions for the commercialization of quinteros’ 
products and the safety of their families.  
When it comes to selling their products, including different sorts of lettuce, tomatoes, 
basil and peppers, horticulturalists do not have the leverage (for lack of financial, material and 
human resources) to negotiate the price of their vegetables or to decide not to sell when the 
amount being offered is too low. Their distant location from the urban fruit and vegetable 
markets in La Plata and Abasto, where their fresh products are sold, along with their lack of 
means of transportation have contributed to quinteros’ disadvantageous position, as Rufino 
signals:  
 “Here, we are small producers and so we sell to anyone who comes and pays us a bit 
better…Three or four trucks come to take our vegetables to the market and we sell to the one 
who offers us one peso or five cents more.” 
Quinteros in Etcheverry have no choice but to sell in order to buy new seeds and sow 
again. In contrast, the choices available to big producers expand along with their financial 
means, access to transportation, machinery and hired labour. Despite the hardships involved in 
being a productor chiquito in Las Quintas, as Rufino puts it, he is satisfied with his decision to 
return to the campo. Even if struggling, he sells enough to feed his family and plant again 
while living in tranquility and working at his own pace.  
Isolation also means for quinteros and their families that they can live in security, away 
from two dangers: the police and the pibes chorros, whom they often meet while doing their 
shopping in urban areas of Etcheverry and Olmos. According to Rufino, the police abuse of 
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paisanos (rural Bolivians) in the partido is restricted to Las Quintas, whereas the pibes 
chorros’ crime is endemic in the GBA. When Rufino worked in La Plata city (in 
construction), la cana (the police) never stopped him although he travelled a lot. In contrast, 
policemen have continued to take advantage of horticulturalists in neighbouring urban areas, 
where rural Bolivians are bribed as soon as they come out of a corner store. For safety reasons, 
quinteros try to avoid urban areas as much as possible, as Rufino explains:  
 “Here [in Las Quintas]is very safe, but everyone comments that if you’re on the street [in 
neighbouring urban areas]those from the comisaría [police station] find an excuse to stop you 
and ask you for money, and if you don’t give them some, they kidnap you and they beat you 
up.”  
The territoriality of police abuse in the partido has emerged as the result of some 
allegedly intrinsic characteristics of quinteros combined with the institutionalized corruption 
of this institution. Evidence of the latter, for Rufino, is that, even if officers of the local 
comisaría were sent elsewhere in the GBA in the past, following numerous formal and 
informal complaints, they were replaced by others, who soon resorted to deeply-rooted corrupt 
behaviours. Under these circumstances, quinteros’ visibility and their complacent attitude 
combines to make them easy prey for corrupt policemen. According to Rufino, rural Bolivians 
never complain and, when being bribed or abused, they never do or say anything, but stay 
quiet. As compared with criollos, they’re more cowardly and timid, and they dislike trouble or 
appearing on the news. These reasons altogether explain why people abuse them. Rufino’s 
account of why “other” quinteros or paisanos in the area inexorably become the target of 
corrupt police sets him (discursively) apart from “them”. In addition, Rufino’s comments on 
his non-compliant attitude regarding police abuse along with his knowledge of urban life 
(which paisanos lack by definition) position him with criollos instead, while reinforcing the 
distance separating him from other compatriots of rural origin: 
“They [the police] have never abused me because I’ve always taken all 
precautions…Moreover, if they ask me [for money], I do not give them any, why should I? I 
would rather go to jail for two or three nights instead of giving them money…Here the 
comisarios constantly walk over the paisanos, on the street, in full view, but if you go to La 
Plata, things are different because those in police cars are different…Since I worked there for 
a long time, I know how things differ.” 
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As was the case for other migrants, the clear-cut boundary established by Rufino’s 
narrative became blurry many times, when instead of referring to “them”, he spoke of “us”, as 
I show shortly. 
Quinteros also mention another danger they encounter when visiting neighbouring 
urban areas: the pibes chorros. Rufino refers to them as chorritos in a denigrating manner that 
also highlights their youth:   
“They are people who do not like to work, they ‘disguise’ themselves [referring to their 
dress code]…They go around in gangs on small motorbikes, so when you’re at the bus stop, 
they come and steal whatever you have or they put a knife to your back and say ‘give me what 
you have or you’re dead!” 
Rufino’s eldest son, who is fifteen years old, fell victim to the chorritos after doing 
some grocery shopping in urban Olmos. While waiting for the bus, they took the little money 
he had for the ticket while threatening him with a knife. According to Rufino, the pibes 
chorros are youth, between ten and fifteen years of age, who are everywhere in the GBA and 
commit their crimes in complicity with the police:  
 “They [the police] are the ones who send the others [chorritos] after you, and if you make a 
formal complaint or call them [police] when someone is after you, they pretend that nothing is 
happening in order to allow the others [chorritos] to finish committing their crime…And this 
scares people [quinteros] a lot.” 
In regard to these two urban dangers, the isolation of quintero neighbourhoods turned 
their (re) productive spaces into safety zones, which contrasts with the circumstances of 
migrants living in urban and peripheral areas of the partido, being regulated by different 
assemblages (Marcus and Saka 2006)194 of state governmentality and crime territoriality (see 
chapters IV and V). Many quinteros believe that since justice does not exist in Las Quintas, 
they are left with no choice but to find ways to protect themselves and their families, an idea 
that was often expressed as follows: “Nowadays, if you don’t take care of yourself, nobody 
will”. Even if Rufino agrees, citing the impunity of police abuse and chorritos’ crime, he finds 
it quite challenging for quinteros to keep safe because of their conspicuous mestizo and/or 
aboriginal visibility:  
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 “For us it’s really complicated [to be safe] because we are cara de paisano [paisanos 
face]…Everyone says that we’re feitos [ugly], negritos [‘black’ meaning ‘dark’] and, as a 
consequence, easy prey for people who need money.” 
Rufino’s explanation illustrates two important issues. First, it signals the extent to 
which migrants’ narratives shift back and forth across the classificatory boundary between (in 
this case) the quinteros being abused by the police and those who resourcefully manage to 
escape such predatory behaviour. In contrast with Rufino’s frequent efforts to distance himself 
from the quinteros cara de paisano, in this example, he clearly includes himself among them. 
Second, his explanation confirms the racial logic underpinning the hegemonic ethnic hierarchy 
of the partido, where Bolivians are invariably ranked last. In particular, the notion of paisano 
in Las Quintas reinforces the denigrated status of Bolivians due to a) their apparent visibility, 
resulting from their aboriginal and/or mestizo ancestry, and b) their rural origin, which would 
explain their timidity about defending themselves from state officials. Indeed, the latter (b) in 
this particular setting is often interpreted by migrants and non-migrants as a double handicap. 
It implies rudimentary levels of education that (supposedly) impair quinteros’ ability to 
navigate the written world of law and commerce—whereas the (assumed) lack of education of 
Bolivians in urban localities of the partido is associated with rudeness and lack of manners. 
Rural origin also connotes the lack of a certain know-how associated with urban life, which 
(allegedly) equips migrants with the necessary symbolic resources to efficiently deal with state 
officials and institutions (the police among them) and fight for their rights. In the city, this sort 
of shyness and reticent attitude is not exclusively associated with migrants’ rural origin, but it 
is more generally perceived as a clear sign of their recent arrival in Argentina.  
Denigrating Views of Quinteros and the Partido’s Grid of Ethnic Delinquency 
The high labour mobility of Rufino’s parents, inherent in their lifelong career as golondrinas 
in Argentina, has led his family to be spread over both countries. Like him, half of his siblings 
decided to stay in Argentina: a brother and a sister live in the province of Salta, whereas Julián 
lives in Los Hornos and another sister in Las Quintas. The other half of the family chose to 
settle in Bolivia, even if they regularly travel between both countries thanks to their 
Argentinean citizenship. Like Rufino, many of his siblings were born in Argentina and his 
parents also obtained their papers. The situation of Rufino’s wife is different, however, since 
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she has not yet started the procedures to obtain her Argentinean residency, despite having 
lived in the country for several years. This does not worry Rufino, who considers that getting 
residency papers in Argentina is mostly an issue of getting into the right mind-set. In addition, 
his wife’s “irregular” migration status did not prevent her from  receiving care at a public 
hospital when she delivered her two babies, whose Argentinean citizenship is expected to 
speed up the processing of their mother’s residency.  
Rufino knows the required procedures very well and has an easy-going approach to 
completing them, even while acknowledging how lengthy and costly they are. This contrasts 
not only with the more generalized ignorance and confusion of migrants living in urban areas 
of the partido, but also with the views of quinteros held by municipal officers, such as the 
Director of the Dirección General de Colectividades y Migraciones of the Municipality of La 
Plata. In office since 2007, this young bureaucrat describes himself as a committed Peronist 
who fervently believes in the Patria Grande integration project (see Chapter III). His initial 
comments, when interviewed, seem to demonstrate his inclusive approach towards migrants, 
yet his degrading views of Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans in general, whom he 
collectively labels latinoamericanos, and those of quinteros in particular, soon becomes 
apparent.  
He asserts that, unlike Chinese migrants who arrive with their papers in order, ready to 
work or with money to install a mini-market in La Plata, the Latin Americans do so empty-
handed, without even knowing why they have migrated, which has led the municipality to 
develop a special policy for them. Their “integration hardships”, he says, are caused by a 
certain condición, a vague notion referring to a mix of ignorance, disinterest and 
communication problems, that the Director associates with the “afflicted character” of 
migrants’ countries of origin, whose societies have large aboriginal populations with low 
degrees of Westernization and high illiteracy levels. When talking about the implementation 
of the Patria Grande documentation program in the partido, which granted temporary 
residence to 3,000 Latin Americans, the Director asserts that migrants’ “cultural” level 
(integral to their condición) explains why they lose their paperwork, do not complete the 
procedures or sometimes even do not understand anything at all: 
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 “We gave them ‘one thousand’ notices because the program lasted for almost five 
years…We went a lot to their barrios, we went to see them…Those who did not get their papers 
were either colgados [lazy and negligent people] or lacked interest.” 
The Director finds it extremely difficult to understand these migrants, except for the 
Peruvians who have studied at La Plata’s universities, with whom he can have a “different” 
dialogue. He also adds disapprovingly that Latin Americans have their babies at Argentinean 
public hospitals in order to promptly obtain their DNIs and so as to receive their Asignación 
Universal por Hijo (see chapter III). The Director’s degrading portrait of these migrants is 
completed by juxtaposing the partido’s grid of ethnic delinquency with it, which is often 
equally endorsed by its migrant and non-migrant residents. In this notion, Peruvians and 
Paraguayans are attributed the highest rates of trata de blanca (human trafficking for forced 
prostitution) while quinteros are depicted as having the worst slavery problem. It was when 
talking about rural Bolivians’ exploitation of their own compatriots that the Director advanced 
his pejorative views of these horticulturalists:  
“They are like little animals, who have not mentally progressed…You get close to them and 
they run away, they enter their casillas [poor houses] and they do not want to talk with anyone, 
they feel threatened easily, like topos [moles].”  
This denigrating portrait of rural Bolivians is not only alarming but also at odds with 
my own experience with them. It is indeed quite upsetting to hear such biased opinions 
coming from a public official whose role is to facilitate and enhance migrants’ full 
participation in La Plata, and who describes himself as an open citizen wishing for an 
increasingly diverse society. My fieldwork showed quinteros to be wise, critical and 
welcoming people, who kindly took unplanned pauses from work or permitted me to go along 
with them through their busy routines in order to share their views with me.  
 
Quinteros’ Minimal Access to Public Entitlements and their Views of the Government 
In contrast with the dehumanizing analysis advanced by the Director, quinteros provided a 
much more pragmatic answer when explaining why they find it challenging to obtain their 
documentation. Namely, the labour-intensive horticulture practiced in Las Quintas does not 
allow for parcels to be left unattended during long periods of time, which conflicts with the 
time required to complete lengthy bureaucratic procedures, including those to obtain residency 
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and citizenship papers and to access diverse non-taxable public subsidies. In addition, since 
most institutions processing entitlements and services are situated in La Plata city, quinteros 
have to commute for about two hours each way in order to start, follow up with and finish 
procedures. Travel and waiting times, combined with the cost of bus tickets and processing 
fees deter quinteros from leaving their parcels, though this does not tend to affect their 
children, who almost always have their Argentinean papers in order.  
The demands of intensive horticulture also make it almost impossible for quinteros to 
visit relatives in other provinces or back home. Not only is it difficult to find someone who 
can replace them while they are away, but bus trips are about a day-and-a-half long. The last 
time Rufino travelled to Bolivia, he left his parcel with a young neighbour, who took good 
care of it; yet, this is not always possible. These constraints lead horticulturalists to seldom 
travel and, when they do so, only for short periods of time. In addition, although the cost of 
family visits is substantial, producers’ main concern is rather leaving work behind. Rufino’s 
comment illustrates the extent to which trips back home tend to be considered a waste of 
workable time for quinteros: 
 “We travel very little…A short time ago, my brother-in-law came, so we practically do not 
travel…The last time I went to Bolivia, at least three years ago, I did so fast because if you 
leave, everything here is abandoned…If you lose ten days, you lose all this [the crops], it’s all 
destroyed, and it’s really difficult to get it back again.” 
When expressing their views of the government, quinteros often express a certain 
perplexity resulting from the disconnect between what they hear and what they do not see, as 
Rufino’s comment shows:  
 “To tell you the truth, one has to think about it, one who works…They say that there are 
subsidies but they do not arrive here…I’ve been working on an ‘opportunity’ [the possibility 
of obtaining public subsidies for his children] for a long time and it does not 
arrive…Honestly, I don’t know what to think!”  
Rufino has unsuccessfully tried to fix the bureaucratic glitch that was still sending the 
public subsidies granted to his children to Salta instead of Etcheverry, despite the fact that he 
had registered their change of residence five years earlier. Despite having invested large 
amounts of time attending to such procedures, nothing has changed. This sort of problem is 
rather common in the partido and affects migrant and non-migrants alike. Yet, horticulture’s 
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time requirements impose particular restrictions upon quinteros seeking to fix such glitches, 
which involves completing lengthy procedures.   
While horticulturalists in Etcheverry most often do not benefit from the wide range of 
public subsidies available to low-income families like theirs, they do receive some technical 
support from an agronomist paid for by the government (as part of its efforts to revitalize and 
democratize the campo). The young agronomist has helped quinteros to choose the most 
appropriate crops according to the season and market’s needs while advising them on new 
pesticides. His regular visits have also served to inform producers about public subsidies 
suitable for them and to help get their requests ready. These joint efforts have not translated 
into horticulturalists’ access to their entitlements, however, which has generated a sense of 
combined mistrust and perplexity regarding the government’s actions. Like other quinteros, 
Rufino interprets the official promise of diverse subsidies, which they have never received, as 
a strategy to get votes. Quinteros are also critical of the taxation system imposed by the 
government because it harshly impacts households like theirs, with very little revenue, by 
demanding that people have everything en blanco, which Rufino expresses as follows:  
“Here in Argentina, if you do not work you do not eat, and if you work more, the 
government comes [to you] and tries to find the way to take your money, I’m not sure for 
whom one works.” 
In the end, quinteros claim a certain self-imposed disinterest in politics more generally, 
resulting from witnessing successive deceitful governments that, in their view, have all done 
the same: take the money, sell everything and leave people empty-handed. 
The Return to the Campo among the Children of Golondrina Workers 
The brief account of Rufino’s geographical and labour trajectory illustrates that of other 
Bolivians and Paraguayans whose parents are (or were) also golondrinas in Argentina. Being 
born in this country and having obtained their citizenship at an early age permits these dual 
citizens to easily move between the two states. Initially, they settle in northern Argentinean 
provinces and eventually move to the GBA, while working in some of its partidos or Buenos 
Aires city. These migrants’ high geographical mobility is often paralleled by their diversified 
labour trajectory.  Having as a common point of departure the labour-intensive agriculture 
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passed on to them by their parents, migrants later work at a wide range of urban jobs. One of 
Rufino’s brothers, Julián, constitutes a good example of such a geographical and labour 
trajectory.  
Julián moved to the Argentinean northern provinces of Salta and Jujuy when he was a 
boy, where he worked in the zafra (sugar harvest) for eleven years along with his father. Like 
others before and after him, when work became scarce, Julián moved to the GBA, where he 
did a variety of urban, non-specialized, labour intensive jobs. The first one consisted of 
cleaning machines in a factory of lathes in Ranelagh, partido of Berazategui. Later on, Julián 
worked digging trenches for TELECOM (a privatized telephone company) in Buenos Aires 
city, from dusk to dawn, while living in Longchamps, partido of Almirante Brown. Even if 
this job paid well, he considered it muy sacrificado (it demanded too much sacrifice) since his 
two-hour commute (each way) involved taking a bus, a metro and two trains. After quitting, 
Julián moved to Ensenada city, capital of the partido of the same name in the Gran La Plata 
Aglomerado Urbano, where he worked as a welder for Astilleros Río Santiago until he was 
fired because his sight deteriorated. In 1998, he moved to the partido of La Plata and began to 
work in the construction sector, where he eventually pursued his career. Starting as an albañil 
or construction worker, Julián progressively moved up to reach the top of this sector’s 
hierarchy by becoming a maestro mayor de obra. Like most migrants, Julián learned all his 
trades on the job, mostly by observing others.  
Rufino and Julián’s labour trajectories also illustrate the extent to which many of those 
who initially worked in the campo along with their families are drawn back to their early 
occupation. While Rufino’s reintegration into rural life took place soon after he moved to the 
partido of La Plata, Julián’s return was being planned in 2010. He already owned some 
parcels in Las Quintas, which were being worked by a medianero. Through this commercial 
relationship, Julián is learning about horticultural production and commercialization in the 
partido while building up his own production, both of which are essential for his desired 
transition from construction to rural work. Unlike Rufino, however, Julián does not want to 
live in Las Quintas, but only plans to work there. He is not willing to leave the comfort of his 
peripheral lifestyle to settle in Las Quintas, where the lack of basic public services is almost 
complete and housing is extremely precarious. This does not suit him or his family. Instead, 
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Julián envisions getting the best of both worlds by combining the advantages of his current 
residency with the tranquility of horticultural work. His main reason for shifting labour niches 
is the stressful complications inherent in being a maestro mayor de obra:  
“I’m tired of this [construction work]…You start very early and it’s very problematic…I 
got the project [building a big house] myself, independently, so I have to deal with the owner, 
the engineer, the workers, and sometimes things don’t turn out as planned, so you are very 
stressed all the time.” 
 
QUINTEROS IN OLMOS  
Together from Tarija to Las Quintas 
Pancho, Tomasa and their three children are southern Bolivians from Tarija who moved to 
Olmos in 2004. Initially, they lived with Tomasa’s parents in Etcheverry, where they practiced 
small-scale family horticulture while their children attended school. A couple of months later, 
Pancho found work as a carpenter, which allowed the family to move out of his in-laws’ 
home. Like most recently arrived migrants, Pancho was hired en negro and had to learn the 
trade on the job. He enjoyed making wooden furniture, but considered its marketing and 
selling challenging. Tomasa, for her part, soon found the opportunity to work in a quinta in 
Etcheverry, where she rented a parcel from an Argentinean owner. With the initial profit 
made, she started building a small greenhouse that was essential to continue growing produce 
during the winter. Problems arose, however, when the landlord wanted to double her rent after 
seeing the initial stages of Tomasa’s greenhouse.  
In Las Quintas, leases last for three years and are signed at a bank that legalizes the 
commercial transaction between the two parties involved, whose leverage power is markedly 
unequal, as in the case of the medianería relationship. Quinteros are required to pay their rent 
each month without flexibility or consideration of the high risks involved in their work. Their 
production can be easily lost due to pests, fungus or bad or fast-changing weather, or not sold 
as planned since intermediaries decide from whom and at what price to buy. Equally 
insensitive to quinteros’ struggles is the market in charge of establishing seed prices. 
Horticulturists’ constraints contrast with landowners’ leeway to increase rent prices at their 
will, since no entity regulates this economic factor. This issue is the most unjust, since 
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quinteros’ investment in infrastructure can only be transferred to another parcel with great 
difficulty, as Tomasa and Pancho explain:  
“If the landowner sees that you have built a greenhouse, he doubles the rent by the end of 
the year…They take advantage [of quinteros] because it’s very difficult to move [the 
infrastructure] somewhere else. After you dismantle it, you might be able to recover about 
70% of it, but it may be even less [than that].” 
As was the case of most quinteros I interviewed, Tomasa’s rent continued to increase, 
which, combined with the rude manners of the landlord, led her to leave the parcel she had 
worked for almost two years. After that, Tomasa spent several months without work, a period 
that she recalls as being very challenging because she was used to working the land since 
childhood: “I didn’t know what to do because I was not used to being home all day, just 
cooking, cleaning, taking care of the kids, the clothes…I swear I could not put up with it 
anymore!” Eventually, a quintero offered Tomasa some of his rented parcels in medianería, 
which allowed her to go back to her work routine.  
In the meantime, Pancho found a second part-time job working in a country or barrio 
privado (private neighbourhood), where he performed a variety of menial chores. To his 
surprise, he was hired despite not having his papers in a place where workers’ documentation 
was routinely controlled, though not so much for taxation purposes as for security reasons:  
“They checked your documents before you entered [the barrio privado], as they did with 
everyone [workers regardless of their migration situation] in the wagon…They very carefully 
inspected every corner of the wagon, but they never asked for your papers when you left!” 
Seemingly, strict control procedures sought to keep burglars out, not undocumented 
migrants, who were hired for low wages.  
Upon the death of Tomasa’s father in late 2008, the family moved to the parcel he used 
to work in Olmos, when his widow decided to transfer the lease. Since then, the couple has 
practiced horticulture together. The family has access to electricity, but their house is still very 
rudimentary. Their work, even if performed under the auspices of the law, does not have any 
of the benefits associated with regulated employment, such as health care and retirement plan 
contributions. These problematic issues are common among quinteros in Olmos. 
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Pancho and Tomasa practiced agriculture since childhood in Tarija along with their 
respective families. Pancho learned gravity irrigation, the technology employed by his parents 
to produce commercial crops. Tomasa’s parents, for their part, complemented the work of 
their own parcels with their seasonal agricultural employment in Argentina. As is the case of 
other children of golondrinas, Tomasa considers herself a Tarijeña, even if she was born and 
raised until the age of ten in Argentina. Tomasa’s parents continuously travelled back and 
forth between Argentina and Bolivia until her paternal grandparents, who were in charge of 
looking after their property in Tarija, could no longer do it. It was then that Tomasa’s family 
returned “home”. Following her parents’ path, Tomasa eventually became a golondrina and 
migrated for several years to seasonally perform agricultural work in Argentina’s regional 
economies. This work came to an end when she met Pancho in Tarija, who “brought” her to 
the country. When talking about those days, Pancho does not regret his decision:  
“We left at a critical moment and we are doing much better here, so maybe, we may go [to 
Bolivia] but only to visit…Because the children do not want to even hear about returning 
home.” 
Their two eldest children agree, asserting their desire to pursue university studies in La 
Plata city and find urban employment afterwards. Having completed public high school, their 
eldest daughter is taking some time off to choose her future career. Their son is pursuing the 
last part of his high school studies at a private institution because no spaces were left at his 
former public school by the time he chose his electives195. Their youngest daughter is 
attending primary school. In all three cases, schooling has taken place in urban Olmos. Like 
many quinteros in Etcheverry, Pancho and Tomasa are committed to their children’s 
educational success, so it is rare that they require their help to work the parcels and they go out 
of their way to support their aspirations.  
The Future Barrio Boliviano in Olmos: A Once in a Lifetime Opportunity  
Pancho and Tomasa have not returned to Bolivia since they moved to Las Quintas because 
tickets are expensive for five people and work cannot be left unattended for long periods of 
time. For Tomasa, this has not proved difficult since only uncles, aunts and cousins are left in 
Tarija; her parents (only her mother is left after her father’s death) and Tomasa’s sister are in 
Las Quintas as well, close to her. The situation is different for Pancho, whose entire family has 
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remained in Bolivia. He has five brothers, three of whom are albañiles, one who is a priest and 
another who is a serigraphist, and a sister, whose two children have completed university 
studies, which is remarkable in a country where education is both very expensive and highly 
regarded. Overall, Pancho’s family is doing well and, for this reason, they do not plan to join 
him in Argentina, as he explains:  
“They are okay there, some are doing fine even if not really well, but they have their 
homes, some also have their profession and my sister’s children finished their studies, so they 
are doing well, even if they are struggling.” 
 
While most migrants are only vaguely aware of how the economic, political and social 
circumstances of their countries of origin have evolved since they left, Bolivians tend to be 
well informed about how their nation has changed since President Evo Morales assumed 
office in January 2006196. Popularly known as Evo, Morales was first elected President of 
Bolivia with 53.7% of the popular vote in December 2005 and was re-elected with 63% of the 
votes in December 2009. The Bolivians I interviewed in the partido are aware of the policies 
he implemented, which they tend to explain by his aboriginal, rural, poor upbringing197. Most 
speak about his leadership in bringing about the country’s land reform, which sought to give 
land to the poorest peasants while improving their living circumstances by providing them 
with running water and other basic services. Many also mention Morales as being the first 
Bolivian president of aboriginal ancestry, who has challenged the historical unjust distribution 
of wealth in the country.  
Those I interviewed are also aware of Morales’ policies for Bolivians abroad, 
especially those “facilitating” the issuing of their documentation in Argentina (I will return to 
this issue shortly). Some even mention that Peruvians in La Plata produced fake Bolivian 
documents in order to benefit from Morales’ policies that aided Bolivians in obtaining 
Argentinean papers. Others are also aware of Morales’ financing of a barrio boliviano in 
Olmos, which is to be allegedly the biggest one outside Bolivia. This project has been 
managed by a Bolivian cooperative that seized the opportunity to buy a large portion of land 
being auctioned by a bank in 2005. The cooperative then contacted the Bolivian Consulate in 
La Plata, which helped create the barrio’s project proposal while seeking the financial support 
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from President Morales. With Bolivian public funds, the cooperative eventually bought the 
land, which was then strictly attributed to Bolivians (or to non-Bolivians with Bolivian 
partners), who are allowed to pay for their respective lots by installments and without interest. 
By the time I began my fieldwork in 2010, all lots were allocated and the cooperative was 
about to start making inner and outer streets so that public service trucks could access the 
neighbourhood. At the time I visited, however, the area was a wasteland that became 
inaccessible when it rained.  
Although many of the quinteros I interviewed know about this project, none of them 
made it in time to acquire a lot. Pancho and Tomasa, for example, explain their circumstances 
as follows:  
“They are about to start building a neighbourhood for fifty families, which is not far 
from here…We were late, we registered ourselves but since you had to be a socio [cooperative 
member] in order to access the lots [and they were not]…And you also had to pay the 
installments for the lot…You have to engage yourself in it [project] and sometimes in la quinta 
[it is very difficult to do so].” 
A combination of lack of time and of financial resources did not permit those quinteros 
I interviewed to take advantage of this unique opportunity to become the proprietors of their 
land. Other Bolivians, however, were able to get their foot in the door on time and were active 
members of the barrio’s project. Such was the case of Sandro, the Tarijeño who has a 
verdulería with his wife Edelina in La Plata city, where they live with their four-year-old 
daughter (see Chapter IV). Sandro has closely followed the evolution of the project and 
attends each of the monthly meetings organized by the cooperative in Olmos. Each of those 
trips, made by bus or on bicycle, permit Sandro to see his lot, where he spends some time 
envisioning what he will make out of it.  
Sandro wants to build a house that will be big enough to lodge his family on the upper 
floor while using its ground floor as the premises of some sort of business. He is not the only 
future resident with a commercial vision, however. Indeed, since the barrio is scheduled to be 
an autonomous entity both economically and socially, many neighbours are considering 
launching small stores that will cater to the needs of a supposedly fast-growing population. 
Sandro also wants to leave something to his daughter and perceives his commercial project, or 
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even its premises, which could be eventually rented out, as a good economic prospect for her 
in the future. Sandro hopes for his daughter to study (at university), so she can become 
“someone”, unlike him, who only managed to complete rural primary school. Sandro believes 
that his project will provide her with the necessary financial support to succeed.  
Like many other Bolivians of rural origin, Sandro wants to return to the tranquility of 
the rural life, which he longs for after years of estar a las corridas (running non-stop) in the 
city. Sandro misses working in the fields with his brothers and cherishes the paisano life, 
which he describes as developing at a different (much slower) pace, with people who are 
“much more cordial”. Actually returning to Bolivia does not seem to be feasible for Sandro at 
present, however, because Edelina wants to stay in Argentina. As a result, he has seen the 
barrio boliviano as a great opportunity to fulfill his desire. Sandro hopes to move into their lot 
as soon as the initial edification of their home is completed, or even by installing a precarious 
shed, in order to promptly launch his business while making sure that the construction of their 
house as well as the provision of public services are being properly done. By living on their lot 
and working on his business, Sandro also hopes to save on rent and transportation costs while 
avoiding the long commute between La Plata, Olmos and Etcheverry, which he does by 
bicycle several times a week to complete a series of deliveries.  
When talking about who has obtained parcels in the future neighbourhood, Sandro 
mentions that both poor and well established (bien parados) Bolivians are among the forty-
five families that will live there. The extent to which this is the case became most apparent 
when I accompanied Sandro to one of the meetings of the cooperative on a Saturday 
afternoon. As usual, I met him at the verdulería, where I played with their daughter while 
talking to Edelina, who was serving clients, until Sandro finished his deliveries. Right after he 
returned, we left for the bus stop, where we waited for forty minutes until the bus came. After 
the fifty minute ride, we walked an extra twenty minutes to reach Sandro’s lot in the future 
barrio, where we spent some time before walking fifteen minutes to the cooperative. When we 
arrived, only a couple of people were there and it was a little over an hour before the meeting 
was due to start. As Sandro explains, the project’s meetings always begin late because some of 
its “uninterested” participants are very unpunctual. By watching future neighbours arriving at 
the meeting, I witnessed the extent to which their economic means differ. While some arrived 
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by bus and walking like us, others rode bicycles or drove quite modest, old vehicles. A few 
others arrived in brand new, expensive large trucks however.  
The progression of the meeting and its attendance rate reflect the diverse interests of 
future neighbours. In this regard, Sandro emphasizes that those who are well-off (the 
“successful” Bolivians) are not really invested in the timely advancement of the project 
because they are already all set. For them, having a lot in the barrio is one among several 
financial investments and they can afford to wait a long time until the project comes to 
fruition. These are the future residents who either miss most meetings or arrive quite late and 
whose participation is often limited to the timely payment of their installments. In contrast, the 
future poorest neighbours, such as Sandro, are those engaged in moving the project forward 
and who make great efforts to participate. For them, becoming landowners is an exceptional 
opportunity that can importantly change their precarious socio-economic circumstances. They 
never miss meetings, even if their participation is costly in terms of transportation and work 
time. These individuals are also the ones who struggle to pay their installments out of their 
meagre incomes and seek to get financial support to build their homes as well as to provide the 
neighbourhood with public services.  
The barrio’s project meetings are chaired by three men: the president of the 
cooperative, who is Bolivian; its treasurer, who is an Argentinian married to a Bolivian; and 
the project’s consultant, also Argentinian (who missed the meeting I attended in order to 
participate in the celebration of his child’s birthday party). None of them will live in the 
neighbourhood. Fewer than twenty people, men, women and children, were present when I 
attended the meeting and Sandro indicated that many were absent that Saturday. Most of them 
did not know each other and only a few shyly posed questions or raised concerns, which were 
mainly expressed in one-on-one conversations with the chairs after meetings. The timid 
attitudes of the majority contrasted with those of the few participants, who, with different 
degrees of assertiveness, put their ideas forward in public. Three core issues were discussed at 
the meeting I attended: a) the blueprints of lots had to be obtained in order for future 
neighbours to legalize their ownership before starting any sort of edification. Thanks to the 
support of the Bolivian Consulate, this process was already under way at the municipality; b) 
the barrio’s main entrance had to be paved in order for construction and service providers’ 
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trucks to access lots in the near future; and c) power lines had to be installed on all lots for 
each neighbour to have access to electricity. These concerns illustrate the basic demands 
expressed by the poorest future residents of the neighbourhood, whose financial situation 
remains precarious enough to hamper their actual ability to eventually move into the barrio. 
These are the disadvantaged Bolivians who hope to get financial support for their ownership 
dream, so the possibilities it entails can come true. Even if noted, as happened at previous 
meetings, no concrete answer was given to socios’ main concerns, which left them with a 
mixed feeling of uncertainty and powerlessness. 
The extent to which the project is stagnating and the limited leverage the poorest socios 
have to alter the situation became most apparent by the end of the meeting. While those in big 
trucks and the meeting chairs promptly left with a smile, as if indicating their satisfaction at 
having successfully fulfilled their monthly obligation, the majority of those who had either 
silently or timidly participated remained for a while on the cooperative’s premises. Some 
looked concerned and others disconcerted, and most did not talk. Sandro was raging with 
frustration at the little progress made by the project since its start, which he believes has 
stayed stagnant for too long. Sandro is also upset at the lack of engagement of the few well-off 
socios, who could easily and substantially contribute to the realization of the neighbourhood, 
whereas the majority can barely give their opinions. On our long commute back to the 
verdulería, which was an extra hour long because Sandro needed to buy some medicine at a 
faraway pharmacy offering a special discount, he mentioned that one of those well-off socios 
wanted to buy his lot. This was one of those Bolivians with construction companies and we 
saw one of his buildings in progress on our way back home. Due to the favourable location of 
Sandro’s lot in the barrio, this compatriot offered him a considerable amount of money (which 
was much larger than its actual cost), envisioning the future profitability of the parcel. Without 
thinking twice about it, Sandro refused his offer, reassured that he would never miss such a 
once in a lifetime opportunity. This was his chance to go back to the tranquility of the campo 
and to leave something to his daughter.  
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Breaking Down Prejudice: Quinteros’ Critical Thinking 
In most cases, the migration situation of quintero families is mixed since their members have 
diverse legal statuses. Households tend to have some Argentinean-born children (who are 
Argentinean citizens) and some Bolivian-born ones, who either already have their Argentinean 
residency papers or were processing them. Adults’ legal situation was equally varied. Adults 
whose parents were golondrinas were almost always Argentinean citizens while those who 
were Bolivian-born often do not have their papers, were thinking of completing the requested 
procedures or, less frequently, had already obtained them. Even if several factors contribute to 
diversify quintero families’ legal status (including the seasonal mobility of parents, the age 
and time of migration and changing migration regulations), horticultural work hamper their 
ability to process legal paperwork. Very long work hours, geographical isolation and meagre 
incomes combined to make it very difficult for quinteros to complete the necessary 
procedures, as I showed in the previous section. The situation of many horticulturists in Olmos 
was different, however, as Tomasa and Pancho’s family case illustrate.  
While Tomasa is Argentinean by birth, Pancho has already obtained his residency and 
their children are awaiting theirs. Their good standing is due to the Patria Grande 
documentation program (see chapter III) along with the invaluable support of the Bolivian 
Consulate. Aware that during the 1990s migrants found it almost impossible to obtain their 
Argentinean papers, Pancho felt very lucky in regard to how easily his family completed the 
procedures. Crucial for quinteros in Olmos was that procedures were completed in this 
locality’s urban area instead of in La Plata, which made it difficult for those in Etcheverry to 
get documentation. In addition, the Bolivian consulate issued the requested official documents 
at no charge, which proved vital for quinteros whose meagre income left them with very little 
manoeuvring power when it came to choosing between important expenditures. The only 
drawback of the process was the location of their consulate in La Plata, which forced quinteros 
to engage in long commutes for obtaining their Bolivian documents.  
The processing of Pancho’s residency took a year and he speaks knowledgeably about 
the bureaucratic procedures leading to the issuing of his DNI198:  
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“They gave me the precaria for two years and after that they issued my DNI. The precaria 
is to last indefinitely until you process your DNI. The first DNI that you receive lasts for two 
years and has to be renewed [after that period] in order to get the definitive one.”  
Pancho’s explanation makes apparent that he understands the steps involved in 
obtaining permanent residency in Argentina, that is, first precaria, temporary residency and 
then permanent residency. As was the case for Rufino, Pancho’s knowledgability about these 
procedures clashes with the views of quinteros held by municipality officers, who often 
portray them as “illiterate”, “stupid”, “lazy” and “quasi-animals” incapable of understanding 
anything beyond horticulture. Pancho and Rufino’s clarity on the procedures also contrasts 
with the confusion and uncertainty that often permeate equivalent explanations provided by 
migrants living in both urban and peripheral areas of the partido. Migrants and non-migrants 
alike often argue that only those who acquire enough “urban savvy” are equipped to deal with 
state bureaucracies and abusive employers, but my fieldwork shows that this is not always the 
case. 
Pancho and Tomasa’s views of the value of having their papers in order also differs 
from those held by many migrants living in urban and peripheral areas of the partido. Their 
own experiences proved that the legal status of family’ members did not affect their daily 
activities or social interaction with Argentinians (ordinary citizens and public servants alike). 
This contrast with the views of many migrants in urban and peripheral areas, who claim that 
their lives were markedly changed for the better since they obtained their Argentinean 
documentation (see chapters IV and V). Pancho makes his point by citing his former job in the 
barrio privado, where he was hired without papers, and adds: “Da igual [It does not matter]”. 
Likewise, their three children have been able to enrol in school immediately upon their arrival, 
before even starting the procedures to obtain their papers, and moved along with their 
schooling without any trouble. School personnel and teachers advised Pancho and Tomasa to 
get their children’s papers without hampering their access to public education. By the time I 
met them, their eldest daughter, who was about to turn eighteen years old, was close to 
obtaining her DNI, while the other two children were a bit farther behind in the process, but 
knew that they would obtain theirs eventually.  
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Pancho and Tomasa are critical of the sensationalist tone of some media that was 
promoting increasing levels of insecurity. They know from other migrants that keeping safe 
was difficult during the 1990s, yet, crime has not touched them. Upon their arrival, Pancho 
and Tomasa were perplexed by the number of houses in urban Olmos with bars over the 
windows and entrances. Their hometown in Bolivia is very quiet and people know each other 
very well, so there is no need to deploy such defensive measures. Their two teenaged children 
indicate that it is safe for them to go out in Olmos, and that nothing has happened to them or to 
their friends. Yet, they believe, it is important to play it safe, so they only travel by remís to 
avoid long waits for buses at night. Pancho and Tomasa hold that it is better not to watch the 
news. Both agree that there is crime, but consider that the sensationalist media exaggerate it in 
order to support the profitable security industry (see Chapter IV). For them, levels of 
(in)security vary greatly depending on the area: “If you live close to a villa, it is ‘heavy’ 
[really difficult]”, Pancho says while Tomasa adds: “If there is crime, it is in the villas; it is for 
sure that it happens there”. As was the case for most migrants I interviewed, Pancho and 
Tomasa make an implicit connection between villeros and crime, which is presented as an 
“undeniable reality”, even if they do not know anyone who has been affected.  
Pancho prudently evaluates the public polices of the government, arguing that in order 
to compare Kirchner’s presidency with that of Fernández one would to have lived in Argentina 
longer than he has.  He sees quinteros as not really in touch with the country’s political life 
because they are mostly devoted to their work:  
“We practically live in a different world because we are here [in Las Quintas], we work, 
we produce and trucks come to load our vegetables, so we do not have much contact [with 
politics].” 
Pancho also believes that quinteros’ focus on work helps explain why public subsidies 
(such as those for children) do not reach them: “Maybe those who are more into politics get 
them but us, we mostly work.” This last remark signals the extent to which he is aware of the 
political manoeuvres regulating the attribution of public subsidies, which are employed by 
some politicians to secure votes, as mentioned by some urban migrants as well. Despite his 
modest evaluation of his own political knowledge, his comments prove otherwise.  
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Lack of Regulations and Unfair Commercialization Rules: From Producers to Intermediaries  
As was the case for other quinteros, Pancho and Tomasa do not have fixed breaks to eat, even 
if they start work very early. Only in the winter do they begin a bit later since they cannot get 
used to the partido’s “cold” temperatures (compared to those of Tarija). Horticulturists often 
refer to this issue by saying that they “fear” coming out of their houses and having to face 
temperatures ranging between zero and five degrees Celsius. Most quinteros in Olmos 
produced a variety of lettuces, tomatoes and peppers along with some herbs such as basil and 
oregano. Those who manage to build a greenhouse, often made with very basic, low cost 
infrastructure, continue to cultivate some of these products throughout the year whereas others 
seek to diversify their production (still within narrow margins) in order to maximize their 
commercialization opportunities. Quinteros in Olmos receive technical advice from the same 
agronomist paid by the government who has helped those in Etcheverry, and value his 
counselling on pesticides and new produce varieties. While they appreciate the government’s 
help with these issues, horticulturists regret its lack of intervention when it comes to regulating 
the commercialization of their produce, which is extremely unjust.  
As in Etcheverry, quinteros in Olmos are well aware of how unevenly distributed 
profits are in their industry. Small producers like them are at the bottom of the gain scale while 
a range of intermediaries, diversely positioned in the commercialization chain, are the ones 
benefiting the most. Horticulturists’ meagre profits are related to their constraining 
circumstances, which result from playing by production and commercialization rules that grant 
them almost no negotiation power. As concerns their family and work-related fixed 
expenditures, quinteros’ fluctuating production places them in a very unfavourable position 
that makes them most vulnerable in winter, when consumption of their fresh produce 
importantly decreases. In summer, in contrast, their circumstances tend to improve in tandem 
with the higher consumption level of their products, which leads to a modest increase in its 
price while speeding up its commercialization, as Tomasa explains:  
“Now [winter] is a really tough time [está bravo]…And one wants to ‘run away’! 
[quit]…But, we have to ‘keep pushing’ because if we quit, our situation can only worsen…The 
summer helps us a bit, especially after a difficult winter.” 
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While quinteros in Etcheverry mention not knowing each other beyond those living 
close by in their dispersed neighbourhoods, which hampers their capacity to get organized to 
lobby for better commercialization prices, those in Olmos indicate otherwise. When talking 
about the government’s lack of intervention in establishing fairer commercialization terms, 
Pancho signals that horticulturists in Olmos are in touch:  
“We all use the same price grid in the zona, for example, if it costs 2$ pesos, we all sell at 
2$ pesos…There is communication, even if we are lacking a way to get organized so that we 
are the ones setting the prices.”  
Horticulturists speak with frustration and resignation about how much the price of their 
produce increases as it moves further away from them in the commercialization chain. For 
example, quinteros were in early 2010 paid 1$ peso for a box of lettuce weighing several kilos 
while at verdulerías the kilo was sold for 14$. Tomasa wishes the president would regulate 
this process and Pancho laments that in its absence, it is the market law of supply and demand 
that unfairly does so: 
 “We do not really negotiate the prices of our products, nor those of the seeds…So, things 
do not work out well for us…Imagine, if you buy a plantín [little plant] of lettuce for about 
6.50$ pesos and you sell the box of lettuce for 1$ peso, what can you do? You do not make 
enough [profit] to even plant again.”  
Horticulturists know that those who profit the most from their hard work are people 
who have means of transportation. The commercialization chain starts with intermediaries 
with trucks, who visit multiple family producers in the area before buying in order to compare 
the price and quality of produce. They are the ones who establish the price of quinteros’ 
products, which the latter cannot reject, even when seeking to sell according to the area’s grid 
of prices. These are the trucks that later on reach urban fruit and vegetable central markets. 
Intermediaries’ gains are substantial indeed: if they pay quinteros 1$ peso for a certain 
product, for instance, they sell it for 4$ in the market. According to Tomasa, those who make 
the largest profit are the verduleros with small trucks or wagons, who are able to buy in the 
market and sell in their own store. At the other end of the gain scale are the quinteros, as 
Tomasa puts it: “We kill ourselves working here! It is really ‘ugly’ the sacrifice that one has to 
make in order to survive.” The cost of commercializing horticulturalists’ products is way 
beyond their meagre financial means. Indeed, they are not even able to afford the rental of a 
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truck and the wooden boxes needed to transport their products (vacíos or cajones)199. These 
constraints are not exclusive to quinteros but shared by the verduleros de barrio in La Plata 
city.  
Topographical Hierarchies with Strong Ethnic Counterparts: From the Market to the 
Verdulerías 
The circumstances of verduleros Edelina and Sandro (chapter IV) are representative of those 
of others who also struggle to survive in an industry controlled by very few. As is the case 
among horticultural producers, marked differences exist between a majority of small 
verduleros and a minority of big ones. This is mostly the case due to the size of their 
respective businesses, including the volume of transactions, premises and employees, and their 
means of transportation, owned or rented. Verduleros’ unequal profits translate into a wide 
variety of saving capacities, ranging from none to very high. Only a handful of very successful 
verduleros has managed to invest their financial capital in other business opportunities, such 
as the few Bolivians who have launched their own construction companies or were selling 
home appliances during the 2000s.  
The extent to which the unfair commercialization of quinteros’ products is central to 
the (re)creation of hierarchies in the horticultural industry of the partido becomes most 
apparent in the Central Fruit and Vegetable Market of La Plata. In this socio-economic space, 
crucial economic transactions take place between a series of social actors, materializing the 
second important stage in the commercialization of horticulturalists’ products. The third and 
final node of the chain is constituted by verdulerías and other grocery stores (including ferias 
bolivianas, Chinese mini-markets and big chain supermarkets), where horticultural products 
are sold along with other merchandise. Located in the outskirts of the city, this central market 
runs from 01:00 to 10:00 and is open to the general public, yet only the automobiles of those 
there for commercial purposes can enter the premises. Locally produced vegetables, fruits and 
spices are commercialized along with merchandise coming from other provinces and 
countries. A range of verdulería-related items such as aprons and plastic bags are also sold.  
The market is divided into four sections or pavillions, whose puestos (market stalls) 
noticeably differ in terms of size, visibility (strategic positioning), quality of their products, 
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and number of workers. This topographical hierarchy has important ethnic and financial 
counterparts, since the best puestos have historically been owned by a few Argentinians, who 
have made a family business out of this trade. Not only are these stalls the most expensive in 
the market, but they also sell the best quality merchandise (widely recognized by their brands) 
along with some “exclusive” products, which in both cases only a few puesteros can afford to 
carry. Streets and large open spaces separate the market’s four main pavillions and serve as 
loading areas, where vehicles are successively parked for buyers to load the merchandise. 
Within pavillions, market stalls are separated from each other by very small corridors or 
narrow paths where wooden and cardboard boxes pile up, full of fresh products early in the 
day and, with any luck, empty by the end of the morning.  
Restrictive rules are in place to make it very difficult for new puesteros to enter the 
market, mostly in the form of complicated and costly bureaucratic procedures that have 
become real obstacles for those seeking to access this trade arena. Key to success in acquiring 
a market stall, however, is to know “someone”, that is, influential people. According to 
Sandro, puestos could be either bought for about 30,000$-40,000$ pesos or rented for 14$ a 
day in 2010. Rental regulations are very strict and those who temporarily leave their puesto 
unattended or do not punctually pay their rent lose their spots.  
Since the birth of their daughter, Edelina has run the verdulería, by serving clients, 
keeping vegetables and fruit “fresh” and choosing what to buy, while Sandro has made the 
purchases at the market. Like other small verduleros, Sandro makes three trips a week in order 
to supply the store with merchandise and leaves their home at 01:35. Making successive, small 
purchases gives verduleros de barrio flexibility without taking large risks, since they can 
replace the merchandise already sold while satisfying the particular demands of regular 
clients. Not having a vehicle, Sandro goes to the market by remís, always relying on the same 
company, and returns home with the same fletero. A flete is a transportation service offered by 
a driver with a small truck (the fletero), and is commonly used to carry either large objects or 
big quantities of smaller ones. Sandro has used the services of the same Argentinean fletero 
since they opened the verdulería, which have proved reliable and affordable, even if his truck 
is old. Sandro does not need to book him each time, but simply waits for him to finish serving 
two other clients (Sandro is his third). Sandro usually comes back home at around 07:45, and 
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after helping Edelina to arrange the merchandise, he walks their daughter to school and does 
some deliveries. Only in the early afternoon does Sandro manage to catch up on his sleep, 
although, over the years, he has gotten used to not sleeping much. 
The time I accompanied Sandro to the market, I met him at their home at 01:35 in 
order to leave soon after in remís. He insisted that in order to buy the best produce at good 
prices, one has to arrive early—an assertion that proved to be true since it disappeared not 
long after we arrived. The purchase of merchandise at the market is a very intense process, 
combining fast decision-making and good judgment. Sandro has his own “route”, which he 
promptly completes by visiting a large number of puesteros, who know him well and greet 
him by name. Sandro closely inspects fruit and vegetables, knowing from their weight and 
appearance if they are good. After finishing his first round, which allows him to compare the 
quality, price, and availability of the products on his list, Sandro returns to the market stalls 
where he has decided to buy. During this second round, he indicates to each puestero what he 
wants and his merchandise is put aside. Only then does Sandro relax a bit and sits to socialize 
with some puesteros. The time I went with him, we spent most of his break time with a 
Bolivian puestero, born in the northern Argentinean province of Jujuy, whose parents had 
been golondrinas. His family eventually settled in La Plata and their joint hard work permitted 
them to succeed economically. They have built their own cement house and bought their stall 
in the market. All his relatives have remained in the horticultural industry, working as 
quinteros and verduleros.   
Sandro emphasizes that Bolivian puesteros, like his friend, were increasingly found in 
the market, yet our tour showed otherwise. Most stalls continue to be occupied by 
Argentinians and very few of them are held by Bolivians. Moreover, based on stalls’ location, 
merchandise and labour force, it is clear that Argentinians continue to run the market. This 
being said, marked differences exist within both national groups. Only a couple of 
Argentinean families own the best puestos whereas the rest rent theirs, which are diversely 
positioned in the market’s hierarchies. Among Bolivians, only a few of them, who made their 
wealth during the 1990s, own their stalls, which still are not situated in the best areas of the 
market. We only saw one quintero, whose stall was very small, hidden and poorly supplied, in 
one of the worst areas of the market. The economic transactions taking place in the market 
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also make apparent the disparities between diverse verduleros. Those with large verdulerías 
arrive in their own large trucks or pick-ups with several employees, and make large purchases 
that included the market’s best products. Others arrive in rather old vehicles, without 
personnel, and buy in much smaller quantities. And of course, there are others like Sandro, 
who rent the services of a flete and only buy a little each time.  
It was already past 07:00 when Sandro managed to load the flete. He had borrowed a 
cart from a puestero in order to carry his purchases from distant stalls. It was a rainy, grey 
dawn and even though the sun had risen by then, the weather continued to be humid and cold. 
When we were about to get on the flete, the truck would not start. After several tries, the 
fletero informed us that he needed to get the parts to fix it and that it would take some time. I 
had no choice but to leave in a taxi since I had to take my child to daycare whereas Sandro 
was to wait for his fletero, whose services were the only ones he could afford. When I did 
some of my grocery shopping at their verdulería in the afternoon, I learned that Edelina had 
been worried sick because Sandro only managed to arrive at 11:00.  
The ethnic hierarchies of the market, with their economic, social and political 
counterparts, confirm those of society at large and signal the extent to which the economic 
progress made by some successful Bolivians in La Plata is not matched by a concomitant rise 
in the district’s social ladder (see chapter IV). Some Bolivian puesteros managed to buy their 
own stalls in the market while consolidating prolific horticultural, construction and commerce 
businesses. Despite these financial and entrepreneurial achievements, which demonstrate that 
they are much wealthier than many of their Argentinean counterparts, Bolivian puesteros have 
not been allowed to access the higher-ranked circles of the market. Economic success is not 
necessarily enough to overcome the well-established ethnic value hierarchy of the partido. 
The economic transactions taking place at the market also confirm quinteros’ assertions about 
the unfair commercialization of their products, which continues to be monopolized by a 
handful of intermediaries with their own means of transportation.  
The precarious positioning of the verduleros de barrio in the commercialization of 
horticultural products in the partido situates them close to quinteros. Both work to survive and 
their poor profits do not allow them to accumulate enough financial capital to improve their 
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respective negotiation power in this monopolized industry. Not having their own means of 
transportation proves crucial for both as well. Quinteros have no choice but to leave the 
commercialization of their products in the hands of intermediaries whereas small verduleros 
rely on often precarious fletes, whose cost remains substantial given their tight budgets. 
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CHAPTER VII: ‘El Boliviano Es El Más Sufrido’: Migrants’ 
Views of the GBA Ethnic Hierarchy  
  
In this chapter, I examine migrants’ views and uses of the hegemonic ethnic hierarchy in force 
in the partido of La Plata over the past decade. As I have shown, the racial logic underpinning 
this ranking is not exclusive to the partido but representative of the GBA—and, generally 
speaking, also of migrants’ countries of origin. Even if migrants agree on the devalued status 
of Bolivians in Argentina, some criticize it, along with Argentinians’ denigrating attitudes and 
exploitative treatment of these migrants. The cases I examine make apparent migrants’ 
problematic operationalization of such a hierarchy in everyday social interaction, which tends 
to contrast with their theoretical mastery of its racial logic. Migrants’ re-elaboration of some 
sensationalist media discourse on “migrant crime” shows the extent to which their 
appropriation of such discourse differs according to the particular goals it endorses. Moreover, 
personal, situational and geographical factors influence migrants’ views and uses of the ethnic 
hierarchy in force, which impact social interaction among migrants, and between migrants and 
non-migrants.  
 
The Belittlement of Bolivians 
 
Ana from Peru notes that not only Argentinians mistreat migrants, but that the latter also do it 
among themselves. Ana considers that the foreigners “suffering the most” in Argentina are the 
Bolivians:  
“The Paraguayan defends himself even if he’s a bit marginalized. They [people in 
general]know that if a Paraguayan se raya [gets upset, crazy], he reacts strongly, so there is 
some fear [towards them]; the Peruvian, if you treat him well, he treats you well, he prefers to 
quit his job [instead of getting in trouble], but the Bolivian es el más sufrido.”  
Ana also believes that the distinctions endorsed by migrants often lead to belittling 
attitudes towards Bolivians:  
“Even among us [migrants]…Because we say ‘Why does he [Bolivian] work for 4 cents 
when I said 10 [cents]?’, so he’s discreetly given a bad look, in disapproval [lo miran mal], 
[thinking] este boliviano boludo! [what a stupid Bolivian!]…Because it’s like this, the 
Argentinian gets paid 20$, the Paraguayan and the Peruvian get 10$ or 15$, but the Bolivian 
does the job for, say, 5$, imagine!”  
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Ana’s view of the ethnic value hierarchy classifying migrants in the GBA is 
representative of others I interviewed, migrants and non-migrants alike, who, even if flexible 
in terms of how they position Paraguayans and Peruvians, remain rigid about placing 
Bolivians at its bottom. In this regard, some migrants openly express their opinions while 
others only do so in a more discreet or indirect manner. Elva, for example, a Paraguayan 
woman from Encarnación in her late twenties, expresses her views of other migrants in an 
oblique manner. Elva arrived in La Plata in 2004 and since then has worked as an empleada 
doméstica, even if her original plan was to study nursing at the Universidad Nacional de La 
Plata. Initially, she found employment through an agency that her sister recommended and 
worked cama adentro under exploitative and abusive conditions. Eventually, a cousin passed 
on to Elva one of her part-time cleaning jobs with a “nice” retired widow in City Bell, which 
has better fitted with Elva’s family life since she has a five-year-old son with a Peruvian 
partner. Talking about the bad treatment that migrants receive from state officials, Elva 
timidly mentions the “disadvantageous” positioning of Bolivians while distancing herself from 
them: “It varies but Bolivians are still the ones being treated the worst…This is what I’ve 
heard because, personally, I have not experienced bad treatment from municipal agents”. Elva 
also minimizes the discrimination against Paraguayans in the partido brushing it off as a 
“personal issue”: “I’ve heard that they [Argentinians and other migrants] say ‘bad things’ 
about Paraguayans, but it depends on the person”. Elva’s opinion contrasts with the views of 
many Paraguayans I interviewed, however, who affirm that they have experienced 
discriminatory attitudes from Platenses and Peruvians; e.g., Richard (see chapter V).  
Other migrants, however, are quite straightforward when it comes to expressing their 
negative views of Bolivians.  Such was the case of Jorge, a Peruvian man in his late thirties 
from Huacho, a locality in the country’s north-west. Jorge arrived in La Plata in 1996 and 
worked for several years at a construction company doing large public projects in diverse 
localities of the Gran La Plata Urban Agglomerate, which includes the partidos of Ensenada, 
Berisso and La Plata (see Fig. 4). Jorge talks at length about how he has earned the trust of his 
Argentinean employers, who almost exclusively hire Peruvians, Paraguayans and Bolivians. 
This makes him very proud. Speaking about discrimination, Jorge emphasizes that he never 
had a “bad” experience, even if he is aware that many of his compatriots have lived “really 
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bad moments”. Distancing themselves from those experiencing discrimination was a common 
discursive strategy deployed by migrants in 2010, though it was not used to the same extent as 
in the late 1990s, when limítrofes were criminalized by the government. When expressing his 
views of other migrants and Argentinians in the partido, Jorge openly advances his pejorative 
views of Bolivians:  
“Me, never![had a problem]. Instead, I’ve only “had words” [intercambios de palabras] with 
Bolivians, but not with Argentinians…The Paraguayans are buenísimas personas [great 
people] and I’ve had a really nice relationship with them…Bolivians are a bit ‘low in culture’ 
[bajos en cultura] and maybe for this reason they are mal hablados [rude, foul-mouthed]…One 
feels offended because most of them have not studied, and so they’re very vulgar.” 
Justifying belittling views of Bolivians by citing their alleged lack of formal education 
was another common attitude among migrants and non-migrants in the partido, especially in 
its urban and peripheral areas. Ultimately, despite how migrants framed it, the vast majority of 
those I interviewed asserted the lowest ranking of Bolivians in what they considered a 
generalized ethnic value hierarchy extending beyond the partido. Even Bolivians themselves 
tended to agree regarding their own disadvantageous social status, which they illustrate with 
examples of other migrants and Platenses’ covert and overt demeaning attitudes towards them. 
Those living in the partido’s rural areas, most of whom are Tarijeños, are the ones who report 
such incidents more frequently in the form of abuse by police and pibes chorros, and Northern 
compatriots’ condescending attitudes and exploitation (see previous chapter). The latter is also 
the case among verduleros Tarijeños in the city, as Sandro and Edelina’s case demonstrates 
(see chapter IV). A flagrant and extreme version of the denigrating views of Bolivians held by 
some Platenses was bluntly expressed by the municipality’s Director of the Dirección General 
de Colectividades y Migraciones, when he described quinteros (Bolivian family 
horticulturists) as “almost little animals who have not progressed mentally” (see previous 
chapter). Bolivians, for their part, only seldom and rather timidly belittle other migrant groups, 
as we shall see in the last section of this chapter, even though they express their resentment 
towards pibes chorros, such as in Sandro’s case (chapter IV) and Julián’s (chapter V). 
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Migrants’ Re-elaboration of the Discourse on “Migrant Crime”  
While during the 1990s, the conservative media became a central tool in the government-
sponsored criminalization of Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans in the country (see chapter 
I), the dissemination of such discourse became a rather restricted affair in the following 
decade. It was mostly when analyzing the “2000s insecurity” that some sensationalist media 
programming occasionally shifted its focus from the villeros as the per se perpetrators of all 
crimes to migrants from neighbouring nations. The extent to which this discourse informed 
migrants’ opinions varied, as my interviews show. Raúl, for example, a Peruvian from Lima in 
his late thirties, endorses the discourse on “migrant crime”. Raúl arrived in Buenos Aires city 
in 1993 with the intention to study fine arts at the Universidad de Buenos Aires, yet he soon 
began to work in construction and keeping up with school requirements became difficult. 
Sometime later, he met his future wife, an Argentinian from San Fernando (GBA), with whom 
he has two children; family obligations have prevailed over his desire to complete an arts 
degree. In 2006, they all moved to Lima, and Raúl began to travel back and forth between the 
two countries (by bus) in order to work independently on construction projects in Buenos 
Aires city. Despite his numerous border crossings and many jobs over the years, Raúl only 
obtained his DNI in 2007.  
Talking about recent insecurity levels in the GBA, he mentions being robbed twice 
over the past six months, which he considers “the norm” in provincia (or the interior, see 
Chapter I). In both cases, the perpetrators were young Argentinean men under the influence of 
drugs and happened close to midnight, when Raúl was commuting from work in Buenos Aires 
city to his parents-in-law in San Fernando, about a two-hour long trip. When talking about this 
incident, Raúl promptly switches to the issue of “migrant crime”:  
“Maybe you watched it [on TV], heard it [on the radio] or read it on the newspapers, in 
the news, that there are foreigners [in Argentina] who ‘have as a their profession’ to rob, to 
steal; for example, there are Peruvians who do so, but they are not people who come to 
work…They were already chorros [burglars] before they came, back in Peru.” 
Raúl also cites a conversation held with an Argentinean police officer on this issue, 
who claimed that “Peruvians were chorros of cellphones” (in Argentina), while advancing his 
own view: “Yes, there are many [Peruvians who do so], everywhere, but not only Peruvians, 
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there are also Chileans, Paraguayans”. In the end, both agreed that the justice system in 
Argentina has significantly contributed to the creation of “migrant crime” because it is “too 
soft”. It does not imprison minors and releases criminals of all ages and nationalities “too fast” 
based on their good conduct.  
Raúl’s account illustrates the extent to which his perception of “migrant crime” in the 
GBA is informed by sensationalist media discourse since his own “encounters with the 2000s 
insecurity”, as it was often put, and those of others he spoke about never involved migrants as 
perpetrators. Raúl’s resorting to the “authoritative” opinion of an Argentinean policeman 
provides supporting evidence for his media-informed opinion. While in Argentina this state 
force has been increasingly looked down on, being identified with corruption and abuse, in 
migrants’ countries of origin it is regarded highly. Raúl’s generalizations are partially 
narrowed down, however, when he seeks to exclude himself, along with other hard-working 
migrants in Argentina, from the criminalizing discourse he is endorsing. 
Similarly, Edelina, the Bolivian verdulera who lives in La Plata city with her husband 
Sandro and their young daughter (see chapter IV), seeks to differentiate the “hard-working” 
Bolivian migrants from their “criminal” compatriots in the district. Yet, Edelina does so in a 
less assertive, more hesitant manner:  
“If you came before [that is, during the 1990s] and worked like us, you made [a lot of] 
money and for that reason, some Bolivians have chalets and 4x4 pick-ups…But there are some 
who say that it’s because they bring drugs, marijuana…Some maybe, but I do not believe that 
all of them…An Argentinean friend of mine, who is a policeman, tells me: ‘All Bolivians bring 
drugs and carry them in their backpacks’ then he laughs and tells me: ‘Not you! You’re 
laburadora [industrious]’.”  
In contrast with Raúl’s assertions on migrant crime which refer to migrant groups in 
general (Peruvians, Chileans and Paraguayans), Edelina’s remarks are embedded in a larger 
classificatory logic that, along ethnic lines, seeks to set apart northern from southern Bolivians 
(see chapter IV). What matters the most for her is to highlight the boundary separating 
ethnically “distinct” groups of compatriots instead of focusing on northern Bolivians’ 
particular link to crime, which always remains uncertain, as is also the case for Tarijeños. A 
way of doing so is to provide the country’s geography of drug production and then match it 
with the inhabitants of the region where production is allegedly carried out:  
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“Since there are drugs there [in the north of Bolivia]…Those that bring them are people 
from the north, us [southerners] from Tarija, which is closer [to Argentina] don’t do that…I 
do not believe that the Tarijeño brings drugs. I don’t know, maybe.”  
 
More assertively, Peruvian César and Yolanda (see chapter IV) speak with indignation 
and surprise about the “loose” migration controls in Argentina that permit “criminal” migrants 
to enter the country, as César notes:  
“Migration is expanding and more and more people come with a criminal record and I 
don’t know why they are accepted…I’m talking about immigrants from my country and from 
other countries…Friends from Peru who ‘know people’ tell me that some [compatriots who 
are in Argentina] were hunted in Peru, so what are they doing here? I don’t know how they 
entered!”  
Paradoxically, however, what César and Yolanda do not mention is that the same 
“loose” migration controls that they criticize permitted them to enter the country with a tourist 
visa, which migration officers know was to be overstayed, and to live “irregularly” for many 
years until they could get their residence papers. Yolanda, for her part, seeks to differentiate 
the “criminal” migrant (as portrayed in sensationalist media discourse) from the “honest” 
hard-working one (like her and César) by employing a classificatory logic based on migrants’ 
type of entry in Argentina:  
“Those people [the criminal migrants] enter by land…And at the border, they [migration 
officials] do not control; yet, when you come by plane [as César and Yolanda did], they 
control indeed [at the airport].”  
 
Yolanda’s use of transportation type as the “marker of criminals” is not random but 
signals the divide between the majority of poor migrants from neighbouring countries, who 
can only afford a bus ticket, and the very small minority who can pay for a plane ticket. 
Indeed, migrants’ “choice” of transportation when travelling between countries (including 
annual trips) is an important indicator of their kinship networks’ socio-economic status. A 
plane ticket costs a great deal more than a bus fare, and involves a shorter and much more 
comfortable trip. In this regard, Yolanda’s remark echoes that of others who also associate 
migrants’ poverty, lack of formal education, rural origin or even aboriginal background with 
their alleged “propensity” to commit criminal acts—as was the case, yet in a more widespread 
manner, during the 1990s.  This discursive strategy is employed to create or reinforce a 
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distancing process between the person who deploys it and “others”. Migrants seek to distance 
themselves from criminalizing discourse targeting limítrofes, whereas some Argentinians use 
it to confirm their prejudiced views of these groups and their devalued position in the GBA’s 
ethnic hierarchy, as was the case of the Director of the Dirección General de Colectividades y 
Migraciones in La Plata.  
César’s comments reinforce the distinction made by Yolanda while making it apparent 
that he agrees with the “lowest” positioning attributed to Bolivia in the Southern Cone 
(Recalde 2004), understood as a country that, among other things, permits criminals to freely 
cross its borders:  
“As they say, all ‘those’ people[criminals] enter through Bolivia because there is no 
control there, as to avoid Mendoza [central-western Argentinean province]…In the news you 
see that ‘certain’ [criminal] individuals arrived and because of them we are all blamed, it’s 
their fault…Cuando llueve todos se mojan [‘when it rains everyone gets wet’], it’s wrong.” 
Other migrants make similar, indirect remarks to signal Bolivia’s “low” rank in South 
America and, by extension, Bolivians’ “lowest” social status in the GBA’s (hegemonic) ethnic 
hierarchy. Some describe Bolivian crossing points (to Argentina) as the most “corrupted”, 
“bothersome” and even “dangerous” while others emphasize the country’s “poor”, “bad 
quality”, “always breaking down” albeit cheap bus services, which are compared to the 
“comfortable”, “reliable” and “great” service offered by Argentinean (and sometimes Chilean) 
bus companies.  
Widespread media discourse on the “decade’s insecurity” (associated with the pibe 
chorro) significantly informed migrants’ views of their own safety in the partido of La Plata 
while affecting their use of public and private space, as I showed in the previous three 
chapters. Even if to a much lesser extent, the more occasional discourse on “migrant crime” 
also shaped the perceptions of migrants, or rather, migrants reproduced such discourse for 
diverse purposes in a number of ways. Some claim that compatriots or other limítrofes are 
perpetrators of a number of illicit activities, mostly drug trafficking and petty street robbery. 
These sorts of generalizing assertions do not convey the fearful images and feelings associated 
with the pibe chorro but are rather used to differentiate between the “honest” and the 
“criminal” migrant. Still others deploy such discourse to advance their views of the “lowest” 
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standing of Bolivians in the GBA’s ethnic hierarchy and, more generally, of Bolivia as a 
country of a “lesser value” in the Southern Cone. Finally, some reproduce the discourse on 
migrant crime in a more indirect manner, and in the process highlight the boundary separating 
ethnically different compatriots, as in the case of Edelina and Sandro (chapter IV).  
“Learning to Get Used to It” 
When it comes to evaluating the views of limítrofes held by Platenses, some migrants are quite 
critical. Lucas, a Peruvian who provides in-house care for the elderly (see chapters IV and V) 
for example, opposes the prejudiced views of one of his elderly patients, a well-off retired 
Argentinean architect. Even if acknowledging the disadvantageous positioning of Bolivians in 
the nation’s social imaginary, Lucas indicates that other migrants are not exempt from the sort 
of denigrating views held by this patient: 
“He always worked with Bolivians in his construction projects and treated them really 
badly, ‘however he wanted’…These are people who have been permanently marginalized [in 
Argentina] because of their colour, their size, their way of talking, which is really 
wrong…This man said that Bolivians were delinquents and brutos [stupid, ignorant, brutish] 
and that Peruvians were criminals…He even told me that I was not good for studying, but only 
good for work in construction.” 
Lucas’ tolerance of this patient’s condescending comments came to an end, however, 
resulting in a radical change in how the Platense treated him. Lucas says in a triumphal tone: 
“I do not remember how I did it…He went too far and I stopped him short, and since then, he 
changed completely. Since then, I was not a negro anymore. Most of the migrants I 
interviewed did not experience such a victory, though, and had get used to denigrating labels, 
such as peruca, bolita and paragua, as well as bad treatment. The comments of Raúl from 
Peru echo those of other migrants in the partido:   
 “In the construction company, they always bother you, they make rough jokes at your 
expense, and it’s not only the Argentinians but also the Paraguayans, the Bolivians…That 
happened to me the first time I came [to Argentina]…When you are new, you have to pagar 
derecho de piso [“earn your place”]…In the beginning, I wanted to go back [home], but I got 
used to it little by little…Argentinians call you negro, gordo [fat] and they think that it’s 
normal...In the beginning it shocks you but, later on, you learn that it’s their way of treating 
people…By the time I became their co-worker, I understood that it was all a game.” 
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Raúl’s experiences as a novice in the obra were not funny, however. He was called 
names and told things that he “could not repeat” while co-workers kept stealing his 
possessions, including clothes and shower items. It was only due to his brother’s 
encouragement to aguantar (put up with this abusive treatment) until things got “sorted out”, 
that he managed to remain in the job. Raúl’s disciplining into the rules of the workplace 
involved his progressive adoption of “heavy” joking and behaving “like the others”, which 
showed his co-workers and employers that he could not be played around with anymore.  
The disciplining process at work in the obra, a masculine workplace par excellence, 
parallels those inherent in two feminized economic niches of La Plata: the ferias (see chapter 
IV) and the care sector (see chapter V). In all three of these ethnicized labour niches, 
employers and some co-workers, including compatriots, take advantage of novices. 
Exceptions to this are jobs done individually, most often at private houses, such as those of the 
empleadas domésticas, whose broad job description includes caring for children and pets 
along with cleaning and doing the household’s grocery shopping, and some nurse assistants or 
“helpers”, who care for the elderly, the disabled or the sick outside institutionalized settings. 
Feelings of suffering and the longing to leave the job permeate the initial work experiences of 
migrant men and women in these three settings, and are counterbalanced by the 
encouragement they receive from experienced relatives and friends, who have already gone 
through such a learning process, to endure their exploitative and abusive circumstances. 
Migrants’ socialization into the hierarchical and racialized power dynamics regulating their 
labour niches is mostly done through a “silent pedagogy” (Samudra 2008) by imitation that 
involves adopting well-established rules of conduct. Novices’ progressive advancement in the 
hierarchy of the workplace translates into better treatment and pay, and is concomitant with 
the arrival of new co-workers. The newcomer status of the most recently arrived always 
interacts with their ethnic rank in the workplace, with both together affecting in the manner 
and speed with which they move in the ranks. Going through this painful learning 
(disciplining) process permits some migrants to obtain the necessary knowledge and contacts 
to either get a better job or start working independently. Those who decide to stay, for their 
part, are rewarded with better treatment, higher pay and a sense of belonging. 
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The Racial Classificatory Logic Underpinning the GBA’s Ethnic Hierarchy  
As Lucas’ and Raúl’s accounts illustrate, the xenophobic views of migrants from neighbouring 
countries held by some Argentinians are often condensed in the label negro (“black”). 
Emblematically incarnating the “non-white” Argentinean nation, this term and its historical 
derivatives have been used to refer condescendingly to subaltern social groups in Buenos 
Aires, such as the negros Porteños (black people who lived in the city during the 1900s-1920s 
period); the cabecitas negras (“little black heads”, internal migrants of “dark” complexion 
who took part in the expanding industrialization of the metropolis during the 1940s and 1950s 
while becoming supporters of Peronismo); the villeros (inhabitants of villas miserias, or 
slums, in the subsequent decades); and the limítrofes (who, since the mid-1960s, have been 
settling in the GBA). Being perceived as cultural, social class, political and even residential 
“threats” to the alleged “whiteness” and decorum of Porteño elites (Guber 2002, Ratier 1971, 
Recalde 2006-a), all these social categories have been attributed similar negative social and 
psychological characteristics, making apparent a deeply rooted racial classificatory logic 
dating from the late 19th century (Frigerio 2006). According to the Argentinean anthropologist 
Alejandro Frigerio (2006), the production of “white” Argentina, notably in Buenos Aires city, 
involved rendering black groups and their descendants invisible while shifting from racial to 
social categories in the discourse on social difference and stratification (pp. 5-6)200. Indeed, the 
(re)creation of nationhood since the country’s independence has been underpinned by a racist 
logic that has shaped national identity politics while regulating social interaction and 
classification (Recalde 2006-a). The extent to which this is still the case is evident in the 
popularity and stigmatizing power that the label negro continues to have today, as well as in 
the fact that it has come to encompass its historical variants, which have shaped public 
imagination until recently (Frigerio 2006). Paradoxically however, since official discourse has 
portrayed Argentinean society as “open and prejudice-free”, both those who discriminate and 
those who are discriminated against do not admit it openly, but rather resort to evasive and 
concealing strategies instead (Margulis and Urresti 1998).  
 
My 2010 fieldwork confirmed the prevalence of the label negro over the historical 
variants of the term among Argentinians from La Plata, Buenos Aires city, the GBA and other 
provinces, who commonly employ it to refer pejoratively to the most disadvantaged social 
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groups in the country, whether they be migrant or not201. The use of this label also tends to 
prevail over its contemporary variant: the pibe chorro. Migrants, in contrast, tend to use the 
labels villeros and pibes chorros when referring to the most marginalized Argentinians, who 
discriminate against them overtly rather than using the convert strategies more often deployed 
by members of other social classes. Some migrants also mention becoming the target of 
“xenophobic crime”, explaining that pibes chorros seemingly “choose” them based on their 
“non-Argentinean” accent and “looks” (complexion). Ana from Peru, for example, was once 
robbed late at night in La Plata, while returning home from work, by an Argentinean couple in 
their forties, who were under the heavy influence of drugs and alcohol. Ana was cornered and 
searched, as she explains:  
“Since I didn’t have any money, they took my cell and my [Argentinean and Peruvian] 
documents and because of my way of speaking, they asked me: ‘Are you Peruvian or Bolivian? 
Dale mami! [hurry up], stand up’…They wanted to take me to a dark place, but I told them: 
‘Kill me here so my family will be able to find me’…My husband was in jail and my children 
waiting for me at home.” 
 
While migrants living in the peripheries of the partido and the GBA also report being 
assaulted or robbed by the pibes chorros (see chapter V), Bolivians in rural areas of La Plata 
such as Olmos and Etcheverry are the ones who cite this type of incident most often. 
According to these family horticulturalists, the majority of whom are Tarijeños, the pibes 
chorros (and the police) easily identify them due to their cara de paisano or “aboriginal face” 
when they shop in neighbouring urban areas (see previous chapter). Similarly, those being 
assaulted in peripheral localities mention being quite “noticeable” due to their cara de 
extranjero or de mestizo (“foreign” or “mestizo” face).  
 
Bolivians, Peruvians and Paraguayans’ comments on the “whiteness” of (some) 
Argentinians and the concomitant “darkness” of (some) migrants should be interpreted in 
terms of this ingrained racial hierarchy. Lucas’ emphasis on the contrasting complexion of 
Argentinians and migrants provides the rationale for the latter’s marginalization by the former. 
Lucas amplifies both the “darkness” of the Colombian nurse working at a public hospital in La 
Plata (who was morochita) and the “whiteness” of her Argentinean patients (who were “blond 
people with blue eyes”) while explaining this nurse’s devalued status by Argentinians’ 
negative assessment of her complexion. Likewise, Leo’s comments emphasize how “tall and 
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blond” the Argentinean Señora who tipped him in La Plata was, and the “attractiveness and 
sex appeal” of most Argentinians, while contrasting these stereotyped racial portraits with his 
self-description as “a negro whose appearance frightens migrants and non-migrants alike”. 
Both examples (from chapter V) illustrate the extent to which many migrants in La Plata, 
despite their gender, adhere to the racial classificatory logic underpinning the GBA’s 
hegemonic ethnic hierarchy. This is the case because racial hierarchies are integral to most 
Latin American societies, where people’s “colour” or the degree of métissage between 
European conquistadores, aboriginal peoples and African populations (initially brought to 
Latin America as slaves by Europeans) structures social interaction and power hierarchies. To 
various degrees, from one society to another, these racial classifications vary according to the 
person’s socio-economic situation, the context and his/her own identity construction (Frigerio 
2006).  
The Problematic Operationalization of the GBA’s Ethnic Hierarchy  
Some migrants who sought to evade the issue of ethnic hierarchies by saying that they only 
relate minimally to other migrants; e.g. this Bolivian couple, who work as verduleros in La 
Plata:  
“We speak with some [migrants] but only a little; there was a young Paraguayan woman 
with whom we used to talk, but in the end, she stopped seeing us because she likes to drink a 
lot and wanted to share it with us, but we do not.”  
Paraguayans’ heavy drinking is often mentioned by Peruvians as well, and by 
Paraguayans themselves, as Aníbal and Nancy’s comments illustrate (see chapter V). Ricardo, 
a man in his early forties, migrated from Ascope, northern Peru to La Plata in 2005. He has 
worked independently in construction and lives with his family in the Altos de San Lorenzo, a 
peripheral locality of the partido. During a group conversation, he raises the “drinking 
problem” of Paraguayans in combination with their “language issue”, which seemingly makes 
it very difficult to work with them:  
“As a Peruvian, you can’t work with a Paraguayan because he starts to speak his Guaraní 
and you don’t know if he’s insulting you! [laughs]…And the Paraguayan drinks too much [es 
muy borracho loco], every day, he is with wine, wine and wine! Ah mierda! Wine and cigarettes, 
they do it too much! [como le meten loco!].”  
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Later on, Ricardo somewhat temperes his comment by highlighting a positive aspect of 
Paraguayans that signals a negative trait of (some) Peruvians:  
“The Peruvian is a bit selfish, at least some of them, they don’t like to see compatriots 
making progress, prospering…He’s not like the Paraguayan who, yes, one weekend [says] 
‘let’s go build a house’ and they get together four, five, six, ten of them…And we [Peruvians], 
no, as long as we do not pay people, they do not move.” 
Ricardo’s composite and shifting views of Paraguayans are representative of those held 
by other migrants I interviewed and illustrate how migrants’ opinions of other migrants 
question (implicitly or explicitly) the classificatory logic underpinning the dominant ethnic 
hierarchy of the GBA  
A good many of those I interviewed claim to be able to easily identify (or to have been 
easily identified due to) what they consider conspicuous mestizo or aboriginal appearance and 
demeanour (phenotype, accent, manners, etc.). As the examples I have presented so far show, 
some even claim to be able to discern the smallest details that distinguish groups from each 
other, such as the ethnically different Bolivians, or migrant and non-migrants of aboriginal 
ancestry and provincial Argentinians. In everyday social interaction, however, things get more 
complicated, even messy, as several comments from Paraguayans Nancy and Aníbal illustrate. 
They both assert the historical discrimination endured by Bolivians in Argentina, and Aníbal 
remarks:  
“Since I came, I’ve heard that it has always been that way with them…I do not know 
why...It’s like if Bolivians were not taken into account as persons. In the obra, they called them 
‘bolita’ or treat them as negros.” 
Nancy and Aníbal also affirm that Bolivians carry conspicuous aboriginal traits 
(rasgos indígenas), yet, when they begin to elaborate on this issue, the ethnic boundaries that 
separate different migrant groups become blurred, as Nancy’s comment shows:  
“They [Argentinians] treat them [Bolivians] like indígenas…And in Paraguay there are 
people who look like Bolivians: the aboriginal peoples…And Peruvians and Bolivians look a 
lot alike…Even if Peruvians are not discriminated against as much in Argentina.” 
The extent to which ethnic classificatory logics are learned (and so vary across time 
and social space) and are differently operationalized by individuals,depending on personal and 
situational factors, became most apparent when the couple could not agree upon the labelling 
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of their close neighbours, whom Nancy identifies as Bolivians while Aníbal insists they are 
Peruvians. Likewise, Paraguayan Ana’s actual use of the GBA’s ethnic classification scheme 
became problematic sometimes, even though she demonstrates her own mastery of its racial 
logic by talking about how much “mestizo peoples” look alike and how easily she could 
distinguish between them. Indeed, migrants’ accurate knowledge of the clear-cut-boundaries of 
this hegemonic ethnic hierarchy often differs from how these boundaries are used. 
Operationalizing the logic of this hierarchy in discourse or social interaction depends on a 
number of factors, including the person’s social class, gender, age and trajectory; the social 
situation, that is, the presence of other people, their social statuses and the relationships 
between the participants; moreover, distinctive zones of graduated sovereignty have shaped 
people’s interaction and perceptions in urban, peripheral and rural areas of the partido. As a 
result of these factors, migrants locate differently the dividing line establishing whom to 
include and where in the GBA ethnic hierarchy (or whom to exclude from which group).   
Some migrants use a somewhat different classificatory logic, however, consisting in 
grouping together the limítrofes (Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans) with the Argentinians 
from the interior (or provincial) in order to oppose them to the xenophobic villeros. The case 
of Bolivian Julián comes to mind. After talking about the disparaging attitudes of villeros 
towards migrants and asserting his own denigrating views of these disadvantaged 
Argentinians, Julián brings out the solidarity that reigns in his peripheral neighbourhood, 
where Paraguayans, Bolivians and provincial Argentinians always look after each other. This 
“community of interest” has emerged in response to what neighbours perceive as a common 
experience of aggression and burglaries by villeros inside and outside their barrio. Similarly, 
most of the migrant men I interviewed emphasize that they are “hard-working and honest”, 
making a connection with their Argentinean counterparts, before distancing themselves from 
the “lazy and good-for-nothing” villeros and pibes chorros. In a less confrontational manner, 
other migrants express their alleged “closeness” to provincial Argentinians by claiming that 
they all eat the same food and get along really well in La Plata—an issue that I also 
documented in the late 1990s, when limítrofes noted that Platenses discriminated against 
Argentinians from the interior as much as they did against them (Recalde 2006-a).  
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Subverting the Lowest Ranking Attributed to Bolivians 
In this last section, I present two cases of migrant narratives that explicitly subvert the low 
status ascribed to Bolivians in the GBA’s ethnic value hierarchy. They come from two migrant 
women: Soledad, Paraguayan, and Gladys, who is Bolivian. Soledad, thirty-five years old, is 
originally from Villeta city, close to Asunción, the country’s capital. At the age of fifteen, she 
spent a year working in Buenos Aires and, since then, has been in love with the city. Yet, it 
was only in 2003 that she could move to Argentina while rejecting invitations to go to Brazil 
and Spain, a decision she explains as follows:  
“I loved Argentina [at the time], and maybe I also retained the idea that I had when I was 
little…Grandmothers [hers and those of others] had really nice photos of their visits to 
relatives in Argentina, and so those images always stayed in my head.” 
In 2003, Soledad left her three young children with her second partner, who was the 
father of her third child, an eight-month-old baby. As was the case of most migrant women, it 
was in fact Soledad’s mother who looked after her children by leaving her home in a 
provincial town of Paraguay and moving into the couple’s house in Asunción. In Buenos 
Aires, Soledad took care of an elderly woman with Alzheimer’s disease, until the latter 
attempted to commit suicide by jumping off a balcony, at which point Soledad decided to find 
a less stressful job. She cleaned houses for a year so as to save money to build a home for her 
family in Paraguay. Soledad’s partner joined her some time later, when the company he was 
working for as a driver closed down; in Buenos Aires, he found a job at a glassworks factory. 
Only in 2007 did they manage to bring their three children to Buenos Aires. By the time I met 
Soledad in early 2010, she had a son who was almost two years old (her fourth child) and 
worked as an empleada doméstica in Buenos Aires. Her husband was doing a range of small 
household maintenance jobs since his contract working on the carpentry and refrigeration of a 
Japanese ship had finished. He had obtained this job through a compatriot, after completing 
government-funded training.   
Soledad’s family has lived in a number of dangerous peripheries of the GBA (see 
chapter V), side by side with other migrants and villeros. When referring to the criminal 
activities regularly engaged in by neighbours, Soledad does not seek to discursively distance 
her family from them, as many migrants do. She is not reluctant to share the neighbourhood 
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with the pibes chorros and allegedly “criminal” migrants, nor does she endorse the denigrating 
views of the villeros in general. Instead, she gives the impression of being “at ease” wherever 
she lives and of having adapted to the ethnically diverse and often dangerous milieus of the 
neighbourhoods she has inhabited with her family.  
Soledad’s transgression of the GBA’s hegemonic ethnic hierarchy became apparent 
during a conversation we had about migrants’ exploitation and abusive treatment of their own 
compatriots. Commenting on her husband’s experience with this issue, Soledad speaks with 
irritation about the arrogance of some migrants, who, pretending not to have gone through 
hardship at home, mistreat compatriots who are new at the job. At this juncture, she 
comments, with a mixture of laughter and indignation, on her own female compatriots’ 
arrogance, which she contrasts with the courtesy of Bolivians and Peruvians:  
“When I went to the agency where all people [migrants] go, women were waiting outside. I 
arrived and Bolivian and Peruvian women asked: ‘How are you?’ and introduced themselves, 
they offered you something to drink…But the Paraguayans, you look at them and they give you 
an arrogant look, they act like important people [se hacen las importantes], they do not greet 
you and they pretend to only speak Argentinean Spanish!” 
Like Soledad, Peruvian Jorge identifies some positive attributes of other migrants 
(Paraguayans) that make apparent certain defects of his own compatriots (Peruvians); yet, he 
does not go as far as to speak highly of Bolivians. In fact, Soledad was the only migrant I 
interviewed who overtly emphasizes the “nice character” and “good manners” of Bolivians 
(specifically women)—an opinion that stands out against the demeaning views of Bolivians 
held by migrants and non-migrants alike in the GBA. 
Gladys, a northern Bolivian woman in her early twenties, was the only Bolivian 
migrant I interviewed who overtly criticized the morality of migrants from another 
neighbouring nation. In different areas of the partido, her compatriots tended to “cushion” the 
denigrating attitudes of migrants and non-migrants towards them, without pronouncing 
themselves overtly against any migrant group—except when supporting Platenses’ negative 
views of Chinese migrants, as do limítrofes in general (see chapter IV). Gladys arrived in La 
Plata in 2005, at the age of seventeen, along with a cousin. Coming from a large, poor family, 
Gladys seized the opportunity to help her family by working in Argentina: “When my aunt 
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asked me if I wanted to come, I said yes, because we needed the help, we’re many…So, I left 
to help my brothers and sisters to study”. By the time I met her in 2010, Gladys was running a 
verdulería with her Bolivian partner, who had arrived as a young teenager in La Plata in 1995, 
and with whom she has a nine-month-old baby girl. Both have their DNIs, yet, ironically, 
while it took Gladys’ partner four years to get his in the 1990s, Gladys promptly obtained hers 
in the late 2000s thanks to Bolivian President Evo Morales’ support (chapter VI) and 
Kirchnerismo’s documentation campaigns (chapter III).  
When speaking about her previous experience of working without papers, Gladys 
advances her negative views of Peruvians. Soon after she arrived in La Plata, a cousin found 
her a baby-sitting job at La Salada, an area of Lomas de Zamora (GBA) where Bolivians and a 
few Peruvians produce a wide range of imitation designer-brand garments, which are sold 
cheaply202. Before speaking about her own exploitation, Gladys mentions, without much 
surprise, that of her compatriots, while emphasizing that the issue was widely publicized by 
the media some time ago:  
“There are some who mistreat you. It was well known in the sewing [textile] sector there in 
La Salada; they found many [migrants] without documents, en negro, who were exploited; it 
appeared on the news…There were Bolivians who exploited other Bolivians, the same 
compatriots who brought them.”  
Only at this point does Gladys raise the subject of her own exploitation at the hands of 
Peruvians, who, like Bolivians, force undocumented employees to work day and night, while 
hiding them from public view. Employees are young women and men in their late teens and 
early twenties, who work from 07:00 to 21:00, and sometimes until midnight in order to finish 
the job, only having a one-hour break at noon. Gladys notes with disapproval the exploitative 
atmosphere:  
“I worked for a month for Peruvians in La Salada, they were costureros [people who make 
clothes], I looked after their children and cooked for them while their employees [also 
Peruvian people] could not even go to the street without their boss…I didn’t have problems 
because I did not get into their business…But it was terrible to see how they [employers] 
treated people [employees]…It was horrible to work under those conditions, non-stop all day 
long.”  
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Gladys also emphasizes that her employer, a Peruvian woman, found it so much 
cheaper to hire undocumented migrants than Argentinians that she even brought some into the 
country herself—this comment echoes Edelina’s account of her female boss in the feria 
(chapter IV). Even if aware that economic exploitation and mistreatment are endemic in La 
Salada, with her compatriots both perpetrators and victims of such a labour regime, Gladys 
still focuses her resentment on what she considers the “low morals” of abusive Peruvians. 
People are forced to “pile up” in tiny rooms and work like slaves while some are harshly 
reprimanded for no good reason. Such was the case of a boy, who was scolded severely when 
attempting to leave his workplace for a moment.  
Gladys’ negative views of La Salada, along with her sister’s insistence that she quit, 
led her to leave the job and move back to La Plata, where she soon found work in a verdulería. 
Her decision represented a safe and comforting shift from what she considered “Peruvian” 
exploitation and abuse to a familial and flexible atmosphere, while working at the verdulería 
of a female compatriot whom she found agreeable:  
“When I was working at La Salada, I called my mom every week because I could not get 
used to it and I cried…In contrast, at the verdulería I ate whatever I wanted, went out when I 
wanted, I took vacations, I went to church, I visited my sister over the weekend…I could go in 
and out, I had no problem.” 
 
In this chapter, I have examined migrants’ views and uses of the hegemonic ethnic 
hierarchy in force in the partido of La Plata, showing that the racial logic underpinning it is 
representative of the GBA. Migrants’ problematic operationalization of such a hierarchy in 
everyday social interaction tends to contrast with their theoretical mastery of its racial logic. 
Migrants’ re-elaboration of some sensationalist media discourse on “migrant crime” shows the 
extent to which their appropriation of such discourse differs according to the particular goals it 
endorses. Moreover, personal, situational and geographical factors influence migrants’ views 
and uses of the ethnic hierarchy in force, which impact social interaction among migrants, and 
between migrants and non-migrants. Although migrants agree on the devalued status of 
Bolivians in Argentina, some criticize it, along with Argentinians’ denigrating attitudes and 
exploitative treatment of these migrants.  
  
 
CHAPTER VIII: Conclusion 
 
Broadly speaking, my thesis examines the workings of grounded social, economic and 
political processes that have contributed, often in a conflicting manner, to the (re)definition of 
membership criteria in both the nation and the state. It does so in dialogue with two broad, 
interrelated bodies of literature, citizenship and transnationalism, which have examined issues 
of belonging, exclusion, mobility and access to rights among transnational migrants, while 
highlighting the renewed capacity of the state to regulate both people’s movements and 
migrants’ actual access to public entitlements. My research has been carried out at two 
distinctive analytical and empirical levels. First, I have examined the “technologies of 
citizenship” (Ong 2003, Fujiwara 2008) deployed by the government to transform Argentina 
into a diverse, inclusive and Latin American nation over the past decade, paying particular 
attention to Kirchnerismo’s creation of a “new legality” for the Paraguayans, Bolivians and 
Peruvians in the country. Second, I have analyzed the “horizontal dimensions of citizenship 
processes” (Neveu 2005, Pickus and Skerry 2007, Gagné and Neveu 2009) among these 
migrants in urban, peripheral and rural areas of the partido of La Plata. Namely, I have 
examined the extent to which migrants’ socio-economic circumstances have changed in 
tandem with their new legal status (as nationals of the MERCOSUR in Argentina with rights 
equal to those of its citizens) and the “inclusive citizenship” policies deployed by the 
government. In this final chapter, I return to the core questions of the thesis set out in Chapter 
I and its research contributions (Chapter II) in order to advance some conclusions.  
 As introduced in Chapter I, a central threefold question has guided my doctoral 
research: to what extent has the new legal equality granted to Peruvians, Bolivians and 
Paraguayans in Argentina affected a) their actual access to entitlements, b) their informal 
social interaction with other migrant and non-migrants residents, and c) their valuation of 
official papers in the partido of La Plata over the past decade? By answering this question, my 
dissertation has not only challenged a number of positions that have research and policy 
agendas on migrant transnationalism and citizenship, but has also questioned the hegemonic 
analytical and methodological approaches underlying them, as discussed in Chapter II.  
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THE HEGEMONIC ROLE OF THE STATE 
My thesis shows that, even if in dialogue with regional bodies and international conventions, 
the state continues to play a hegemonic role when it comes to regulating people’s movements 
across its borders and within its territory. In South America, states have independently decided 
if and how to implement adopted international conventions on the protection of human rights 
as well as regional agreements seeking the free mobility and equal treatment of nationals of 
the newly created blocs (Recalde 2008-a, Novick 2010,). As I have shown in Chapter III, 
Argentina, together with Brazil, has led these developments by making substantial 
contributions to the advancement of regional integration. Kirchnerismo has played a decisive 
role in moving MERCOSUR away from its neoliberal, mercantile origins while advancing 
other strategic alliances in Latin America, such as UNASUR and TeleSur. Its commitment to 
deepen regional integration has been inseparable from its effort to “Latin Americanize” 
Argentina, which has involved confronting ingrained national myths claiming the exclusive 
European ancestry and character of the nation.  
Insofar as Kirchnerismo’s political project is representative of a “moment” in Latin 
America’s geopolitics (Chapter III), public strategies to firmly anchor Argentina’s past, 
present and future developments to the region show the extent to which migration politics and 
policies have been crucial to the current nationhood-(re)making projects of particular states in 
the region. This South American example also illustrates the extent to which the boundaries of 
the nation-state are not merely territorial but also a function of the state’s discursive authority. 
When it comes to national identity, immigration constitutes a “focal point” or privileged site 
in, about and through which the form and content of national identity gets shaped (Croucher 
1998), which I have illustrated through my analysis of Argentina’s new migration law. Yet, it 
is not just official immigration policy that constructs the contours of the nation since the 
politics, rhetoric and discourse surrounding immigration play an equally important role 
(Croucher 1997), as I showed in my examination of Kircherismo’s celebrations of the 
bicentenary of Argentina’s independence and its adoption of a new law regulating the media 
(Chapter III).  
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LEGAL RIGHTS VERSUS THE EXPERIENCE OF RIGHTS 
My dissertation questions legalistic approaches to citizenship by showing that formal legal 
entitlements are translated into quite different “experiences of rights” depending on: a) the 
social status attributed to diversely defined groups based on their standing in local shifting 
ethnic hierarchies; b) the geopolitics of place and the attendant regimes of governmentality 
that have evolved in diverse settings along with the settlement of diverse ethnic and social 
class groups, which change over time and across space; and c) migrants’ embodied (gender, 
age, phenotype, etc.) and acquired (social class, ethnicity, etc.) characteristics and their access 
to networks of trust spanning across multiple countries, which are permeated by uneven 
distributions of power along lines of gender, age and status.  
Membership in the Nation: Limítrofes Moving Up and Closer to Platenses 
As the ethnographic chapters (IV to VII) demonstrate, migrants’ experiences of formal 
membership in the body politic, that is, their actual exercise of citizenship in the partido, 
varies substantially depending on their group’s relative positioning in the national moral order, 
which establishes the degrees of deserving and undeserving citizenship according to a wide 
range of non-legal factors, including racial classificatory systems (Ong 2004-a, 2004-b). While 
membership in the state is decided constitutionally through (exclusionary) citizenship policies 
(Shafir 2004, Howard 2006, Morris 2002), membership in the nation entails a much more 
complicated configuration of “us” and “them” (Gregory 2004, 2007). In this regard, national 
identity is defined and maintained in opposition or contradiction to some other group that, at 
best, becomes temporary outsider or, at worst, deeply despised enemy (Croucher 1998, Barth 
1969). The extent to which this identity politics is a dynamic, historically situated process 
becomes apparent in the displacement of this “space of otherness” in the Argentinean national 
imaginary from the limítrofes during the 1990s to the so-called chinos and pibes chorros in the 
following decade.  
As I demonstrated in chapter IV, the negative connotations attributed to the behaviours 
and alleged values considered “Chinese” by Platenses, notably in urban areas of the partido, 
have altered the city’s ethnic hierarchy, against which migrant groups in general are measured 
(Recalde 2006-a). This reformulation has led to a substantial improvement in the overall social 
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standing of Bolivians, Peruvians and Paraguayans in the course of the 2000s. Limítrofes have 
been repositioned higher in this ethnic hierarchy given their status vis-à-vis that of Chinese, 
who, by virtue of their standing at the bottom of the scale, have pushed limítrofes up. At the 
same time, given Platenses’ revision of their own ethnic loyalties and ancestry (seemingly 
more and more anchored in South America), limítrofes have also been repositioned closer to 
Platenses because they are Latin American and not Asian. It is still early to evaluate the extent 
to which Kirchnerismo’s strategies to Latin Americanize Argentina have contributed to this 
shift, and, if so, what their effect will be in the long run. It also remains to be seen how the 
more recent arrival of African migrants in La Plata will alter the hegemonic ethnic hierarchy 
of the partido (chapter IV). 
What is clear by now, however, is that Chinese migrants have challenged one of 
Argentina’s foundational myths over the past two decades, whereas limítrofes have not. This 
helps explain the shifting locations of these groups in La Plata’s ethnic hierarchy. Namely, the 
solid economic and ethnic presence that Chinese migrants have established in the partido (and 
the GBA), in a relatively short period of time, transgresses a deeply rooted assimilationist 
mandate (Recalde 2006-a) in two important ways. First, their development of prosperous mini-
markets and restaurants contradicts the notion that (ethnic or social) groups considered 
“inferior” or “undeserving” must occupy labour niches according to their “low” social status. 
Second, Chinese migrants’ continuous use of their own language/s in everyday social 
interaction goes against the linguistic mandate establishing that migrants must promptly adopt 
Argentinean Spanish as their own language. The resentment expressed by Platenses at this 
double transgression is evident in their explanations of why they dislike these migrants in 
2010 (see Chapter IV). Previous fieldwork I conducted in La Plata indicates that in the late 
1990s, when Chinese migrants were developing then small businesses and their linguistic and 
ethnic visibility was less conspicuous, Platenses did not express as much contempt for them. 
So, it seems that the more pronounced the transgression, the stronger the rejection of the group 
and the behaviours and values incarnating it. 
Limítrofes, in contrast, have largely remained in low status labour niches that have 
been considered in line with their “devalued” standing in the nation’s social imaginary 
(Recalde 2006-a). This has been the case despite Kirchnerismo’s strategies to create a more 
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favourable view of these groups while improving the work conditions and rights of the 
economic niches that they occupy (Chapter III). In urban areas of La Plata (and in those of 
Buenos Aires city and the GBA), Peruvian, Paraguayan and Bolivian men have continued to 
be concentrated in the construction sector, whereas Peruvian and Paraguayan women have 
been so in domestic employment. Bolivian women, for their part, have specialized in the 
commercialization of fruits and vegetables (chapter I). Bolivian men and women in rural areas 
of the partido have come to be the main horticultural producers there, as well as in the rest of 
the country (Chapter VI). The extent to which limítrofes have remained (symbolically and 
materially) “in their place” becomes apparent in the naturalization of their contributions to 
society by Platenses (and by Porteños and Argentinians from the GBA), who have come to 
identify Peruvians, Paraguayans and Bolivians with the jobs that they have historically 
performed. Those whose economic success has transgressed the boundaries established by the 
partido’s hegemonic ethnic hierarchy have not experienced a concomitant rise up the social 
ladder, as the example of the few Cochabambinos who became well-off during the 1990s, 
demonstrates (Chapters IV and VI). Moreover, limítrofes’ use of a language other than 
Argentinean Spanish, or even of an accent or idioms other than those used locally, has been 
resented by Platenses, as my 2010 and previous fieldwork in the city showed. Migrants have 
been ridiculed and stigmatized due to their cantito (accent) and use of idiomatic expressions 
that are not strictly Platense, or for not knowing Spanish (Recalde 2006-a). Many have also 
mentioned feeling insecure in La Plata about the way they talk or that they are incapable of 
speaking Spanish properly, when this language is, in fact, their mother tongue.  
Over the past decade, discourse on so-called “insecurity” emerged and consolidated, 
powerfully impacting the perceptions and behaviour of migrants and non-migrants in 
Argentina. Integral to this process has been the powerful social figure of the pibe chorro: 
young, poor Argentinean men, mostly minors, allegedly under the influence of drugs. The pibe 
chorro has come to incarnate the fear of being robbed at any time in the GBA and Buenos 
Aires province in particular, where the profitable (in)security industry has flourished (Chapter 
IV). The pibe chorro has also come to be considered the exemplary member of the most 
disadvantaged social groups (formerly called negros, cabecitas negras and villeros) while 
capturing the feeling of insecurity that closely associates uncertainty, criminality and a well-
 226 
delimited (racialized) social group. As a result, the pibe chorro has come to replace the 
limítrofe ilegal as the prevalent stigmatized social figure catalyzing the social, economic and 
political tensions of the decade. This shift has significantly benefited Peruvians, Bolivians and 
Paraguayans in Argentina, who have become much less the target of stigmatizing attitudes and 
marginalizing behaviour.  
Those living in La Plata have embraced this displacement, often echoing the prejudiced 
views endorsed by sensationalist media and some political discourse—as happened during the 
1990s, when the government criminalized the most recently arrived limítrofes (Recalde 2006-
a). This appropriation has brought about an important shift in the social representations of 
migrants. For those in urban and peripheral areas of the partido, the pibe chorro, with all the 
connotations that the term connotes, has come to replace the police, whose agents personified  
frightening reality for migrants in La Plata (and the GBA) during the 1990s (and early 2000s). 
In rural areas, corrupt policemen continue to represent an abusive, fearful force that quinteros 
encounter in neighbouring urban areas, with the pibe chorro in second place as the 
personification of danger.  
Zones of Graduated Sovereignty and Variegated Systems of Rights in the Partido 
Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans’ actual experiences of their new legal status in the 
partido have also depended on whether they have lived and worked in urban, peripheral or 
rural areas. This has been the case because “zones of graduated sovereignty” (Ong 1999), 
which vary in terms of the mix of disciplinary and value regimes and often contain ethnically 
marked groupings, have evolved in these three settings, leading to the emergence of “systems 
of variegated citizenship” (Ong 1999, 2006), in which populations enjoy different kinds of 
rights, discipline, caring and security. Migrants living in urban areas of the partido have been 
the ones accessing most of their new rights and state protection, whereas those in its rural 
areas have been the ones enjoying them the least. This situation has resulted from the 
concentration of public services and regulatory efforts in La Plata city and a few nearby urban 
localities. The uneven distribution and quality of public services in the domains of education, 
health care, recreation and transportation have continued to prevail in the partido. This 
tendency has only been reinforced by the fact that most of the newly developed services have 
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been situated in a handful of urban localities. Likewise, the institutions where most official 
procedures are completed, ranging from processing public subsidies to obtaining legal 
documents, are still exclusively located in La Plata city. Under these circumstances, 
geographical proximity has become a determinant of migrants’ access to public entitlements, 
given the implications in terms of cost and time. While those in peripheral areas have waited 
in vain to get the most basic public services, such as electricity, running water and sewage 
systems (Chapter V), migrants in rural areas have lived without even the expectation of such. 
The processing of new public entitlements (such as subsidies for low income families) in La 
Plata city has disadvantaged migrants in rural areas the most (Chapter VI). The active 
documentation campaigns of the 2000s, including the Patria Grande program, have likewise 
most benefited migrants who live and/or work in urban areas, where public efforts have been 
concentrated.  
Official strategies to secure workers’ rights (through work regularization campaigns), 
to adapt national and provincial programs to local needs, and to decrease the “deficiencies” of 
state institutions (from fighting against police corruption to improving the delivery of public 
services) have also been concentrated in La Plata city and a few other nearby urban localities. 
Migrants with urban jobs have been the ones benefiting the most from work-related public 
initiatives, whereas those with rural occupations (quinteros) have only obtained the technical 
assistance of an agronomist. However, these initiatives have had unequal results as regards 
improving working conditions and advancing the rights of migrants with urban employment. 
Kirchnerismo’s fight against informal and precarious work, in particular, while benefiting 
most migrant men working in construction and promoting the hiring en blanco of Peruvian 
and Paraguayan women doing domestic work, has been rather disadvantageous for Bolivian 
women. This campaign’s focus on the construction and textile sectors, along with its incipient 
interest in domestic work, has led to the deployment of blanket strategies that did not take into 
account the gendering and ethnicization of the labour niches occupied by migrants in La Plata 
(Chapter IV). Migrants in urban areas have benefited the most from the important changes 
introduced to the functioning and rules of some state institutions, such as the police, ministries 
and secretariats. As the ethnographic chapters show, the territoriality of police corruption and 
abuse dramatically changes from urban to rural areas, being particularly resilient in urban 
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localities near Las Quintas and disadvantaged peripheries of the partido and the GBA. The  
racial profiling of migrants (relying on their “cara de paisano”) and police abuse of their 
alleged complacent attitude have not changed from the 1990s in these areas, and have come to 
be complemented “xenophobic” crime perpetrated by pibes chorros’ during the 2000s.  
The interplay between the availability, quality, and delivery of public services in the 
partido under Kirchnerismo’s inclusive federalism (Chapter III) has shaped the markets for 
housing, employment and educational credentials, as well as the distribution of basic goods 
and services. Thus, state structures and policies play a decisive role in the differential stitching 
together of inequalities of class, place and origin whether ethnoracial or ethnonational 
(Wacquant 2008). The attendant “degrees and forms of state penetration” (Wacquant 2008) in 
different areas of the partido have framed not only informal social interaction between 
migrant and non-migrant residents, but also the changing and often contradictory relations that 
migrants maintain with different public officers and agencies, such as schools and hospitals, 
entities processing public entitlements and official documents, the courts and the police. As I 
have examined in Chapter V, migrants’ past encounters with a wide range of public servants 
has informed their representation of the Argentinean state, which has shaped the strategies that 
migrants deploy to access their rights (such as the usucapión that establishes that a person can 
take possession of abandoned land or buildings) in peripheries of the partido or when making 
claims to obtain the most basic public services (Chapter V).  
State governance by absence and neglect, the effects of which I have examined in the 
peripheries of La Plata and the GBA (Chapter V), is most extreme in the partido’s rural areas, 
such as Las Quintas, where the state has removed itself completely from its service-providing 
obligations and role as guarantor of public security (Chapter VI). The interplay between this 
governmentality regime and the particular ethnic and social class mix of each geographical 
setting has led to distinctive experiences of rights and (in)security among migrants. In Las 
Quintas, the isolation of horticulturalists’ neighbourhoods has transformed these 
(re)productive areas into safety zones away from two major dangers, the police and the pibes 
chorros, whom migrants often meet while doing their shopping in neighbouring urban areas of 
Etcheverry and Olmos. In peripheries such as Villa Elvira, Los Hornos and San Lorenzo (as in 
others of the GBA), by contrast, these fearful forces are integral to the daily experiences of 
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migrants. Most often, villeros and pibes chorros live side by side with migrants, while police 
incursions into their neighbourhoods or nearby areas happen frequently. Despite the more 
disadvantageous economic circumstances of quinteros, their manoeuvering power is greater 
than that of migrants in peripheries when it comes to exercising some control over these 
sources of insecurity. Horticulturalists minimize danger by rarely leaving their 
neighbourhoods, which is not feasible under the territoriality of police abuse and pibes 
chorros’ crime in the peripheries. In both cases, however, migrants note that they are easy 
prey for these abusive social actors due to their cara de paisano or cara mestizo and general 
“dark” complexion.  
Two types of circumstances are the most problematic and dangerous for migrants 
living in disadvantaged peripheries. On one hand, when some residents, often a minority in the 
neighbourhood, are engaged in the sex and drug trades, their nightly, clandestine activities 
perturb in important ways the social reproduction of households, whose members work and 
study during the day. Ironically, while most residents do not benefit from the financial gains of 
this minority, they are still forced to cope with the most pernicious side effects of illicit 
activities, such as witnessing or experiencing the violence that accompanies drug and sex 
transactions, being unable to sleep at night due to the noisy and abusive climate that is 
generated, and finding their surroundings polluted by a range of party leftovers (Chapter V). 
On the other hand, when migrants inhabit pensiones in marginalized areas, xenophobic and 
sometimes violent inter-ethnic crime hinders their normal routines, and combines with the 
racial profiling and abuse by corrupt policemen and pibes chorros in nearby areas. While in 
some cases, migrants manage to physically and/or psychologically isolate themselves from 
their challenging circumstances, in others they cannot and, consequently, live in great distress.  
The safety of pensiones varies greatly, however, depending on the periphery (or the 
urban area), even if their multi-ethnic (migrant) composition prevails regardless of their 
location. Moreover, even under similarly precarious and perilous conditions, the relationships 
developed among migrants, and between migrant and non-migrant residents, differ greatly, as 
do the strategies that residents deploy individually or collectively to deal with contentious 
situations and general material deprivation. The heterogeneity of La Plata and the GBA’s 
peripheries is apparent on several levels: physical (material circumstances and environment), 
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social (by class and ethnicity, but also according to social interaction) and political (state 
governmentality). This highlights the importance of using the plural when referring to such 
areas—an issue that Wacquant (2008) also raises when examining the French banlieues, 
which he contrasts with the homogeneity of the American hyperghetto
203. 
Experiencing Difference while Participating in Reciprocity Transnational Networks 
The ethnographic chapters show the extent to which citizenship constitutes a contested field of 
power relations and practices, where struggles over access to employment and other rights and 
goods are conducted between state authorities and the heterogeneous populations under their 
control (Gregory 2007). Through citizenship practices, along with their enabling discourse, 
norms and documents, differences tied to race, class, gender and national origin are embodied 
and articulated into a complex system of exclusions that is the social foundation of the 
division of labour (Gregory 2004). Moreover, since everyday behaviour and thinking define 
norms of belonging, which operate as informal modes of inclusion and exclusion, formal legal 
citizenship does not erase the enduring exclusions of the colour lines that often deny full 
citizenship to migrants and racial minorities (Rosaldo 1994, 1997). Under these circumstances, 
social status becomes a defining characteristic of citizenship, which is produced through 
everyday social interaction by transposing socially constructed distinctions into a formal 
(legal) system of exclusions (Morris 2002, Gregory 2007). The new legal status granted to 
limítrofes by Kirchnerismo, far from being evenly guaranteed to all in the partido of La Plata, 
has been differently enforced in its urban, peripheral and rural areas (as I have argued in the 
previous section) and unequally experienced by different categories of migrants.  
The case studies that I have examined portray the socio-economic trajectories of 
various migrant households, whose members are spread over a number of countries. These 
cases highlight the agency of individual migrants and the extent to which, through their 
personal yet often family-informed decisions and actions, migrants both transgress and 
reinforce the residential and work patterns established by their ethnic groups over the decades. 
These cases also illustrate the commonality and uniqueness of migrants’ experiences of 
“legality” in different areas of the partido during the 2000s. Marginalidad (marginality), 
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social discrimination and economic exploitation, along the sufrimiento (suffering) that they 
entail have framed the particular trajectories of migrant men and women in La Plata. In most 
cases, these shared experiences, emerging out of their perceived mestizo or aboriginal 
appearance and demeanour by Platenses (and other Argentinians), have generated a sense of 
commonality, even a certain empathy, among otherwise diverse migrants. A number of 
individual characteristics, both embodied (such as sex and age) and acquired (including social 
class and ethnic allegiances), along with migrants’ idiosyncrasies, have contributed to the 
diversification of their exercise of new entitlements. Strictly legal factors, such as migrants’ 
nationality or their (citizenship) status in Argentina, for their part, have not had a 
“homogenizing” effect on migrants’ access to their rights—even when many mention that 
upon the birth of an Argentinean child the processing of both their own residency papers and a 
number of child-related subsidies (including the Asignación Universal por Hijo) was 
accelerated.  
My interest in the gendering of practices and processes becomes an analytical thread 
that traverses all ethnographic chapters, and shows the extent to which migrants’ gender 
intersects with their age, ethnicity and time of arrival in Argentina, under the partido’s racial 
classificatory logic, to affect their experiences of formal (legal) equality vis-à-vis 
Argentinians. The cases I have examined demonstrate that the envisioning and implementation 
of the migration project are gendered processes, whose rationale and motivations differ 
between men and women. Men often emphasize the economic reasons that lead them to seek 
better prospects in Argentina; i.e., shrinking (personal) employment opportunities or the 
deterioration of economic conditions rendering their occupations unproductive in their 
countries of origin. Women, in contrast, emphasize the hardships experienced by close 
relatives, including social marginalization and discrimination due to lack of economic means, 
as the main reasons leading them to migrate. The actual implementation of the migration 
project also tends to differ between women and men, who tend to travel separately and draw 
on gendered transnational social networks of compatriots and relatives in order to access a 
panoply of resources, through which they make travel, accommodation and employment 
arrangements. Even if Bolivian households have traditionally migrated together to Argentina, 
this pattern has been changing in recent decades in tandem with the increasing feminization of 
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South American migrations to the country (Cerrutti 2009, Pacecca and Courtis 2008, Texidó 
2008).   
The cases analyzed also show the extent to which the labour niches that migrants 
occupy in La Plata are strongly gendered and ethnicized. Some urban economic sectors have 
experienced marked changes in terms of ownership, hiring practices, labour regimes and 
composition of the labour force over the past two decades. The ferias and mini-markets, for 
example, have come to be run by Cochabambina women and Chinese men respectively, who, 
having replaced Argentinians, preferentially hire Bolivian women. In other cases, however, 
the marked ethnicization and gendering of some economic niches’ labour force have not been 
accompanied by a transfer in ethnic ownership or control. Such has been the case of 
construction and domestic and care work, whose labour force is almost exclusively migrant, 
whereas employers continue to be Argentinians. As a result, Peruvian, Bolivian and 
Paraguayan men are considered to be “the” construction workers in La Plata (and the GBA), 
while Peruvian and Bolivian women are seen as “the” domestic and care workers. Likewise, 
ferias and mini-markets have become exclusively bolivianas and chinos respectively. 
However, in rural areas, the “Bolivianization” (Benencia 1997, 2003, 2006, 2008), or rather 
“Tarijeñization” according to my research participants, of horticulture (in Las Quintas) and 
flower production (in Los Porteños) has not brought about the marked gendering seen in urban 
labour niches, since these occupations are jointly performed by men and women. Horticulture 
continues to predominantly be a familial, small-scale productive activity whereas flower 
production has become a larger business, whose ethnic ownership has diversified along with 
the homogenization of its labour force (see Chapter IV).  
As I noted in the previous section, the interplay between the gendering and 
ethnicization of urban economic niches occupied by migrants and the gender-blind 
regularization campaigns deployed by the government have brought about disparate 
consequences for migrant women and men. In some of these niches, migrants’ recent arrival, 
along with their lack of papers and ignorance of local legal norms and social conventions, has 
been capitalized on by abusive employers, who perceive new migrants’ as “docile” in 
character. Such has been the case in both “feminine” (ferias, domestic and care work) and 
“masculine” (construction) economic sectors, where novices are disciplined into the 
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workplace rules through a silent pedagogy (Samudra 2008) that involves learning by 
imitation—except for the empleadas domésticas and in-house caregivers, who work alone. 
When migrants’ youth combines with these exploitative circumstances, their vulnerability 
further increases.  
Migrant women and men’s accounts of their family’s socio-economic trajectory in 
urban and peripheral areas of La Plata also differ, which often reflects the gendering of their 
concerns. While men’s narratives focus on the “successful” aspects of their economic careers, 
women overtly speak about the marginalization and exploitation they have endured. Men 
either minimize or avoid talking about the emotional considerations and financial hardships 
inherent in the migration process, whereas women bring to the forefront the costly 
implications that migration has brought about for themselves and the relatives left behind. 
Women’s accounts often detail migrants’ initial “suffering in solitude” in urban areas, as they 
put it, which they perceive as being the result of their lack of access to local networks of trust 
(confianza) in combination with financial hardship, economic exploitation and denigrating 
treatment (marginalidad). By overcoming their initial struggles, however, women experience 
an important personal transformation, which they describe as a process of learning and growth 
leading to increased autonomy and financial independence. Only two migrant men expressed 
going through such a process: the Peruvian, Lucas, who works as an in-house caregiver of the 
elderly and sick and the Paraguayan, Richard, who does domestic work. Their transgression of 
traditionally gendered occupations has been coupled with an attendant feminization of their 
narratives.  
In rural areas, in contrast, women do not seem to experience this sort of transformative 
process for at least two important reasons. First, Tarijeño households tend to migrate together 
to Las Quintas, where they often join relatives or close paisanos (compatriots). Even if this 
type of migration does not remove all emotional costs involved in leaving “home” (Al-Ali and 
Koser 2002), it does significantly reduce the feelings of isolation, solitude and marginalization 
experienced by women who migrate by themselves to urban and peripheral areas of the 
partido. Second, Tarijeño women work side by side with men in horticulture, so they do not 
acquire the financial independence or experience the increased autonomy often noted by 
women performing remunerated work in urban areas.  
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The questioning of the traditional division of gendered household roles by women in 
urban and peripheral areas tends to be rather temporary. As the leaders of their family’s 
subsequent migration to Argentina, Peruvian and Paraguayan women acquire new financial 
obligations while still fulfilling, albeit transnationally, their former caring roles. They become 
their family’s breadwinners, both locally and transnationally, and continue to play such a role 
even after their spouses have joined them in La Plata. Yet, women gradually go back to their 
former domestic obligations, while decreasing the amount of remunerated work that they do, 
as men’s ability to earn a steady and somewhat substantial income increases and dependants 
arrive from the home country, mostly young children. In some cases, busy couples “invite” an 
unemployed female relative to join them and to take on the domestic responsibilities of the 
mother, which allows her to continue pursuing remunerated employment. Even when domestic 
roles revert to pre-migration arrangements, women in urban and peripheral areas try to keep 
some financial independence, however limited it may be.  
 Migrants’ views of the government and its policies, and of Argentina, more generally, 
also differ from women to men. Most men strongly criticize what they consider the “negative” 
consequences of Kirchnerismo’s inclusive citizenship policies (see chapter III), even when 
they or their relatives have benefited from government-funded training and a range of low-
income family subsidies. Men claim that the government has been creating a cultura de vagos 
(“culture of idlers”) among the villeros that fosters their transformation into pibes chorros, 
which they tend to contrast with both their own hard-work ethic and the “firm” public policies 
implemented in their countries of origin. In order to reverse this situation, they argue, the 
government should cut public subsidies and most social programs while reintroducing 
compulsory military service. Women, in contrast, view their family’s access to public 
education and health care, along with other public entitlements guaranteed by Kirchnerismo, 
as invaluable new opportunities offered to them all. Women express being grateful to 
Argentina for the things the country has given to their families as well as for their own 
personal growth. Although men also consider Argentina a “generous” country, it is women 
who more often emphasize that none of the rights that they enjoy at present exists back home.  
 Migrants’ experiences of their new legal status in La Plata have also been mediated by 
their participation in transnational social networks of kin and (ethnic) compatriots, which are 
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reproduced according to trust (confianza) and an ethic of care while being marked by gendered 
differences in power and internal rankings of status and class. Through these networks, 
migrants have been able to move to Argentina, and find initial accommodation and 
employment in La Plata, the GBA or Buenos Aires. The cases I have examined show the 
extent to which relatives and close friends are invaluable resources to help overcome the 
emotional, social and financial cost of their migration. These networks not only give migrants 
support in developing and carrying out their migration project, but they also continue to do so 
after migrants arrive in Argentina, in the form of emotional support and caring for dependants, 
property or a business left behind. Certainly, networks also demand from migrants various 
forms of material, symbolic and emotional compensation since they work through reciprocity. 
Exchanges do not take place exclusively between the people engaged in an initial 
“transaction” (favours, gifts, loans, moral support, services, etc.), but also include close and 
distant relatives and their friends, who might become the ones to be rewarded instead (see 
Cohen 2011 on this question). Members of these networks of care and trust are located in 
diverse destinations that tend to be spread over several countries in North America, South 
America and Europe.  
 
Once they arrive in the host country, migrants draw on these networks to find new 
sources of employment and accommodation, to learn about how to complete official 
procedures or whom to contact (locally or abroad) in case of emotional, social or financial 
need, or when seeking to move to a new destination (in Argentina or abroad), mostly through 
“invitations”. As the case of César’s shop illustrates, through social networks migrants can 
access social spaces where they experience the comforting feeling of “being at home while 
abroad” (Chapter IV). Yet, networks can also pose obstacles for migrants who transgress well-
established residential and labour ethnic patterns, as Sandro and Edelina’s launching of a 
verdulería shows (Chapter IV). The case of this Tarijeño couple also demonstrates the extent 
to which networks of compatriots are strongly ethnicized social fields, traversed by marked 
differences in socio-economic status (Glick Schiller 2004) that not only support migration but 
also function to prevent the geographical, social and economic mobility of compatriots in the 
partido. Depending on networks can also become problematic for migrants when they 
presume a certain shared ethic that others do not actually share, as Yolanda’s initial painful 
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experience when sharing an apartment with compatriots illustrates (Chapter IV). Migrants also 
belong to social networks which are not ethnically based, such as churches, whose ethnic 
membership tends to be quite diversified, including migrants and non-migrants. As Ana and 
Leo’s participation in a Christian network around a prison congregation shows, faith-based 
networks can become essential for the emotional, social and economic survival of migrant 
families going through difficult times (Chapter V). Many of those who have become active 
members of churches, which are mostly Evangelical, note that religious congregations are the 
only social space in Argentina where they feel treated as equals by migrants and non-migrants, 
while benefitting a wealth of resources (see Steigenga and Cleary eds. 2007, and Levitt 2008 
on these issues).  
 
Migrants’ Value of their New “Legality” in the Partido of La Plata 
 
My fieldwork shows that migrants’ views of their new legal status in Argentina during the 
2000s, or of having their residence papers in order, vary depending on their actual exercise of 
citizenship practices (Gregory 2004, 2007; Gagné and Neveu 2009). The more rights migrants 
can access while fulfilling their civic obligations and enjoying somewhat convivial informal 
social interaction with migrant and non-migrant residents, the more they consider it important 
to be “legal”, that is, to have their precaria or residency papers. This becomes most apparent 
in La Plata’s urban areas, where the governmentality regime deployed by the state has not only 
granted residents the most benefits (in terms of public services and state protection), but also 
subjected them to the highest control (in terms of work and documentation regularization 
campaigns, for example). At the other end of the spectrum, migrants in rural areas do not see 
the difference between having their Argentinean papers or not, since their access to public 
entitlements, including state protection, has been practically non-existent. Quinteros tend to be 
rather perplexed about the dissonance between official promises and their non-fulfilment by 
the government. Those living in peripheries of the partido are in an in-between situation since 
they have been subject to a governmentality regime of neglect and absence in their 
neighbourhoods, similar to that of rural areas, yet, they have also exercised some of their new 
public entitlements  given the close state scrutiny they experience  working in urban localities.  
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INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS, HOUSEHOLD STRATEGIES AND KINSHIP OBLIGATIONS  
The analysis of the ethnographic cases I have presented in the thesis demonstrates that 
transnational migrations do not exclusively respond to economically calculated reasoning, but 
are rather guided by complex decision-making processes integral to household strategies. 
Decisions to migrate are always gendered and are related to the positioning of different 
individuals in their household’s reproductive cycle and power hierarchies at particular 
moments. Migration decisions often result from negotiations taking place within extended 
kinship networks and that are always framed by shifting economic, political and social 
circumstances, affecting the contrasting of prospects available at home and “somewhere else”. 
“Better” prospects are not merely defined in economic terms, but rather, in varying 
combinations of social and environmental safety, civil and political freedoms, gender role 
expectations, access to a variety of public entitlements (notably education and health care) and 
upper social mobility opportunities (Merla and Baldassar 2010, Cohen 2011). The balance of 
migrants’ evaluations of such bundles of prospects changes over time, yet it always involves 
considerations going beyond merely economic or individual factors. Migrants have not left 
Argentina in an exodus each time that its economy has markedly deteriorated, not even during 
the last financial crisis (Pacecca and Courtis 2008, Texidó 2008, Cerrutti 2009). In fact, their 
economic situation (in this country) tends to be characterized by rather long periods of 
financial hardship that migrants often balance out with a number of other rights that their 
families enjoy, and which they cannot even dream of in their countries of origin. Some 
migrants note that relatives live better and longer, and that parents can secure good prospects 
for their children (through their universal access to public health care and education); others 
emphasize the invaluable opportunity to acquire their own homes (through the usucapión or 
planes de vivienda), while others mention their increased autonomy and independence (mostly 
women and youth). Moreover, even in households that have done well economically, some of 
its members decide to return home for a number of non-pecuniary reasons, such as kinship 
obligations (having to care for elderly parents), nostalgia (longing to enjoy old age back home, 
often without having to work thanks to an Argentinean pension) or unbearable marginalization 
(often among children being bullied at school). While in some cases, people migrate to leave 
kinship obligations or gendered duties behind, in others, migrants feel obliged to remain in 
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Argentina, even when they yearn to return, to fulfil such obligations (see Merla and Baldassar 
2010, Merla 2010 and Baldassar 2010 on these issues).  
QUESTIONING HEGEMONIC APPROACHES: SOUTH AMERICAN MIGRATIONS TO 
ARGENTINA 
My dissertation also contributes to the decentring of the hegemonic geopolitics that have 
shaped research and policy agendas in the scholarship on migrant transnationalism and 
citizenship. This literature’s predominant focus on the Euro-Atlantic arena has brought about 
two particularly problematic issues. First, it has considered English-speaking settler societies 
and Western Europe as the destinations “par excellence” of transnational migrants, while 
assuming that an almost exclusive South-North dynamic propels these migrations. This 
assumption has not only permeated current literature on the “transnationalization or 
privatization of social reproduction” (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001, Parreñas 2001, Ehrenreich and 
Russell Hochschild 2002, Russell Hochschild 2002, Maher 2004, Herrera Mosquera 2008, 
Arat-Koç and Giles 1996) supporting the “social organization of care” (Glenn 2010), but has 
also guided research on the political economy of migrations from “poor” to “rich” countries 
more generally (Sassen 1998). My study of Peruvian, Paraguayan and Bolivian migrations to 
Argentina challenges this claim by illustrating the increasing centrality of intra-regional or so-
called “South-South” migrations in Latin America (see also Ratha and Shaw 2007, Hujo and 
Piper eds. 2010, Goldade 2008, Gardner 2010). The International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) indicates that intra-regional migrations in South America are increasing, along with a 
concomitant decrease in the emigration of South Americans to European countries and the 
United States (Carmo 2012). Argentina continues to be not only the country that attracts the 
most migrants in the region, but also the benchmark for migrations in the Southern Cone 
(Texidó 2008). In this regard, my dissertation also shows the extent to which a “Southern 
country” such as Argentina can be at the same time an immigration and emigration state that 
plays diverse roles in the mobility trajectory of migrants, ranging from the desired “final” 
destination to a transitional one permitting those on the move to get the papers or the 
necessary capital to migrate to the next one; e.g., many Peruvians, Bolivians and Peruvians in 
the country, who see their Argentinean DNI as opening the door to European destinations, 
most often Spain.  
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Second, dominant paradigms (Glick Schiller 2004) in the scholarship on migrant 
transnationalism and citizenship, produced in the “Global North”, have often neglected the 
prolific work of scholars from the “Global South”, which has led to the use of diverse 
combinations of Euro-American value systems as “universals” when designing research (and 
policy) despite the diversity of the groups concerned and their geographical locations. My 
thesis draws on local and regional scholarship and is based on extended fieldwork in 
Argentina, undertaken in a serious attempt to further question my own disciplinary and 
scholarly geopolitical assumptions. As I have noted, however, “ethnographic truths” remain 
inherently partial and made possible by powerful “lies” of exclusion and rhetoric since power 
and history work through them, in ways their authors cannot fully control (Clifford 1986). 
 
My dissertation makes apparent that the nation-state continues to play a central role 
when it comes to regulating peoples’ movements across its borders and within its territory as 
well as migrants’ access to entitlements. Its legitimacy and authority to do so have continued 
to prevail over other political entities, even if the powers of the state have been renegotiated in 
the context of regional integration initiatives and global economic and political processes. My 
analysis of Kirchnerismo’s policies has sought to bring to the fore the tension between 
somewhat neat official discourse and policy design, and its conflicting implementation along 
with the unexpected results that it brings about (see also Crewe and Harrison 1998). What I 
have examined in chapter III is the governmentality regime deployed by Kirchnerismo to 
govern different populations in the state’s territory (Foucault 1975, 1978) in an effort to shape 
the nation’s social imaginary according to its political project. Providing evidence for this 
tension, other than the implementation of the new migration law and migrants’ actual 
experiences of their new entitlements in the partido of La Plata, has proved difficult. In this 
regard, Argentinean colleagues note that up to the present most academic analyses of 
Kirchnerismo’ policies have been rather politicised, that is, pro or against (black or white), and 
based on rhetoric and isolated data. Scholars also indicate that solid empirical studies take 
time to be completed and are often published several years after a government has left office, 
which explains that up to 2006, the literature focused on the effects of the 1990s model, and 
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only in 2010, did it begin to examine Néstor Kirchner’s policies (Argentinean anthropologist 
Pablo Rodríguez, personal communication). 
I have also tried to show that migrants’ exercise of their new public entitlements is 
never merely an issue of legal status. In the contrary, migrants’ experiences of their new 
formal equality are constructed in daily social interaction, and depend of four sets of factors: 
a) the groups’ (shifting) standing in the hierarchical national moral order (Ong 2004), b) the 
zones of graduated sovereignty (Ong 1999) evolving in different geographical areas, c) the 
embodiment of difference (Morris 2002), and d) migrants’ belonging to transnational social 
networks permeated by power inequalities and differences of gender and social class (Glick 
Schiller 2004). Membership in the state and the nation has always been permeated by 
conflictive negotiation and exclusionary measures (Shafir 2004, Howard 2006, Morris 2002, 
Gregory 2007). Finally, my thesis emphasizes that in order to properly understand migrants’ 
citizenship practices (Gregory 2004, 2007; Gagné and Neveu 2009), they have to be situated 
not only locally, but also in the context of national and regional politics.  
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Appendix A: Maps 
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   Fig. 1: Political Map of South America. 
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Fig. 2: Political map of Argentina.  
 
 
v 
 
Fig. 3: Political map of the Gran Buenos Aires (GBA) or conurbano bonaerense.  
The GBA is composed of 24 partidos, with a total land area of 3, 680 km2, and has a 
population of 9,916,715 inhabitants that accounts for 63.46% of the provincial total. 
The Gran La Plata Aglomerado Urbano is composed of the partidos of La Plata, Berisso and 
Ensenada.  
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Fig.4: Map of the Partido de La Plata.  
The partido of La Plata is often considered part of the GBA due to geographical proximity and 
for demographic reasons, even if, from an administrative point of view, it belongs to the 
interior of Buenos Aires province. The partido has a land area of 942.23 km2 and comprises 
its casco urbano or capital, La Plata city, and 17 centros communales or localities with urban, 
peripheral and rural characteristics (Abasto, Arturo Seguí, City Bell, Etcheverry, El Peligro, 
Gonnet, Gorina, Hernández, Lisandro Olmos, Los Hornos, Melchor Romero, Ringuelet, San 
Carlos, San Lorenzo, Tolosa, Villa Elisa y Villa Elvira). According to the 2010 Census, the 
partido has 654,324 inhabitants and one third of them live in its capital. Situated 56 km south 
of Buenos Aires city, La Plata city is also the capital of Buenos province 
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Table I. Source: Censo Nacional de Población, Hogares y Viviendas 2001 and 2010, Instituto 
Geográfico Nacional (INDEC 2012) 
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Table II. Source: Censo Nacional de Población, Hogares y Viviendas 2001 and 2010, Instituto 
Geográfico Nacional (INDEC 2012). 
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Table III. Source: Censo Nacional de Población, Hogares y Viviendas 2010 (INDEC 2012). 
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Table IV. Source: Censo Nacional de Población, Hogares y Viviendas 2010 (INDEC 2012). 
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Table V. Source: Censo Nacional de Población, Hogares y Viviendas 2010 (INDEC 2012).  
 
 
xiii 
 
Table VI. Source: Censo Nacional de Población, Hogares y Viviendas 2010 (INDEC 2012). 
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ON KIRCHNERISMO’S POLITICAL-IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS 
Perón’s Controversial Political Persona 
In 1946, Juan Domingo Perón presented his presidential candidature with Hortensio Quijano 
as vice-president of the Partido Laborista and won the elections with 56% of the votes. This 
victory marked the beginning of what has been called the “Argentinean revolutionary process” 
(Aritz Recalde, 2010). The competing party, the Unión Democrática, headed by José P. 
Tamborini, obtained 44% of the votes. The Partido Laborista was a coalition integrated by the 
Junta Coordinadora de la Unión Cívica Radical (a dissident fraction of radicalismo), unions 
and other “political groups” (agrupaciones políticas). The 1946 elections were considered the 
“cleanest and freest” in Argentinean history, despite the campaign launched by the US 
Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs Spruille Braden (1945-1947), at 
the time US Ambassador to Argentina (1945), which attempted to discredit the corruption-free 
nature of the elections (Moniz Bandeira 2004, p.203). 
 
The views of Perón are quite controversial. Those who see him as a líder popular 
(popular leader), who fought for los intereses del pueblo (the nation’s interests), claim that his 
policies were aimed at resolving the problems of workers and national entrepreneurs. 
Accordingly, Perón is described as a nationalist, a Latin Americanist, an industrialist and an 
anti-imperialist (Aritz Recalde 2010-e, f, g; 2011). In contrast, others have highlighted Perón’s 
coercion of those who opposed his regime, such as the American historian Whitaker (1956, 
cited in Moniz Bandeira 2004), who describes his regime as “the tyranny of the majority over 
a minority under democratic forms”. Critics of Perón argue that his accomplishments were 
partly based on both the coercion of those who opposed his views and the expansion of his 
discretionary powers. Persecution and imprisonment, which initially targeted the country’s 
ruling classes, soon extended to all those who did not sympathize with Justicialismo (Perón’s 
regime) and affected newspapers and universities.  
 
Although under Perón’s governments, Argentina normalized the functioning of its 
democratic institutions, from the beginning the PJ or Partido Justicialista (his own party), 
dominated both chambers of congress and gradually came to control the Supreme Court of 
Justice. In 1947, through a political process promoted by the congress, Perón managed to 
eradicate the judges who were hindering the implementation of new laws. In 1948, thanks to 
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the overwhelming victory of the PJ in the legislative elections, he amended the 1853 
Constitution allowing for: a) a “direct vote” (previously voting was conducted with an 
electoral college system as in the United States), b) presidential re-election and c) the 
deepening of the state’s intervention in the economy, thus obtaining a monopoly over foreign 
trade, mineral exploitation, energy sources and public services. Perón also had the support of 
unions and the influential Confederacón General del Trabajo (CGT), which counterbalanced 
the power of the Fuerzas Armadas (Army), and controlled a large proportion of Buenos Aires’ 
newspapers. Together, these circumstances gave Perón a great deal of freedom to personally 
determine the country’s destiny (Moniz Bandeira 2004).   
 
Perón’s tercera posición (“third position”) program implied the consolidation of an 
economic and political community in South America, which he believed could evolve into a 
third bloc able to mediate conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union, and 
ostensibly object to United States supremacy in Latin America. With this goal in mind, Perón 
intensified commercial and political ties with other South American countries while promoting 
Justicialismo in the region. In Perón’s project, this community of nations would include 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia and Peru, and would start as a customs union capable of 
regulating the world’s market of raw materials. By potentially incorporating Spain, Portugal 
and France, this community could evolve into a third bloc  (Moniz Bandeira 2004). Perón’s 
third position also entailed combating communism by eradicating its causes: the poverty and 
misery resulting from the extreme social inequalities generated by capitalism in liberal 
democracies. Perón proscribed the Communist Party (which was in line with the economic and 
politic elites opposing his government) and established diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union a day after assuming his presidential mandate—despite describing himself as an anti-
communist and being a former sympathizer of Nazi-fascism (Moniz Bandeira 2004). 
 
Perón’s first presidential term (1946-1955) gave women the right to vote in 1947 and 
sanctioned the 1949 Constitution, which recognized the rights of workers and state companies 
while protecting the country’s natural resources. This constitution also established an eight-
hour work day, paid holidays and workers’ leisure time (derecho al esparcimiento) while 
regulating rural labourers and lease-holders’ rights for the first time. Perón’s fist mandate 
guaranteed the right to housing (derecho a la vivienda) through the creation of popular 
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neighbourhoods (barrios populares) financed by the state, while building community 
organizations’ premises and neighbourhood clubs. He developed a universal (free) public 
health care system with the state as the producer of drugs, and made public education, from 
kindergarten to university, free. Perón also created technical schools, the Universidad Obrera 
Nacional and the Ministry of Education while building schools, libraries, laboratories and 
universities. National science was developed at military factories, the State Aeronautic and 
Mechanic Industries (IAME) and the National Commission of Atomic Energy. Moreover, 
Perón promoted the launching of political youth organizations, such as the Unión de 
Estudiantes Secundarios (UES) and the Confederación General Universitaria (CGU), and the 
creation of the Confederación General Empresaria (CGE). His policies also led to the 
centralization and strengthening of the Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT) and a 
dramatic increase in unionizing rates (Aritz Recalde, 2010-e; Moniz Bandeira 2004).  
 
Perón sanctioned the first Ley de Medios (Law 14.241/53) in the country in 1953, 
contributed to the creation of TELAM (the Argentinean National News Agency) in 1945, and 
created a public TV channel (Canal 7) in 1951. Perón’s first and second presidencies also 
promoted national cinema, which permitted the development of this industry—the 
International Film Festival in Mar del Plata in 1954 gave national artists global visibility, for 
example. Perón’s third presidency nationalized the most important TV channels in Argentina 
and his “National Plan of Communication” introduced the professionalization of journalism 
and communication studies in 1954 (Aritz Recalde, 2009-b).  
 
By the 1950s however, Argentina was showing an increasing tendency towards 
instability. Affected by the economic depression, Perón’s government was falling into a 
political crisis while intensifying the repression of his adversaries. In a context of increasing 
tension in universities and the Army, Perón ordered a “state of internal war”, which furthered 
the persecution of the opposition and the restriction of political freedoms. It was under these 
circumstances that he presented his presidential candidature in 1951 with his second wife Eva 
Duarte, known as Evita, as vice-president, and they won with 65% of the votes. The death of 
Evita in July 1952, however, contributed to the weakening of the government. Inflation, 
increasing unemployment rates and a budget crisis forced Perón to improve his relationship 
with the United States and to accept its economic demands in order to obtain financial support. 
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Although the “opening” of the economy to foreign capital improved Argentina’s financial 
situation, a coup d’état forced Perón to flee to Paraguay in 1955 (Moniz Bandeira 2004; Aritz 
Recalde 2010). Being persecuted by successive United States-funded military regimes in 
Argentina, Perón obtained asylum in various Latin American countries, where he continued to 
plan his return to political life in Argentina while promoting Justicialismo. In 1973, he won 
the presidential election with his third wife, María Estela Martínez, known as Isabel, as vice-
president, with 62% of the vote (Moniz Moreira 2004). Perón began to pursue goals similar to 
those of his first presidency, yet this time formulated in a Plan Trienal (three-year plan) 
instead of Quinquenal. Perón died on July 1974 and the subsequent deterioration of the 
country’s political and economic circumstances led to a coup d’état in 1976 which overthrew 
Isabel, who had succeeded Perón in office (Aritz Recalde, 2010-g; Moniz Moneira 2004). 
 
The Celebrated Próceres Latinoamericanos  
 
Francisco Morazán (1792–1842) ruled several Central American states during the turbulent 
period from 1827 to 1842, and was recognized as a visionary and great thinker who attempted 
to transform Central America into one large and progressive nation known as the Federal 
Republic. Due to his military skills, he was able to keep a firm grip on power until 1837, when 
his Republic became irrevocably fractured and was divided into five Central American nations 
by the conservative opposition. Morazán rose to prominence during the Battle of La Trinidad 
on November 11, 1827 and dominated the political and military scene in Central America until 
his execution in 1842.  
 
José Francisco de San Martín Gómez y Matorras (1778–1850), known as José de San 
Martín, was the primary leader of southern South America’s successful struggle for 
independence from Spain. He was born in Yapeyú, Corrientes, Argentina, which he left as a 
child in order to complete his schooling in Madrid. In 1808, San Martín joined Spanish forces 
to fight against France. In 1812, after contacting the promoters of South American 
independence in Europe, he set sail for Buenos Aires and offered his services to the “United 
Provinces of South America”. After the Battle of San Lorenzo (1813) and spending time as 
commander of the Ejército del Norte in 1814, San Martín started to put into action his plan to 
defeat the Spanish forces that menaced the United Provinces. San Martín created the Ejército 
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de los Andes in the province of Cuyo, Argentina, which recruited soldiers from diverse parts 
of the region and carried this army’s flag instead of the Argentinean one. From Cuyo, he led 
the “Crossing of the Andes” to Chile and prevailed over Spanish forces at the Battles of 
Chacabuco and Maipú (1818). This led to the liberation of Chile from Royalist rule. San 
Martín then set sail to attack the Spanish stronghold of Lima, Perú by sea. After seizing partial 
control of Lima in 1821, he was appointed Protector of Perú and, a few days later, on July 28, 
1821, Peruvian independence was officially declared. After a closed-door meeting with fellow 
liberator Simón Bolívar in Guayaquil, Ecuador on July 22, 1822, San Martín unexpectedly left 
the country and resigned the command of his army, while Bolívar took over the task of fully 
liberating Peru. San Martín excluded himself from politics and the military and moved to 
France in 1824.  
 
Bernardo O'Higgins Riquelme (1778–1842) was a Chilean independence leader who, 
together with San Martín, freed Chile from Spanish rule during the Chilean War of 
Independence. Although he was the second Supreme Director of Chile (1817–1823), 
O'Higgins is considered one of Chile’s founding fathers, as he was the first holder of this title 
to head a fully independent Chilean state.  
 
José Gervasio Artigas Arnal (1764–1850) was a Uruguayan national hero, sometimes 
called "the father of Uruguayan independence". In 1814, he organized the Liga de los Pueblos 
Libres, of which he was declared Protector. In 1815, he liberated Montevideo from the control 
of the Unitarians from Buenos Aires.  
 
José Julián Martí Pérez (1853–1895) was a Cuban national hero and an important 
figure in Latin American literature. In his short life, he was a poet, an essayist, a journalist, a 
revolutionary, a philosopher, a translator, a professor, a publisher, and a political theorist. He 
was also part of the Cuban Freemasons. Through his writings and political activity, Martí 
became a symbol of Cuba's bid for independence against Spain in the 19th century and is 
referred to as the "Apostle of Cuban Independence". He also fought against the threat of 
United States expansionism into Cuba.  
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Tracing the Origin and Subsequent Use of the Term Patria Grande in Argentina 
Widely employed by South American governments during the 2000s, the term Patria Grande 
was in fact coined in 1922 by the Argentinean writer, diplomat, and socialist politician Manuel 
Ugarte (1875–1951) when editing a book promoting Latin American union. The term has also 
been juxtaposed with that of Patria Chica to signal contrasting political projects in Latin 
America, as, for example, by Arturo Jauretche (1901–1974), a prominent Argentinean writer 
and politician. He used Patria Chica to designate the political projects of transferring 
resources and sovereignty into foreign hands, and Patria Grande to refer to those oriented 
toward the defense of the material, territorial, social, and cultural patrimony of peoples 
(pueblos) and the promotion of Latin American integration (Jauretche 1958).  Generally 
speaking, the term Patria Grande has been used by activists, scholars and politicians in Latin 
America to signal a “shared space of belonging” (among nations) and the collective imagery 
built around the possibility of creating an enlarged political union in the region. As a result, 
the term has been closely associated with that of unión latinoamericana (Latin American 
union) and to the libertarian projects of Bolívar and San Martín. 
 
ON KIRCHNERISMO’S POLICIES 
Recovering Social Rights and Reaching Argentinians Living Abroad 
 
The Política de Recuperación de Derechos Sociales implemented by Kirchnerismo targeted a 
wide range of social groups, as I showed in chapter III. Here, I briefly review the public 
strategies focusing on four of these groups: people with disabilities, homosexuals, aboriginal 
populations and the elderly. Kirchnerismo implemented an important number of projects, 
programs and subsidies in order to enhance the integral participation of individuals with 
disabilities and their families in all spheres of society (Presidencia de la Nación Argentina at 
www.casarosada.gov.ar, consulted between May and August 2011). Argentina also adopted 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Person with Disabilities and its Protocol 
(under Law 26.378) on May 21, 2008 and the International Day of People with Disabilities 
(following the 1992 UN Declaration) on December 13, 2010 (Argentina en Noticias at 
www.argentina.ar and Sala de Prensa, Secretaría de Medios de Comunicación at 
www.prensa.argentina.ar, retrieved on January 20, 2011). Moreover, Argentina’s new Ley de 
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medios (Law 26.522) passed in October 2009, establishes that TV and cable stations must 
incorporate closed captioning, sign language and audio description in order to guarantee 
“equal opportunity” for people with sensorial disabilities, the elderly and others with difficulty 
accessing this type of content (www.argentina.ar, retrieved in January 2011).  
 
Argentina passed the Ley de Matrimonio Igualitario (Law 26.618) in July 2010, which 
modifies the Civil Code to allow people of the same sex to get married (Argentina en Noticias 
at www.argentina.ar and Sala de Prensa, Secretaria de Medios de Comunicación at 
www.prensa.argentina.ar; retrieved on January 20, 2011). As part of Kirchnerismo’s effort to 
rewrite the nation’s official history, several initiatives incorporated aboriginal peoples’ own 
versions of history into it while revaluing their contributions to Argentinean society and 
culture (Apoyo a los Pueblos Originarios under Obra de Gobierno at www.casarosada.gov.ar, 
Argentina en Noticias at www.argentina.ar,  and Sala de Prensa, Secretaria de Medios de 
Comunicación  at www.prensa.argentina.ar; consulted between June and August 2011). See 
also Tamagno (1997), who examines the políticas indigenistas in Argentina, and Maidana et al 
(2010), who analyze the classificatory logics underpinning the creation and implementation of 
censuses on aboriginal populations in the country.  
 
The elderly benefited from a substantial public measure implemented by Kirchnerismo: 
the universalization of a non-taxable pension given to all adults older than 70 years of age who 
do not receive any other social security allowance or a salary and who live in poverty 
(situación de pobreza). This measure sought to remediate the pernicious consequences of the 
AFJP system introduced during the 1990s, as part of Menem’s privatizations. The AFJP was a 
deregulated and private system administering workers’ contributions, which, by the end of the 
decade had left a very large proportion of the retirement-age population unemployed and 
without access to any pension despite decades of making pension contributions. The AFJP 
fiasco was not exclusive to Argentina but widespread in many other Latin American countries, 
where the International Monetary Fund (IMF) had imposed neoliberal and ultraconservative 
economic policies during the 1980s and 1990s as a prerequisite to obtaining financial aid 
(Black 2002). In October 2008, the AFJP system was replaced by the Sistema Integrado 
Previsional Argentino (SIPA), which restored public retirement and pension plans, where 
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participation was compulsory (Administración Nacional de la Seguridad Social at 
www.anses.gob.ar, Obra de Gobierno, Ministerio de Trabajo at www.casarosada.gov.ar; 
consulted between July and August 2011). According to official statistics, 100,000 
Argentinians accessed a jubilación anticipada (an advanced retirement pension) thanks to the 
SIPA. 
 
Kirchnerismo implemented a series of measures to decrease the heterogeneity of 
incomes among workers who were not protected by any collective agreement while increasing 
their purchasing power. Central to these measures was the progressive increase of the salario 
vital y móvil or minimum wage, which was implemented in three stages—to $1,400 pesos in 
August 2009, to $1,440 in October 2009 and to $1,500 in January 2010. According to official 
statistics, this strategy reached 300,000 non-unionized workers, excluding those in rural areas 
and in the domestic sector, who were targeted by the specific measures I noted in chapter III. 
This measure was developed and implemented by the Consejo del Salario (Salary Council), 
which is composed by the Ministry of Work, the CGT, the Central de los Trabajadores 
Argentinos (CTA) and business entities (Presidencia Argentina de la Nación, Obra de 
Gobierno-TRABAJO, Ibid; retrieved on August 5, 2010; Cruces and Gasparini 2010). 
 
 
Kirchnerismo developed a number of strategies to target Argentinians living abroad 
and the following four are the most noteworthy: a) the RAICES Program (Red de Argentinos 
Investigadores y Científicos en el Exterior) that seeks to connect Argentinean scientists living 
abroad with local research groups (see http://www.raices.mincyt.gov.ar); b) the Volver a 
Trabajar Program that seeks to repatriate Argentinean scientists living abroad through job 
offers, post-doctoral fellowships, and other measures; c) Inter-institutional strategies and 
partnerships (including doctoral, internship and post-doc fellowships) to train (locally and 
abroad) and retain scientists in Argentina’s technology priority areas; and d) the Provincia 25 
Program that seeks to promote the democratic participation of Argentinians abroad and 
strengthen their relationship with the state (Texidó 2008).  
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LATIN AMERICAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND MERCOSUR 
Integration Initiatives in Latin America since the 1960s  
 
A number of regional integration projects in Latin America have generated disparate results, 
confronting social actors with differing interests; they include: the Asociación 
Latinoamericana de librecomercio (ALALC) created in 1960, which in the Montevideo Treaty 
of 1980 became the Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI); the Managua 
General Treaty of Centro-American Integration (MCCA) of 1960; the Asociación de Libre 
Comercio del Caribe of 1965 which became CARICOM (Caribbean Community) in 1972; and 
the Grupo Andino (1966-1969) which became the Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN) by 
the Pacto Andino of 1969 (Mellado 2009, Armony 2011).  
 
Following Ferré (2009), Aritz Recalde (2010-c) argues that two “big waves” of 
regional integration have taken place since independence in Latin America, one in the 1960s 
and the other in the 1990s, creating five “basic nodes of integration”: NAFTA, Mercado 
Común Centroamericano, CARICOM, Comunidad Andina and MERCOSUR. Recalde adds to 
this list UNASUR and ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América 
created in 2004).   
 
Member and Associated States of MERCOSUR Ampliado 
 
The requirements for a state wanting to become estado parte (full member) of the 
MERCOSUR are different from those for a state wanting to become estado asociado 
(associate). In the first case, a state has to ratify MERCOSUR’s central treaties and adhere to 
the Tratado de Asunción of 1991 (i.e., incorporation into the bloc’s “free trade zone” and 
adoption of the AEC or External Common Tariff), the Protocolo Oruro Preto of 1994 
(participation in the institutional structure of the MERCOSUR and approval of its resolutions) 
and the Protocolo de Olivos of 2002 (resolution of controversies). In contrast, to join the 
MERCOSUR as an estado asociado, the state has to a) be a member of the ALADI 
(Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración), b) subscribe to the Protocol of Ushuaia on 
Democratic Commitment (of 1998, ratified in 2004), and c) work to ratify other protocols on 
education, culture and judicial cooperation. Associated states can participate in 
MERCOSUR’s meetings, adding their opinions to the debate, but they lack voting power. In 
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addition, the demands that need to be met by associated states in the area of commercial 
integration are less stringent than those imposed on member states; their participation in the 
resolution of controversies is also less important. The conditions required in order to join the 
MERCOSUR as estado asociado were established in 2004 by the Consejo del Mercado 
Común (http://www.mercosur.int; retrieved on March 16, 2011).  
 
MERCOSUR Político, Social and Institucional  
MERCOSUR Ampliado sees integration as a “vital political agreement” laying the foundations 
for the stable, democratic, peaceful and just development of the region. Two foundational 
treaties were signed in 1998 yet only ratified in 2004: a) the Ushuaia Protocol on Democratic 
Commitment establishes that the proper functioning of democratic institutions is an 
indispensable condition for the development of regional integration, and b) the Political 
Declaration of the MERCOSUR, Bolivia and Chile as Peace Zone states that peace is essential 
for the continuity and deepening regional integration of the region, and puts in place regional 
mechanisms for cooperation and coordination on issues of security and defense, as well as on 
agendas of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In 2007, the Democracy Observatory 
of the MERCOSUR was created to strengthen the objectives established by the Ushuaia 
Protocol (MERCOSUR’s official website, Ibid; retrieved on March 16, 2011). 
 
The bloc has also emphasized the need to foster economic development with social 
justice and to this extent it created the Instituto Social del MERCOSUR (SIM) in 2007, which 
has striven to strengthen integration while promoting “integral human development” in the 
region. A core part of the MERCOSUR Social, the SIM has sought to overcome regional 
asymmetries by collaborating in the design of regional social policies, systematizing and 
updating social regional indicators, exchanging “best practices”, and seeking new sources of 
funding for its projects (MERCOSUR Social’s website at http://www.mercosur-social.org; 
retrieved on March 16, 2011). The bloc also created the Instituto de Políticas Públicas de 
Derechos Humanos (IPPDDHH) in 2009 in order to make the defense of human rights “a 
fundamental axis of MERCOSUR’s identity and development” (MERCOSUR’s official 
website, Ibid). 
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Four sets of important modifications to the socio-juridical dimension of integration 
signal MERCOSUR’s efforts to strengthen its institutions: a) marked changes and updates in 
the core laws of member states, notably, reforms of national constitutions; b) strong regulatory 
activity of MERCOSUR’s bodies, especially that of the Grupo Mercado Común that deals 
with commercial issues; c) progress made in the areas of education, social security (prevision 
social), judiciary and health care policies, fundamentally in the hands of the Consejo del 
Mercado Común; and d) the limited role played by the legislative powers and political parties 
(Novick 2010). In addition, MERCOSUR’s institutional structure and international legal entity 
were modified by replacing the Comisión Parlamentaria Conjunta (CPC, created by the Oruro 
Preto Protocol of 1994) with the Parliament of the MERCOSUR. The Consejo del Mercado 
Común set the directives for the bloc’s new institutional stage in 2007, and created the 
Reunión de Alto Nivel para el Análisis Institucional del MERCOSUR (RANAM) in 2010 
(MERCOSUR’s official website, Ibid). 
 
Despite the remarkable progress made in the social, political and institutional aspects 
of integration during the 2000s, MERCOSUR continues to be predominantly an initiative that 
focuses on economic integration, or as it is usually phrased, one marked by its mercantile 
origins. This becomes apparent in the amount of progress made by the bloc on the commercial 
and financial aspects of integration, which vastly surpass that made by its social, political and 
institutional counterparts. The strategies deployed by the MERCOSUR to consolidate an 
“external common duty” (Arancel Externo Común), to “correct” structural (economic) 
asymmetries and foster the productive integration of the region illustrate this imbalance 
(MERCOSUR’s website, Ibid; retrieved on March 16, 2011). 
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1 As I will show, this term had stigmatizing connotations during the 1990s, which progressively 
decreased in the following decade. My use of this label does not carry such meaning, however, and is 
justifed instead in its synthetic capacity, that is, I can refer to these three groups collectively by using 
only one term. Throughout the thesis, I also use the longer label “migrants from neighbouring nations” 
as an equivalent to that of limítrofes. 
2 See Appendix C for the requirements to be fulfilled by a state seeking to join the MERCOSUR either 
as member or associated state. 
3 This term was widely employed in the end of the 1990s in Argentina to refer to the processes that 
emptied or drained the state of its resources and services, transforming it into a hollow or empty 
structure. 
4 Large cuts in the budgets of these public services were legitimized by ruthless campaigns praising the 
private, allegedly more efficient and transparent options offered by the market, which only a few could 
afford. 
5 An excellent documentary that analyzes the roots and effects of the 1990s crisis in Argentina is 
Memoria del Saqueo (2004), directed and produced by Fernando Solana. Another one is Bombón el 
perro (2004), directed by Carlos Sorín, which examines the impact of this crisis in the country’s south. 
Both have been screened at international film festivals in 2005 with French and English subtitles. 
6 Workers in their 50s were in a particularly vulnerable situation. Being considered too expensive and 
old for the flexible market, they were among the first to be fired and hardly ever found employment 
according to their qualifications and experience. 
7 Perticará (1995) and Maguid (1995, 1997, 2001) show that migrants from neighbouring countries 
have posed no risk for Argentinean workers, whereas Torrado (1994) and Oteiza and Aruj (2000) 
emphasize that the actual problem was being created by the employers who exploited these migrants by 
paying them salaries that did not correspond with labour legislation.  
8 The term colectividad is widely employed in Argentina by migrants, government officials, the media 
and ordinary citizens to refer to the country’s migrant groups or communities, which are defined 
employing nationality criteria.  
9 These supposedly clear-cut distinctions often became blurry in migrants’ narratives, especially when 
common experiences of discrimination (despite their distinctive migratory statuses, arrival times and 
economic situations) provided Peruvians, Bolivians and Paraguayans with a fertile ground to equally 
identify with. See Recalde (2006-a), esp. ch. V.  
10 According to successive national censuses, Europeans represented the following proportions of the 
total Argentinean population: 13.3% in 1947, 10.7% in 1960, 7.2% in 1970, 4.1% in 1980, 2.4% in 
1991 and 1.6% in 2001 (Pacecca and Courtis 2008, p.10).  
11 Even if at that time, Argentina received fewer immigrants than the United States, its numbers were 
larger than those of Canada and Brazil. Compared to other countries in the Americas, Argentina 
attracted a larger proportion of family groups and a larger percentage of people who declared an 
occupation (more farmers and qualified workers than day labourers). In addition, its return rates were 
lower (Devoto 2004, Ch. 6). 
12 The estimates of these migrants’ associations were higher because they included their descendants 
who were born in Argentina: 20,000 Koreans and 40,000 Chinese (Pacecca and Courtis 2008).   
13 In 1994, in the context of the dismantling of the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), the 
Argentinean Ministry of the Interior granted nationals of 21 Eastern Europe’s former republics special 
treatment, allowing them to solicit a one-year temporary visa without a work contract. According to 
official statistics, up to 7,500 of these visas were granted by 1999, in the vast majority of cases to 
Ukrainians (Pacecca and Courtis 2008).   
 
 
xxviii 
                                                                                                                                                         
14 Texidó (2008) proposes the same numbers even if using different sources and presents statistics 
disaggregated by country on extra-regional refugees. He combines data from the Dirección Nacional 
de Migraciones (DNM), Ministry of Interior, with that from the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR). Pacecca and Courtis (2008) examine the demographics and specific 
challenges to socio-economic participation of different refugee groups in Argentina along with the 
problems permeating official statistics on refugees in Argentina.  
15 See Aruj (2004) for an interesting (trans-disciplinary) analysis of why university students of the 
UBA (Universidad de Buenos Aires) decided to emigrate during the 1990s.  
16 According to the 2010 Census, Argentina’s total population was 40,117,096 inhabitants and was 
unevenly spread over a land area of 3,745,997 km2. See Table I. (INDEC 2012,Cuadro P3).  
17 I have conducted fieldwork research on migration and identity issues in La Plata city since 1995. My 
personal projects initially focused on Japanese migrants and their descendants (1995-1997) and, 
thereafter, on South American groups (1998-today). My early, urban research on the latter included 
Uruguayans, Brazilians, Chileans, Paraguayans, Peruvians and Bolivians (1998-2000), but, since 2001, 
I began to concentrate on the last three groups. Since I moved to Canada in the end of 2000, I have 
returned to La Plata (and Buenos Aires) for a month every year. In 2005, I spent the summer 
conducting fieldwork research in both cities. From 1995 to 2000, I also participated in a wide range of 
research projects on diverse migrant groups in the province of Buenos Aires directed by Professor 
Marta Maffia at the Universidad Nacional de La Plata.  
18 Both migrants’ nationality and sex were evenly represented: one third of them were Peruvian, one 
third were Paraguayan and one third were Bolivian. Within each nationally defined group, half of the 
migrants were women and the other half were men.   
19 In the context of this thesis, calling the presidencies of N. Kirchner and C. Fernández’s “the 2000s’ 
government” or Kirchnerismo is justified in two important ways. First, even if facing specific 
challenges and dealing with them in particular ways, they have been perceived by their own cabinets, 
other political parties and society at large as the continuation of one another, that is, as the same 
government. I see them as representing two stages in the consolidation of the same political project. 
Second, the use of the analytical categories “2000s” and “1990s” governments allows me to make 
comparisons concerning public policy impacting migrants in Argentina. Namely, while Kirchnerismo 
created a certain “legality” for the Peruvians, Paraguayans and Bolivians in the country, Menem’s 
government had criminalized them during the 1990s.   
20 Very influential in this regard has been the work of the prominent Argentinean writer and politician 
Arturo Jauretche (1958), who argues that the specificity of Latin America flows from its condition of 
political and cultural dependency. Aritz Recalde (2010-c) re-elaborates this proposition. Armony 
(2011), for his part, emphasizes that Latin America is united by a shared socio-political history and 
reality, namely, by its racialization and métissage dynamics, its religious syncretism and its hyper-
politicization of social relations.    
21 Perón even cited San Martín in public speech. He had learned about San Martín while completing his 
military schooling and later taught about him as a teacher in the military. Unlike Kirchner and 
Fernández, who were civilians, San Martín and Perón were both military men. Aritz Recalde (March 
10, 2011), personal communication.     
22 Prior to taking office as president of Argentina, Kirchner had been the mayor and governor of the 
city and province of Santa Cruz (1991-2003); Fernandez had been the National Senator of Buenos 
Aires (2005-2007) and of Santa Cruz (1995-1997, 2001-2005) provinces, as well as the Deputy of 
Santa Cruz (1997-2001). After his presidential mandate was over, Kirchner became the Secretary of 
UNASUR (Unión Sudamericana de Naciones, 2004-2010) and the deputy of Buenos Aires province 
(2009-2010).  
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23 At the time of the presidential elections of 2003, Peronismo was divided into 3 political lists: N. 
Kirchner presented his candidacy as a member of the Frente para la Victoria coalition (FPV), yet the 
other two Peronist candidates (Menem and Rodríguez Saa) did so separately. In 2007, C. Fernández 
also presented her presidential candidacy as member of the FPV coalition.  
24 This is an expression of a kirchnerista indicating that the Ks do not follow the formal party model, 
cited by Schurman (2006), who highlights the heterogeneous gamut of political affiliations inherent 
within Kirchnerismo, including justicialistas, radicals, ex duhaldistas, ex frepasistas, ex aristas, social 
orthodox and union leaders.  
25 Alfonsín’s government sanctioned the so-called “impunity laws” (Ley de Obediencia de Vida, Punto 
Final and Indultos) that forgave the perpetrators of atrocious crimes committed during these military 
dictatorships. Likewise, Menem pardoned (indultar) them from those crimes. To learn about 
Kirchnerismo’s work on this issue see: “24 de marzo 1976-2006: del horror a la esperanza” (March 
24: from horror to hope): http://www.24demarzo.gov.ar/html1976.htm.  
26 The confrontation between N. Kirchner and former US president George W. Bush reached its climax 
at the Mar del Plata’s Summit of the Americas in 2005, when Argentina refused to sign the Free Trade 
of the Americas Agreement (FTAA). In contrast, former president Menem had sought to implement the 
FTAA through the development of so-called relaciones carnales (“carnal relations”) with the US 
(Aritz Recalde 2010-a). 
27 See Políticas de Estado, Presidencia de la Nación. www.casarosada.gov.ar. Retrieved on August 5, 
2010.   
28 See Políticas de Estado, Presidencia de la Nación. Ibid.  
29 The scope of my thesis does not allow me to analyze a wide range of other public strategies 
(targeting other social groups) that were also central to the reinvention of Argentina during the first 
decade of the 2000s. These include strategies directed at a) the impoverished middle-classes: 
substantially increasing budgets for research and higher education, investing in technology and 
development, and improving working conditions and salaries of a wide range of professionals; b) 
Argentinians living abroad: repatriation programs, enhancement of exchanges between citizens in the 
country and those living abroad (see Appendix C); and c) a multitude of national and foreign economic 
actors: promoting the development of national entrepreneurship while expanding commercial 
partnerships and markets abroad. Detailed information on these strategies can be found on Presidencia 
de la Nación’s website. Ibid.  
30 The Argentinean constitution establishes that all inhabitants of the territory regardless of their 
citizenship status—whether residents, citizens, naturalized citizens, refugees, etc.— are equally entitled 
to the rights, freedoms and protections guaranteed by the state, as well as being responsible for the 
fulfillment of their obligations to the state and society.  
31 To fulfill this project, pedagogy’s role was to be restored so as to enable an integral intervention in 
schools while teachers qua civil servants were to emphasize the political character of their 
responsibility as contributors to the creation of citizenship. See Políticas de Estado, EDUCACIÓN at 
www.casarosada.gov.ar, retrieved on August 5, 2010. See as well the Ministerio de Educación’s 
website: http://portal.educacion.gov.ar, retrieved on April 7, 2011.    
32 See the section Ministerios y Secretarías under GOBIERNO, Presidencia de la Nación Argentina’s 
website for a comprehensive list of the state’s institutions, their missions and composition. See as well 
the Organigrama del Estado (under GOBIERNO) for a concise chart of the Administración Pública 
Nacional. Ibid, retrieved on August 5, 2010. 
33 See Políticas de Estado, POLÍTICA SOCIAL, Ibid. 
34 See Obra de Gobierno: GESTIÓN SOCIAL for details on these three national programs and their 
outcomes (Ibid, retrieved on August 5, 2010). See as well the Ministerio de Desarrollo Social website 
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for information on these and related initiatives. http://www.desarrollosocial.gob.ar, retrieved on April 
8, 2011. 
35 The wide spectrum of people covered by this national initiative was not merely a sign of the 
government’s commitment to embracing the nation’s “diversity” through the recognition of the 
heterogeneity inherent in these groups’ particular needs and their ways of satisfying them. The 
alarming increase in both the heterogeneity and numbers of those people considered vulnerable by the 
government was also a strong indicator of the profound fragmentation and impoverishment of 
Argentinean society by the mid-2000s (Cruces and Gasparini 2010, SEDLAC 2009, 2011).  
36 The Ley de Protección Integral de los niños, niñas y adolescentes explicitly establishes the 
compulsory implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Children, and delimits the obligations 
and responsibilities of the state, the family and the community on this matter. Accordingly, national 
and provincial institutions were created and modalities of state intervention were defined for cases 
when the rights of children and adolescents are either threatened or violated. See www.argentina.ar for 
the complete text of this law and related articles. See also the Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y 
Seguridad Social website for detailed information about the Law 26.390 (Prohibición del Trabajo 
Infantil y Protección del Trabajo Adolescente), which seeks to eradicate children’s work while 
protecting adolescents’ employment. www.trabajo.gob.ar/leyes Retrieved on January 26, 2011.  
37 This national program had two components: “Todos a Estudiar” (All to study) and “Volver a la 
Escuela” (Going back to school), which together acted to guarantee equal access to and full 
completion of public school by reincorporating dropouts.  
38 See Obra de Gobierno, MINISTERIO DE GESTIÓN SOCIAL, for details on these and related public 
initiatives, their goals and outcomes. www.casarosada.gov.ar Retrieved August 8, 2010. See as well the 
Ministerio de Desarrollo Social for more information on the Secretaría Nacional de Niñez, 
Adolescencia y Familia. www.desarrollosocial.gob.ar  
39 See the Ministerio de Salud de la Nación website for details on its campaigns, programs and 
institutional structure. http://www.msal.gov.ar. Retrieved on April 8, 2011.  
40 The different websites that I have mentioned document in detail the outcomes of the specific 
initiatives deployed under the recovery of social rights policy.  
41 By the term informalidad laboral or trabajo precario (precarious work), the government referred to 
employment that was not regulated, that is, a) it lacks mandatory benefits such as retirement, pension 
and health care contributions, and b) it does not respect mandatory safety norms. 
42 This new law gave new competencies to the Work Ministry, which along with the AFIP 
(Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos) performed official inspections and severely penalized 
employers that did not respect the new regulations dictated by the Social Security System (Sistema de 
Seguridad Social).    
43 This Resolución is part of the Law 26.063, Recursos de la Seguridad Social partially passed on 
December 6th, 2005. 
44 For details on this set of regulations see Resolución General (AFIP) 2927/2010-Reglamentación 
Presunciones Laborales, Ley 26.063-BO: 21/10/2010. 
45  See the Annex I of the Reglamentación Presunciones Laborales, where these two economic sectors 
are used to exemplify how calculations (estimates) are made. See the Resolución General (AFIP) 
2927/2010, Ibid. for details.   
46 This tragedy was considered double because former complaints denouncing the circumstances under 
which migrants were being forced to work had been neglected by the city’s government. According to 
the Clínica Jurídica CELS-CAREF-UBA, most of the complaints were informal because migrants were 
afraid of losing their jobs and housing; others were threatened with deportation (Acosta et all 2007). 
Pacecca and Courtis (2006) argue that complaints made by Bolivians in 2005 had already made 
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apparent the modalities under which exploitation and human trafficking were taking place along with 
the dangerous and unhealthy working conditions of some textile shops. 
47 According to Acosta et al (2007), migrants’ vulnerability turned them into the victims of actors 
performing profitable unregulated activities. Pacecca and Courtis (2006) show the complexity of these 
exploitative circumstances, which often involve compatriots bringing co-nationals to Argentina under 
false pretexts. They highlight three core issues: a) a wide range of actors benefits from these migrants’ 
exploitation (the police, employers and state agencies); b) these practices are not new and combine 
intra- and inter-ethnic relationships regulating different work ethics; and c) the obligations and social 
networks surrounding remittances are based on kinship and friendship among other relationships. 
48 Pacecca and Cerruti (2006) argue that the flaws in two specific areas of state controls (fiscalización 
estatal) are hindering the respect of migrant human rights in Argentina: a) migration controls and 
regulations at the border detecting irregular or clandestine entries that later on facilitate the exploitation 
and trafficking of people at the destination/s, and b) the regulation and control of workplaces, labour 
conditions and employment relationships under which foreigners work. Acosta et al (2007) claim that 
both the vulnerability and illegal conditions under which these migrants live are made possible by the 
lack of implementation of Argentina’s new migration law of December 2003. The absence of 
information campaigns (migrants do not know their rights), discrimination and unscrupulous people 
contribute to this situation.   
49 Régimen especial de seguridad social para empleados del servicio doméstico is part of the Law 
26.063 Recursos de la Seguridad Social. This new regime was partially approved on December 6th, 
2005 and on May 5, 2011, the Deputy Chamber unanimously approved the bill: Régimen especial de 
contratos de trabajo del personal de casas particulares (see Ley para el servicio doméstico, 05 de 
Mayo 2011, retrieved on September 2011 from www.argentina.ar).  
50 The only antecedent to this new regime was the Decree/Law 326/56 of January 20, 1956, which 
rudimentarily regulated the rights and obligations of employers and employees of the empleo 
doméstico. 
51 In the late 19th century, aboriginal women, who had been kidnapped as part of an official campaign 
to eliminate aboriginal peoples (Recalde 2006-a), and black women (Frigerio 2006) did the domestic 
work of wealthy households in Buenos Aires.  
52 See ‘Ya se blanquearon 400 mil empleadas domésticas, 14 de Agosto de 2010’ at www.argentina.ar; 
retrieved on September 1st, 2011.  
53 See Ley para el servicio doméstico, 05 de Mayo 2011 at www.argentina.ar; retrieved in September 
2011. 
54 For details on these initiatives see the section entitled: “Trabajo Agrario” of the Ministerio de 
Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social, which developed these measures together with the Comisión 
Nacional de Trabajo Agrario (CNTA). www.trabajo.gob.ar/agrario Retrieved on January 27th, 2011.  
55 According to Cruces and Gasparini (2010), the fast economic recovery was aided by the new 
“relative structure of prices”, which resulted from the strong devaluation of the Argentinean Peso in 
2002. That is, the fall of real salaries increased the competitiveness of Argentinean products while 
discouraging imports. The peak in commodity prices, which increased the terms of exchange in the 
economy, and the high levels of liquidity of international capital markets also contributed to such fast 
recovery. 
56 See Obra de Gobierno-TRABAJO at www.casarosada.gov.ar; retrieved August 5, 2010, and 
Inspección, Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social  at 
http://www.trabajo.gob.ar/inspeccion/metodologia; retrieved January 28, 2011.   
57 See Políticas de Estado, under POLÍTICA SOCIAL. Ibid website.   
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58 For details on this law and related issues see: “Hablemostodos.ar: Ley Servicios Comunicación 
Audiovisual” at www.argentina.ar/hablemostodos and Autoridad Federal de Servicios de 
Comunicación Audiovisual website at http://www.afsca.gob.ar/web.  
59 See Radio y Televisión Argentina-Sociedad del Estado (RTA)’s website, notably its section entitled: 
Democratización de la Comunicación at www.rta-se.com.ar/bicentenario. 
60 According to Kirchnerismo, this development “revealed” the inalienable human right to express, 
receive, disseminate and seek out information, ideas and opinions without any type of censorship. See  
“Argentina en Noticias, La Nueva Ley de Medios punto por punto” at 
http://www.argentina.ar/_es/pais/nueva-ley-de-medios. 
61 Aritz Recalde (2011-a) examines the relationship between the media and democracy in Argentina, 
and elaborates on the notions of “plurality of voices” in the 2000s vis-à-vis “free press” of the 1990s. 
Novick (2008) shows that the “neoconservative program” was put in place in Argentina by the military 
coup d’état of 1955, and how it progressively became hegemonic in the country’s institutions, so as to 
systematically oppose governments with strong popular support.  
62 See this entity’s official website for more details:  http://www.afsca.gob.ar/web/ . 
63 The new law specifies who can be a license holder based on aptitude and experience in the activity 
(idoneidad and arraigo en la actividad) and, in tandem with Kirchnerismo’s human rights policies, 
specifically excludes those who held high-ranking positions under the military dictatorships. According 
to the law, the media plays a central role in the consolidation of the Estado de Derecho (law-abiding 
state) and democratic life (See La nueva ley de medios punto por punto, Ibid).  
64 When the service provider is a “commercial society”, it should always include national capital and 
limit the participation of foreign capital to up to 30% of the total shares.  
65 See the INCATV website at www.incaatv.gov.ar . The INCA is the Instituto Nacional de Cine y 
Artes Audiovisuales.  
66 See www.pakapaka.gov.ar and www.educ.ar , the two official websites dedicated to the production 
and promotion of quality programming for children. 
67 See the websites of Canal 7, La TV Pública (www.tvpublica.com.ar/tvpublica) and Radio Nacional 
(www.radionacional.com.ar ) to have a better idea of their programming and the content endorsed by 
this new media law.  
68 This is mostly done by regularly broadcasting the diversity inherent in the country’s provinces. See 
the public TV and radio websites, Ibid.  
69 See, for example, the educational content and the resources available to teachers at http://educ.ar  
and http://www.encuentro.gov.ar/EspacioDocente.  
70 See Obra de Gobierno-RELACIONES EXTERIORES (www.casarosada.gov.ar, retrieved on August 
5, 2010) and Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto 
(http://www.mrecic.gov.ar) for details. 
71 See POLÍTICA EXTERIOR for details on Kirchnerismo’s foreign policy at www.casarosada.gov.ar, 
retrieved on August 5, 2010.   
72 Core to these goals have been two sets of developments: a) the ratification in 2004 of the Protocolo 
de Ushuaia sobre el Compromiso Democrático and the Declaración Política del MERCOSUR, Bolivia 
y Chile como Zona de Paz, which had been signed in 1998; and b) the creation of the Observatorio de 
la Democracia del MERCOSUR (ODM) in 2007 and the Instituto de Políticas Públicas de Derechos 
Humanos (IPPDDHH) in 2009. See Appendix C. 
73 Crucial to these efforts has been the Instituto Social del MERCOSUR (SIM), created in 2007. See 
Appendix C for other important initiatives in this regard.   
74 Three initiatives have been integral to it: a) the Protocolo de Olivos,  which regulates the resolution 
of controversies between bloc members (signed in 2002); b) the Permanent Tribunal of Revision, 
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which implements a mechanism of consultative opinion (created soon afterwards); and c) the 
Parliament of the MERCOSUR (functioning since 2005).  
75 Lazo-Civinades (2005) argues that the electoral victories of the political Left (la izquierda) in South 
America over the past decade have often been interpreted as the advancement of a homogeneous 
whole. For him, however, this left represents a rather heterogeneous set of forces carrying a certain 
discourse (ideology) that for large parts of the electorate is either reivindicativo (makes claims or 
demands) or offers an alternative to the (real or supposed) failure of neoliberalism and globalization. 
Armony (2011) claims that regional integration in Latin America is today a fact not only in the 
economic and political spheres, but also in the social and cultural ones. For Novick (2011), the Latin 
American integration process has generated a “strong strategic tension” with the model imposed by the 
United States through NAFTA. 
76 Aritz Recalde (2010-a) argues that the co-dependency developed between these two countries over 
the past decade structures their renegotiated roles in the MERCOSUR and signals a new era in Latin 
American regional integration, which is based on policy coordination and the consolidation of different 
“nodes of integration” in the region.  
77 The CSN was created by the Declaración de Cusco (December 8, 2004) and its name was changed 
to UNASUR by the Declaración de Margarita (April 16, 2007), when Quito (Ecuador) was established 
as the permanent headquarters of its General Secretariat. See UNASUR’S official website: 
www.pptunasur.com, retrieved on March 15, 2011.  
78 The core issues regulated by the Declaracón de Cusco are the following:  a) political and diplomatic 
consensus/harmonizing and coordination;  b) deepening the convergence between the MERCOSUR, 
the Andean Community and Chile through the improvement of the free trade zone; c) greater 
integration in the spheres of energy and communications; d) the harmonization of rural development 
and of food and agricultural policies; c) the transfer of technology in the areas of science, education 
and culture; and d) the interaction between enterprises and civil society, taking into account the social 
responsibility of companies. See UNASUR’s website, Ibid.  
79 See the Tratado Constitutivo de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas of May 23, 2008, which can 
be downloaded from UNASUR’s official website, Ibid.  
80 See the Boletín-UNASUR (on UNASUR’s official website) where the bloc expresses its condolences 
for Kirchner’s death. Retrieved April 5, 2011.   
81 The meaning of Norte (north) here is double since it refers to (a) the geopolitical Global North, and 
(b) the Spanish expression of perder el norte (to lose one’s way). TeleSUR defines SUR (South) as a 
geopolitical concept that promotes peoples’ fight for peace, self-determination, respect for human 
rights and social justice. See TeleSUR’s website: www.telesurtv.net, retrieved on April 11, 2011. 
82 Among them, US Congressman Connie Mack (14th District, Florida) has accused TeleSUR of 
“creating a global TV chain for terrorists and other enemies of freedom” due to the exchange of 
audiovisual contents between TeleSUR  and the Arab news chain Al-Jazeera in February 2006. See 
Mack’s official website for more information on his views and those of others seeking to discredit and 
shut down TeleSUR: http://mack.house.gov. Retrieved May 19, 2011. See also TeleSUR’s website for 
the evolution of its programming content, retrieved April 11, 2011.  
83 At the moment of its creation, 70% of TeleSUR’s financing was provided by Venezuela, while 5 
other sponsor states (Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador and Nicaragua) provided the remaining 30%. 
84 See TELAM’s official website for more details: www.telam.com.ar, consulted from March to May 
2011.  
85 Argentinean diplomatic representations (embassies, consulates, etc.) in 90 countries also celebrated 
the Bicentenary. See Bicentenario: festejos en el mundo. País, 28 de mayo de 2010, retrieved from 
www.argentina.ar in May 31, 2011. For a complete list of celebrations see the Bicentenario’s official 
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website at www.bicentenario.argentina.ar. Retrieved on June 1st, 2011. The subsequent allusions I 
make to the celebrations taking place at the Paseo come from the official website’s section entitled 
“Bicentenario”, except when otherwise indicated.   
86 The Revolución de Mayo was a historical process that in 1810 led to the cutting of colonial ties 
connecting Argentina to Spain and made possible the independence of the country in 1816. A 
liberation movement had sought since 1806 to increase the criollos (Argentinean-born people of 
European and aboriginal ancestry)’ economic and political participation in society. However, it was 
only in 1810, upon receiving the news of the Spanish defeat by the French, that the criollos convened a 
Cabildo Abierto, which led to the Congreso de Tucumán on July 9, 1816, thus concretizing Argentina’s 
independence.  
87 Each of the twenty Argentinean provinces displayed their arts and crafts, gastronomy, and “natural 
beauty”. The Feria de las provincias also included a) “Provincia 25”: Argentinos en el Mundo, which 
represented Argentinians living abroad; b) “Provincia del Futuro”: Espacio de Niños; and c) Nación-
Ciudad, which highlighted the relationship between the Nation, as the organizer of the celebrations, 
and the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, as the host of the Revolución de Mayo de 1810. 
88 The participant countries were Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Paraguay, Ecuador, Chile, 
Venezuela, Panama, Mexico, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, El Salvador, Cuba, Spain, 
France, Italy and the Secretaría General Iberoamericana (Segib). 
89 Each of these Puertas Temáticas analyzed, through the work of an artist, one of the following six 
themes: Human Rights, Identity, Employment/Work (Trabajo), Culture, Democracy and Institutions. 
The three Escenarios Federales and the Escenario Principal hosted the tributes paid to National Rock 
and Cinema as well as performances of tango and folklore, the Argentinean Symphonic Orchestra, and 
the National Polyphonic Chorus among others. 
90 According to official statistics, 6 million people participated in the celebrations of the Bicentenary at 
free parades, shows and other spectacles: 15,000 people participated in the 4 parades, and 6,000 people 
visited, every day, each of the 117 stands of the Paseo. In terms of infrastructure: 20,000 square meters 
were fenced off; 50,000 meters of tubular structures were built; 27,000 square meters of canvas and 
backstage areas were put in place, and 7,000 lights and 2 million Argentinean flags were installed.  See 
La Fiesta del Bicentenario, retrieved from www.bicentenario.argentina.ar on May 31, 2011.   
91 Particularly monumental was one of the closing shows entitled Desfile del Bicentenario, an artistic 
and historical spectacle that I describe when I mention the parades held during the celebrations. For 
videos of the celebrations see the Bicentenary’s official website, Ibid. 
92 The most notable was the spectacle of lights and music called Mapping del Cabildo on May 25th, 
which narrated the country’s history through the video projection of images on the Cabildo’s façade. 
See the Paseo del Bicentenario’s section (Ibid) for official speech on this issue.  
93 This was the Argentina-Canada match that was part of the World Cup of Soccer held on May 24, 
2010.  
94 On May 25th, called TC en el Paseo, there was an exhibit of Turismo Carretera (Road Racing), and 
later on the start of the “symbolic race”. The TC is very popular in Argentina.  
95 During my fieldwork, I often heard this sort of comment, emphasizing the emotional and touching 
tone of the celebrations, coming from both those who had participated in the events at the Paseo and 
those who followed them online and/or on TV. 
96 There were four parades: (1) the Desfile Histórico Militar on May 22, with more than 5,000 
members of the Fuerzas Armadas y de Seguridad; (2) the Desfile Federal, also on May 22, with more 
than 3,000 people portraying urban and street music, dance and other artistic expressions; (3) the 
Desfile de la Integración on May 23, with more than 4,000 members of 80 colectividades (migrant 
groups) wearing “typical” clothing; and (4) the Desfile del Bicentenario on May 25, with more than 
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2,000 actors in scene for two hours, which integrated groundbreaking aesthetics with cutting edge 
technology.  
97 See the AGENDA section of the Bicentenario’s website.  
98 See Comienza el año bicentenario. Ibid. For the short biographies of the fathers of Latin American 
independence see the chapter’s first section and Appendix C. 
99 See Comienza el Año del Bicentenario, Cultura, 26 de Mayo de 2010 at www.argentina.ar, retrieved 
on May 31, 2012.  
100 The representatives of other countries came from Canada, Germany, India, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Austria, France, Dominican Republic, Peru, Ireland, Algeria, Spain, Serbia, Libya, Jordan, Palestine, 
Mexico, Panama, Cuba and Rumania.  See Fiesta del Bicentenario for more details, Ibid, retrieved on 
May 31, 2011. 
101 The Casa Rosada is the official seat of the executive branch of the Argentinean government and the 
office of the President. It is also considered to be one of the most emblematic buildings in Buenos 
Aires, having been declared a national historic monument in Argentina. See its official website for 
more details: www.casarosada.gov.ar. 
102 The portraits on display were donated by other states in the region. The Argentinean government 
donated oil paintings of Juan Domingo Perón, Eva Duarte de Perón, José de San Martín, Juan Manuel 
de Rosas, Manuel Belgrano and Hipólito Yrigoyen. To see a list of the historical leaders selected by the 
other participating countries as their respective national heroes and Latin American patriots, see Salón 
de los Patriotas Latinoamericanos, at the Bicentenary website; retrieved on May 31, 2011. See as well 
Galería de los Patriotas Latinoamericanos, País, 26 de Mayo de 2010 for a short clip that, through the 
narrative of a girl, portrays the Argentinean government’s view of the current “Latin American union” 
and identifies the patriots considered the Padres de la Patria Grande (Fathers of the Enlarged 
Homeland).  
103 Salón de los Patriotas Latinoamericanos, Ibid. 
104 The opening of the gallery was followed by a Cena de Honor (Gala Honour Dinner) held at the 
Salón Blanco of the Casa Rosada. See Cena de Estado en el Salón Blanco, retrieved on May 31, 2011 
from the Bicentenary’s website. 
105 President Fernández emphasized the difference between the independence celebrations held in 1910 
and those of 2010 at a speech she gave at the launch of the gallery. While in 1910, celebrations had 
taken place in a country under a state of siege, where socialist and anarchist union leaders (European 
immigrants) were being persecuted, the 2010 commemorations were “different and popular” (con el 
pueblo en las calles). See Comienza el Año del Bicentenario, Ibid.  
106 See La Casa’s official website for details at http://www.casadelbicentenario.gob.ar/la-casa, 
retrieved on May 30, 2011. 
107 This federal channel broadcasts content from all regions of Argentina and does not include any 
advertisements. See its website for details: www.encuentro.gov.ar .   
108 This portal implements the policies of the Ministry of Education in the area of Information 
Technologies and Communication (TIC) and focuses on aiding teachers and directors of educational 
institutions to incorporate the TIC into their work. See its website for more details: educ.ca.  
109 These were 200 sucesos (http://www.bicentenario.argentina.ar/listado_historia.php?decada=1810) 
and 25 miradas_200 minutos: los cortos del Bicentenario (http://www.25miradas.gob.ar). I consulted 
these websites between May and June 2011.  
110 See Bicentenario TV, Diario El Bicentenario, Reviví el Bicentenario, and Qué nos define como 
argentinos? Elegí los 200 símbolos del bicentenario on the Bicentenary’s official website; also follow 
the link to 2.0 participá to access the Bicentenary’s pages on Facebook, YouTube and flickr.  
111 POLITICA EXTERIOR, Presidencia de la Nación Argentina. Ibid.    
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112 Representatives of migrant organizations, NGOs, religious institutions, human rights organizations, 
unions and some political actors (the Population Commission of the Deputy Chamber, the Direction of 
Women and the Sub-Secretary of Human Rights of Buenos Aires City, the INADI and the Human 
Rights Secretary of the Nation) worked since the return to democracy in 1983 to derogate the previous 
migration law. The Mesa de Organizaciones por los Derechos de los Inmigrantes also played a crucial 
role in this process. See Novick (2008) for an examination of the historical context and the 
parliamentary debates surrounding the sanction of the new migration law and the juridical discourse 
that it embodies. See as well the volume edited by Giustiniani (ed., 2004), who as the President of the 
Population and Human Resources Commission of the Deputy Chamber, drafted the bill and promoted 
its sanction.  Domenech (2007) argues that the elaboration of this law made apparent the disputes, 
divergences and contradictions within the state. 
113 By the Decree 616/2010: Reglamentación de la Ley de Migraciones N 25.871 y sus modificaciones. 
The whole text of the new law along with the modifications introduced by its reglamentación can be 
found at the Dirección Nacional de Migraciones’s website at: http://www.migraciones.gov.ar.  
114 Jelin (2006) argues that even if the migration phenomenon was not central to the agenda of the post-
dictatorship political transition, the state’s dominant interpretative framework emphasized both the 
defense of human rights (which had been violated during the dictatorship) and the broadening of the 
notion of human rights (so as to make it the foundation of the new constitutional regime). This, along 
with the implementation of mechanisms of direct expression of citizenship demands made it possible 
for the migration issue to enter the state’s sphere. 
115 According to article 4: “The right to migrate is essential and inalienable to the person and the 
Argentinean Republic guarantees it under principles of equality and universality” (my translation).  
116 Art. 17 establishes that: “The state will provide the means conducive to the adoption and 
implementation of measures seeking to regularize the migration situation of foreigners” (my 
translation).  
117 In addition to what is stipulated in art. 28,  on the first page of the law’s reglamentación is indicated 
that “…Argentina has reformulated the objectives of its migration policy within the framework of 
Latin American regional integration, respecting human rights and migrants’ mobility, which is aimed at 
fostering mutual cooperation among MERCOSUR’s state members and associates…” (my translation).  
118 At the time of writing this thesis, many studies had already analyzed this new migration law, which 
allowed me to evaluate the gap between its formal postulates and its deployment on the ground. This 
was not feasible for most public policies of Kirchnerismo, however, due to the scarcity of studies that 
have examined them.  
119 According to the DNM, 12,065 migrants regularized their situation thanks to this plan; the largest 
group coming from China, followed by Koreans, Colombians and Dominicans (Novick 2010). For 
Ceriani Cernadas and Asa (2005), 14,000 people went to the DNM to benefit from this plan, and most 
of them were Asians, Africans, non-MERCOSUR Latin Americans and Eastern Europeans.  
120 See the DNM’s website for the procedures to be followed and the requirements to be met by 
MERCOSUR and non-MERCOSUR migrants at http://www.migraciones.gov.ar. 
121 The statistics of other MERCOSUR nationalities are the following: A) through PG: Uruguay 
(10,790), Chile (5,360), Brazil (4,600), Colombia (1,247), Ecuador (930), Venezuela (217) and Panama 
(1). These statistics correspond to migrants who were in the first stage of the program and had arrived 
in Argentina before April 17, 2006. B) Through the “nationality criteria”: Colombia (13,538), Chile 
(12,311), Brazil (9,727), Uruguay (7,003), Ecuador (4,495), and Venezuela (3,115). Statistics 
elaborated by the Oficina Temas Internacionales, DNM (Sept. 2009), cited in Novick (2010), p.20.  
122 The use of a legalistic paradigm in the analysis of migrants’ rights and experiences is not unique to 
Argentina and South America (Domenech 2008-b, Novick 2010), but has also prevailed over other 
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approaches in Europe and North America over the past decade. The websites of two recent 
international events, in which I participated, are quite illuminating in this regard: the 11th EASA 
(European Association of Social Anthropologists) Biennial Conference, Maynooth (Ireland), August 
24-27, 2010 and the Canadian Association for Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (CARFMS) 
Annual Conference, Montréal (Canada), May 11-13, 2011. 
123 Both the DNM and the RENAPER worked under the Ministry of the Interior. See its website for 
more information, specifically the sections entitled DNI and Migraciones at 
http://www.mininterior.gov.ar  
124 Acosta et al (2007) effectively show this problematic issue through their analysis of a) the case of 
Bolivian migrants working in textile shops (pp. 297-298), b) the illegitimate restrictions on access to 
social security (seguridad social) imposed on foreigners who have not spent “enough” time in 
Argentina (pp.299-303), and c) the refusal to grant juridical assistance to foreigners without a DNI 
(most often migrants who had been swindled with faked DNIs) (p.304). Ceriani Cernadas and Asa 
(2005) examined several restrictions imposed upon migrants and the abuses that they endured between 
the approval of the new migration law and PG’s implementation. 
125 Political views aside, this judgment might be at least partly influenced by the fact that these scholars 
have seen the whole development of the program (based on their publication dates) while the critics I 
mentioned earlier only examined its beginnings.  
126 Domenech (2007) has noted, however, that the participation of these diverse actors was not equal 
and that most of them were based in Buenos Aires, which reproduced the center-periphery relationship 
that Kirchnerismo was supposed to reverse. For him, the inclusion of a multitude of civil society actors 
is today part of the legitimization strategies deployed by the government.  
127 Novick (2010) claims that new migration policy in Argentina is being “de-nationalized” due to a) 
the adoption of international norms that consider migration to be an essential human right that limits 
the autonomy and power of the state, and b) the priority given to regional integration as a relevant 
factor in guaranteeing rights, which defines policy by criteria that exceed the strictly national. 
Nejamkis and Rivero Sierra (2010) argue that the deepening of MERCOSUR and the importance given 
to it by Kirchnerismo have been crucial in the development of Argentina’s new migration policy.   
128 For Domenech (2007), the control of borders and national territory are at the heart of regularization 
programs seeking to identify and track people’s movements in South America. In 2005, Argentina 
deployed two sets of strategies to expand its control of migrations in tandem with the deepening of 
regional integration. Namely, the Ministry of the Interior created the Sistema Integrado de Captura 
Migratoria while the DNM developed three National Registries (Admición de Extranjeros, Aptitud 
Migratoria and Ingreso y Egreso del Territorio).  
129 As was explicitly stated at the beginning of this chapter, my intention was not to analyze the 
contradictions nor the internal frictions and divisions of Kirchnerismo.  
130 The restructuring of productive relations in tandem with evolving (ethnic, religious, national, class, 
political, etc.) group hierarchies in contexts characterized by the arrival of successive immigration 
waves has been well documented in the literature. See, for example, Bourgois (1996) and Devoto 
(2004). 
131 Migrants who worked in rural areas of the partido before holding urban occupations in La Plata very 
often used the term sucio (dirty) to describe their former horticulture or flower production jobs. This 
label referred to the muddy rural environment as well as to its precarious infrastructure and public 
services. While “dirty” jobs were ranked lower to urban ones by most migrants who decided to stay in 
the city, those choosing to go back to rural areas of the partido disagreed. This was the case of 
Bolivians of rural origin, who valued the quietness and close social interaction characteristic of the 
partido’s rural areas (see chapter VI). 
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132 Barth (1969, 1998) defines ethnic boundaries as social constructions (even when they have a 
territorial counterpart) that organize people’s interaction by entailing criteria for determining and 
signalling membership and exclusion. Thus, it is the maintenance of the ethnic boundary that defines 
the group, not the ‘cultural content’ that it encloses. Moreover, socially relevant factors alone become 
diagnostic for membership, rather than overt ‘objective’ differences.  
133 My use of quotes here signals: a) the deployment of homogenizing national labels by Platenses and 
migrants alike, and b) the defying strategies often advanced by those being targeted by such labelling 
process (Recalde 2006-a).    
134 According to the Director of the Municipality’s Dirección General de Colectividades y 
Migraciones, Chinese migrants arrived in La Plata (and other parts of the country) with their 
paperwork in order and ready to work either in the mini-market of a compatriot or with enough capital 
to open their own. 
135 The Chinese Cámara de Comercio in La Plata has been crucial in speeding up the processing of 
permits to open mini-markets in the partido and supports the profitable performance of these stores 
through subsidies.    
136 In one such store where I did participant observation and in-depth interviews, both husband and 
wife run the business. In order to so, they left their baby at home with a young Bolivian woman, who 
also cleaned their home and could replace either of them at work.  
137 Tax evasion strategies in Chinese mini-markets in La Plata mostly consisted in paying employees 
salaries much lower than the minimum wage (as established by the law), avoiding employer’s 
contributions to employees’ health care and pension plans, and declaring business profits far lower than 
their actual gains.  
138 If they saw someone they did not know suspiciously loitering around the verdulería, Sandro went to 
the sidewalk, where he could easily ask for help if needed. 
139 According to Devincenzi (2006) in October 2001, 55.6% of the country’s minors (under 18 years of 
age) were poor and almost 60% of the nation’s poor were younger than 24 years of age. By May 2002, 
these statistics were 66,6% and 56.3% respectively. In addition, 47.7% of the youth aged 19 to 24 were 
poor and 15.2% were indigent; 20% of those aged 15 to 24 did not work, search for work, study  or do 
domestic chores. Buenos Aires province has 58.2% of the country’s youth under these circumstances. 
140 See Echeverria (2008) who elaborates on the temporality of this insecurity: a supposed “glorious” 
past is compared to both an “insecure” present and a “terrible” future.  
141 In 2010, it was mostly when purposefully asking people about (in)security or paying close attention 
to mundane details during participant observation that these precautions became evident to me. The 
extent to which this was the case struck me when, after some months of fieldwork, I realized that I had 
come to “alarm myself” even if feeling at ease. Systematically and without exception, I turned on and 
off the alarm system of the house where I lived, which was located in a neighbourhood of City Bell 
that was widely considered very safe.  
142 The privatization of public security and public space in Argentina became most apparent during the 
1990s in the GBA. The decade witnessed the proliferation of the so-called countries (private 
neighbourhoods kept under surveillance 24 hours per day) and a range of attendant services and goods 
catering to this well-off clientele. Capdevielle (2009) signals some of these developments. 
143 This phenomenon was not unique to La Plata but was also occurring in other parts of Argentina, and 
certainly in the GBA. Some Argentinean scholars have argued, however, that at the peak of the 
country’s last crisis (2001-2002), an important change in the nation’s social imaginary took place 
(affecting how the nation imagined itself), which in turn altered the way in which migrants were 
perceived and positioned in the national imaginary. The Argentinean anthropologist Grimson (2006) 
considers that the limítrofes were assigned a crucial role in the 1990s neoliberal model (where their 
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criminalization served to confirm the claimed “white superiority” of Argentina in Latin America) and 
that with the end of this model’s legitimacy, the stigmatization of imítrofes became irrelevant, albeit 
temporarily. 
144 Maffia and Zubrzycki (in press) examine the recent visibilization process of the “Afro” population 
in Argentina (Cape Verdeans, new African migrants and afro-descendants) and give a concise portrait 
of these groups. For an exhaustive study of Cape Verdeans in Argentina see Maffia (2010). See as well 
Frigerio (2006), who analyzes the processes involved in the (historical and present) invisibilization of 
blacks in Argentina and the concomitant shift operated in official and ordinary discourse to transform 
racial categories and classifications into cultural ones in the construction of a “white” Argentina.  
145 To complement the point that I make here, see Pickus and Skerry (2007), who argue for the 
strengthening of horizontal (informal) and vertical (institutional) relations integral to citizenship in 
order to overcome the illegal-legal immigration debate in present day US. To prove that both ties of 
membership into the political community are vital, the authors show that most Americans care about 
immigrants being good neighbours, while the government fears them failing to be good citizens.   
146 I am referring to the decree Dec. N 64/10, signed at Foz de Iguazú on December 16, 2010 in which 
the Consejo del Mercado Común introduced the Estatuto de la Ciudadanía del MERCOSUR. Plan de 
Acción, which stipulates how to establish MERCOSUR citizenship’s status in up to 10 years. The 
fundamental rights and benefits granted to MERCOSUR nationals consist of: a) free circulation of 
people in the region; b) equal civil, social, cultural and economic rights and freedoms; and c) equal 
access to employment, health care and education. This and other regulations can be downloaded from 
MERCOSUR’S official website: http://www.mercosur.int. Additionally, Argentina’s new migration 
law establishes the free circulation of people in the MERCOSUR as one of its objectives (art.28); see 
previous chapter on this issue.  
147 See the volume edited by Al-Ali and Koser (2002), particularly Chapter 1, for a critical examination 
of the meanings and uses of the notion of home by scholars and those on the move.  
148 Knowing someone as in the sense of Anderson’s (1983) imagined communities and being able to 
trust the peraon as in Barth’s (1969) basic value orientations. 
149 See Ratier (1971) on the notion of villeros in Argentina as well as the previous section. 
150 Reminiscent of a former architectural style, this type of multi-family housing referred to as casa 
chorizo is still very common in La Plata and other localities of the GBA. 
151 By the time I met César, he was working not only on repairing shoes but also received orders from 
boutiques and designers to assemble sandals and boots (by sawing or gluing the already-cut pieces he 
received) and taught some courses on shoe-making.  
152 Ong (1999) borrows Foucault’s (1975, 1978) notion of regime to refer to power/knowledge schemes 
that seek to normalize power relations by appealing to particular “truths” that have developed about 
science, culture and social life. 
153 Applied to the design of public policy, this repressive and austere ideology has only reinforced the 
historical concentration of wealth and opportunities in migrants’ countries of origin, leading to the 
deepening of their structural poverty levels. Under these circumstances, poor people have been left 
with only one “option”: struggle to survive, as most migrants I interviewed explained. 
154 Most women I interviewed mentioned having very negative experiences delivering their babies back 
home. Some talked about public hospitals rejecting them because they could not pay for the services, 
while others said that they had been charged exorbitant fees for products they never used. Some 
women also spoke about traumatizing experiences, where their hands and feet were bound while they 
were badly treated by doctors. 
155 See http://www.gob.gba.gov.ar/portal/subsecretarias/SubGobierno/dniRapido.php for detailed 
information on these centres.  
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156 This was the way in which each of them described where they came from. Aníbal’s home town is 
located in the south-west of the country whereas Nancy’s is in central Paraguay, to the north of 
Asunción.   
157 I doubt that Nancy’s employer, a mother herself, could have missed Nancy’s (second) 7 month-
pregnancy. I believe that this unscrupulous employer sought to defer paying her salary as long as 
possible, knowing that she would not leave without it.  
158 The whole issue remained unclear at the time I interviewed them years later. Nancy’s aunt was a 
nurse and built two houses in Argentina (one in Villa Alba, another in Buenos Aires) and one in 
Asunción, Paraguay. After this incident she was not seen or heard from again. 
159 Taxi drivers helped the couple to find a recently opened clinic that accepted premature babies. Their 
stay at the hospital ended up being extremely expensive because they were charged not only for the 
room and arriving and departure fees, but also for a so-called bolsa de parto (delivery bag), which they 
never used. This lucrative business consists of imposing the purchase of these bags on clients, most of 
whom never use its contents, which permits the clinic to re-sell the same items many times.  
160 Nancy managed to get her DNI immediately thanks to their Argentinean daughter, whereas Aníbal, 
who completed the procedures before Nancy, was still waiting for his. He had initially done his 
paperwork when the local government offered to document migrants so they could vote in municipal 
elections. Nevertheless, despite having complied with all requirements, including paying the fees, he 
had never received his DNI. As a result, Aníbal ended up going through the procedure again, although 
this time, because of their Argentinean daughter, he was sure he would get his DNI quickly.    
161 Interestingly, this double dynamic involving pushing to gain access and surrounding to prevent it 
resembles the general evolution of citizenship rights, which led to the emergence of civil, social, 
political and cultural rights over the 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st centuries respectively. See Shafir (2004) 
and Lipschutz (2004).  
162 Those who occupy abandoned property almost always win their cases in court by proving that the 
sum of money they have spent taking care of the property is either greater than or equal to its actual 
price. This tends to be the case because most abandoned lots were originally purchased at low prices 
(due to their distant location from urban areas at the time), yet population growth and the need to house 
new urban dwellers have turned areas formerly considered distant into proximate ones. Aitor Recalde, 
Civil and Construction Engineer, Subsecretaría de Recursos Hídricos de la Nación; personal 
communication, April 2012. 
163 Through this sort of labour cooperative, compatriots (men) help one another build their houses by 
taking turns. The work is done on weekends (to avoid interfering with job obligations) and the owner 
of the house being built is in charge of proving food and beverages. According to those I interviewed, 
this practice is most common among Paraguayans and, to a lesser extent, among Peruvians and 
Bolivians.   
164 Nancy and Aníbal could not agree upon the nationality of some neighbours, who for her were 
Bolivians and for him were Peruvians. 
165 I believe this manifests their conflicting feelings about living in Villa Elvira, a part of them having 
naturalized their harmful environment, yet another still attempting to dismiss the barrio’s most 
negative aspects by highlighting its positive sides.  
166 The extent to which parents deal with this issue in Villa Elvira varies enormously, ranging from 
some who do not explain these illicit trades to their children, simply telling them to avoid those 
neighbours, to others who discuss at length with them the dangers involved in the drug and sex trades.  
167 Soledad’s family was registered into this plan by a Paraguayan man, who knew the rules very well. 
In the past, people waited for about eight years before taking possession of their homes, but President 
Fernandez has promised people access to their homes in less than three years from their enrolment.  
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168 Female compatriots living in that pensión had taught César to cook, helped care for their child and 
shared food with them.  
169 Richard’s voice, mannerisms, body language, postures and clothing are strongly feminine even if he 
does not present himself as a woman. Moreover, most of the work that he does at the house of his 
female employer in City Bell belongs to occupations traditionally considered feminine, such as 
cleaning, cooking and waxing floors.  
170 This was so common during the 1990s that migrants included this expenditure (the penalty to be 
paid at the border) when calculating the overall cost of their trips back home. 
171 See Brettell’s (2003) analysis of Emigrar para voltar, on the Portuguese ideology of return 
migration, which corresponds to the phenomenon I examine here. 
172 The maestro mayor de obra is the person in charge of guaranteeing the good and timely 
development of a construction project. This job is the top-ranking authority in the day-to-day obra. 
Unlike architects or engineers, who visit construction sites only occasionally, in order to supervise their 
maestros mayor de obra, the latter are required to be on site until a project is finished.  
173 Both the sort of claim posed by Ana and the sensitive response given by the policeman signal an 
important shift from the 1990s, when the discretionary power given to this institution to handle 
undocumented migrants resulted in abuse of authority, easy deportations and a climate of regnant 
insecurity (Recalde 2006-a).  
174 The Monotributo or Sistema de Régimen Simplificado regulates the contributions to be made by 
autonomous or independent workers. It establishes a monthly, fixed amount based on the earnings of 
the worker, which includes taxes and social contributions (to retirement and pension plans for 
example). See the AFIP’s website for more details: http://www.afip.gob.ar/monotributo 
175 Of those interviewed in my research (apart from Lucas), only two Paraguayan men working as 
building concierges in Buenos Aires and two Bolivian verduleros in La Plata city obtained their DNI 
through the services of a lawyer.   
176 Although this private clinic paid them well in the beginning, their salaries dramatically decreased 
over time because they were not paid for all the hours they worked. This situation led Ana’s friend (the 
Argentinean nurse) to take their employers to court, but Ana abstained from doing so herself, fearing 
that such a legal action could hamper getting her DNI. 
177 Interestingly enough, the two men who spoke at length about the marginalizing they experienced, 
and the suffering that it involved, were Lucas from Peru (in his late 40s) and Richard from Paraguay 
(in his mid-20s, see previous section). Both men occupy labour niches traditionally considered 
feminine, such as caring for the elderly (as a nurse assistant) and performing domestic chores (as an 
empleada doméstica) respectively. Their transgression of a well-established gendered division of 
labour seems to have been paralleled by their going beyond the conversation topics identified as 
masculine by interviewees. 
178 Another Señora, who was the owner of a fashionable boutique in La Plata, only paid Ana 5$ pesos 
per hour and treated her with disdain. This employer’s high expectations did not match Ana’s 
miserable pay and mistreatment since she wanted her house to be spotless and shining. Others even 
made Ana do “light jobs”, such as cleaning windows or ironing clothes, during her breaks. 
179 A friend of Ana’s, for example, sent her daughter to Peru in order to work without consulting 
anyone, out of pride and ignorance of citizenship norms, and by the time she tried to bring her daughter 
back, it was impossible. Since the child was Argentinean, expensive paperwork had to be done, which 
the mother could not afford. Moreover, after years of separation, the daughter did not want to join her 
mother, but demanded a great deal from her financially. 
180 Ana took a bus from the pensión in Los Hornos to La Plata’s train station, where she took the train 
to Buenos Aires. From the station, she walked several blocks to get to her employer’s house. 
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181 Ana was also robbed of her documentation in a separate incident, which complicated her visits to 
Leo in jail. She had been robbed at night by an Argentinean couple in their forties, who were under the 
heavy influence of drugs and alcohol. I come back to this incident in chapter VII. 
182 Prices in Peru are expressed in US dollars even if it is official currency is the Sol.  
183 The strong support that Ana obtained from the Peruvian Consulate contrasts with the experiences of 
other Peruvians in La Plata such as César, who considers that their consulate is useless, except when it 
wants to get migrants’ votes.  
184 Leo’s initial sentence was of twelve years and was reduced to nine, while his good conduct in jail 
permitted another reduction of two years through probation. As a result, he spent seven years in prison. 
Leo’s good conduct also allowed him to obtain some very advantageous jobs, such as being the 
Director’s mozo or personal waiter. When this Director left, his replacement took Leo to work in an 
outbuilding in Olmos, where he washed cars and loaded trucks practically on the streets, as he puts it.   
185 Some migrants mentioned having family in Chile and Brazil, whereas only a few indicated 
Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela and Switzerland as their relatives’ destinations. 
186 I use parentheses to indicate that these two localities are commonly designated Olmos and 
Etcheverry respectively. 
187The Spanish term golondrina (swallow) emphasizes the seasonal mobility of these workers by 
comparing them to the migration bird.  
188 The military service in Argentina, normally referred to as colimba, changed from being compulsory 
to voluntary in 1995. This was the result of the diminishing number of conscripts every year, the 
experience of the 1982 Guerra de Malvinas (Falklands War) which proved the superiority of 
professional servicemen over conscripts, and a series of conscription-related brutality scandals which 
culminated with the death of Private Omar Carrasco at an Army base in 1994 due to brutal disciplinary 
action. The term colimba is a composite word derived from the verbs correr (to run), limpiar (to clean) 
and barrer (to sweep).  
189 Benencia (1997) highlights the “work without rest and with sacrifice” of Bolivians in the cinturón 
verde bonaerense (Buenos Aires province’s green belt), which “native workers cannot imitate” (p.85). 
190 The term criollo is used in Latin America to refer to those people resulting from the métissage 
between European colonizers (mostly Spaniards) and aboriginal peoples. In this context, however, 
Rufino uses the term to refer to Argentinians and to distinguish them from Bolivians.  
191 The Area Hortícola Bonaerense (AHB) is the most important in the country because of the volume 
that it produces and the number of productive sites that it contains. The AHB not only supplies Buenos 
Aires City and the GBA, but also exports to other provinces (Benencia 2003).  
192 Subsecretaría de Coordinación Económica, Ministerio de Economía website: 
http://www.ec.gba.gov.ar/estadistica/chfba/censohort.htm, retrieved on May 1, 2012. 
193 Rufino did not use the term “neighbourhood” but acá (here) when talking about the nearest 
residential area that his family shared with others, and la zona (area), el campo or la zona de campo 
when referring to the larger area comprised by Las Quintas. I chose to use the term neighbourhood to 
convey the sense of locality and close relationships between families, which were characteristic of 
Rufino’s residential area. I qualify this social geography as dispersed to emphasize its rural setting, 
which is more spacious than its urban counterpart, and does not separate residence (home) from work 
spaces, as tends to be the case in urban areas, except for verduleros and costureras or seamstresses 
whose workplace was also their family’s home. 
194 As emphasized by these authors, assemblage is a conceptual resource that has to do with the 
imaginaries of shifting relations and emergent conditions of spatially distributed objects of study in the 
contemporary period of globalization. It is a notion that evokes emergence and heterogeneity. 
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195The restructuring of Argentina’s education system during the 1990s required students in their final 
high school years to choose an area of specialization according to their closest interests and future 
choice of university career. This was problematic because most youth either did not know what to 
choose or were not planning to attend university. The number of years to be spent at primary and high 
school also changed. These modifications brought about serious problems of a strategic, financial and 
training nature. Teachers were not prepared for teaching the newly proposed curricula, buildings were 
not adequate to receive fast-changing populations (resulting from a change in the zoning of school 
districts), and funding was not well allocated to finance the wide range of changes taking place. 
Various changes have been implemented since then to reverse the negative consequences of such 
educational policies.  
196Juan Evo Morales Ayma (born October 26, 1959) is a Bolivian politician and activist. Morales has 
been the leader of both the Movimiento al Socialismo party (MAS) and the cocalero trade union. 
Morales’ presidency has focused on implementing leftist policies and poverty reduction measures, 
introducing a new constitution and land reforms, nationalizing various key industries, and opposing 
both United States and corporate involvement in the country's politics. 
197 Morales was born into a working class Aymara family in Isallawi, Orinoca Canton, and grew up 
helping his parents as a subsistence farmer. After studying, Morales undertook national service until 
1978, when he returned to family farming and eventually settled into growing coca. His social activism 
led him into the political arena. As the leader of the MAS, Morales has been involved in the gas 
conflict and the Cochabamba protests of 2000, which sought to give more power to the country's 
indigenous and poor communities by means of land reforms and redistribution of wealth. 
198 There are two main types of Argentinean DNI (Document Nacional de Identidad): one for 
temporary and permanent residents, which is dark red, and another for citizens, which since 2010 is 
light blue (it had been dark green before).  
199 The cajones or vacíos are used to store, carry and display horticultural products. Their rental 
involves paying a small price for their use, which is added to that of the products being bought. 
Cajones circulate among the different social actors involved in the commercialization process.  
200 The construction of the so-called blanquedad (“whiteness”) porteña has occurred at two levels since 
the 19th century: a) in the dominant narrative of the Argentinean history through the constant 
invisibilization of the “black presence” and its influences and contributions to Argentinean culture, and 
b) in quotidian social interaction through the continuous invisibilization of black phenotypical traits 
(Frigerio 2006). 
201 Although to a lesser extent, the term negro can also be used in a positive way, to denote affection 
and closeness between people who know each other very well, and interact in informal settings. The 
term still makes reference to the person’s “dark” complexion. 
202  See the official website of the Feria La Salada for further information, including an historical 
account of how it was created in 1991 and its evolution since then: http://www.ferialasalada.com.ar 
203 The disadvantaged peripheries of La Plata and the GBA, where some of the migrants participating 
in my research have lived, lack the strong presence of public institutions catering to social needs 
characteristic of the French working-class banlieues studied by Wacquant (2008), however. 
